IN RE: the Involuntary Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of J.A. (Minor Child) and R.A. (Mother) (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] R.A. (“Mother”) appeals the Marion Superior Court's termination of her parental rights over her minor child J.A. (“Child”). Mother appeals, arguing that the order terminating her parental rights is not supported by clear and convincing evidence.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Mother and W.P. (“Father”)¹ are the biological parents of Child, who was born April 6, 2012. Mother has three older children, who are Child's half-siblings. Over the years, the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) has “had extensive involvement with Mother and her children for allegations regarding sexual abuse, physical abuse, and neglect, ․ including prior CHINS proceedings” from 2013 through 2015. Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 28.

[4] On November 20, 2019, Mother drove to her ex-boyfriend's (“C.C.’s”) apartment to confront him about having molested Mother's children. Unbeknownst to Mother, Child was asleep in the backseat of her car at the time. Mother and C.C. argued, and Mother stabbed C.C. When Mother got back in her car, Child, who was seven years old at that time, woke up. Mother was arrested the same day and incarcerated, and DCS removed Child from Mother's home.

[5] DCS filed a petition alleging that Child was a CHINS due to Mother's criminal offenses and incarceration. On April 1, 2020, Mother admitted that Child was a CHINS, and the trial court adjudicated Child a CHINS. Child began living with a foster family.² The court ordered Mother to complete home-based case management, home-based therapy, a parenting assessment, domestic violence services, and family therapy. In May, Mother pleaded guilty to Class A misdemeanor residential entry, Class A misdemeanor invasion of privacy, and Class B misdemeanor battery, related to her stabbing of C.C. in November. Mother was sentenced to time served and one year of probation.

[6] Mother made “no meaningful or sustainable progress” with court-ordered services in the CHINS proceeding. Id. at 30. Accordingly, in August 2023, the trial court changed Child's permanency plan from reunification to adoption. And DCS filed a petition to terminate Mother's parental rights over Child. In response to that petition, Mother began home-based therapy.

[7] Following the final termination hearing in April and July 2024, the trial court found in relevant part as follows:

33. As of the fact-finding hearing, Mother had resided in numerous residences since the CHINS cause was initiated, at times she has lived in friends’ homes, in hotels and other residences in Indianapolis, Anderson, IN, Michigan[,] Ohio, and Florida. In the weeks leading up to the Fact Finding, Mother lived in three different residences. A few days before the Fact Finding, Mother's adult daughter flew in from Atlanta to sign a lease for an apartment for Mother to live in. Since the child's removal, Mother has only been able to accomplish very brief periods of stability of housing and a job.

34. As of the factfinding, Mother was employed at Applebee's restaurant. Mother has a history of income instability, which according to her testimony included periods of self-employment for which no documentation was provided to the DCS and sporadic reported employment.

35. Despite being ordered to participate in Home[-]based Therapy in June 2021, Mother only began Home[-]based Therapy in September of 2023, following the filing of the petition for the termination of parental rights case. The goals of Home[-]based Therapy for Mother include addressing anger management, depression, and grief.

36. The Court finds that Mother did not benefit from the domestic violence services she was provided by the DCS prior to July of 2021, as her therapist reported Mother was in a relationship which included domestic violence until her partner died in February of 2023.

37. Prior to [Child]’s removal by the DCS, Mother regularly left [Child] in the care of his older sibling, who was unable to attend school as a result, and who was obligated to address [Child]’s basic needs, including retrieving water from neighbors when the children were left home alone for extended periods of time.

38. Mother was aware of repeated physical abuse of [Child] by [C.C.] when he resided with the family.

39. Mother and child began therapeutic supervised parenting time in January 2024. Mother and child's relationship has not improved in this time. Mother has not been able to hear and empathize with child when he has talked about times when he was scared when he lived with Mother. Mother has not made any therapeutic progress. To date, Mother has not shown a maturity to empathize with child or to accept the choices that she has made when it comes to parenting [Child]. Mother lacks insight of what it means to have and show compassion and understanding for the child. During these parenting sessions, Mother would grab child's head and jerk it back, something that he did not like. Mother could not see beyond herself to try to understand the child's feelings. There were times during these visits that Mother was completely inappropriate, ranting at child and suggesting that he needs to go to boot camp. It has been over 3 years since Mother was arrested for stabbing an individual with [Child] with her and since child was physical[ly] abused by her boyfriend, and she still cannot talk about it with [Child]. Even when he has been therapeutically ready to do so.

40. The Court finds that Mother did not benefit from the parenting education services she was provided by the DCS and completed in approximately 2020, as her behavior toward [Child] during visitation continued to demonstrate a lack of necessary parenting skills and/or a refusal to implement skills she had learned through services.

41. When [Child] entered foster care, he displayed fear of authority figures, hoarded food, and had to be taught basic personal hygiene skills such as how to bathe. He was 7 years old.

42. During [Child]’s initial foster care placement, his anger outbursts and violent behavior toward others in the foster home resulted in his placement in a residential facility for treatment.

43. [Child] is in individual therapy. Through therapy, [Child] is processing the trauma he experienced while in Mother's care. [Child] increasingly shares what it was like for him when he lived with Mother. [Child] was traumatized by being left on his own to fend for himself at a young age, by the physical abuse by Mother's live-in boyfriend, and by there not being enough food in the home.

44. [Child] desires to be adopted and understands that would require termination of his parents’ parental rights.

45. [Child]’s therapist believes ongoing contact between [Child] and his mother would be harmful to [Child]’s emotional and mental health.

46. [Child]’s foster parents, who have cared for [Child] for most of the time since he was removed from Mother, are willing to adopt him and are intimately familiar with his special needs.

Id. at 30-32.

[8] The court concluded that continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to Child's well-being; there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in Child's removal or the reasons for continued placement outside of Mother's home will not be remedied; termination of Mother's parental rights is in Child's best interests; and DCS has a plan for Child to be adopted by his foster parents. Thus, the court terminated Mother's parental rights over Child. This appeal ensued.

Standard of Review

[9] Indiana appellate courts have long adhered to a highly deferential standard of review in cases involving the termination of parental rights. In re S.K., 124 N.E.3d 1225, 1230-31 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). In analyzing the trial court's decision, we neither reweigh the evidence nor assess witness credibility. Id. We consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences favorable to the court's judgment. Id. In deference to the trial court's unique position to assess the evidence, we will set aside a judgment terminating a parent-child relationship only if it is clearly erroneous. Id.

[10] To determine whether a termination decision is clearly erroneous, we apply a two-tiered standard of review to the trial court's findings of facts and conclusions of law. Bester v. Lake Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005). First, we determine whether the evidence supports the findings; second, we determine whether the findings support the judgment. Id. “Findings are clearly erroneous only when the record contains no facts to support them either directly or by inference.” In re A.D.S., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1156 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. If the evidence and inferences support the court's termination decision, we must affirm. In re L.S., 717 N.E.2d 204, 208 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied. We will accept unchallenged factual findings as true. See In re S.S., 120 N.E.3d 605, 614 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019).

[11] It is well-settled that the parent-child relationship is one of society's most cherished relationships. See, e.g., In re A.G., 45 N.E.3d 471, 475 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied. Indiana law thus sets a high bar to sever that relationship by requiring DCS to prove four elements by clear and convincing evidence. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2) (2023).³ We need only discuss two of those elements raised by Mother in this appeal: (1) whether there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for his continued placement outside of Mother's home will not be remedied; and (2) whether termination of Mother's parental rights is in the child's best interests. I.C. § 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B)(i) and (C).

[12] Clear and convincing evidence need not establish that the continued custody of a parent is wholly inadequate for a child's very survival. Bester, 839 N.E.2d at 148. It is instead sufficient to show that the child's emotional and physical development are put at risk by the parent's custody. Id. If the court finds the allegations in a petition are true, the court shall terminate the parent-child relationship. I.C. § 31-35-2-8(a).

[13] Finally, we observe that Mother does not challenge the trial court's findings of fact related to either conclusion we address on appeal,⁴ and therefore, she has waived any arguments relating to the unchallenged findings. See In re S.S., 120 N.E.3d 605, 610 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). And we accept all of the trial court's relevant findings as true. Id.

Reasons for Removal

[14] Mother claims that DCS failed to prove that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in Child's removal and continued placement outside of her home will not be remedied. Consideration of this argument involves a two-step analysis: first, identifying the conditions that led to removal, and second, determining whether there is a reasonable probability those conditions will be remedied. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 642-43 (Ind. 2014). In the second step, the trial court determines a parent's fitness at the time of the termination proceeding, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions; in other words, the court must balance a parent's recent improvements against habitual patterns of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation. Id. In conducting its analysis, the trial court may also consider the reasons for the child's continued placement outside the home. In re N.Q., 996 N.E.2d 385, 392 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013).

[15] Child was removed from Mother's care “after her arrest for a violent crime and subsequent incarceration and [the] removal continued due to her failure to consistently participate in and/or benefit from participation in services toward reunification.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 34. Mother argues that she completed domestic violence education classes and has made progress in therapy. And Mother maintains that she has independent housing and employment. But Mother's argument is merely a request that we reweigh the evidence.

[16] At the time of the termination hearing, the evidence that Mother had made some progress with services was essentially too little, too late. Indeed, after Mother completed domestic violence education, she began a relationship that involved domestic abuse. That relationship only ended after the man died. At the time of the hearing, Child had been living in foster care for more than four years, and Child was, by all accounts, thriving. The trial court thoughtfully considered the evidence that Mother had obtained housing and employment and was, since the termination petition had been filed, engaged in home-based therapy. The court weighed that evidence against Mother's historic inability to address the reasons Child was removed and had remained in foster care. Indeed, Child testified at the final hearing that he wanted his foster parents to adopt him.

[17] The trial court's conclusion that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in Child's removal and for continued placement outside Mother's home will not be remedied is supported by clear and convincing evidence.

Best Interests

[18] Mother also argues that DCS failed to prove that termination of her parental relationship with Child is in his best interests. In determining what is in a child's best interests, a court is required to look beyond the factors identified by DCS and consider the totality of the evidence. A.S. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs. (In re A.K.), 924 N.E.2d 212, 223 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). A parent's historical inability to provide “adequate housing, stability, and supervision,” in addition to the parent's current inability to do so, supports finding termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the child. Id.

[19] When making its decision, the court must subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the child. See Stewart v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs. (In re J.S.), 906 N.E.2d 226, 236 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). “The court need not wait until a child is irreversibly harmed before terminating the parent-child relationship.” Id. Moreover, this Court has previously held that recommendations of the family case manager and court-appointed special advocate to terminate parental rights, coupled with evidence that the conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied, are sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child's best interests. Id.

[20] Again, at the time of the termination hearing, Child had not been in Mother's care for more than four years. DCS presented evidence, and the trial court found, that Child had experienced trauma due to Mother's neglect of him while he was in her care. With the stability he has found in his pre-adoptive home, along with therapy, Child is thriving. Put simply, Child needs stability and permanency that Mother is not able to provide. Moreover, the guardian ad litem testified that termination of Mother's parental rights was in Child's best interests. And the family case manager testified that she supported Child's adoption by his foster parents. Finally, Child testified that he wanted to be adopted by his foster parents.

[21] For all of these reasons, we conclude that the trial court's conclusion that termination of Mother's parental rights is in Child's best interests is supported by clear and convincing evidence.

Conclusion

[22] Mother has not persuaded us that the trial court's order is clearly erroneous, and we affirm the court's order terminating Mother's parental rights to Child.

[23] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   W.P. is Child's alleged father. For ease of discussion, we refer to him simply as “Father,” but he does not participate in this appeal.

2.   Child's half-siblings were placed with their father.

3.   The legislature has amended this statute effective March 11, 2024. Rather than subsection (b), the relevant provisions are now found in subsection (d).

4.   Mother only challenges findings related to Child's well-being, but we do not address that statutory element. In any event, Mother's challenges to those findings are merely requests that we reweigh the evidence.

Mathias, Judge.

Chief Judge Altice and Judge DeBoer concur. Altice, C.J., and DeBoer, J., concur.