Jerome Sullivan, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Jerome Sullivan appeals his conviction for Class A misdemeanor domestic battery,¹ arguing insufficient evidence supports his conviction. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Sullivan and Jonathan Mead met in 2019. They had a “dating relationship” that was sometimes “intimate.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 41, 54. On March 30, 2024, Sullivan called Mead requesting money to purchase items for Sullivan's daughter. Mead agreed to help and in the early morning hours of March 31 picked Sullivan up from his house. The pair drove around until they found a secluded location to wait until Mead received his direct deposit wages.

[3] While waiting together in the back of Mead's SUV, the two began to argue. Sullivan wanted more money than Mead was willing to provide. Upon the deposit of Mead's paycheck, Sullivan climbed on top of Mead, took his car keys, and punched, bit, scratched, and choked him while exclaiming, “Transfer the money right now.” Id. at 45–46. Eventually Mead relented and transferred about $420 to Sullivan. During the attack, Mead exited the vehicle to protect himself. However, due to the secluded location and lack of alternative transportation, he eventually returned to the SUV. Once the confrontation was over and the money transferred, Sullivan returned the car keys. Mead drove Sullivan back to Sullivan's house then contacted police.

[4] The State charged Sullivan with Class A misdemeanor domestic battery and Class A misdemeanor battery resulting in bodily injury. At the bench trial, Mead testified to his romantic relationship with Sullivan, the argument over transferring money, the injuries he sustained when Sullivan became enraged over his refusal, and his eventual transfer of the money. The State admitted photographs depicting Sullivan's blood-stained clothing and injuries, including bruises, bite marks, and scrapes. For his part, Sullivan testified he never had a romantic relationship with Mead and never met with him in private. Sullivan claimed he attended church with Sullivan's daughter and her mother on the morning in question. Sullivan said he was never angry with Mead about money and never attacked him.

[5] The trial court determined Mead's account of events was credible and found Sullivan guilty of both counts. It entered judgment of conviction only for domestic battery and imposed a 365-day sentence with 353 days suspended to probation set to terminate upon Sullivan's successful completion of a batterer's intervention program.

Sufficient evidence supports Sullivan's conviction.

[6] Sullivan argues the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support his conviction. A sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim warrants a “deferential standard of review in which we ‘neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility[.]’ ” Hancz-Barron v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1237, 1244 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Brantley v. State, 91 N.E.3d 566, 570 (Ind. 2018), cert. denied). Instead, we respect the fact-finder's exclusive province to weigh conflicting evidence, Phipps v. State, 90 N.E.3d 1190, 1195 (Ind. 2018), and consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences that support the judgment of the trier of fact, Hall v. State, 177 N.E.3d 1183, 1191 (Ind. 2021). We will affirm the conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Teising v. State, 226 N.E.3d 780, 783 (Ind. 2024). It is “not necessary that the evidence ‘overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.’ ” Sallee v. State, 51 N.E.3d 130, 133 (Ind. 2016) (quoting Moore v. State, 652 N.E.2d 53, 55 (Ind. 1995)).

[7] To prove Sullivan guilty of Class A misdemeanor domestic battery as charged, the State must have shown beyond a reasonable doubt that he (1) knowingly or intentionally; (2) touched Mead; (3) in a rude, insolent, or angry manner. I.C. § 35-42-2-1.3(a)(1). Additionally, the State was required to prove Mead was Sullivan's family or household member, defined in pertinent part as an individual who is or has dated or engaged in a sexual relationship with the other person. I.C. § 35-31.5-2-128(a)(2)–(3).

[8] Mead testified to a dating or sexual relationship with Sullivan, and on March 31, Sullivan punched, bit, scratched, and choked Mead. The trial court determined Mead's testimony was more credible than Sullivan's. Yet Sullivan asserts the State failed to prove domestic battery because the record “leaves gaps” and “suggests that the testimony of Mr. Mead is of incredible dubiosity.” Appellant's Br. at 9.

[9] In general, the uncorroborated testimony of the victim is sufficient to sustain a conviction. Bailey v. State, 979 N.E.2d 133, 135 (Ind. 2012). We may make an exception, however, when that testimony is incredibly dubious. The incredible dubiosity rule allows the reviewing court to impinge upon the fact-finder's responsibility to judge the credibility of witnesses when confronted with evidence that is “so unbelievable, incredible, or improbable that no reasonable person could ever reach a guilty verdict based upon that evidence alone.” Moore v. State, 27 N.E.3d 749, 751 (Ind. 2015). We apply the rule where there is: “1) a sole testifying witness; 2) testimony that is inherently contradictory, equivocal, or the result of coercion; and 3) a complete absence of circumstantial evidence.” Id. at 756. Application of the incredible dubiosity rule is “rare[,] and the standard to be applied is whether the testimony is so incredibly dubious or inherently improbable that no reasonable person could believe it.” Love v. State, 761 N.E.2d 806, 810 (Ind. 2002). Although incredible dubiosity “provides a standard that is ‘not impossible’ to meet, it is a ‘difficult standard to meet, [and] one that requires great ambiguity and inconsistency in the evidence.’ ” Moore, 27 N.E.3d at 756 (quoting Edwards v. State, 753 N.E.2d 618, 622 (Ind. 2001)).

[10] Sullivan concedes there is not a complete lack of circumstantial evidence. “In a case where there is circumstantial evidence of an individual's guilt, ‘reliance on the incredible dubiosity rule is misplaced.’ ” Id. at 759 (quoting Majors v. State, 748 N.E.2d 365, 367 (Ind. 2001)). The State introduced photographs corroborating Mead's account of events alongside testimony clarifying the specific circumstances under which each injury was sustained. This alone precludes the application of the incredible dubiosity rule. Mead was the sole testifying witness for the State, but his testimony was not inherently contradictory, equivocal, or coerced and circumstantial evidence supported his testimony.

Conclusion

[11] Sufficient evidence supports Sullivan's conviction for Class A misdemeanor domestic battery.

[12] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1.3 (2021).

Kenworthy, Judge.

Judges Bradford and Pyle concur. Bradford, J., and Pyle, J., concur.