IN RE: Z.N. (Minor Child) Child in Need of Services (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] H.N. (“Mother”) appeals the Hancock Superior Court's order adjudicating her child a Child in Need of Services (“CHINS”).¹ She raises three issues, which we reorder and restate as:

1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it reopened the evidence after the fact-finding hearing was concluded; and,

2. Whether the court's order adjudicating the child a CHINS is supported by a preponderance of the evidence.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On February 14, 2024, law enforcement officers transported thirteen-year-old Z.N. (“Child”) to Community North Behavioral Health after a physical altercation with Mother. Specifically, Child became violent and attempted to kick Mother because she took his phone from him after Child fought with his sister. A Department of Child Services (“DCS”) family case manager received information that Mother had called the police because Child made suicidal threats. Therefore, she met with Child at Community North to assess Child's general safety and well-being. The case manager then contacted Mother via telephone to assist Mother with obtaining behavioral health resources for Child. The case manager had to end the phone call because Mother was too upset to participate in the call.

[4] Six days later, Mother signed a safety plan with the case manager, and she agreed to obtain mental health counseling services for child through Community Gallahue at his school. Child returned home to Mother's care that day. The case manager provided Mother with contact information for additional mental health resources and encouraged Mother to contact those providers.

[5] On April 30, the trial court authorized DCS to file a petition alleging that Child is a CHINS. In its petition, DCS alleged that Child was not participating in therapy and that Mother had not refilled Child's medications. DCS also reported that Child's teacher believed Child would benefit from therapy and his behavior had worsened. Child's school had suspended him for four days due to his behavior.

[6] At the initial hearing, Mother denied that Child is a CHINS. Thereafter, the court issued an order appointing a Court Appointed Special Advocate (“CASA”). At the pretrial conference, Mother waived the sixty-day statutory requirement, and the trial court set the fact-finding hearing for August 8. The court ordered the parties to exchange discovery by July 26.

[7] Mother failed to obtain mental health services for Child and refused to meet with providers from family preservation services. During a June 5 home visit, Mother would not allow the family case manager “to observe the entire home” or to speak with Child's sibling. Appellant's App. p. 69. Mother also told the case manager that she would not sign a release of information for Child's mental health provider. The trial court ordered Mother to execute the necessary releases for DCS and to allow DCS to conduct home checks.

[8] On July 1, Mother took Child to Aspire for a mental health intake assessment. Mother did not tell her family case manager that Child had an intake appointment at Aspire. On July 31, Mother told the CASA about the Aspire intake assessment.

[9] At the August 8 fact-finding hearing, the family case manager testified that there have been nineteen DCS assessments for the family since 2016, including a substantiation from 2021 regarding Mother's and Child's mental health. Tr. Vol. 2, pp. 57, 59. Mother was not cooperative with DCS, and she was “unwilling to participate in any kind of services or let [DCS] verify the safety of” Child. Id. at 62. Mother refused to let the family case manager speak privately with Child. The case manager did not believe that Child was having his mental health needs met. Id. at 65. Prior to the fact-finding hearing, the case manager had been unable to meet with Mother and Child for approximately thirty days.

[10] DCS also referred Mother to family preservation services through Lutheran Family Services. During the intake appointment, Mother informed the counselor that she wanted Child to have mental health treatment. Id. at 91. Mother also discussed her own mental health issues but stated that she needed to focus on her Child's issues before she could take care of her own. Id. at 91-92. The service provider recommended individual therapy for Child and Mother and family therapy. Thereafter, Mother refused to participate in services with the provider and said she was able to address the issues on her own. Id. at 95.

[11] The day after the fact-finding hearing, the CASA received Child's records from Aspire and filed an emergency motion to reopen the evidence. Mother objected to the motion. Mother observed that the CASA requested the records on July 31 but the discovery deadline for the fact-finding hearing was July 26. Appellant's App. p. 96. The CASA requested the records the same day that Mother informed her that Child had an intake appointment at Aspire. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 144. The trial court granted the CASA's motion and set an additional fact-finding hearing for September 24. The trial court overruled Mother's renewed objection to the admission of the evidence at that hearing.

[12] The Aspire therapist diagnosed Child with oppositional defiant disorder. She recommended individual and family therapy and medication management. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 150. Mother stated she would set up appointments for Child to meet with a therapist, but Mother subsequently informed Aspire that she wanted to withdraw Child from services. Id. at 150-51.

[13] On October 29, the trial court issued its order adjudicating Child a CHINS. The court determined that Mother has not “secure[d] adequate mental health services for” Child, that Child “has violent outbursts and behaviors that need[ ] to be addressed,” and “[t]here have been previous assessments and CHINS cases with similar concerns.” Appellant's App. p. 3. The court concluded that “coercive intervention of the Court is required to ensure that the child receives needed care, treatment, and supervision.” Id. But the court also ordered Child to remain in Mother's care.

[14] Mother now appeals.

The Trial Court Acted Within its Discretion when it Reopened the Evidence.

[15] Mother argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it granted the CASA's motion to reopen the evidence because the CASA's discovery request was made after the July 26 discovery deadline. “[I]t is within the discretion of the trial court to permit a party to present additional evidence or testimony once the party has rested, once both parties have rested, or after the close of all of the evidence.” Moriarty v. Moriarty, 150 N.E.3d 616, 626-27 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (quoting Collyear-Bell v. Bell, 105 N.E.3d 176, 186 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018)); see also Paternity of M.S., 146 N.E.3d 951, 957 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020).

[16] Here, Child had an intake appointment for mental health services with Aspire on July 1, 2024. Mother did not tell her family case manager about the appointment. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 124. Mother told the CASA about Child's intake appointment on July 31, which was five days after the discovery deadline. That same day, the CASA requested the intake records from Aspire. Id. at 144. The CASA received the records from Aspire the day after the fact-finding hearing and immediately filed a motion to reopen the evidence. The trial court granted the motion and allowed the CASA to present evidence from the Aspire therapist who assessed Child at the intake appointment. Mother was permitted to cross-examine the Aspire therapist.

[17] DCS and the CASA had no knowledge of the Aspire intake assessment before the discovery deadline because Mother did not inform them that the assessment had taken place, and whether Mother had obtained or was attempting to obtain the necessary mental health services for Child was the essential inquiry in this matter. For these reasons, we conclude that the trial court acted within its discretion when it granted the CASA's motion to reopen the evidence. See Moriarty, 150 N.E.3d at 628 (quoting Sanders v. Ryan, 112 Ind. App. 470, 41 N.E.2d 833, 836 (1942)) (stating “[t]he trial of a case is not a mere game for testing the skills and vigilance of contesting lawyers, but is an investigation instituted for the purpose of ascertaining truth”).

The CHINS Order is Supported by the Evidence.

[18] Mother also argues that the trial court's order adjudicating Child a CHINS is not supported by the evidence. Specifically, Mother claims that DCS failed to prove that Child had ongoing mental health issues for which he was not receiving treatment or that Child is unlikely to receive needed medical treatment without the coercive intervention of the court.

[19] Our court will reverse a CHINS adjudication only upon a showing that the trial court's decision was clearly erroneous. In re K.D., 962 N.E.2d 1249, 1253 (Ind. 2012). We consider only the evidence that supports the court's decision and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom, and we will not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility. Id.

[20] Our Supreme Court recently reiterated the purpose and goals of CHINS proceedings:

Indiana's juvenile law is founded on the parens patriae power of the State and the courts to “step into the shoes” of parents, guardians, or custodians when necessary to safeguard a child's best interests. In re K.G., 808 N.E.2d 631, 635-36 (Ind. 2004). CHINS law in particular is focused on serving “families in crisis” by getting children the help that parents are not “willing or able to provide.” [In re] S.D., 2 N.E.3d [1283,] 1285 [Ind. 2014]. Thus, in CHINS proceedings, the courts’ focus is on protecting children, not punishing parents. Id. Indeed, the courts and DCS must make “all decisions ․ in consideration of the best interests of the child or children concerned,” I.C. § 31-10-2-2(2), with ensuring a child's safety “the most important consideration,” I.C. § 31-10-2-1.5.

To advance a child's best interests during CHINS proceedings, our trial courts are vested with “broad discretion.” K.G., 808 N.E.2d at 636. But this discretion is not unbounded. Courts must uphold the parties’ “due process rights” and “take into account recommendations and input” from DCS, parents, children, and others. In re K.D., 962 N.E.2d 1249, 1255 (Ind. 2012). And to guard against “unwarranted State interference in family life,” courts can only adjudicate a child as needing services when all the substantive requirements of the applicable CHINS statute are satisfied. See S.D., 2 N.E.3d at 1287. In this way, the State's “ ‘coercive intervention’ into family life”—and the potentially long-lasting collateral consequences of a CHINS adjudication—are reserved for families that cannot meet their children's needs “without coercion.” Id. at 1285.

Matter of E.K., ––– N.E.3d ––––, 2025 WL 1711025, at *5 (Ind. June 19, 2025).

[21] The State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a child is a CHINS. See In re K.D., 962 N.E.2d at 1253. DCS alleged that Child was a CHINS under Indiana Code section 31-34-1-1, which provides:

A child is a child in need of services if before the child becomes eighteen (18) years of age:

(1) the child's physical or mental condition is seriously impaired or seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or neglect of the child's parent, guardian, or custodian to supply the child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education, or supervision:

(A) when the parent, guardian, or custodian is financially able to do so; or

(B) due to the failure, refusal, or inability of the parent, guardian, or custodian to seek financial or other reasonable means to do so; and

(2) the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that:

(A) the child is not receiving; and

(B) is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the court.

A CHINS adjudication under this statute “requires three basic elements: that the parent's actions or inactions have seriously endangered the child, that the child's needs are unmet, and (perhaps most critically) that those needs are unlikely to be met without State coercion.” In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d 1283, 1287 (Ind. 2014). When a court considers whether a child is a CHINS under this section, and particularly whether the coercive intervention of the court is necessary, the court “should consider the family's condition not just when the case was filed, but also when it is heard.” Id. at 1290.

[22] First, we address Mother's argument that “[t]here was scant evidence put on the record at the first fact-finding hearing regarding [Child's] need for mental health services.” Appellant's Br. at 10. Mother acknowledges that Child needed mental health treatment in February 2024 when he received inpatient care at Community North but claims “there was no evidence of any behaviors requiring services on an ongoing basis thereafter.” Id. We disagree.

[23] DCS presented evidence that Child did not receive mental health treatment after he was released from Community North except for speaking to a counselor at school and undergoing an intake assessment at Aspire. Child's teacher testified to several of Child's positive attributes but also stated that he had behavioral problems at school. Tr. Vol. 2, pp. 100-07. And the Aspire therapist testified that Child needs therapy to treat his oppositional defiance disorder. Id. at 167-68. Moreover, Mother admitted that Child has exhibited “concerning violent behaviors ․” Id. at 111.

[24] This evidence is sufficient to prove that Child needs mental health treatment that Mother was not providing and that Child's mental condition was endangered by Mother's neglect.

[25] We now turn to Mother's argument that DCS failed to prove that Child needs medical treatment that he is unlikely to receive without the coercive intervention of the court. In support of her argument, Mother relies on her claim that Child's behavior had improved since February 2024, and she notes that Child has had access to a school counselor. Appellant's Br. at 11-12.

[26] Mother agreed to obtain mental health services for Child after he was released from Community North in February 2024. But Mother did not do so and told at least one DCS service provider that Child did not need therapy. After the intake assessment at Aspire, Child's next appointment for therapy was cancelled.² When the fact-finding hearings were held in August and September, DCS presented evidence that Mother had never obtained mental health services for Child on a consistent basis. Mother also often refused to cooperate with the family case manager and other DCS service providers. This evidence is sufficient to prove that Child needs mental health services that are unlikely to be provided for him without the coercive intervention of the court.

Conclusion

[27] The trial court acted within its discretion when it reopened the evidence and allowed the CASA to present evidence from the Aspire therapist. And DCS proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Child is a CHINS under Indiana Code section 31-34-1-1. We therefore affirm the trial court's order adjudicating Child a CHINS.

[28] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Child's father is unknown.

2.   Mother acknowledged that Child's appointments with mental health providers were cancelled on several occasions but claimed that she did not cancel them and implied that the family case manager had done so. Tr. Vol. 2, pp. 111, 113, 124.

Mathias, Judge.

Foley, J., and Scheele, J., concur.