Keith Lee Bryant, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] After representing himself at trial, Keith Bryant was convicted of murder. He now appeals this conviction, raising multiple issues, which we reorder and restate as: (1) whether he knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right to counsel; (2) whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying his request for standby counsel; and (3) whether sufficient evidence supports his convictions for murder and possessing a firearm as a serious violent felon. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Between May 25 and 26, 2021, Bryant exchanged ten phone calls with Keandre Coleman (Coleman).¹ Bryant last called Coleman at 3:05 p.m. on May 26 and the men spoke for less than one minute. Around that time, Coleman sat in his parked car in West Montgomery Park, also known as Hawthorne Park, in Indianapolis. Tracking data showed Bryant's cell phone and his girlfriend's 2019 gold Ford Fusion move toward Coleman.² However, Bryant's girlfriend's cell phone did not move toward the park. At 3:12 p.m., Bryant texted someone saved in his phone as “Dez” that he was “[a]t the park I'm hawthorn[.]” Exhibits Vol. 2 at 84. Bryant told Dez that he would be at the park for a “[l]il bit” and to meet him there. Id.

[3] Also at the park were sisters Tamika Tewell and Lashanna Tutson, and social worker Olivia Hinds. Earlier, Coleman approached Tewell and asked whether he could purchase food she was grilling. When Tewell told him the food was not ready, Coleman drove off before returning to where he had parked, which was within Tewell's view. At some point, Tewell noticed a “big” black male with shoulder-length “braids or dreads” leaning with his hands on the driver's side door of Coleman's car talking to Coleman, who was sitting in the driver's seat. Transcript Vol. 2 at 199. Tewell returned her attention to the grill for about five minutes before she heard “three or four” gunshots and took cover. Id. at 201. When she looked around, she saw the “back end of a gold car leaving” the parking lot at a fast pace. Id.

[4] Tutson also saw a black man with “long hair” putting his hands on the driver's side of Coleman's car while talking to him. Id. at 209. She did not see the shooting but heard “three or four” gunshots and saw a gold car leaving the park. Id. at 212. Tutson later told a detective that she suspected the shooter's fingerprints would be on Coleman's car.

[5] While Hinds was working—monitoring a supervised visit in the park—she noticed a car driving “fast” in the park. Id. at 217. Then, in her peripheral vision, Hinds saw someone “get out” of one car, “run,” and “fling” open another car's door. Id. Distracted by her computer, she did not see the men talking. Hinds then heard a gunshot, looked over, and saw a black male of “average height” with shoulder-length dreadlocks “shooting a person in a car.” Id. Witnessing the shooting made her “hysterical.” Id. at 218. She described the car she saw as white with silver trim, but she acknowledged that she was “very much in shock, so that's what [she] thought [she] saw[.]” Id. at 219.

[6] After the shooting, Tewell approached Coleman's vehicle, saw he had been shot, and called the police. Officers were dispatched to the scene at 3:32 p.m. Cell phone records showed that around this time, Bryant's cell phone and his girlfriend's car were traveling away from Hawthorne Park. Bryant never called Coleman again and deleted his cell phone's history between May 26 and May 29, which included about 350 calls. See State's Ex. 72 at 24:30-24:42.

[7] An evidence technician located two fired cartridges in the parking lot outside of Coleman's car and one inside the car. He also recovered Coleman's cell phone from the scene. Later, another crime scene specialist swabbed the driver's side door of Coleman's car for fingerprints. Bryant's right palm print was found below the driver's side window, and his left palm print was found in two places above the driver's side window.

[8] In mid-June, police stopped Bryant, who had dreadlocks down to his shoulders, driving a gold Ford Fusion. See State's Exhibit 67. Officer's seized Bryant's cell phone. When interviewed by detectives, Bryant denied being in Hawthorne Park on the day of the shooting.

[9] Coleman sustained three gunshot wounds—to his left eye, his left jaw, and the back of his neck. When Coleman was transported to the emergency room, he was in critical condition. See State's Ex. 41 at 6:37-6:46. While doctors were attempting to intubate Coleman, he went into cardiac arrest. Staff administered chest compressions and were able to restart his heart; however, the episode “caused him to have injury to his brain” and he “never really regained consciousness.” Tr. Vol. 3 at 45. He spent nearly a year in a vegetative, “coma-like state.” Id. Eventually, Coleman was moved to an acute long-term care facility until January 2022 when he was placed in hospice care at his mother's home. Coleman died on May 3, 2022. According to the forensic pathologist, Coleman's “[c]ause of death was complications of remote gunshot wounds to the head, neck and torso.” Id. at 49. These complications included pneumonia, pressure ulcers, and pulmonary embolism, which “would not have ․ happened without the gunshot wounds having occurred.” Id. Accordingly, the forensic pathologist concluded that Coleman's manner of death was homicide.

[10] The state originally charged Bryant with attempted murder but refiled its case after Coleman's death. In July 2022, the State charged Bryant with Count I: Murder, a felony;³ and Count II: Unlawful Possession of a Firearm by a Serious Violent Felon (SVF), a Level 4 felony.⁴

[11] On August 9, 2022, Bryant appeared for an initial hearing. When the trial court asked Bryant if he was able to hire his own attorney, Bryant responded, “I wanna waive my right as – with counsel and represent myself pro se with counsel on standby.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 5. The trial court then asked Bryant questions to gauge his understanding of what was involved in proceeding pro se. Bryant acknowledged he would be held to the same standard as an attorney, and be responsible for making required filings, obtaining witnesses, entering evidence, conducting jury selection, examining witnesses, and making arguments within the rules of evidence and procedure.

[12] When the trial court asked Bryant why he wanted to represent himself, Bryant responded, “I feel like I could hold that responsibility and with the right information, I'll be able to represent myself accordingly.” Id. at 7. The trial court explained that an attorney would be better suited to facilitate discovery, but Bryant said he could handle discovery matters. Bryant explained that he had his GED and had been a criminal defendant before but had never represented himself. Despite this and the fact that he was facing a serious charge, Bryant affirmed his belief that proceeding pro se would serve his best interests.

[13] The trial court then addressed the issue of standby counsel, explaining that standby counsel could “provide advice” and function as a “soundingboard [sic],” but would not have “a duty to take part of the proceedings,” which were “all [Bryant's]” to conduct. Id. at 9. Bryant acknowledged he understood.

[14] The trial court again confirmed that Bryant had considered the serious nature of the murder charge and that he still desired to represent himself. Bryant said he understood the elements of murder and that his case might involve some technical discovery. The court told Bryant that it is “never a good idea [ ] to represent oneself” and that it was still “concerned about [Bryant's] ability to fully and fairly represent [himself]” as counsel would be able to. Id. at 11. However, the court found that Bryant had “knowingly” and “voluntarily” made the decision to waive counsel. Id. Bryant said he understood and affirmed that he still wished to represent himself. The trial court told Bryant that it might raise the issue of self-representation in future hearings to ensure his rights were protected. At the end of the August 9 hearing, the trial court explained that it would not appoint standby counsel “at this time[,]” but would make that determination “closer in time” to trial. Id. at 16.

[15] Bryant represented himself at pretrial conferences on October 6 and December 1 and filed various motions in the interim. At a pretrial conference on January 5, 2023, Bryant said, “Your Honor, at my initial hearing, I asked for co-counsel for this case.” Id. at 53. The trial judge—a different judicial officer than had conducted the hearing in which Bryant waived counsel—responded:

COURT: Well, sir, you don't get co-counsel. You either have an attorney or you don't have an attorney․ I don't make the public defender sit standby. That's not their job to sit standby and answer your questions. You either want an attorney or you don't want an attorney.

BRYANT: I was told I was gonna get one. That's why I was just asking.

COURT: There's no co-counsel․ Their job is to be the attorney and then you can assist them and you can talk to them, but ․ I'm not gonna order them to sit there and assist you․ So if you wanna represent yourself, you're your attorney, okay?

BRYANT: Yes, ma'am.

Id.

[16] At the next pretrial conference on March 16, Bryant said, “I'ma (sic) need co-counsel ’cause my facility will not let me print ․ paperwork. I can't present my evidence.” Id. at 61. The trial judge then had the following exchange with Bryant:

COURT: Well, sir, that's one of the things when you go pro se, ․ I don't give you co-counsel. You opted to go pro se. You don't get co-counsel. If you wanna hire –

BRYANT: I mean, to make it a fair trial be having to prevent [sic] my defense ․

COURT: . . [W]e went over all the ․ problems and issues when someone represents themself when you decided to represent yourself, and one of those things was you were in a facility and ․ you would ․ be at a disadvantage.

Id.

[17] Bryant explained that he needed certain transcripts and the prosecutor said his office could make those available for Bryant at trial. The court reiterated that it would not be appointing Bryant standby counsel because Bryant had “decided to go pro se.” Id. at 63. After Bryant said that he needed the proper paperwork to present his case, the court responded:

COURT: [W]e'll see ․ what we can do. But again, you decided to go pro se. You are your attorney. That's one of the detriments that we talked about when you decided to go pro se is that you were in a facility and you wouldn't have the ability to do some of the things that someone else would. So that's just one of the problems that you have to deal with. We'll try to help you out because we'll ․ do that, but that's not what our job is, okay?

Id. at 62-63.

[18] Following the March 16 pretrial conference, Bryant participated in multiple depositions and attended ten more pretrial conferences and hearings spanning one year. During this period, Bryant did not request an attorney, and the court did not readdress the issue of self-representation. At a March 14, 2024 pretrial conference four days before trial, the trial court asked Bryant, “you are still representing yourself; is that right?” Id. at 97. Bryant responded that he was and that he had not changed his mind on the issue of self-representation.

[19] On March 18 and 19, Bryant represented himself at his jury trial. He gave an opening statement, cross-examined witnesses, moved for a directed verdict after the State rested, and presented a closing argument. Ultimately, the jury found Bryant guilty of murder and knowingly possessing a firearm. The remainder of the SVF charge was bifurcated, and Bryant waived his right to a jury trial on the status phase. The trial court heard further evidence on the SVF charge and found Bryant guilty. At sentencing, the trial court told Bryant that the jury had complimented his performance at trial. The court sentenced Bryant to concurrent sentences of sixty-two years for murder and six years for SVF.

Discussion and Decision

1. Waiver of Counsel

[20] Bryant contends that he did not execute a valid waiver of his right to counsel. The right to counsel is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 13 of the Indiana Constitution, and the right of self-representation is implicit in the Sixth Amendment.⁵ See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 832 (1975). When a criminal defendant seeks to waive his right to counsel in favor of self-representation, “[t]he trial court is uniquely situated to assess whether a defendant has waived the right to counsel.” Wright v. State, 168 N.E.3d 244, 254 (Ind. 2021), cert. denied. We will “most likely” uphold the trial court's decision on a defendant's request to proceed pro se if the trial court “made the proper inquires and conveyed the proper information, and reache[d] a reasoned conclusion about the defendant's understanding of his rights and voluntariness of his decision.” Poynter v. State, 749 N.E.2d 1122, 1128 (Ind. 2001) (quoting U.S. v. Hoskins, 243 F.3d 407, 411 (7th Cir. 2001)).

[21] A defendant's invocation of his right to self-representation “triggers strict procedural requirements for the trial court to ensure compliance with basic constitutional guarantees of fairness.” Wright, 168 N.E.3d at 259. “[T]he waiver of counsel must be: (1) knowing; (2) intelligent; (3) unequivocal; and (4) voluntary.” McGraw v. State, 241 N.E.3d 1175, 1181 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024), trans. denied.

When deciding whether a defendant meets these standards, a trial court should inquire, on the record, whether the defendant clearly understands (1) the nature of the charges against [him], including any possible defenses; (2) the dangers and disadvantages of proceeding pro se and the fact that [he's] held to the same standards as a professional attorney; and (3) that a trained attorney possesses the necessary skills for preparing for and presenting a defense.

Wright, 168 N.E.3d at 263-64. There is no magic language the trial court must use when conveying this information, and the nature of the trial court's warnings will depend upon case-specific factors, including the severity of potential punishment. Id. at 264. A valid waiver of counsel “may be established based upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding the case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.” Jones v. State, 783 N.E.2d 1132, 1138 (Ind. 2003).

[22] Bryant argues that his waiver of counsel was not valid because it was “contingent” on the appointment of standby counsel, and he was informed that he would not get standby counsel after the trial court had already accepted his waiver. Appellant's Br. at 25. However, the record does not reflect any such contingency. At his August 9, 2022 initial hearing, Bryant said that he wanted to “waive [his] right as -- with counsel and represent [himself] pro se with counsel on standby.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 5. He did not then, or ever during any of the proceedings, say he would proceed pro se only if he was appointed standby counsel. Moreover, despite being given many opportunities to clarify that he did not want to represent himself without the assistance of standby counsel, Bryant's words and conduct expressed the opposite—that he was willing to accept the dangers and disadvantages of pro se representation without the assistance of standby counsel.

[23] At the outset, the trial court's August 9 inquiries and Bryant's responses were adequate to establish that Bryant unequivocally invoked his right to self-representation and waived his right to counsel knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently. Bryant told the trial court he wanted to represent himself because he felt he could “hold that responsibility and with the right information, [he would] be able to represent [himself] accordingly.” Id. at 7. Although he had not represented himself before, Bryant had his GED, had experience as a criminal defendant, and claimed that he understood the elements of murder. The trial court informed Bryant that: (1) he would be held to the same standard as an attorney; (2) he would be responsible for filing relevant documents; (3) he would be responsible for examining witnesses and conducting statements and arguments as he desired; (4) he would have to comply with the rules of procedure and evidence; (5) counsel would be in a better position to handle discovery; (6) “it is never a good idea ․ to represent oneself[;]” and (7) he could “request the assistance of counsel to be appointed to represent [him] from whatever point forward going to trial.” Id. at 11. Bryant acknowledged he understood the court's warnings about self-representation and the seriousness of the murder charge he faced, yet he still believed it was in his best interests to represent himself.

[24] On multiple subsequent occasions, Bryant and the trial court discussed his pro se status. On January 5, 2023, the trial court clearly told Bryant it would not appoint standby counsel and asked him, “if you [want to] represent yourself, you're your attorney, okay?” Id. at 53. Instead of requesting counsel, Bryant reaffirmed his desire to act as his own attorney. Although he raised the issue of co-counsel once more during the March 16, 2023 hearing, Bryant represented himself in over a dozen subsequent hearings, depositions, and pretrial proceedings in the year before his trial and never again raised the issue of standby counsel or co-counsel. As late as March 14, 2024, Bryant unambiguously confirmed that he had not changed his mind about representing himself. Given Bryant's continued self-representation and affirmations of his unwavering desire to remain pro se, we find Bryant's waiver of counsel to have remained knowing, voluntary, and intelligent throughout the proceedings.

2. Standby Counsel

[25] Bryant also argues that the trial court abused its discretion by declining to appoint him standby counsel. The appointment of standby counsel can be an “appropriate prophylactic device when a defendant assumes the burden of conducting his own defense.” Jackson v. State, 441 N.E.2d 29, 33 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982). When operating in a proper capacity, standby counsel does not impinge on the right of self-representation because the “pro se defendant retains control over his case.” Wilson v. State, 94 N.E.3d 312, 324 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018); see also Goble v. State, 766 N.E.2d 1, 5 n.5 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (“Standby counsel is not considered to have been appointed to represent the defendant” because the “[d]efendant is entitled only to confer with standby counsel” and “is not entitled to have standby counsel actively participate in the proceedings.”). Yet the appointment of standby counsel is subject to the trial court's discretion; “a defendant who proceeds pro se has no right to demand the appointment of standby counsel for his assistance.” Sherwood v. State, 717 N.E.2d 131, 135 n.2 (Ind. 1999). The trial court abuses its discretion if its ruling is “clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances and the error affects a party's substantial rights.” McCoy v. State, 193 N.E.3d 387, 390 (Ind. 2022).

[26] In Wright, the Indiana Supreme Court “strongly urge[d],” but did not require, trial courts to appoint standby counsel when a defendant is permitted to self-represent in a capital or life without parole (LWOP) case. Wright, 168 N.E.3d at 264. Here, by contrast, Bryant did not face potential capital punishment or LWOP and does not cite any Indiana case law—and we have found none—reversing a trial court's pretrial denial of standby counsel or articulating circumstances in which such denial would constitute an abuse of discretion.

[27] Bryant also cites an American Bar Association recommendation that standby counsel be appointed in cases in which a severe sentence might be imposed. While we tend to agree with the ABA's recommendation, we must look at the specific facts of each case. Here, when the trial judge denied Bryant's request for standby counsel on January 5, 2023, she had already observed Bryant filing multiple motions and capably representing himself at pretrial conferences on two separate occasions. At the October 6, 2022 pretrial conference, Bryant successfully requested help from an investigator and received a continuation of the trial date. On November 18, Bryant filed a motion to dismiss the charging information against him for lack of specificity, arguing that it failed to allege the time and place of the offense and that Coleman did not die until about one year after the shooting. At the December 1 pretrial conference, the trial court denied this motion as well as Bryant's motion to suppress fingerprint or handprint evidence. Bryant also argued that he should be able to depose certain State expert witnesses and receive discovery he claimed was missing. On December 20, Bryant filed a motion to suppress cell site evidence, arguing that admission of the data would violate the Fourth Amendment and Indiana Evidence Rule 403. The court denied this motion on January 5, 2023, before addressing Bryant's request for co-counsel or standby counsel. While we generally agree with Bryant's contention that it would be constitutionally suspect for a trial court to maintain a blanket policy of denying criminal defendants’ requests for standby counsel, here, the the trial judge denied Bryant's request for standby counsel after accumulating extensive information about his ability to effectively represent himself. Under these circumstances, we do not find that the trial court's decision to deny standby counsel constituted an abuse of discretion.

3. Sufficiency of the Evidence

[28] Bryant argues that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support his conviction for murder and SVF. Our standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence challenges is well established. Teising v. State, 226 N.E.3d 780, 783 (Ind. 2024). Sufficiency claims “trigger a deferential standard of review in which we ‘neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility, instead reserving those matters to the province of the jury.’ ” Hancz-Barron v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1237, 1244 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Brantley v. State, 91 N.E.3d 566, 570 (Ind. 2018), reh'g denied, cert. denied). When conducting this review, “we consider only the evidence that supports the jury's determination, not evidence that might undermine it.” Id. We affirm if the probative evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom could have allowed a reasonable jury to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. McHenry v State, 820 N.E.2d 124, 126 (Ind. 2005).

A. Identity

[29] To convict Bryant of murder, the State had to prove that he knowingly or intentionally killed Coleman. Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1(1). Despite acknowledging that the evidence at trial showed he was in the park around the time of the shooting and his palm prints were found on Coleman's driver's side door, Bryant contends that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was the person who shot Coleman. See Appellant's Brief at 13-14. Pointing to phone calls made between himself and Coleman, Bryant argues that they were “friends who communicated regularly” and thus, Bryant's “legitimate access” to Coleman's vehicle does not rise to a reasonable inference that he shot Coleman. Id. at 14; see also Mediate v. State, 498 N.E.2d 391, 393-94 (Ind. 1986) (discussing the relevance of a defendant's “legitimate access to the object” in the context of burglary and theft cases where the “only evidence supporting the conviction is [the defendant's] fingerprints”). Bryant also argues that even if he did talk to Coleman just before the shooting, the eyewitness testimony renders it “unreasonable to assume that the speaker and shooter were the same person.” Appellant's Br. at 14.

[30] Simply put, Bryant's argument is a request for us to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See Young v. State, 198 N.E.3d 1172, 1179 (Ind. 2022). “[I]t is well-settled that ‘circumstantial evidence alone’ can sustain a murder conviction.” Hancz-Barron, 235 N.E.3d at 1244 (quoting Sallee v. State, 51 N.E.3d 130, 134 (Ind. 2016)). “In a circumstantial case, no single piece of evidence in isolation—no ‘smoking gun’—is offered to persuade the jury to convict.” Young, 198 N.E.3d at 1176. However, the jury may be persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt “by looking at ‘a web of facts in which no single strand may be dispositive.’ ” Id. (quoting Kriner v. State, 699 N.E.2d 659, 664 (Ind. 1998)). Here, the jury was presented with ample evidence by which it could have determined Bryant was the shooter. See Young, 198 N.E.3d at 1177 (The State presented sufficient evidence to identify the defendant as the shooter where “the pieces of evidence ․ fit together into a coherent whole that incriminate[d] the defendant.”).

[31] The evidence most favorable to the jury's verdict shows that Bryant and Coleman exchanged ten calls between March 25 and 26, 2021. Their final call lasted just under one minute and began at 3:05 p.m. on May 26, minutes before Coleman was shot. After the shooting, Bryant never called Coleman again. Instead, he deleted his call history—about 350 calls—from the day of the shooting and three days after. See Stone v. State, 555 N.E.2d 475, 477 (Ind. 1990) (“Attempts to conceal evidence may be considered by the jury as revealing consciousness of guilt.”).

[32] The evidence also shows that Bryant was in Hawthorne Park at the time of the shooting, which he denied in his June 2021 interview with detectives. In fact, Bryant now concedes that the evidence shows he was in the park around the time of the shooting. Bryant's cell phone and his girlfriend's gold Ford Fusion emitted data showing that his phone and the car traveled toward the park before the shooting. However, his girlfriend's phone stayed stationary during this period, from which we can infer that Bryant was driving her car. At 3:12 p.m., Bryant texted a contact named Dez that he was at Hawthorne Park. After the shooting, Bryant's phone and his girlfriend's car traveled away from the scene of the shooting.

[33] Furthermore, eyewitnesses described a man with Bryant's characteristics talking to Coleman just before the shooting and DNA evidence directly tied him to Coleman's vehicle where the shooting took place. While Coleman was sitting in his car at the park, both Tewell and Tutson saw a black male talking to him and leaning on Coleman's driver's side door. Tewell described the man as “big” and having shoulder-length “braids or dreads[,]” and Tutson confirmed the man had “long hair.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 199, 209. Hinds also testified that she saw a black man with shoulder-length dreadlocks shooting into Coleman's vehicle. Just after the shooting, Tewell and Tutson saw a gold car leaving the scene. The shooter's physical appearance and the sisters’ descriptions of the vehicle leaving the scene are consistent with Bryant's appearance and the vehicle he had access to when the shooting occurred. Significantly, Tutson told detectives that the shooter may have left fingerprints on Coleman's car, and Bryant's palm prints were indeed found on the vehicle's driver's side door.⁶

[34] To summarize, the evidence placed Bryant at the scene of the shooting talking to Coleman just minutes before the shooting occurred. The shooter's description matched Bryant's appearance, and the jury could infer that Bryant drove his girlfriend's gold Ford Fusion away from the crime scene just after the shooting. Then, Bryant deleted his call history from the days surrounding the shooting, never called Coleman again, and lied to detectives about being in the park on the day of the shooting. Viewed as a whole, this circumstantial evidence is sufficient to support the jury's conclusion that Bryant was the shooter.⁷

B. Intervening Cause

[35] Bryant also disputes his murder conviction on the ground that the evidence is insufficient to show that the shooting caused Coleman's death. Coleman suffered three gunshots to the head and neck area on May 26, 2021, but did not die until May 3, 2022. Bryant argues that the decision to place Coleman on hospice care at his mother's home was an intervening cause that would make it “unfair to hold Bryant responsible” for causing Coleman's death. Id. at 18.

[36] “An intervening cause is an independent force that breaks the causal connection between a defendant's actions and the victim's injuries.” Watson v. State, 776 N.E.2d 914, 920 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (citing Wooley v. State, 716 N.E.2d 919, 928 (Ind. 1999), reh'g denied). An intervening cause only breaks the causal chain of criminal responsibility if it is “so extraordinary that it would be unfair to hold the appellant responsible for the actual result.” Id. (citing Ewing v. State, 719 N.E.2d 1221, 1225 (Ind. 1999), reh'g denied). If no such intervening cause exists, “ ‘[a]n individual who inflicts injury upon another is deemed by law to be guilty of homicide if the injury contributed mediately or immediately to the death of that person.’ ” Wooley, 716 N.E.2d at 928 (quoting Sims v. State, 466 N.E.2d 24, 25 (Ind. 1984)).

[37] Bryant suggests that the State was required to prove that removing Coleman from the care of medical professionals was necessary and that pneumonia alone caused Coleman's death. We disagree. After being shot three times in the face and neck, Coleman went into cardiac arrest before his heart was restarted. He never recovered from these events, but he lived for nearly a year in a “coma-like state,” completely dependent on others for his survival. Tr. Vol. 3 at 45. Coleman was initially treated in the hospital before he was moved to an acute long-term care facility. About eight months after the shooting, Coleman was placed on hospice care at his mother's home. On May 3, 2022, he died. It is not extraordinary, but entirely foreseeable, that a victim of gunshot injuries of the severity Coleman suffered might transition to receiving palliative care after eight months of existing in a coma-like, vegetative state. See Spencer v. State, 660 N.E.2d 359, 362 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (finding that a beating victim being removed from life support was not an intervening cause in the victim's death where continuing treatment was “in all probability a futile exercise” and the best the victim had hope for was living in a “persistent vegetative state”).

[38] Moreover, the forensic pathologist testified that Coleman's “[c]ause of death was complications of remote gunshot wounds to the head, neck and torso.” Tr. Vol. 3 at 49. Specifically, at the end of his life, Coleman suffered from pneumonia, pressure ulcers, and pulmonary embolism. While pulmonary embolism and pressure ulcers can be caused by inadequate blood flow when a patient is not frequently moved, the forensic pathologist testified that the pneumonia was caused by Coleman's unconsciousness and inability to protect his airway, which was a direct result of the shooting. See id. at 45. The forensic pathologist also opined that none of the complications would have “happened without the gunshot wounds having occurred” and concluded that the manner of Coleman's death was homicide. Id. at 49. Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Coleman's placement on hospice care was not such an extraordinary event as to break the causal chain between the shooting and his death. Accordingly, the evidence is sufficient to support Bryant's murder conviction.

Conclusion

[39] For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Bryant executed a valid waiver of counsel, which remained valid through his trial. We also conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Bryant's request for standby counsel. Finally, the evidence was sufficient to prove that Bryant was the shooter and that the shooting caused Coleman's death. We affirm Bryant's convictions for murder and SVF.

[40] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Coleman and Bryant each had the other's phone number saved in his phone under a nickname. Coleman was listed in Bryant's phone as “Dun Dun,” and Bryant was saved in Coleman's phone as “Kilo Brother.” See Transcript Vol. 3 at 16.

2.   At trial, the State played the recorded deposition of Detective Jason Hayes in which he provided testimony about the technical mapping and analyses of Bryant's and his girlfriend's certified call detail records related to their cell phones. See State's Ex. 71. The detective also testified about records derived from the GPS tracking device on Bryant's girlfriend's Ford Fusion.

3.   Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1(1).

4.   I.C. § 35-47-4-5(c).

5.   The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution grants a criminal defendant the right “to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.” Article 1, section 13 of the Indiana Constitution gives a criminal defendant the right “to be heard by himself and counsel[.]” Our Supreme Court has held that the rights provided by section 13 “neither ‘addressed the right of self-representation’ nor amounted to an ‘unlimited right’ for a pro se defendant ‘to conduct all trial proceedings on his own.’ ” Wright, 168 N.E.3d at 257 n.6 (quoting Edwards v. State, 902 N.E.2d 821, 828, 829 (Ind. 2009)). However, Indiana courts have “long respected a person's preference to proceed pro se.” Id. at 257.

6.   Bryant claims that because Hinds testified the shooter was “average height” and he, at 6’2”, is taller than the average American male over the age of twenty, this “excludes him as the shooter.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 217. However, we simply cannot expect eyewitnesses to criminal activity to recall the height of the accused with scientific certainty, and we do not know what information and experience a lay witness might draw upon when using a term like “average height.” Any conflicts raised by Hinds's testimony about the circumstances of the shooting were properly resolved by the jury. See Young, 198 N.E.3d at 1179 (finding that our standard of review compels us “not [to] substitute our weighing of the evidence for that of the jury” when there are “debatable questions of fact that the jury could reasonably have determined either for or against the defense”). Given the totality of the evidence and Hinds's admission that she was distracted around the time of the shooting and “[h]ysterical” after the fact, the jury could have properly discounted Hinds's testimony about the shooting and considered the sisters’ testimony more probative. Tr. Vol. 2 at 218.

7.   The jury found Bryant guilty of knowingly possessing a firearm and after he waived his right to a jury trial on the SVF phase, the trial court received evidence of his prior convictions and determined he was a serious violent felon and found him guilty of the SVF charge. See Ex. Vol. 2 at 141-63. Relying exclusively on his argument that he was not the shooter, Bryant asserts that “because there was no independent evidence that [he] possessed a firearm, his SVF conviction is also supported by insufficient evidence.” Appellant's Br. at 17. However, because the evidence is sufficient to show that Bryant was the shooter and therefore necessarily possessed a firearm, we also conclude that his SVF conviction is supported by sufficient evidence.

DeBoer, Judge.

Judges Bailey and Vaidik concur. Bailey, J., and Vaidik, J., concur.