M.J. (Mother) and J.M. (Father), Appellants-Respondents v. Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee-Petitioner (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] M.J. (Mother) and J.M. (Father) (collectively Parents) appeal the trial court's termination of their parental rights to M.M. and A.J. On appeal, Parents both challenge the trial court's conclusion that there is a reasonable probability that the reasons for removal will not be remedied and that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the best interests of the children. Mother also challenges the trial court's conclusion that continuation of the parent-child relationship posed a threat to the children's well-being. Because the evidence clearly and convincingly supports the trial court's judgment, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Mother and Father are the parents of M.M., born in January 2020, and A.J., born in October 2022. On October 6, 2022, Mother and Father both had outstanding warrants for their arrest. That day, Father was driving a vehicle with Mother and M.M., then two years old, in tow when law enforcement initiated a traffic stop. Law enforcement discovered syringes and methamphetamine inside the vehicle. Mother, pregnant with A.J. at the time, was transported to the hospital due to complications. Mother gave birth to A.J. later that day. While hospitalized, Mother tested positive for amphetamines and THC, and A.J. was born drug exposed to amphetamine and methamphetamine. Mother eventually discharged herself against medical advice. Thereafter, Mother did not stay with A.J. during her extended hospital stay and seldom visited.

[3] DCS obtained authorization from the trial court to remove the children from Parents’ care and placed them in foster care on October 18. Two days later, DCS filed its petition alleging A.J. and M.M. were children in need of services (CHINS). Parents subsequently admitted to multiple allegations made by DCS at dependency mediation.¹ Among other things, Mother admitted to the following: the traffic stop and her subsequent hospitalization on October 6; Parents were unable or unwilling to provide appropriate care to the children; Parents were unable to provide a home free of substance abuse; and Parents and the children would benefit from services. Father later admitted to the following: he was the father to both children; Father had two outstanding warrants for his arrest; A.J. was born drug exposed; Father was unable to provide appropriate care in a home free from substance abuse; and Father and his children would benefit from services.

[4] The trial court adjudicated the children as CHINS on November 21 and entered two dispositional orders as to Mother and Father. Among other things, Parents were ordered to refrain from all criminal activity; maintain clean, safe, and appropriate sustainable housing; cooperate with DCS and the GAL; complete diagnostic and substance abuse assessments; enroll in individualized and substance abuse counseling; follow all recommendations; and attend all supervised visitation. Mother was also ordered to enroll in home-based services.

[5] Throughout most of the CHINS proceeding, Mother and Father failed to comply with the dispositional orders. Parents repeatedly refused to submit to drug screens, or they would test positive for drugs. Mother used methamphetamine, amphetamine, fentanyl, and THC; she later testified that she used drugs “[d]aily.” Tr. Vol. II pp. 15. Father also admitted that he regularly used methamphetamine and fentanyl. Parents also failed to avail themselves of services, with agencies closing multiple referrals in 2022 and 2023 due to Parents’ lack of participation and noncompliance. During a permanency hearing on October 2, 2023, the trial court approved a permanency plan for adoption and termination of parental rights after Parents had failed to meaningfully participate in any services, and Mother continued to test positive for drugs.

[6] While Mother began to improve her circumstances in 2024, she was unable to maintain those improvements and consistently comply with the dispositional order. Regarding her substance abuse, Mother began to earnestly work towards sobriety in January 2024 when she stopped using fentanyl. She attended and was dismissed from an intensive outpatient treatment facility in May 2024 due to a lack of progress and noncompliance. One month later, Mother began attending a suboxone clinic and outpatient treatment facility.

[7] Regarding the court-ordered assessments and services, Mother did not complete her substance abuse and diagnostic assessments until February 2024, nearly two years after the trial court ordered her to complete them. She initiated and was later discharged from recovery skills services and individual therapy due to noncompliance. Mother also experienced homelessness in 2023 and early 2024 until she moved in with her mother in April.

[8] Throughout the CHINS case, Mother's attendance at supervised visitation appointments was inconsistent. Beginning in February 2024, Mother started consistently attending visitations until she became aggressive with staff and they discharged her from visitation services. In mid-June, Mother resumed visitation services with a different provider. While DCS Supervisor Rebekah Brophy testified that Mother's visitations generally went well, the children's behavior often regressed afterwards: they would misbehave, wet the bed, and experience anxiety.

[9] Father never completed his assessments nor participated in services. He also struggled to establish stable housing: living with his grandmother, his cousin, and in multiple hotels before he was incarcerated in February 2024 to serve time on a felony conviction for possession of methamphetamine. Thereafter, Father began attending a parenting program and attended two twelve-step meetings. Father did not attend visitation, in part due to his incarceration.

[10] DCS filed its petition to terminate Parents’ relationship with the children on February 6, 2024. The trial court held a termination hearing over two days: July 29 and August 12. DCS presented evidence on Parents’ failure to comply with the dispositional orders: Parents struggled to maintain their sobriety, maintain stable housing, attend visitation, complete assessments, or meaningfully participate in services throughout most of the case.

[11] Mother testified that she was working towards her sobriety but admitted that she used methamphetamine as late as May 2024. She contended that most drug screens from June 2024 would be negative, aside from suboxone, a drug she was taking to help combat her addictions. Agency staff also testified that Mother had recently reinitiated services in the weeks leading up to the termination hearing. Father testified that he anticipated being released from incarceration in November 2024, but he was “not sure” where he would live upon release. Id. at 109.

[12] GAL Thomas Allen testified that termination of the parent-child relationship was in the best interests of the children. M.M., at four years old, spent half of her life in foster care and A.J., at two years old, spent his entire life in foster care. GAL Allen believed that Mother's “inroads on sobriety” were not enough to overcome her history of addiction and noncompliance with the trial court's dispositional decree. Id. at 180. Father was not available to parent the children due to his incarceration and made no attempts to achieve sobriety or participate in services prior to his incarceration. The GAL believed that the longer the children spent in foster care the “harder and harder” it would be “to go back to [Parents].” Id. at 181.

[13] Family Case Manager (FCM) Sara Murriel also testified that it was in the children's best interests to terminate the parent-child relationship because neither Parent took advantage of the services offered until Mother began doing so in the five weeks leading up to the termination hearing. FCM Murriel also testified that the children were bonded to their foster family and would seek out their foster parents for comfort. One of the foster parents testified that M.M. and another child in the foster home became “best friends” and “do everything together.” Id. at 62.

[14] The trial court issued its order terminating the parent-child relationship on November 12. Among other things, the trial court found: Parents failed to avail themselves of services, Parents failed to maintain consistent contact and visitation with the children, and Parents largely failed to comply with drug screens and abused illegal drugs throughout most of the case. The trial court also found that while Mother began to participate in intensive outpatient treatment, she admitted to using methamphetamine as late as May 2024 and did not earnestly participate in outpatient treatment until June 2024. As to Parents, the court also found they failed to establish stable housing and failed to provide “any material, in kind or financial support for the children during the CHINS proceeding.” App. Vol. II p. 44.

[15] Mother and Father separately appealed the termination of their parental rights with M.M. and A.J. We granted a motion to consolidate appeals. This decision follows.

Discussion and Decision

I. Standard of Review

[16] We recognize “[a] parent's interest in the care, custody, and control of his or her children is ‘perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests.’ ” In re R.S., 56 N.E.3d 625, 628 (Ind. 2016) (quoting Bester v. Lake Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child, 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005)). “[A]lthough parental rights are of a constitutional dimension, the law provides for the termination of these rights when the parents are unable or unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities.” In re A.P., 882 N.E.2d 799, 805 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), reh'g. denied. Involuntary termination of parental rights is the most extreme sanction a court can impose, and therefore “termination is intended as a last resort, available only when all other reasonable efforts have failed.” Id.

[17] “We have long had a highly deferential standard of review in cases involving the termination of parental rights.” In re C.A., 15 N.E.3d 85, 92 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).

In considering whether the termination of parental rights is appropriate, we do not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility. We consider only the evidence and any reasonable inferences therefrom that support the judgment, and give due regard to the trial court's opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses firsthand. Where a trial court has entered findings of fact and conclusions of law, we will not set aside the trial court's findings or judgment unless clearly erroneous. [Ind. Trial Rule 52(A)]. In evaluating whether the trial court's decision to terminate parental rights is clearly erroneous, we review the trial court's judgment to determine whether the evidence clearly and convincingly supports the findings and the findings clearly and convincingly support the judgment.

In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1229-30 (Ind. 2013) (citations and quotation marks omitted). Any unchallenged findings of fact are accepted as true by this Court. In re S.S., 120 N.E.3d 605, 609 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). As such, if the unchallenged findings clearly and convincingly support the judgment, we will affirm. Kitchell v. Franklin, 26 N.E.3d 1050, 1059 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied; T.B. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 971 N.E.2d 104, 110 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied.

[18] A petition to terminate a parent-child relationship must allege and prove, in relevant part:

(B) that one (1) of the following is true:

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(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the child.

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(C) [T]hat termination is in the best interests of the child; and

(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the child.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(2)(B)(ii)-(D) (2019).² DCS must prove each element by “clear and convincing evidence.” R.S., 56 N.E.3d at 629; Ind. Code § 31-37-14-2 (1997). If the trial court finds the allegations in the petition are true, the court shall terminate the parent-child relationship. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-8(a) (2012).

II. Termination of Parents’ parental rights was not clearly erroneous.

A. Remedying Conditions

[19] Parents do not challenge the trial court's findings of fact, so we accept them as true. See S.S., 120 N.E.3d at 609 n.2. Parents contend the unchallenged findings do not clearly support the trial court's conclusions that the conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied and Mother, in addition, challenges the trial court's conclusion that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to Child's well-being.

[20] Because Indiana Code Section 31-35-4-2(B) is written in the disjunctive, only one of these conclusions was necessary to terminate Parents’ parental rights. See generally In re S.K., 124 N.E.3d 1225, 1233 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (Where former Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) (2017) was disjunctive, “the trial court need only find that one of the three requirements of that subsection has been established by clear and convincing evidence.”), trans. denied. Here, we conclude the trial court did not err in determining the conditions would not be remedied, thus we need not address Mother's argument that the trial court erred in concluding that continuing the parent-child relationship posed a threat to the children's well-being.³

[21] In reviewing a trial court's finding that the conditions warranting removal will not be remedied, we engage in a two-step analysis: first, “we must ascertain what conditions led to [the children's] placement” and second, “we determine whether there is a reasonable probability that those conditions will not be remedied.” K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1231 (citations and quotation marks omitted). In considering the second step, a “trial court must consider a parent's habitual pattern of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation.” Id.

[22] First, the children were removed from Parents because they were unable to supervise the children properly due to substance abuse issues, they engaged in criminal conduct, and A.J. was born drug exposed. Parents admitted that they were unable or unwilling to provide appropriate care to the children due to their struggles with substance abuse, establishing stable housing, and incarceration.

[23] Second, the unchallenged findings and the evidence presented clearly and convincingly demonstrate that these conditions will not be remedied. Father made no efforts to comply with the dispositional order until he was incarcerated in February 2024 to serve time on a conviction for felony possession of methamphetamine. Parents both admitted that they used illegal substances throughout the case, with Mother admitting to using methamphetamine as late as May 2024. Neither Mother nor Father meaningfully availed themselves of the services offered to them until February 2024. Similarly, neither Parent provided “any material, in kind, or financial support for the children during the CHINS proceeding.” App. Vol. II p. 44. Parents also failed to consistently attend visitations throughout the case, with Mother's visitation services suspended after an altercation with staff.

[24] While we commend Mother for working towards sobriety and finally participating in services, she was failing to comply with the dispositional order as late as May 2024—a mere six weeks before the termination hearing began. On appeal, Mother argues that her conduct in late 2024 outweighs her history of noncompliance and substance abuse. In doing so, Mother invites us to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1229. And the trial court did not err by considering Parents’ historical inability to provide “adequate housing, stability and supervision” in addition to considering their present circumstances when it determined the conditions resulting in the children's removal would not be remedied. In re A.K., 924 N.E.2d 212, 223 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). The court's conclusion that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions which led to the children's removal will not be remedied was not clearly erroneous.

B. Best Interests

[25] Parents also challenge the trial court's conclusion that terminating their parental rights was in the children's best interests.⁴ In determining best interests of a child, “trial courts must look at the totality of the evidence and, in doing so, subordinate the parents’ interests to those of the children.” In re Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d 41, 49 (Ind. 2019) (citations omitted), cert. denied. “Central among these interests is children's need for permanency[,]” as “children cannot wait indefinitely for their parents to work toward preservation or reunification.” Id. (citations omitted). A trial court considers whether the child's emotional and physical development is threatened and “need not wait until a child is irreversibly harmed such that their physical, mental, or social development is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship.” In re P.B., 199 N.E.3d 790, 799 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (citing K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1235), reh'g. denied, trans. denied. “[W]e have previously held that the recommendation by both the case manager and child advocate to terminate parental rights, in addition to evidence that the conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied, is sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child's best interests.” A.D.S. v. Indiana Dep't of Child Servs., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1158-59 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (citations omitted).

[26] Here, the children were initially removed from Parents’ care in 2022 because A.J. was born drug exposed and Parents struggled with substance abuse and criminal conduct. By the time the termination hearings took place in 2024, M.M. was four years old and A.J. was two years old. Half of M.M.’s life was spent in foster care and A.J. was in foster care for his entire life. Since removal, Parents had largely failed to avail themselves of services and the reasons for the children's removal had not been remedied.

[27] The GAL recommended termination, in part, because the children needed permanency and it would be a disservice to the children to delay permanency further, stating the longer they spent in foster care, the harder it would be to go back to Parents. FCM Murriel also recommended termination as the children were already bonded with their foster family. FCM Murriel also testified that foster parents were attentive to the children. The children played with the other children in the home and sought out their foster parents when they needed calming or care. In contrast, the children's behavior would deteriorate after they visited Mother. Mother's argument that she developed a strong bond with the children through visitation invites us to reweigh the evidence; we decline. See Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 45. It is not in the best interests of the children to further delay permanency when considering Parents’ history of noncompliance, the children's relationship with the foster family, and the length of time the children were not in Parents’ care. The totality of the evidence, therefore, supports the trial court's determination that termination of Mother and Father's parental rights was in the children's best interests.

[28] We affirm.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Mother and Father separately attended dependency mediation.

2.   Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4 was substantially amended effective March 11, 2024. DCS filed its petition in this case on February 6, 2024, citing to the then-effective version of the statute.

3.   Likewise, we need not address the State's argument that Mother waived this issue by failing to present a cogent argument.

4.   The State contends Father failed to present a cogent argument that the trial court erred in concluding termination of the parent-child relationship was in the children's best interests. Nevertheless, we address Mother's and Father's claims together.

Scheele, Judge.

Judges Foley and Kenworthy concur. [29] Foley, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.