Eric Michael Fields, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Eric Michael Fields appeals his conviction for Level 6 felony intimidation and argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. Specifically, Fields contends that the State failed to prove that he intended to communicate a threat with intent to place the victim in fear that he would carry out his threat.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Lebanon Police Detective Eric Adams, who is assigned to the Hamilton/Boone County Drug Task Force, participated in an investigation that resulted in Fields's arrest. On July 28, 2023, Fields was an inmate in the Boone County Jail. On that date, he placed a telephone call from the jail to his friend Tisha Maxwell. During the call, Fields discussed his mother's arrest for dealing after an investigation in Clinton County involving controlled buys.

[4] Fields became angry during the phone call and told Maxwell, “I'm gonna kill Adams ․ I promise you, it was Adams. I'm gonna kill that bitch.” Ex. 1 (call 2) at 3:00 to 3:15. Fields believed that Adams was involved in the Clinton County investigation concerning his mother. Id. at 10:55 to 11:15.

[5] Prior to any phone call, Boone County Jail advises inmates that their calls are recorded and monitored by law enforcement. Detective Adams listened to Fields's recorded phone call and heard Fields's threat to kill him. The detective took the threat seriously and warned his family about the threat. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 10.

[6] The State charged Fields with Level 6 felony intimidation on August 4.¹ Specifically, the charging information provided in relevant part that, on July 28, 2023,

Fields did communicate a threat to commit a forcible felony against Detective Eric Adams, with the intent that Detective Eric Adams be placed in fear that the threat will be carried out ․

Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 13. Fields waived his right to a jury trial, and, after a bench trial, the court found Fields guilty of Level 6 felony intimidation. After a sentencing hearing, the court ordered Fields to serve 564 days in the Department of Correction.

[7] Fields now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[8] Fields argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. When we consider a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, “[w]e neither reweigh evidence nor judge witness credibility.” Gibson v. State, 51 N.E.3d 204, 210 (Ind. 2016). Instead, we consider only that evidence most favorable to the judgment together with all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. Id. “We will affirm the conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Love v. State, 73 N.E.3d 693, 696 (Ind. 2017).

[9] To prove that Fields committed Level 6 felony intimidation as charged, the State was required to prove that Fields communicated “a threat to commit a forcible felony against Detective Eric Adams, with the intent that Detective Adams be placed in fear that the threat will be carried out ․” Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 13; see also Ind. Code § 35-45-2-1(a)(4), (b)(1)(A). Fields argues that the State failed to prove that Fields intended to communicate the threat to Detective Adams and that he intended Detective Adams to be placed in fear that Fields would carry out the threat.

[10] Concerning his argument that he did not intend to communicate a threat to Detective Adams, Fields claims that the threat was made “in the heat of anger” on a recorded jailhouse call he placed to his friend. Appellant's Br. at 8. Fields observes that he did not communicate the threat directly to Detective Adams and did not ask any person to convey the threat to the detective. Id.

[11] “It is well-established that a defendant need not speak directly with a victim to communicate a threat for purposes of Indiana Code Section 35-45-2-1.” E.B. v. State, 89 N.E.3d 1087, 1091 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). Instead, “the statement must be transmitted in such a way that the defendant knows or has good reason to know the statement will reach the victim.” Id. at 1092.

[12] In J.T. v. State, 718 N.E.2d 1119 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), our court reversed a juvenile's delinquency adjudication for intimidation after concluding that the State did not present sufficient evidence that the juvenile intended to communicate the threat. In that case, a high school student prepared a document that contained a threat against a fellow student and printed it in the high school library. A librarian intercepted the document, and the document was given to the school's administration. Id. at 1121-22.

[13] J.T. appealed the delinquency adjudication for intimidation and argued that there was no evidence that he communicated or attempted to communicate a threat to the student named in the document. Id. at 1123. Our court observed that the State only proved that J.T. intended to print the document containing the threat and that the printed document would be returned directly to him. Id. “The printing of a single document, without more, does not constitute a communication to the person named in the document.” Id. Moreover, J.T. “did not know or have good reason to believe that the document would be intercepted and transmitted through various intermediaries to” the student threatened in the document. Id. at 1124.

[14] On the other hand, our court has held that the State presented sufficient evidence that the threat was “communicated” to the victim where the defendant made the threat in the news media. Ajabu v. State, 677 N.E.2d 1035, 1043 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997), trans. denied. In Ajabu, we held that the State presented sufficient evidence of intimidation when it showed that the defendant made threatening statements to the media about the prosecutor who was prosecuting his son for another offense. Id.

[15] Here, Fields placed the phone call at issue to his friend on the Boone County Jail telephone system. Before the call began, Fields was warned that the call would be recorded and monitored. Tr. Vol. 2, pp. 12-13. Fields admitted that he knew the calls were recorded. Id. at 23. Detective Adams listened to the recording of Fields's phone call and heard Fields's threats to kill him. Id. at 9-10. Because he knew the jail phone calls are recorded and monitored, Fields had good reason to believe that his threat would be communicated to Detective Adams, and the threat was in fact communicated to the detective. This evidence was sufficient to establish that Fields intended to communicate the threat to Detective Adams. Cf. Soucy v. State, 22 N.E.3d 683, (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (granting post-conviction relief to the petitioner because there was no evidence that the threats were communicated to the victim where the petitioner made the threats in a telephone call placed to his mother, but his mother refused to contact the victim to relay the threats).

[16] Fields also argues that the State failed to present sufficient evidence that the threat would likely cause fear in a reasonable person similarly situated to the target of the threat. Appellant's Br. at 9. Fields claims that the context of the threat “undermines any claim that [his] words posed an actual danger or carried serious weight” because he was incarcerated, was unable to carry out his threat, and was simply “blowing off steam.” Id. Fields summarizes his argument as follows: “To criminalize Mr. Fields’[s] words would invite the prosecution for mere venting, and risk chilling protected speech under the First Amendment.”² Id. at 10.

[17] Whether a communication is a threat is an objective question for the trier of fact. Newell v. State, 7 N.E.3d 367, 369 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied. Indiana Code section 35-45-2-1 defines “threat” in relevant part as “an expression, by words or action, of an intention to ․ unlawfully injure the person threatened ․ [or] commit a crime ․” “In determining whether a statement was intended as a true threat, we consider the content of the statement, its context, and the reaction of the listeners.” Whitaker-Blakely v. State, 248 N.E.3d 617, 621 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (quotation and citation omitted). “True threats are ‘serious expression[s]’ conveying that a speaker means to ‘commit an act of unlawful violence.’ ” Counterman v. Colorado, 600 U.S. 66, 74 (2023) (citing Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003)).

[18] During the phone call, Fields was angry because he believed that Detective Adams was involved in his mother's arrest. Fields threatened to kill the detective twice during the call. Ex. 1 (call 2) at 3:00 to 3:15. Detective Adams took Fields's threat seriously and notified his family of the threat. Specifically, he testified that after hearing Fields's threats to kill him, he had “a heightened sense of awareness of things going on around [him].” Tr. Vol 2, p. 10. The detective warned his children “not to just be super trusting of anybody that just shows up” to their house. Id.

[19] Fields's threat to kill Detective Adams in retaliation for being involved in his mother's arrest is a statement that would cause a reasonable person to feel fear. Moreover, that Fields was incarcerated is irrelevant because Indiana Code section 35-45-2-1(a)(4) does not require that the feared harm be imminent. This evidence is sufficient to establish that Fields intended to put Detective Adams in fear that he would carry out his threat to kill the detective. Fields's argument to the contrary is simply a request to reweigh the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses, which our court will not do.

Conclusion

[20] The State presented sufficient evidence to prove that Fields committed Level 6 felony intimidation, and we affirm his conviction.

[21] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The State also charged Fields with Level 5 felony intimidation for a statement he made about Judge Bruce Petit. Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 13. The trial court found Fields not guilty of that charge.

2.   The First Amendment does not protect speech that constitutes a true threat. See Moone v. State, 250 N.E.3d 1101, 1107 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025), trans. denied.

Mathias, Judge.

Judges May and Bradford concur. May, J., and Bradford, J., concur.