Bobby Arnold, Appellant/Defendant v. Jesse Smith Roofing & Remodeling Company, Appellee/Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] After Jesse Smith Roofing & Remodeling Company (“Smith Roofing”) repaired damage to Bobby Arnold's Fulton County house, Arnold refused to pay. Smith Roofing recorded a mechanic's lien and commenced a foreclosure action against Arnold, which it later amended. After Arnold failed to respond to either of Smith Roofing's complaints, Smith Roofing obtained a default judgment. Arnold moved for relief from Smith Roofing's default judgment, which motion the trial court denied. After Arnold filed his appeal, he paid the full amount of Smith Roofing's judgment to the trial court, which Smith Roofing accepted in satisfaction of its judgment.

[2] Arnold contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for relief from judgment. Smith Roofing contends that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Arnold's motion for relief from judgment and, in the alternative, that Arnold's payment in satisfaction of the judgment has rendered this appeal moot. Arnold argues in response to Smith Roofing's mootness claim that we should address his argument on the merits (despite his appeal's potential mootness) because of the potential for unjust negative collateral effects on his personal-injury suit against Smith Roofing. While we agree with Arnold that we should address his appellate claim, we conclude that it is without merit. Our disposition of this appeal in Smith Roofing's favor leaves its mechanic's lien on Arnold's house without basis, so we affirm the judgment of the trial court and remand with instructions to order Smith Roofing to release its mechanic's lien.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Arnold owns a house in Rochester, in which he lives with his girlfriend and her son, and his homeowner's insurance carrier is Erie Insurance (“Erie”). In August of 2022, a tree struck and damaged Arnold's roof. Smith Roofing was hired to repair the roof, but when the work was done, Arnold refused to pay his bill. On February 8, 2023, Smith Roofing recorded a mechanic's lien against Arnold's house. On July 27, 2023, Smith Roofing filed suit against Arnold, seeking to foreclose its mechanic's lien and recover damages. Arnold received the complaint on July 31, 2023, but did not respond.

[4] Smith Roofing amended its complaint on December 18, 2023, to add additional defendants, including unsecured creditors and two secured creditors. Arnold did not respond to the amended complaint either. On May 10, 2024, Smith Roofing moved for default judgment, which motion the trial court granted the same day, entering a judgment in favor of Smith Roofing for $16,309.23. On June 24, 2024, Arnold moved to stay foreclosure and set aside the default judgment. On September 19, 2024, Arnold and the other residents of his house filed a personal-injury complaint in cause number 25C01-2409-CT-695 (“Cause No. 695”) against Smith Roofing, alleging that Smith Roofing's negligent work had caused them injury.¹ On November 12, 2024, after a hearing, the trial court denied Arnold's motion to set aside the default judgment. On December 13, 2024, Arnold filed his notice of appeal.

[5] On or about February 7, 2025, Arnold paid the full amount of Smith Roofing's judgment, plus interest. On February 19, 2025, Smith Roofing moved to dismiss Arnold's appeal, arguing that it is now moot because it had received a check in satisfaction of the money judgment. Arnold filed an opposition to Smith Roofing's motion to dismiss, arguing that there remains a concrete controversy between the parties because Smith Roofing continues to hold a mechanic's lien attached to Arnold's property. Arnold also opposed Smith Roofing's motion to dismiss on the basis that dismissal in this case could adversely affect his (and the other plaintiffs’) position in Cause No. 695.

Discussion and Decision

I. Mootness

[6] Arnold contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for relief from judgment, while Smith Roofing contends, inter alia, that this appeal is moot and should be dismissed because Arnold has satisfied the judgment Smith Roofing had against him. Arnold contends that we should address the merits of his appeal, even if moot, because a mootness finding would have negative collateral consequences in Cause No. 695. In making this argument, Arnold seems to acknowledge the merit of Smith Roofing's argument that dismissal in this appeal would be dispositive of Cause No. 695 because his personal-injury claims against Smith Roofing qualify as compulsory counterclaims that were not brought in a timely fashion.

[7] An appeal or an issue becomes moot when:

1. it is no longer “live” or when the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome;

2. the principal questions in issue have ceased to be matters of real controversy between the parties; or

3. the court on appeal is unable to render effective relief upon an issue.

Because this court decides only real controversies or questions, we dismiss appeals which raise moot or abstract propositions. [․] An appeal may be heard which might otherwise be dismissed as moot where leaving the judgment undisturbed might lead to negative collateral consequences. The reasoning behind this exception is that it is far better to eliminate the source of a potential legal disability than to require the citizen to suffer the possibly unjustified consequence of the disability itself for an indefinite period of time.

Roark v. Roark, 551 N.E.2d 865, 867–68 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (citations and quotation marks omitted). In the interest of eliminating any possibility of unjustified negative consequences in Cause No. 695 that might arise from a dismissal of Arnold's appeal on mootness grounds, we choose to address the merits of Arnold's claim without expressing an opinion on the mootness of Arnold's appeal.

II. Motion for Relief from Judgment

[8] As mentioned, Arnold contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for relief for judgment. Specifically, Arnold contends that the trial court's failure to find that the default judgment should be reversed due to mistake and/or excusable neglect was clearly erroneous. Indiana Trial Rule 60(B) provides, in relevant part, as follows:

On motion and upon such terms as are just the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a judgment, including a judgment by default, for [․] mistake, surprise, or excusable neglect[.] The motion shall be filed [․] not more than one year after the judgment, order or proceeding was entered or taken [and] must allege a meritorious claim or defense.

[9] Our review of a trial court's ruling on a motion for relief from judgment is governed by the following:

The decision whether to set aside a default judgment is given substantial deference on appeal. Our standard of review is limited to determining whether the trial court abused its discretion. An abuse of discretion may occur if the trial court's decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or if the court has misinterpreted the law. We may affirm a general default judgment on any theory supported by the evidence adduced at trial. The trial court's discretion is necessarily broad in this area because any determination of excusable neglect, surprise, or mistake must turn upon the unique factual background of each case. Moreover, no fixed rules or standards have been established because the circumstances of no two cases are alike. [․] In addition, the trial court must balance the need for an efficient judicial system with the judicial preference for deciding disputes on the merits. Furthermore, reviewing the decision of the trial court, we will not reweigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the trial court. Upon a motion for relief from a default judgment, the burden is on the movant to show sufficient grounds for relief under Indiana Trial Rule 60(B).

Kmart Corp. v. Englebright, 719 N.E.2d 1249, 1253 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (citations omitted).

[10] Arnold's argument is, essentially, that his inaction in the face of Smith Roofing's lawsuit should be excused because of his reasonable belief that Erie had been handling his defense. Arnold's argument in this regard is reliant on the truth of his contentions that he informed Erie about Smith Roofing's foreclosure action and was led to believe that Erie was handling his defense. The only evidence supporting these contentions, however, is Arnold's testimony, and the trial court was under no obligation to credit any of this testimony and, apparently, did not. In the end, Arnold's contention that his neglect of Smith Roofing's foreclosure action was excusable amounts to nothing more than a request to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. Arnold has failed to establish that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for relief from judgment.² Our disposition of this appeal in Smith Roofing's favor leaves its mechanic's lien on Arnold's house without basis, so we remand with instructions to order Smith Roofing to release its mechanic's lien.

[11] We affirm the judgment of the trial court and remand with instructions.³

FOOTNOTES

1.   We hereby take judicial notice of the proceedings in Cause No. 695. See Ind. Evidence Rule 201(b)(5).

2.   Arnold argues, for the first time on appeal, that he is also entitled to relief from judgment pursuant to Trial Rule 60(B)(8), or for “any reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment, other than those reasons set forth in sub-paragraphs (1), (2), (3), and (4).” We do not directly address this argument, as “it is well settled that an argument presented for the first time on appeal is waived for purposes of appellate review.” CT102 LLC v. Auto. Fin. Corp., 175 N.E.3d 869, 874 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021).

3.   Because we have addressed the merits of this appeal, we deny Smith Roofing's motion to dismiss Arnold's appeal.

Bradford, Judge.

Judges May and Mathias concur. May, J., and Mathias, J., concur.