IN RE: J.G. (Minor Child) (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] On October 2, 2024, J.G. (“Child”) was found to be a child in need of services (“CHINS”) pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-34-1-1. On appeal, Child's parents, P.G. (“Mother”) and S.E. (“Father”) (collectively, “Parents”) do not dispute that Child was a CHINS. However, both challenge the juvenile court's classification of Child as a CHINS under Indiana Code section 31-34-1-1 rather than Indiana Code section 31-34-1-6. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Child was born to Parents on February 12, 2007. Child was reported as having suffered suicidal ideations and a prior suicide attempt in May of 2022. Leading up to the initiation of the underlying CHINS action, per Parents’ arrangement, Child lived with Father during the week and stayed with Mother on weekends.

[3] On February 21, 2024, the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) received a report that Mother would not allow Child “back into her home and that he [was] not welcome in her home.” Appellant S.E.’s App. Vol. II p. 17. At the time, Father also indicated that Child was “not welcome in his home.” Appellant S.E.’s App. Vol. II p. 17. Child reported that he did not want to live with Father, claiming that “Father beats him when he [ ] resides with Father.” Appellant S.E.’s App. Vol. II p. 17. Child was removed from Parents’ care and placed at the Youth Services Center (“YSC”).

[4] On February 23, 2024, DCS petitioned to adjudicate Child as a CHINS under Indiana Code section 31-34-1-1. DCS family case manager (“FCM”) Jacqueline Justice was assigned to the family and began working with them in March of 2024. At her first meeting with FCM Justice, Mother asserted that “allowing [Child] to stay at [Mother's home] would just be giving in to what he wanted.” Tr. Vol. II p. 12. Since the initiation of the CHINS proceedings, Parents have placed the blame for the need for DCS intervention solely on Child, claiming that he has been disrespectful to Parents and has broken their rules. Mother also accused Child of having vandalized her car at some point, claiming that he had “keyed [her] car” and had threatened to run away. Tr. Vol. II p. 94.

[5] In March of 2024, DCS referred Parents and Child to family-centered therapy with service provider Salisha Keller. Keller observed that “there was high conflict” between Child and Parents. After one session devolved into yelling between Child and Mother, Keller heard Mother tell Child that he “was lucky that she didn't hit him[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 42. Keller's attempts to de-escalate the situation were unsuccessful and the session ended when Mother asked Child and Keller to leave. Mother commented to Keller that “she didn't care where [Child] went.” Tr. Vol. II p. 42. Keller observed that Mother did not appear fearful of Child. After the breakdown of family-centered therapy, Keller continued to work with Child in individual therapy.

[6] On May 1, 2024, Mother, by counsel, filed her notice of intent to assert an “affirmative defense” that Child was a CHINS under Indiana Code section 31-34-1-6.¹ During a two-day evidentiary hearing, which was conducted on July 30, and August 6, 2024, the juvenile court heard evidence relating to whether Child was a CHINS pursuant to either Indiana Code section 31-34-1-1 or Indiana Code section 31-34-1-6.

[7] During the evidentiary hearing, FCM Justice opined that many of the issues between Mother and Child stem from Mother's requests for Child to go to Father's home and Child's position that he does not want to go to Father's home because Father “yells at him and has hit him.” Tr. Vol. II p. 17. Father admitted to FCM Justice that “at one point [he had] put hands on” Child. Tr. Vol. II p. 35. Child reported to FCM Justice that since his initial removal from Parents’ homes in March of 2024, he has had minimal interactions with Father. FCM Justice opined there was no indication that Child was a danger to himself or others. She further opined that family therapy and “probably some individual therapy” for Parents was necessary to ensure that Parents could prove a safe and stable home for Child. Tr. Vol. II p. 19. FCM Justice testified, however, that Parents had indicated that they were not willing to participate in services.

[8] Child's GAL, Stephen Griebel, testified that he has had “many conversations” with Child. Tr. Vol. II pp. 66. Noting Parents’ inability to resolve conflict with Child in a healthy manner, GAL Griebel opined that without Parents’ participation in services, placement in either of Parents’ homes would seriously impair or endanger Child. GAL Griebel further opined that Child was not a danger to himself or anyone else. GAL Griebel testified that “I have, without question, not found [Child] in any way, shape or form close to” being a CHINS under Indiana Code section 31-34-1-6. Tr. Vol. II p. 83.

[9] Keller testified that she and Child met once per week for individual therapy, focusing on coping skills and other “age-typical circumstances.” Tr. Vol. II p. 45. Keller indicated that Child was “making great progress” and is compliant and cooperative. Tr. Vol. II p. 46. Keller opined that Child's behavioral issues in Parents’ homes were “on the worse-than-average-side because he's not able to have the age-typical privileges or things that kind of go along with being a 17-year-old kid.” Tr. Vol. II p. 47. Keller further testified that while Child had, on occasion, let “his stressors get [ ] the best of him[,]” he had not “had any suicidal ideations.” Tr. Vol. II p. 47. Child worked with Keller to develop coping skills and had not reported any self-harm or a desire to hurt himself or anyone else.

[10] Mother indicated a willingness to allow Child back into her home, but only if he received the services that he needed. Father hesitated to say that he would take Child back into his home. Father indicated, however, that he did not believe that Child was a danger to himself or others. Following the fact-finding hearing, the juvenile court determined that Child was a CHINS pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-34-1-1, but not pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-34-1-6.

Discussion and Decision

[11] “The purposes of a CHINS case are to help families in crisis and to protect children, not punish parents.” Matter of D.P., 72 N.E.3d 976, 980 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017).

A CHINS proceeding is a civil action; thus, the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a child is a CHINS as defined by the juvenile code. We neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of the witnesses. We consider only the evidence that supports the trial court's decision and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. We reverse only upon a showing that the decision of the trial court was clearly erroneous.

In re K.D., 962 N.E.2d 1249, 1253 (Ind. 2012) (internal quotation and citations omitted). “[A]s a general rule appellate courts grant latitude and deference to trial courts in family law matters.” Matter of D.P., 72 N.E.3d at 980. “This deference recognizes a trial court's unique ability to see the witnesses, observe their demeanor, and scrutinize their testimony, as opposed to this court's only being able to review a cold transcript of the record.” Id.

[12] During the evidentiary hearing, the juvenile court heard evidence relating to whether Child was a CHINS pursuant to either Indiana Code section 31-34-1-1 or Indiana Code section 31-34-1-6. Indiana Code section 31-34-1-1 provides that

A child is a child in need of services if before the child becomes eighteen (18) years of age:

(1) the child's physical or mental condition is seriously impaired or seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or neglect of the child's parent, guardian, or custodian to supply the child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education, or supervision:

(A) when the parent, guardian, or custodian is financially able to do so; or

(B) due to the failure, refusal, or inability of the parent, guardian, or custodian to seek financial or other reasonable means to do so; and

(2) the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that:

(A) the child is not receiving; and

(B) is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the court.

Indiana Code section 31-34-1-6 provides that

A child is a child in need of services if before the child becomes eighteen (18) years of age:

(1) the child substantially endangers the child's own health or the health of another individual; and

(2) the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that:

(A) the child is not receiving; and

(B) is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the court.

Parents agree that Child is a CHINS. However, both argue that the juvenile court erred by finding Child to be a CHINS pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-34-1-1 rather than Indiana Code section 31-34-1-6.

I. Indiana Code section 31-34-1-1

[13] The juvenile court made a number of factual findings that relate to Indiana Code section 31-34-1-1. Neither Mother nor Father has specifically challenged any of the juvenile court's findings as clearly erroneous or unsupported by the record. We accept unchallenged findings as correct. See Madlem v. Arko, 592 N.E.2d 686, 687 (Ind. 1992); Matter of To.R., 177 N.E.3d 478, 485 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), trans. denied.

[14] The juvenile court's unchallenged findings indicate that on February 21, 2024, Child was removed from Parents’ homes and placed at the YSC after Parents had refused to allow Child to return to either of their homes and “could not provide the names of any (relative or friend) willing to allow [Child] to stay with him or her while looking for an alternative placement.” Appellant P.G.’s App. Vol. II p. 20. Child was placed back in Mother's home on March 18, 2024, but was again removed on March 25, 2024. In addition, after an incident which had occurred in the presence of a home-based therapist, Parents indicated that they “would not allow [Child] to reside in either home, as [Child] was not welcome.” Appellant P.G.’s App. Vol. II p. 20. Since being removed from Parents’ homes, Child has not had any “new juvenile probation involvement” and has made progress in therapy. Appellant P.G.’s App. Vol. II p. 20. GAL Griebel opined that Parents’ behaviors had seriously impaired and endangered Child's safety. Ultimately, the juvenile court found that Child “cannot go home to either parent's home until [Parents] participate in services, [Child] continues his services, and the family completes joint services together” and that the family was unlikely to receive the necessary services without coercive intervention. Appellant P.G.’s App. Vol. II p. 22.

[15] The unchallenged findings establish that Parents had each refused to provide Child with shelter. While each Parent attempts to blame Child for the family's situation, the evidence demonstrates that Parents’ actions had endangered Child's safety, as their actions had left him without a safe and stable living environment. GAL Griebel opined that without intervention, Parents had been unable to meet Child's needs and noted that he did not want to “pin” all the issues on Child. Tr. Vol. II p. 84. While Child had engaged in services and made progress with said services since being removed from Parents’ homes, Parents had not engaged in services. The evidence and the juvenile court's unchallenged findings are sufficient to support the juvenile court's conclusion that Child is a CHINS pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-34-1-1. Parents’ arguments to the contrary effectively amount to invitations to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See In re K.D., 962 N.E.2d at 1253.

II. Indiana Code section 31-34-1-6

[16] The juvenile court also made a number of unchallenged factual findings with regard to Indiana Code section 31-34-1-6. Again, we accept these unchallenged findings as correct. See Madlem, 592 N.E.2d at 687; Matter of To.R., 177 N.E.3d at 485.

[17] The juvenile court's unchallenged findings indicate that while Child had previously been disrespectful to and had tried to manipulate Parents, he had responded to redirection by his foster parents, had participated in therapy, and was taking his prescribed medications. Child had not committed any new delinquent acts or probation violations. In the course of his therapy, Child had not threatened to harm himself or others and had not shown a propensity to harm others. He has not “engage[d] in dangerous or threatening behaviors that stand out from other teens.” Appellant P.G.’s App. Vol. II p. 21. The juvenile court acknowledged Child's prior delinquent behavior but ultimately found that Child “is not a danger to himself.” Appellant P.G.’s App. Vol. II p. 21.

[18] FCM Justice testified that while there were some things that Child could work and improve on with regard to his behavior and mental health, he was not a danger to himself or others. FCM Justice further testified that Child had “been very willing to participate” in therapy and medication management. Tr. Vol. II p. 15. Again, Keller testified that while Child has, at times, let his stressors “get [ ] the best of him[,]” he has developed coping skills and “has not had any suicidal ideations[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 47. Child has not reported any self-harm to Keller or indicated that he had harmed or threatened to harm anyone else. Likewise, GAL Griebel testified that “I have, without question, not found [Child] in any way, shape or form close to” being a CHINS under Indiana Code section 31-34-1-6. Tr. Vol. II p. 83. As the trial court noted, Father even testified that he did not believe that Child was a danger to himself or anyone else. The evidence and juvenile court's unchallenged findings are sufficient to support the juvenile court's conclusion that Child is not a CHINS pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-34-1-6. Parents’ arguments to the contrary again effectively amount to invitations to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See In re K.D., 962 N.E.2d at 1253.

[19] The judgment of the juvenile court is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   We note that DCS argues on appeal that Mother could not raise the claim that Child was a CHINS pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-34-1-6 rather than Indiana Code section 31-34-1-1, claiming that “DCS controls under what CHINS category it alleges.” Appellee's Br. p. 29. Both DCS and the Child's guardian ad litem (“GAL”) objected to Mother's “affirmative defense” below, arguing the same. However, because the juvenile court rendered a decision on the merits of whether Child was a CHINS pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-34-1-6, we will review the juvenile court's decision on the merits without expressing an opinion as to whether it was appropriate for Mother to raise her so-called affirmative defense.

Bradford, Judge.

Altice, C.J., and DeBoer, J., concur.