Sabrina Smith, Appellant-Plaintiff v. 28 IN (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Sabrina Smith appeals the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Bonnie Sloan Post No. 28 The American Legion Department of Indiana and Mike Crump (collectively, American Legion) on her claim for malicious prosecution. She also appeals the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Allen County Sheriff's Department (ACSD) on her complaint for denial of adequate medical care while she was in custody. Smith presents five issues for review, which we consolidate and restate as:

1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in considering American Legion's motion as a motion for summary judgment?

2. Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment in favor of American Legion?

3. Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment in favor of ACSD?

[2] We affirm in part and reverse in part.

Facts & Procedural History

[3] Smith rented a hall from American Legion in New Albany, Indiana for her daughter's sixteenth birthday party on January 27, 2018. To secure the room, Smith paid $260 in cash, which was half of the $520 rental fee. When Smith arrived on the day of the party, she wrote a check in the amount of $260, with the notation “Balance for Rental.” Appendix Vol. II at 48. Unbeknownst to her, the bank account on which the check was drawn had been closed by the bank that same month “due to [suspected] fraud.” Id. at 131. Smith's check was rejected by the bank and returned to American Legion with the notation “Closed Account.” Id. at 48. Smith maintains that she received no communication from American Legion and that she was unaware that American Legion had not received money for the balance owed on the room rental.

[4] Shortly after Smith's check was returned to American Legion, the matter of collection was turned over to Crump, who held a voluntary position with American Legion. Crump tried to call Smith one time but did not reach her and did not leave a message.¹ On April 10, 2018, Crump went to the Floyd County Prosecutor's Office and completed a probable cause affidavit affirming that Smith committed theft. In support thereof, Crump stated that Smith's check had been returned by her bank and that Smith was “offered notice of the unpaid check” but the amount remained unsatisfied. Id. at 47.

[5] On July 31, 2018, the Floyd County Prosecutor formally charged Smith with Class A misdemeanor theft and attached Crump's affidavit to the charging information. On August 3, 2018, the Floyd County Superior Court found probable cause for the theft charge against Smith. The court issued a misdemeanor arrest warrant for Smith on August 6, 2018, which was set to expire on February 6, 2019.

[6] On May 3, 2019, Smith was in Fort Wayne to see her daughter. Around 10 p.m., an officer with the City of Fort Wayne Police Department initiated a traffic stop of Smith. In running her information, the officer learned of the expired arrest warrant. Smith was taken into custody and her car was impounded. Smith did not know she had been charged with a crime or that there was a warrant for her arrest.

[7] At all times relevant to Smith's detainment in the Allen County Jail, ACSD had contracted with Quality Correctional Care, LLC (QCC) to administer medical care to its inmates. Upon her arrival at the Allen County Jail, Smith was booked and processed, which included a standard initial inmate screening assessment. Smith also met with a nurse employed by QCC and told her about the prescription medications she was taking for depression, anxiety, and PTSD. Smith explained that she had recently started taking the medications and that if she went off them, the side effects would be “bad.”² Appendix Vol. III at 65. QCC staff contacted Smith's pharmacy to obtain her prescription records and was informed that her prescriptions had last been filled on April 24, 2019. It was noted in Smith's chart that a doctor would be contacted about the prescriptions.

[8] Smith maintains that she did not receive her medications while being held in the Allen County Jail and alleges that ACSD intentionally denied her access to a medical professional when she asked for her prescriptions. Smith asserts that her medical condition worsened, and she suffered emotional and physical harm because she was not provided with her prescriptions while in the Allen County Jail.

[9] On May 9, 2019, Smith was transferred to Floyd County.³ Smith appeared for an initial hearing on May 21, 2019. On June 18, 2019, the State moved to dismiss the theft case against Smith “without prejudice,” stating that dismissal “is in the best interest of justice.” Id. at 18. The court granted the State's motion on June 24, 2019.

[10] On May 10, 2021, Smith filed a complaint for damages against, among others, American Legion for malicious prosecution and ACSD for false arrest, unlawful detention, and denial of adequate medical care while she was in custody. The trial court scheduled a three-day jury trial to commence on July 9, 2024. The parties stipulated that dispositive motions should be filed at least sixty days prior to the trial date. On November 1, 2023, Smith had her arrest record and the dismissed criminal charge expunged pursuant to Ind. Code § 35-38-9-1, Indiana's expungement statute.

[11] On May 10, 2024, American Legion filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that because the expunged records could be used to defend Smith's claim of malicious prosecution, subsection (j) of the expungement statute provided it with a complete defense. That same day, ACSD filed a motion for summary judgment.

[12] On June 7, 2024, Smith filed a response in opposition to what she classified as American Legion's “Motion for Summary Judgment,” along with her designation of evidence. Appendix Vol. II at 196. Specifically, Smith designated documents from the expunged criminal matter, including the charging information, the probable cause affidavit, and the dismissal. In her supporting brief, Smith argued the substantive merits of her claim for malicious prosecution, asserting that the original action was dismissed in her favor and that “[t]he contents of the expunged records prove the case.” Id. at 200. On June 12, 2024, the day before the hearing on the dispositive motions, American Legion filed a reply to Smith's response, designated additional evidence, and argued that it was entitled to summary judgment.

[13] The court held a hearing on the pending dispositive motions on June 13, 2024. The trial court granted Smith additional time to file another response to address American Legion's substantive arguments in support of summary judgment. The court also heard argument on ACSD's motion for summary judgment. ACSD stated that it was seeking summary judgment on all theories of liability for failure to provide medical care. After Smith presented her argument as to her state law negligence claim against ACSD, the following exchange took place:

THE COURT: Um hm. Okay. Alright․ I didn't hear much about the Federal Constitutional Claims.

[SMITH]: Well, I didn't see that brought in the Summary Judgment with the Monell Claim.[4] I didn't know that we were arguing that.

Transcript at 21. ACSD addressed the court and argued that a Monell claim was not supported by the designated evidence. Smith pointed to the designated evidence and argued that the claim was supported by her deposition testimony and the sworn statements of her cell mate. On July 1, 2024, the trial court entered separate orders granting summary judgment in favor of American Legion and ACSD as to all claims. Smith filed her notice of appeal the following day. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.

Discussion & Decision

1. Procedural Claims

[14] Smith alleges several procedural errors regarding the trial court's handling of American Legion's motion, including that the trial court should not have permitted American Legion to change its motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment well beyond the deadline agreed upon by the parties. Smith also asserts that I.C. § 35-38-9-1(j) conflicts with TR 56 and improperly shifts burden to her, the nonmovant.

[15] We begin by noting that Smith's arguments are based on an inaccurate description of the procedural events that occurred in the trial court. Smith brought a malicious prosecution claim following the dismissal of the criminal case. While the malicious prosecution case was pending, Smith had the criminal case underlying her malicious prosecution claim expunged pursuant to I.C. § 35-38-9-1. Pursuant to I.C. § 35-38-9-1(h), the records relating to the criminal case were redacted and sealed by court order. As this was a confidential proceeding, American Legion was not given notice.

[16] Upon learning that evidence essential to its defense of the malicious prosecution case was expunged, American Legion filed a motion citing I.C. § 35-38-9-1(j) (Subsection (j)) and requested dismissal. Subsection (j) provides, in pertinent part:

If a person whose records are expunged brings an action that might be defended with the contents of the expunged records, the defendant is presumed to have a complete defense to the action. In order for the plaintiff to recover, the plaintiff must show that the contents of the expunged records would not exonerate the defendant.

Because the expunged records were the basis for Smith's malicious prosecution claim, American Legion argued that it had a complete defense, and thus dismissal was warranted.

[17] In response to American Legion's motion, Smith asserted that it should be converted to a motion for summary judgment because it relied upon matters outside the pleadings. Regarding the motion as such, Smith designated evidence and filed a brief in opposition to summary judgment. Specifically, Smith attached evidence of the expunged criminal case. American Legion, relying on evidence of the expunged criminal case, replied to Smith's response with additional evidence and substantive arguments as to why it was entitled to summary judgment on the malicious prosecution claim. Because American Legion's reply was filed the day before the hearing on the matter, the trial court granted Smith additional time to file another response to address her position opposing American Legion's substantive arguments in favor of summary judgment. The trial court did not issue a ruling until after Smith filed her response.

[18] In light of the procedural events of the case, we find that the trial court properly permitted the parties to present their respective arguments and considered the motion as a motion for summary judgment. Smith has not demonstrated any prejudice from the trial court's handling of the dispositive motion in this manner.

[19] We also reject Smith's assertion that American Legion improperly circumvented the timeline for dispositive motions as set out in the joint case management order. Under the circumstances, American Legion timely invoked I.C. § 35-38-9-1(j) and requested dismissal of the action. T.R. 56 only became applicable when Smith herself asserted that the matter had been converted to a motion for summary judgment and she chose to place the sealed records into evidence. Smith cannot now complain regarding the procedural path that she initiated. We also note that the trial court had discretion under the joint case management order to allow dispositive motions after the deadline established by the parties. See Appellant's Appendix Vol. III at 57 (stating that parties agreed dispositive motions would be filed sixty days prior to the trial date “unless otherwise permitted by the Court”).

[20] Further, there is no conflict between Subsection (j) and the summary judgment standard in terms of burden shifting. There is limited appellate history on this subsection of the statute, but the plain language of the statute does not support Smith's argument.

The first step in interpreting a statute is to determine whether the Legislature has spoken clearly and unambiguously on the point in question. When a statute is clear and unambiguous, we need not apply any rules of construction other than to require that words and phrases be taken in their plain, ordinary, and usual sense. Clear and unambiguous statutes leave no room for judicial construction. However[,] when a statute is susceptible to more than one interpretation it is deemed ambiguous and thus open to judicial construction.

Hopkins v. Indianapolis Pub. Schs., 183 N.E.3d 308, 312 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (quoting Schon v. Frantz, 156 N.E.3d 692, 698-99 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020)).

[21] Contrary to Smith's claim, Subsection (j) does not affect the burden allocation in a summary judgment proceeding. Subsection (j) provides a complete defense in an action where the plaintiff's criminal history has been expunged and the contents of such expunged records might be used to defend against the plaintiff's action. For a plaintiff to recover, the plaintiff must show that the contents of the expunged records would not exonerate the defendant. This provision does not shift the burden of proof in violation of T.R. 56. Rather, it prevents a plaintiff from hiding behind the expunged records in pursuit of a separate action.

[22] Here, the summary judgment burden remained with American Legion as the movant. After Smith provided the contents of the expunged records, thus negating the complete defense provided by the statute, American Legion used such evidence in presenting substantive arguments that it was entitled to summary judgment on Smith's malicious prosecution claim, an argument it could not make until after the expunged records were provided. There was no improper shifting of the summary judgment burden.

2. Summary Judgment in favor of American Legion

Standard of Review

[23] Our standard of review is well settled:

When this Court reviews a grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment, we “stand in the shoes of the trial court.” Summary judgment is appropriate “if the designated evidentiary matter shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” We will draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. We review summary judgment de novo.

Arrendale v. Am. Imaging & MRI, LLC, 183 N.E.3d 1064, 1067-68 (Ind. 2022) (citations omitted).

[24] Smith argues that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of American Legion on her malicious prosecution claim. There are four elements of a malicious prosecution claim: (1) the defendant instituted or caused to be instituted an action against the plaintiff; (2) the defendant acted with malice in doing so; (3) the defendant had no probable cause to institute the action; and (4) the original action was terminated in the plaintiff's favor. Id. The essence of malicious prosecution rests on the notion that the plaintiff has been improperly subjected to legal process. City of New Haven v. Reichhart, 748 N.E.2d 374, 378 (Ind. 2001) (citing Ziobron v. Crawford, 667 N.E.2d 202, 208 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans. denied).

[25] As to the first element, Smith argues that American Legion instituted the criminal action when Crump signed and filed a probable cause affidavit for theft. American Legion maintains that the prosecutor made an independent determination of whether to pursue criminal charges and thus it was the prosecutor who instituted the action. Under the circumstances, we agree with Smith. In his deposition, Crump stated that the board of directors for American Legion advised him to go to the prosecutor. Crump then completed and signed an affidavit in which he averred that Smith committed theft by providing American Legion with a check that was returned because the account had been closed. Unlike in Conwell v. Beatty, 667 N.E.2d 768, 778 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), here there is nothing that suggests the prosecutor made an independent inquiry into the matter. The affidavit for probable cause signed by Crump was the basis for the theft charge. But for Crump's affidavit, there would have been no criminal matter. The designated evidence demonstrates that American Legion caused the criminal action to be instituted against Smith. See F.W. Woolworth Co., Inc. v. Anderson, 471 N.E.2d 1249, 1253 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984) (stating that it was “absolutely clear from the record that appellants caused to be instituted a prosecution” where appellants had filed a probable cause affidavit seeking to have prosecutor file criminal charges for theft), trans. denied.

[26] We consider the second and third elements together. As to the second element, we note that malice may be inferred from the institution of a criminal prosecution without probable cause. Kroger Food Stores, Inc. v. Clark, 598 N.E.2d 1084, 1087 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992), trans. denied; Satz v. Koplow, 397 N.E.2d 1082, 1085 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979), trans. denied. Malice may also be inferred from the failure to conduct a suitable investigation. Woolworth, 471 N.E.2d at 1254 (citing Pontius v. Kimble, 104 N.E. 981, 982 (Ind. Ct. App. 1914)). In this vein, the failed inquiry must be culpable, as mere negligence regarding such an inquiry is insufficient to support a finding of malice. Mirka v. Fairfield of America, Inc., 627 N.E.2d 449, 451-52 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994), trans. denied.

[27] Probable cause exists “when a reasonably intelligent and prudent person would be induced to act as did the person who is charged with the burden of having probable cause.” City of New Haven v. Reichart, 748 N.E.2d 374, 379 (Ind. 2001). Indiana Courts have held that a judicial determination of probable cause in a criminal proceeding constitutes prima facie evidence of probable cause in a subsequent civil lawsuit alleging malicious prosecution. See Conwell v. Beatty, 667 N.E.2d 768, 778 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (quoting K Mart Corp. v. Brzezinski, 540 N.E.2d 1276, 1280 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989)).

[28] Smith does not challenge that there was a judicial determination of probable cause. She maintains, however, that “this is not the end of the inquiry.” Appellant's Brief at 29. Citing Chalfant v. Lods, 994 N.E.2d 740, 744 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied, she notes that “[a] judicial determination of probable cause may be rebutted by evidence that shows the finding of probable cause was induced by false testimony, fraud, or other improper means such as the withholding of material facts.” Smith maintains that Crump withheld material facts from the affidavit he submitted: that the dishonored check was partial payment, that there was a rental contract between the parties, and that Smith was never contacted about the returned check. She maintains that given these facts, a jury could have found that American Legion should have made more of an effort to contact her and collect payment before running to the prosecutor's office and filing an affidavit in which it was averred that she had committed theft. In this regard, we note that in the affidavit, Crump stated that Smith had been offered notice of the unpaid check. The designated evidence shows, however, that Crump tried to contact Smith one time using a telephone number provided to him on a piece of paper, he did not reach her, and he did not leave a message. In other words, Crump's affirmation that Smith had been offered notice of the unpaid check was false and likely mislead the prosecutor and the court regarding probable cause for the theft charge.

[29] Given that probable cause is normally an issue of fact for the jury's determination, we find that at this stage of the proceedings and taking the designated evidence most favorable to Smith as we must do, there is evidence from which the jury could find that Smith rebutted the finding of probable cause for the charge of theft.⁵ See id. This same evidence could also support a finding of malice. Indeed, as noted above, complete lack of probable cause or failure to conduct a suitable investigation may support a finding of malice.

[30] Finally, Smith argues that the dismissal is evidence that the action was terminated in her favor. American Legion argues that a dismissal without prejudice is not a termination of the action in her favor because the charges could be refiled leaving the matter open for later prosecution.

[31] American Legion cites Zaremba v. Nevarez, 898 N.E.2d 459, 463 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), for the proposition that a dismissal without prejudice is not a judgment on the merits. However, American Legion takes the court's statement in this regard out of context. The Zaremba court was considering a dismissal without prejudice in terms of its preclusive effect for purposes of res judicata. Moreover, a claim of malicious prosecution requires only that the original action be terminated in the plaintiff's favor. This does not mean, as American Legion contends, that “[o]nly a conclusive dismissal on the merits counts as a ‘termination’ in Smith's favor.” Appellee's Brief at 20.

[32] American Legion's reliance on Strutz v. McNagny, 558 N.E.2d 1103 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990), is similarly unavailing. In Strutz, the court held that summary judgment in favor of the defendant was appropriate where the “clear purpose” of the dismissal order in the original case was to leave open the ability to present the claim in another proceeding. Id. at 1107. Under such circumstances, the court held that the dismissal was not a termination favorable to the plaintiff. See id. (noting that “the court may not ignore the context in which the proceedings were terminated). And in Wong v. Tabor, 422 N.E.2d 1279, 1284 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981), the court held that a termination of the original matter due to agreement or settlement of the parties was a not a termination in favor of the plaintiff.

[33] Here, there is no evidence that Smith signed a plea agreement or had any power over the prosecutor's decision to request dismissal of the theft charge. The prosecutor simply asked the court to dismiss the original action without prejudice “in the best interest of justice.” Appendix Vol. III at 18. Notably, the charges were never refiled. Under the circumstances, dismissal of the original action was in Smith's favor.

[34] On the record before us, we find that genuine issues of material fact remain as to whether Smith rebutted the judicial determination of probable cause and whether American Legion acted with malice in pursuing a theft charge against Smith. Therefore, we reverse the entry of summary judgment in favor of American Legion on Smith's malicious prosecution claim.

3. Summary Judgment in Favor of ACSD

[35] Smith argues that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of ACSD. In her complaint, Smith alleged that ACSD denied her adequate medical care when ACSD “refused” to provide her with medication while in jail.⁶ Appendix Vol. II at 25. ACSD moved for summary judgment, noting that it was unclear whether Smith's claim was under federal or state law, but arguing that regardless it was entitled to summary judgment.

[36] To the extent Smith asserts a state law claim, we find that such claim sounds in negligence. However, in challenging the entry of summary judgment as to a state negligence claim, Smith does not cite relevant authority, and her arguments are undeveloped and not supported by cogent reasoning. We will address her arguments as best as we can discern them from the record before us.

[37] The county sheriff has a statutory duty to “take care of the county jail and the prisoners there.” Ind. Code § 36-2-13-5(a)(7). There are also regulatory provisions that set out standards for medical care that must be provided to inmates and detainees in county jails. See 210 I.A.C. 3-1-11. These regulations place an affirmative duty upon designated medical providers to establish policies and procedures for medical care for inmates within the jail.

[38] Here, ACSD contracted with QCC to provide medical services to jail inmates. Section 2.5.3 of the contract provides that QCC “shall provide and monitor the usage of pharmaceutical medications as well as the Preferred Medication List.” Appendix Vol. II at 160. QCC was also responsible for developing, implementing, and monitoring compliance with policies and procedures for administering medical care and medications for inmates. For instance, there is a provision in the contract that permits jail officers to assist with dispensing of medications under circumstances not alleged here.

[39] It is undisputed that ACSD provided Smith with access to medical care and an evaluation through QCC. It is also undisputed that QCC had knowledge of Smith's medical conditions and her prescription medication. Pursuant to its contract with ACSD, QCC was responsible for providing and monitoring the usage of all prescription medications by jail inmates. It was QCC's responsibility to approve Smith's medications from an outside pharmacy and provide those medications to her. ACSD maintains that the jail officers could not unilaterally provide Smith with her medications as this was the sole responsibility of QCC. ACSD thus argues that to the extent a party was negligent in not providing Smith with her medications, such claim should have been brought against QCC. ACSD maintains that it complied with its duty to provide her with medical care when it had her evaluated by QCC. We agree. Summary judgment for ACSD was therefore proper as to any state negligence claim.

[40] Smith also argues that the trial court erred in entering summary judgment in favor of ACSD on her federal 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Monell claim. The touchstone of a § 1983 action against a government body is an allegation that official policy is responsible for a deprivation of rights protected by the Constitution. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690. Because of “persistent and widespread discriminatory practices of state officials,” § 1983 encompasses constitutional deprivations that may arise out of governmental “custom” or traditional ways of carrying out state policy even though such has not received formal approval through official decision-making channels. Id. at 691. Indeed, courts have recognized that such customs or policies of state officials “could well be so permanent and well settled as to constitute a ‘custom or usage’ with the force of law.” Id. A § 1983 Monell claim is a claim of a constitutional deprivation that arises out of such customs or policies. For Monell liability to attach, the plaintiff must demonstrate that “through its deliberate conduct, the municipality was the ‘moving force’ behind the injury alleged.” Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997).

[41] We first address Smith's claim that she had no notice that her Monell claim was in jeopardy and that the trial court abused its discretion when it sua sponte entered summary judgment in favor of ACSD on all her claims. In finding her position unpersuasive, we initially observe that Smith's theory of liability for her claim of denial of medical care is not clear from her complaint. At no point therein does she mention a Monell claim. Nevertheless, in its motion for summary judgment, ACSD, while noting uncertainty as to Smith's legal theory for her claim against it, explicitly stated that it was seeking summary judgment on all claims, whether asserted under federal or state law. Then, at the summary judgment hearing, both ACSD and Smith addressed their position with regard to a Monell claim. Thus, contrary to her argument, Smith's federal claim was clearly at issue and presented for the trial court's consideration on summary judgment.

[42] We now address the court's entry of summary judgment on Smith's Monell claim. In arguing that summary judgment was improper, Smith points to her deposition testimony and the sworn statements of her cell mate, both of which assert that contrary to stated policy, nurses did not come into the cell blocks and inmates needed to ask for permission to see a nurse. They also both stated that Smith asked jail officers numerous times about obtaining her medications or an opportunity to speak with a nurse, but the jail officers denied her requests while other inmates were permitted to see a nurse.

[43] However, the assertions of two inmates that individual jail officers denied Smith access to a nurse and refused to provide her medications during the short time she was in the Allen County Jail falls short of establishing a persistent and widespread discriminatory practice employed by ACSD and at most, suggest isolated incidents of wrongdoing by individual jail officers.⁷ This is not enough to support a Monell claim. See Howell v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 987 F.3d 647, 654 (7th Cir. 2021). Although the 7th Circuit has not adopted bright-line rules defining widespread custom or practice, there must be some evidence demonstrating a systematic policy or practice at issue rather than a singular event or even a short series of individual events. See Thomas v. Cook Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, 604 F.3d 293, 303 (7th Cir. 2009) (noting that the 7th Circuit has rejected claims of widespread custom or practice in cases involving a single incident, or three incidents). We thus conclude that the trial court properly granted summary judgment for ACSD.

[44] In sum, we reverse the entry of summary judgment in favor of American Legion and affirm the grant of summary judgment in favor of ACSD on both Smith's state and federal claims.

[45] Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Crump stated that the finance officer for American Legion gave him a Post-It note with what was purported to be Smith's phone number.

2.   On a screening form completed by the nurse upon Smith's booking into jail, the nurse noted, “Patient states that if she does not get her meds she will end up in a psych ward somewhere.” Appellant's Appendix Vol. III at 49.

3.   It is unclear if Smith remained in jail after she was transferred to Floyd County.

4.   Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).

5.   We are a bit perplexed by American Legion's claim that “the information and charge against Smith was for check deception” and its corresponding argument that, because there is no requirement that Smith have been contacted for such charge, there is probable cause to support a charge for check deception. American Legion's Brief at 23. Smith was clearly charged with theft, which is what was specifically averred by Crump in his affidavit. The record citations provided by American Legion do not evidence otherwise.

6.   Smith also made claims of false arrest and unlawful detention. During the summary judgment hearing, Smith informed the court that those claims were resolved.

7.   Respondeat superior liability does not attach to claims under § 1983. See City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989). Thus, to the extent her claims are against individual jail officers, Smith's recourse was to bring an action against them individually.

Altice, Chief Judge.

Judges Vaidik and Scheele concur. Vaidik, J. and Scheele, J., concur.