T.J., Appellant-Respondent v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Petitioner (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] T.J. (“T.J.”) appeals his adjudication as a delinquent child for Class A misdemeanor dangerous possession of a firearm.¹ T.J. claims that the juvenile court abused its discretion when it admitted the handgun into evidence. Specifically, T.J. argues that law enforcement's reliance on the anonymous tip it received lacked sufficient indicia of reliability under the Fourth Amendment of our Federal Constitution. In addition, T.J. claims that his initial detention by law enforcement was unreasonable under Article I, section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. Concluding that there is no error under either provision, we affirm the judgment of the juvenile court.

[2] We affirm.

Issue

Whether the juvenile court abused its discretion by admitting evidence.

Facts

[3] On September 26, 2023, Officer Derek Duvall (“Officer Duvall”) and another police officer with the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department were dispatched to 529 North Traub Avenue. A person had called the 911 dispatch center and reported seeing a black juvenile male with a handgun, “[w]aving it around, cocking it, [and] pretending to shoot it.” (Tr. at 46). The caller also provided a clothing description and stated that a black juvenile female was with the juvenile male.

[4] When Officer Duvall arrived, he pulled into the alley and saw a male, who appeared to be a juvenile, wearing clothing “matching the description” given by the 911 caller. (Tr. at 18). A black juvenile female was also present. Both juveniles were standing between the house and a shed located at 529 North Traub Avenue; the shed was approximately thirty feet away from the house. When Officer Duvall got out of his police car, he saw both juveniles move out of sight behind the shed. As he walked closer, “they c[a]me back around to where [he could] see them.” (Tr. at 18). Officer Duvall repeatedly ordered them to come to him so that he could speak with them, but they refused and became argumentative.

[5] At some point, Officer Duvall learned that the black male juvenile was fifteen-year-old T.J. Officer Duvall then watched T.J. move in front of a lawn chair. A pink purse was laying in the chair, and T.J. sat down “on the lawn chair.” (Tr. at 20). Officer Duvall continued to approach. When he was approximately an arm's length away, he grabbed T.J.’s arm. When T.J. stood up and Officer Duvall handcuffed him, Officer Duvall saw a tan Springfield Armory 9 millimeter semi-automatic handgun (“the handgun”) sticking out from underneath the purse. The handgun was loaded, and a subsequent search of T.J.’s clothing revealed several 9mm bullets in his front pocket. As a result, T.J. was taken into custody.

[6] On September 27, 2023, the State filed a juvenile delinquency petition alleging that T.J. had committed the offense of Class A misdemeanor dangerous possession of a firearm. On June 26, 2024, the juvenile court held a fact-finding hearing. During that hearing, T.J.’s counsel objected to the admission into evidence of the handgun, arguing that its admission violated both the federal and state constitutions. The juvenile court overruled the objection. At the conclusion of the fact-finding hearing, the juvenile court found T.J. to be a delinquent child and placed him on supervised probation.²

[7] T.J. now appeals.

Decision

[8] T.J. argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion when it admitted the handgun into evidence. Specifically, T.J. argues that the anonymous 911 caller lacked sufficient indicia of reliability to serve as the basis for his investigatory detention under the Fourth Amendment of the Federal Constitution. In addition, T.J. argues that his detention was unreasonable under Article I, section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. We address each contention in turn.

[9] Generally, we review a juvenile court's decision regarding the admission of evidence for an abuse of discretion. T.S. v. State, 863 N.E.2d 362, 367 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied. An abuse of discretion occurs when it is clearly erroneous and against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court. Id. However, “determinations concerning reasonable suspicion and probable cause for warrantless searches [are] ․ to be determined on a de novo standard on appeal.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

A. Federal Constitutional Claim

[10] The Fourth Amendment provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or things to be seized.

U.S. Const. amend IV. Generally, law enforcement officers must obtain a search warrant before searching for and seizing evidence, but certain warrantless searches are permissible “if [they] fall[ ] within a specific exception to the warrant requirement.” Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 382 (2014). One such exception is known as the ‘Terry Stop.’ Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393 (2014). A Terry Stop allows law enforcement officers to briefly detain people when the officer “has a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.” Id. at 397 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “The ‘reasonable suspicion’ necessary to justify such a stop ‘is dependent upon both the content of information possessed by police and its degree of reliability.’ ” Id. (quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990)). While it takes into account the totality of the circumstances, “a mere ‘hunch’ does not create reasonable suspicion[.]” Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968)).

[11] “These same principles apply with full force to investigative stops based on information from anonymous tips.” Id. at 397. It is not required that a law enforcement officer develop reasonable suspicion based on his personal observations. Id. Reasonable suspicion can be supplied by other people. Id. However, an anonymous tip “alone seldom demonstrates the informant's basis of knowledge or veracity. That is because ordinary citizens generally do not provide extensive recitations of the basis of their everyday observations, and an anonymous tipster's veracity is by hypothesis largely unknown, and unknowable.” Id. (emphasis in original) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Still, under certain conditions, an anonymous tip can provide “sufficient indicia of reliability to provide reasonable suspicion to make [an] investigatory stop.” Id. (quoting White, 496 U.S. at 327).

[12] It is well settled that an anonymous tipster who provides information that can be corroborated by law enforcement can be sufficiently reliable to create reasonable suspicion. White, 496 U.S. at 327-32 “By accurately predicting future behavior, the tipster demonstrate[s] ‘a special familiarity with [the suspect's] affairs,’ which in turn implie[s] that the tipster ha[s] ‘access to reliable information about that individual's illegal activities.’ ” Navarette, 572 U.S. at 398 (quoting White, 496 U.S. at 332). It is also “recognized that an informant who is proved to tell the truth about some things is more likely to tell the truth about other things, including the claim that the object of the tip is engaged in criminal activity.” Id. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).

[13] In this case, the 911 caller informed the dispatch center that he or she had witnessed a black male juvenile waving around a handgun, cocking it, and pretending to shoot it. T.J. argues that this is similar to the case of Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (2000). However, that case is distinguishable. In J.L., the anonymous tipster claimed that a young black male in a plaid shirt was standing at a bus stop armed with a handgun. Id. at 268. “The tipster did not explain how he knew about the gun, nor did he suggest that he had any special familiarity with the young man's affairs. As a result, police had no basis for believing that the tipster ha[d] knowledge of concealed criminal activity.” Navarette, 572 U.S. at 398 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Here, the 911 caller's complaint was not a bald assertion that criminal activity might be occurring. Instead, it was a claim to have actually witnessed T.J.’s alleged criminal behavior. In addition, the caller provided a description that Officer Duvall testified matched T.J.’s appearance. We hold that, considering the totality of the circumstances, the 911 caller's eyewitness account provided substantial indicia of reliability for law enforcement to have reasonable suspicion to detain T.J.

B. Indiana Constitutional Claim

[14] While Article I, section 11 of Indiana's Constitution is nearly the same as the Fourth Amendment, the “legality of a governmental search under the Indiana Constitution turns on an evaluation of the reasonableness of the police conduct under the totality of the circumstances.” Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356, 359 (Ind. 2005). In assessing whether law enforcement conduct was reasonable, we balance the following factors: “[(]1) the degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge that a violation has occurred, [(]2) the degree of intrusion the method of the search or seizure imposes on the citizen's activities, and [(]3) the extent of law enforcement needs.” Id. at 361.

[15] Addressing these three factors, T.J. argues that: (1) the degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge was low because the 911 caller's information was not sufficiently reliable; (2) the degree of intrusion was high because law enforcement walked onto private property to confront T.J.; and (3) the extent of law enforcement needs was low because, although responding to a report of a juvenile with a gun, T.J. was not initially observed with anything in his hand. As a result, T.J. argues that law enforcement acted unreasonably in detaining T.J. and seizing the handgun. We disagree.

[16] First, the degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge was high. The 911 caller informed the dispatcher that a black juvenile was observed waving a gun around, cocking it, and pretending to shoot the gun. This was an eyewitness account, not an assertion that something might have happened. In addition, Officer Duvall testified that the description given by the 911 caller matched what he observed T.J. wearing when he encountered him.

[17] Second, the degree of intrusion was moderate. There was no evidence presented by the State concerning who owned 529 North Traub Avenue or whether T.J. resided there. Nonetheless, law enforcement entry onto private property is significant and warrants an elevated concern.

[18] Finally, the extent of law enforcement needs was high. As we have previously noted, “Protecting the public from gun violence is a legitimate and paramount concern of law enforcement, and the State is legitimately concerned with deterring gun violence and possession of firearms by unlicensed individuals.” Grayson v. State, 52 N.E.3d 24, 28 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied. Having received a tip of a juvenile waving around a gun and pretending to shoot it, police responded to the area and encountered T.J. He was not cooperative. Instead, T.J. moved behind a shed when initially approached by Officer Duvall.

[19] Taken as a whole, we hold that law enforcement's initial detention of T.J. was reasonable under Article I, section 11 of Indiana's Constitution. As a result, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the handgun into evidence.

[20] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-47-10-5(a).

2.   On June 28, 2024, the juvenile court issued a dispositional decree which covers two cause numbers, one of which is this case. In its decree, the trial court found that T.J. had also admitted to committing count 2, theft as a Class A misdemeanor. However, that reference to count 2 refers to an allegation under cause number 49D10-2403-JD-2859, which is not a part of this appeal.

Pyle, Judge.

Judges Bradford and Kenworthy concur. Bradford, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.