Alpacino J. Carson, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] While Alpacino Carson was serving a sentence in another Indiana county, the State filed charges against him in Marion County. Approximately 18 months later, Carson finished his sentence, and, upon his release, he was served with an arrest warrant from Marion County. Nearly eight months later, Carson filed a motion to dismiss the case in Marion County, arguing that the State had failed to bring him to trial within a year in violation of his right to a speedy trial. The trial court denied his motion. Carson now appeals and presents the following two issues for our review:

1. Whether the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss under Criminal Rule 4; and

2. Whether the State violated Carson's constitutional right to a speedy trial.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] In April 2022, the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department (“IMPD”) investigated a complaint of child molest allegedly committed by Carson years earlier. In April, Carson was incarcerated in Henry County, Indiana, on a different criminal matter and had an earliest possible release date of December 1, 2023. On June 16, 2022, the State charged Carson with six counts of child molesting in this cause.

[4] In late 2023, Carson filed multiple pro se motions in this cause. On October 11, Carson filed a motion to dismiss detainer, and on November 1, he filed a motion for a speedy trial under Criminal Rule 4(B). On November 2, the trial court denied the motion for speedy trial, and a stamp on the denial states, “The Defendant is not in custody on this cause and a warrant is still active. Copy to ․ Defendant in IDOC.” Appellant's App. Vol. II at 46. On November 16, Carson filed a motion to withdraw his speedy trial request, stating, “[I]t would be best to speak with counsel in order to ensure that all of his rights are being considered.” Id. at 49.

[5] On December 1, 2023, Carson was released from incarceration in Henry County. That same day, the State served the arrest warrant in this cause and transported Carson to Marion County. On December 5, the trial court held an initial hearing where it set a jury trial for February 20, 2024. Over the next seven months and upon Carson's requests, the trial court continued the trial four times with the final continuance being granted on May 23. On June 26, 2024, Carson filed a motion to dismiss his charges, alleging that the State violated his speedy trial rights in violation of the United States Constitution, the Indiana Constitution, and Indiana's Criminal Rule 4(C).

[6] On July 9, the trial court held a hearing on the motion to dismiss. There, Carson premised his arguments on a belief that the warrant in this cause had been served upon him on June 20, 2022, while he was incarcerated in Henry County. In support of this claim, Carson offered, and the trial court admitted into evidence, a report from IMPD and case notes from the investigating IMPD officer. These documents claim that IMPD served Carson with a warrant on June 20, 2022. However, the Chronological Case Summary (“CCS”) indicates that the warrant was served upon Carson's release in Henry County on December 1, 2023. The trial court relied on the CCS date and denied Carson's motion. On September 11, Carson filed a motion to certify the denial for interlocutory appeal, which the trial court granted. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[7] Carson claims his right to a speedy trial was violated. “The right to a speedy trial is one of this country's most basic, fundamental guarantees—one much older than the nation itself.” (citing ). Carson seeks relief for alleged violations of his right to a speedy trial under Indiana's Criminal Rule 4, the United States Constitution, and the Indiana Constitution. To address Carsons's speedy trial claims, “we review factual findings for clear error and questions of law de novo.” (citing ;, clarified on reh'g on other grounds, ). We initially address Carson's Criminal Rule 4 claim, then we address his constitutional claims.

1. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Denying Carson's Motion to Dismiss Under Criminal Rule 4

[8] Carson argues that the State violated . Criminal was amended after the State charged and arrested Carson but before Carson filed his motion to dismiss. See (effective January, 1, 2024). Carson asks us to apply the prior version of the rule, while the State asks us to apply the amended version. Because the amended version of the rule was in effect at the time Carson invoked Criminal by filing his motion, we apply the current version of the rule. See (applying the amended version of Trial Rule 60 because it was the version in effect when the motion was filed).

[9] Criminal (“C.R. 4(C)”) requires that “[n]o person can be held on recognizance or otherwise to answer a criminal charge for a period in aggregate exceeding one year from the date the criminal charge against such defendant is filed, or from the date of the arrest on such charge, whichever is later.” Additionally, the amended rule provides:

If a defendant is charged in one Indiana county during the time the defendant is incarcerated in a different county, the time periods commence on the earlier of: (1) the date the court in the non-custodial county orders the defendant's appearance; or (2) the date the defendant provides written notice to the court where the charge is pending of the defendant's location and requests initiation of proceedings in the non-custodial county.

Crim. R. 4.2(B).¹ Carson claims that the State failed to bring him to trial within a year as required by C.R. 4(C). We cannot agree.

[10] Carson argues that the State failed to bring him to trial within a year of his arrest. The parties present two dates for when the State served Carson with the arrest warrant. Carson urges us to rely on the IMPD documents he submitted into evidence, while the State asks us to rely on a later date. We encountered a similar dispute in our decision in . There, Harper was in custody for parole violations when the State filed additional charges against him. . The CCS showed the warrant for the new charges was issued on June 30, 2016, and Harper was served with the arrest warrant on August 16, 2017. . Harper filed a motion to dismiss under C.R. 4(C), arguing that his C.R. 4(C) clock began to run on June 30, 2016. . In support, Harper pointed to an email exchange between members of the Marion County Sheriff's Office that purported to show that the warrant was served on Harper in June 2016. Id. We noted that the CCS “is the official record of the trial court” and concluded that Harper's C.R. 4(C) clock did not begin to run until August 16, 2017, because that was when the arrest warrant was actually served on him according to the CCS. Id. (citing ). Here, we similarly have conflicting evidence indicating that the arrest warrant was served upon Carson either on June 20, 2022, or December 1, 2023. Because the CCS is the official record of the court, we conclude that Carson's arrest warrant was served on him on December 1, 2023. See

[11] Even though the arrest warrant was served on December 1, 2023, the State concedes that the C.R. 4(C) clock began on October 11, 2023, which is when Carson filed his motion for detainer and put the trial court on notice of his incarceration in Henry County. Appellee's Br. at 16 (“Carson took action under Rule 4.2(B) by promising to appear for proceedings and asking the trial court to remove a hold on his incarceration on October 11, 2023.”). Because Carson filed this motion before the arrest warrant was served, we agree that the C.R. 4(C) clock began on October 11. See Crim. R. 4.2(B). Carson filed his motion to dismiss on June 26, 2024, stopping the C.R. 4(C) clock, see (citing ), trans. not sought. Since Carson filed his motion for discharge approximately 10 months after the C.R. 4(C) clock began, the trial court did not err in denying Carson's C.R. 4(C) motion to dismiss.

2. The State Did Not Violate Carson's Constitutional Right to a Speedy Trial

[12] Carson also claims that the State violated his rights to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment to the, Section 12 of the Indiana Constitution. “This constitutional guarantee primarily protects three interests of criminal defendants: (1) preventing oppressive pretrial incarceration; (2) minimizing anxiety and concern; and (3) limiting the possibility that the defense will be impaired.” (citing ). To determine whether these interests were protected, we apply the Barker balancing test, which requires us to examine “four nonexclusive factors: (1) was the delay uncommonly long; (2) who is more responsible for the delay; (3) did the defendant assert their right to a speedy trial; and (4) did the defendant suffer prejudice because of the delay.” (citing ). This test “weighs the conduct of the government against the conduct of the defendant.” (citing ). We apply this test for both of Carson's constitutional claims. See .

[13] Analyzing the length of the delay “involves a dual inquiry and acts as the gateway to a full speedy trial analysis.” (citing ). Initially, if we determine “that the interval between accusation and trial is ‘ordinary,’ further inquiry into the other factors is unnecessary.” (citing ). However, “if the defendant shows that the interval is ‘presumptively prejudicial,’ we then consider the extent to which the delay exceeds that triggering threshold.” (citing ). “Delays approaching one year generally satisfy the presumptively prejudicial threshold.” (citing ). Here, approximately two years passed between when the State charged Carson with child molesting and when Carson filed his motion to dismiss. This delay is sufficient to trigger the Barker analysis. See

[14] Next, we conduct “an assessment of who is more responsible for the delay: the government or the defendant.” (citing ). In considering delays caused by the government, “we assess the reasons for those delays and assign them different weights. Reasons for delay generally fall into three categories: (1) justifiable, like a missing witness; (2) neutral, like negligence or court congestion; or (3) bad faith, like a purposeful attempt to hinder the defense.” (internal citation omitted) (citing ). Meanwhile, “any delay caused by the defense falls on the defendant.” (citing ).

[15] The majority of the delay was due to Carson's incarceration in Henry County. Upon his release on December 1, 2023, the State arrested Carson in this cause, and, four days later, set his jury trial for February 20, 2024. Thereafter, the trial court granted four continuances at Carson's request. Carson claims that the State was negligent in bringing him to trial, but he points only to the State's alleged failure to serve him with the arrest warrant in June 2022. For the reasons discussed above, we are unpersuaded by this claim. Thus, most of the delays are attributable to Carson, and this factor weighs against him.

[16] Moving to the third factor, we examine “whether and how a defendant asserted the speedy trial right.” (citing ). Our inquiry “is a fluid one: we determine whether the State and court were put on notice that a defendant has asserted their speedy trial right, while remaining mindful of any conduct by the defendant to the contrary.” (citing ). Carson argues that this factor weighs in favor of him because he filed a pro se motion for a speedy trial on November 1, 2023.² However, the trial court correctly denied this motion because Carson had not been arrested on these charges. Additionally, Carson filed a subsequent motion to dismiss his speedy trial request. Appellant's App. Vol. II at 49. Thus, we are unpersuaded by Carson's claim that this factor weighs in his favor.

[17] Lastly, we assess the prejudice that Carson suffered as a result of the delay. “We assess prejudice in light of the three interests the speedy trial guarantee was designed to protect: (1) preventing oppressive pretrial incarceration; (2) minimizing the anxiety and concern of the accused; and (3) limiting the possibility that the defense will be impaired.” (citing ). Carson claims that he suffered oppressive incarceration, pointing to the time between when the State filed the charges and when the trial court held the initial hearing in this cause. Additionally, he claims this time added to his “anxiety and anguish.” Appellant's Br. at 20, and that he was unable to work on his case while he was in Henry County. However, these arguments ignore the fact that he was already set to be incarcerated until at least December 1, 2023, due to his previous charges regardless of the State's action in this cause. We reiterate that the State held an initial hearing four days after his arrest, the trial court set a trial date at this hearing, and Carson continued this trial date multiple times. Consequently, this factor also weighs against Carson.

[18] In sum, the length of the delay triggered the analysis of the remaining Barker factors, but the remaining factors weigh against Carson's speedy trial claim. The delay was a result of Carson's conduct, and he did little to ensure that he was promptly brought to trial on these charges. We conclude that the State did not violate Carson's constitutional right to a speedy trial.

Conclusion

[19] The trial court did not err in denying Carson's C.R. 4(C) motion to dismiss, and the State did not violate Carson's constitutional right to a speedy trial. We affirm the trial court on all issues raised.

[20] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   This amendment to Criminal is consistent with case law in effect during the previous rule. See (quoting ). (“[O]ur Supreme Court [has] held that ‘when a defendant is incarcerated in another county on unrelated charges, arrest for purposes of does not occur until his return is ordered by the court wherein the second charges have been filed.’ ” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

2.   Carson also asks us to deviate from the Barker factors for his Indiana Constitutional claim and points us to a footnote in in which our Supreme Court stated that “for a speedy trial claim brought under, Section 12, an analysis distinct from Barker may be more suitable.” (citing ). Based on the language of, Section 12, this possible distinct analysis would not require the defendant to assert their right to a speedy trial. See Because we place significant weight on the other factors, the adoption of this approach would not have changed our analysis.

Felix, Judge.

Judges Vaidik and Tavitas concur. Vaidik, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.