IN RE: the Involuntary Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of: I.L. (Minor Child) (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] I.L. (“Child”) is the biological child of J.L. (“Mother”).¹ Six days after Child was born, Child was removed due to an allegation that Mother lacked the skills to parent an infant. Child was adjudicated a child in need of services (“CHINS”), and after Mother failed to improve her parenting skills, her parental rights were terminated. Mother now appeals that termination and presents multiple issues for our review, which we restate as the following two issues:

1. Whether the trial court's decision to terminate Mother's parental rights was clearly erroneous; and

2. Whether the trial court violated Mother's due process rights.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Child was born on January 11, 2023. Six days later, the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) filed a CHINS petition, alleging that Mother was unable to provide Child with a stable home where her basic needs could be met. The petition cited ongoing CHINS proceedings regarding Child's older siblings who had been removed “for receiving inadequate nutrition while in [Mother's] care and, as a result, were diagnosed with failure to thrive.” Appellant's App. Vol. II at 98. The petition alleged that Mother had to be prompted to feed the siblings, had fed them spoiled food, and that she had failed to maintain medical appointments for them. Notably, Child was born with genetic issues that are “important to monitor and address with [Child's] physicians throughout her childhood.” Id. at 8. Child was removed from Mother on an emergency basis on the same day the CHINS petition was filed.

[4] On October 18, Child was adjudicated a CHINS, and on December 20, the trial court entered a dispositional order. The dispositional order required, among other requirements, Mother to contact the DCS Family Case Manager (“FCM”) every week, enroll in FCM-recommended services, engage in individual counseling, and engage in home-based counseling. Mother's difficulty caring for her children stems from her developmental disability. Mother has an IQ of 60 and, as a result, she needs “ongoing assistance and resources related to parenting.” Appellant's App. Vol. II at 8. In the effort to help Mother improve her parenting skills, her “cognitive disabilities were considered in setting up services, providers altered their means of instruction to aid [Mother] in comprehending the information, and DCS providers gave her more opportunities to engage than most clients would receive.” Id. Despite these efforts, Mother did not fully engage in the process. Mother failed to contact the FCM on a weekly basis, was “sporadic” in exercising parenting time with Child, Appellants’ App. Vol. II at 7, and DCS eventually suspended visitation because Mother cancelled three visits in a row. Additionally, Mother failed to enroll in a Bureau of Developmental Disability Services program that was offered to her.

[5] On April 30, 2024, DCS filed a petition to terminate Mother's parental rights over Child, and the factfinding hearing was held on July 9. Due to her low IQ, throughout the factfinding hearing, Mother had difficulty understanding “societal conventions” as well as the nature of the process. Appellant's App. Vol. II at 9. For example, she left the courtroom in the middle of the proceeding to talk to a friend in the hallway. Similarly, Mother had trouble understanding and answering some questions. During testimony, Mother was asked whether her rights were more important than Child's best interests. Initially, Mother stated that her rights were more important, but when asked again she replied, “I don't know.” Tr. Vol. II at 86. Both the FCM and Child's court appointed special advocate (“CASA”) recommended that Mother's parental rights be terminated. The trial court terminated Mother's parental rights, and this appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

1. The Trial Court's Decision to Terminate Mother's Parental Rights Was Not Clearly Erroneous

[6] Mother challenges the trial court's termination of her parental rights over Child. “Parents have a fundamental right to raise their children—but this right is not absolute. When parents are unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities, their parental rights may be terminated.” In re Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d 41, 45–46 (Ind. 2019) (internal citations omitted) (citing In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1230 (Ind. 2013)), cert. denied.

[7] To terminate Mother's parental rights under Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(d)(2), DCS had to prove by clear and convincing evidence, among other factors, that (a) Mother has been unable to remedy the circumstances that resulted in Child being placed outside her home,² and (b) termination of the parent-child relationship is in Child's best interests. See Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c)(3), (d)(2); id. § 31-37-14-2.

[8] We will affirm a trial court's termination of parental rights unless that decision is clearly erroneous. Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 45 (citing In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 642 (Ind. 2014)). A trial court's termination decision is clearly erroneous if the court's findings of fact do not support its legal conclusions or if the legal conclusions do not support its ultimate decision. Id. (citing E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 642). We will not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility, and we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that support the court's decision. Id. (citing In re K.E., 39 N.E.3d 641, 646 (Ind. 2015)). Furthermore, we accept as true any findings which are not challenged on appeal. See R.M. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 203 N.E.3d 559, 564 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (citing Madlem v. Arko, 592 N.E.2d 686, 687 (Ind. 1992)), trans. not sought.³ Mother challenges the trial court's conclusions that (a) she has failed to remedy the circumstances that led to Child's removal and (b) termination of the parent-child relationship is in Child's bests interests. We address each claim in turn.

a. Failure to Remedy Circumstances

[9] Mother challenges the trial court's conclusion that Mother has been unable to remedy the circumstances that led to Child's removal. Child was removed because Mother lacked the skills to safely parent Child. The trial court found the following:

8. Mother has engaged in home-based counseling that included training to advance her parenting skills.

9. However, Mother's continued involvement in parenting training has failed to substantially advance her parenting skills, resulting in the infant continuing to be, after much training, unsafe in her care.

10. Mother has been sporadic in engaging in the parenting time with [Child] offered to her.

11. Mother has been erratic in showing advancement of her parenting skills, having worked on them for a while, only to later to devolve into problem behavior.

12. Mother has not successfully advanced her skills such that the CHINS court at any point during the CHINS case authorized her to have unsupervised visitation.

* * *

22. Mother has provided nothing to ensure that [Child] is properly clothed, fed or supervised.

23. Mother has relied on the placement to meet all of those needs for [Child].

Appellant's App. Vol. II at 7, 8. The unchallenged findings show that Mother failed to fully involve herself in Child's life and that, even when she did participate in services, she was unable to maintain the necessary skills to provide for Child's care. We conclude that the unchallenged findings support the conclusion under subsection (d)(2) of the statute that Mother was unable to remedy the circumstances that led to Child's removal.

[10] DCS also alleged Mother's parental rights should be terminated under subsection (d)(3) of the statute, alleging there was a reasonable probability that the conditions that led to Child's removal or placement outside Mother's home will not be remedied by Mother. See I.C. § 31-35-2-4(d)(3). Essentially, subsection (d)(3) removes the timing requirement relevant to subsection (d)(2) and takes a prospective look at the conditions that led to removal. The trial court concluded that DCS had proven these circumstances under subsection (d)(3), and Mother argues that this conclusion is clearly erroneous. For all the reasons previously discussed, we disagree with Mother's argument. Also, Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4(d) is written in the disjunctive; since we have already concluded the trial court did not err in its decision under subsection (d)(2), no additional analysis is necessary.

b. Best Interests

[11] Mother also argues that the trial court erred in concluding that termination was in the best interests of Child. To determine the best interests of a child, a trial court looks at the totality of the evidence and subordinates the interests of the parents to those of the child. In re P.B., 199 N.E.3d 790, 799 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (citing In re A.B., 887 N.E.2d 158, 167–68 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008)), reh'g denied (Jan. 25, 2023), trans. denied sub nom. A.B. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 209 N.E.3d 1168 (Ind. 2023). A central consideration in this determination is the child's need for permanency. Id. (citing K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1235). The trial court also considers whether a child's emotional and physical development is threatened by the parent-child relationship. Id. (citing K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1235). Permanent impairment of physical, mental, or social development is not necessary before a trial court may terminate the parent-child relationship. Id. (citing K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1235). “We have previously held that the recommendation by both the case manager and child advocate to terminate parental rights, in addition to evidence the conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied, is sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child's best interests.” In re P.B, 199 N.E.3d at 799 (citing L.S. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1158 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied.)

[12] Here, both the FCM and the CASA recommended that the trial court grant the petition to terminate Mother's parental rights. As discussed above, the unchallenged findings show that, despite participation in services, Mother failed to show that she could maintain the skills needed to care for Child. Based on the foregoing, we cannot say that the trial court clearly erred in concluding that termination of Mother's parental rights was in the best interests of Child.

2. The Trial Court Did Not Violate Mother's Due Process Rights

[13] Mother argues that the trial court violated her due process rights in the termination proceedings. “The Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution and the Due Course of Law Clause of the Indiana Constitution prohibit state action that deprives a person of life, liberty, or property without a fair proceeding.” In re C.G., 954 N.E.2d 910, 916 (Ind. 2011) (quoting In re Paternity of M.G.S., 756 N.E.2d 990, 1004 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied). “Parental rights constitute an important interest warranting deference and protection, and a termination of that interest is a ‘unique kind of deprivation.’ ” Id. at 916–17 (quoting Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981)).

[14] “When the State seeks to terminate the parent-child relationship, it must do so in a manner that meets the requirements of due process.” In re C.G., 954 N.E.2d at 917 (citing J.T. v. Marion Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Children, 740 N.E.2d 1261, 1264 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), trans. denied). “The U.S. Supreme Court has written on the importance of heightened due process protections whenever the State wishes to sever the parental bonds of children:

The fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child does not evaporate simply because they have not been model parents or have lost temporary custody of their child to the State. Even when blood relationships are strained, parents retain a vital interest in preventing the irretrievable destruction of their family life. If anything, persons faced with forced dissolution of their parental rights have a more critical need for procedural protections than do those resisting state intervention into ongoing family affairs. When the State moves to destroy weakened familial bonds, it must provide the parents with fundamentally fair procedures.

Id. (quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753–754 (1982)).

[15] Although parental rights are constitutionally protected, a parent's fundamental right to raise the parent's children is not absolute. See In re Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 49 (citing In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1230 (Ind. 2013)). For example, in deciding whether termination of parental rights is in the children's best interests, “trial courts must look at the totality of the evidence and, in doing so, subordinate the parents’ interests to those of the children.” Id. (citing In re A.D.S., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1158 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied).

[16] Mother did not raise a due process argument to the trial court. Nevertheless, this court has “discretion to address the merits of a party's constitutional claim notwithstanding waiver.” Plank v. Cmty. Hosps. of Indiana, Inc., 981 N.E.2d 49, 53 (Ind. 2013). Given the nature of Mother's rights at issue, we exercise that discretion here.

[17] Mother argues her due process rights were violated because DCS failed to comply with the American Disabilities Act (“ADA”) when offering services to Mother. However, “it is well settled ․ that the ADA does not apply in termination proceedings.” N.C. v. Ind. Dept. of Child Servs., 56 N.E.3d 65, 69 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied; see also Stone v. Daviess Cnty. Div. of Child. & Fam. Servs., 656 N.E.2d 824, 830 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995)). The services that Mother argues failed to comply with ADA requirements were part of the CHINS proceedings and not the termination proceedings. Thus, Mother's ADA argument cannot be the basis for challenging the termination order. See N.C., 56 N.E.3d at 69–70; Stone, 656 N.E.2d at 830.

[18] Even assuming the ADA applied here, Mother has failed to show that DCS was deficient in offering services. “The intent of the ADA is to ensure disabled individuals are not denied the benefits provided by a public entity. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b). If the ADA applied to termination of parental rights proceedings, DCS would be required to reasonably accommodate [a parent's] disability.” N.C., 56 N.E.3d at 70. Mother claims that DCS “did nothing to accommodate her disability,” Appellant's Br. at 7, but the record shows otherwise. In fact, the record shows that DCS provided services to Mother and she failed to fully participate. For example, Mother was offered assistance through the Bureau of Developmental Disability Services, but she failed to enroll in the program. Notably, Mother does not point to any services that should have been offered or highlight any specific deficiencies in the services provided. Thus, we conclude that DCS did not fail to provide reasonable accommodations to Mother.

Conclusion

[19] The trial court did not clearly err in terminating Mother's parental rights, and the trial court did not violate Mother's due process rights. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's decision.

[20] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Child's father consented to Child's adoption and the petition to terminate his parental rights was dismissed, so he does not participate in this appeal.

2.   The final element under Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(d)(2) is a timing element. DCS must show a child has been outside the parent's home for 15 of the most recent 22 months. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(d)(2)(A).

3.   In her brief, Mother claims that “that the following finding[s] of fact were not supported by the evidence, Finding #20, 21, 24, 27, 28, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 37, 38, and 40.” Appellant's Br. at 8. However, Mother does not analyze any of these specifically challenged enumerated findings. “We will not step in the shoes of the advocate and fashion arguments on his behalf, ‘nor will we address arguments’ that are ‘too poorly developed or improperly expressed to be understood.’ ” Miller v. Patel, 212 N.E.3d 639, 657 (Ind. 2023) (citing Dridi v. Cole Kline LLC, 172 N.E.3d 361, 364 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021)). Mother's failure to cogently argue these challenges has substantially impeded our review thereof, so we consider these claims waived. See Pierce v. State, 29 N.E.3d 1258, 1267–68 (Ind. 2015); Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a).

Felix, Judge.

Judges Vaidik and Tavitas concur. Vaidik, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.