Antae Noble, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] After staff at a JW Marriott Hotel (“JW”) determined Antae Noble was not a guest of the JW, security escorted him out of the hotel. Noble returned minutes after being told to leave and entered the JW, ignoring demands that he leave. Noble was charged with and convicted of criminal trespass. Noble now appeals, raising one issue for our review: Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support his conviction.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] At approximately 11:30 p.m. on November 24, 2024, JW security guard Hunter Rae observed Noble sleeping outside of a third-floor meeting room. When Rae asked for Noble's key card and his reason for being there, Noble did not respond or produce a key card. Consequently, Rae asked Noble to leave and followed him outside. While Rae was standing by the door watching, Noble returned to the JW. Noble continued inside despite Rae asking him not to enter, threatening to call law enforcement if he did, and telling Noble he was trespassing. Noble returned to the third floor, and a JW employee contacted law enforcement. Law enforcement officers arrived, questioned Noble, removed him from the premises, and issued a trespass order.

[4] The State charged Noble with criminal trespass as a Class A misdemeanor,¹ and after a bench trial, the trial court found him guilty as charged. The trial court sentenced Noble to 30 days of incarceration. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

The State Presented Sufficient Evidence to Support Noble's Conviction

[5] Noble argues that the State presented insufficient evidence at trial to support his conviction for criminal trespass as a Class A misdemeanor. Our standard of review for such claims is as follows:

Our standard for reviewing evidentiary sufficiency challenges is well established, as we have made clear that “[i]t is the fact-finder's role, not that of appellate courts, to assess witness credibility and weigh the evidence to determine whether it is sufficient to support a conviction.” Teising v. State, 226 N.E.3d 780, 783 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007)). “A conviction is supported by sufficient evidence if ‘there is substantial evidence of probative value supporting each element of the offense such that a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” Hancz-Barron v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1237, 1244 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Willis v. State, 27 N.E.3d 1065, 1066 (Ind. 2015)). This Court reviews only the evidence most favorable to the verdict and the reasonable inferences therefrom, and will reverse only where it is shown that “no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Teising, 226 N.E.3d at 783.

Konkle v. State, 253 N.E.3d 1068, 1090–91 (Ind. 2025). Additionally, “[w]hen, as here, the court conducts a bench trial, we presume the trial court knows and properly applies the law and considers only evidence properly before the court as the court reaches a decision.” Brown v. State, 222 N.E.3d 362, 371 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (citing Conley v. State, 972 N.E.2d 864, 873 (Ind. 2012)), reh'g denied (Jan. 2, 2024), trans. denied, 232 N.E.3d 642 (Ind. 2024).

[6] In order to convict Noble of criminal trespass as a Class A misdemeanor under Indiana Code section 35-43-2-2(b)(2) (2024), the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Noble did not have a contractual interest in the JW, and Noble knowingly or intentionally refused to leave the JW after having been asked to leave by JW's agent. Noble specifically contends the State failed to prove that (1) he did not have a contractual interest in JW and (2) he reentered the JW after having been barred. We address each argument in turn.

[7] First, Noble argues that there was insufficient evidence to prove he did not have a contractual interest in the JW because he claimed he was “renting a room with someone, and [he] was waiting for them to arrive.” Tr. Vol. II at 31.

“Contractual interest,” as that phrase is used in the criminal trespass statute, refers to the right to be present on another's property, arising out of an agreement between at least two parties that creates an obligation to do or not to do a particular thing. “[T]he State need not ‘disprove every conceivable contractual interest’ that a defendant might have obtained in the real property at issue.” “[T]he State satisfies its burden when it disproves those contractual interests that are reasonably apparent from the context and circumstances under which the trespass is alleged to have occurred.”

Semenick v. State, 977 N.E.2d 7, 10 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (internal citations omitted), trans. denied, 980 N.E.2d 325 (Ind. 2013).

[8] The evidence and reasonable inferences most favorable to the verdict negate Noble's claim that he had a contractual interest in the JW. Noble failed to produce a key card or reason for his presence outside the third-floor meeting rooms when requested to do so by Rae and, rather than explain he was waiting on a friend or ask to confirm his friend had a room reserved with the front desk, he left when asked. From this, a reasonable factfinder could determine that Noble had no contractual interest in the JW. See Semenick, 977 N.E.2d at 10.

[9] Noble next argues the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he returned to the property after he was “barred from reentry.” Appellant's Br. at 7 (citing I.C. § 35-43-2-2(b)(1)). Noble is confused. He was not charged with trespass under subsection (b)(1), he was charged with trespass under subsection (b)(2). Indiana Code section 35-43-2-2(b)(2) says nothing of reentry; instead, that provision deals only with refusal to leave. Noble nevertheless argues only that the State failed to meet its burden to convict him under subsection (b)(1). Noble's argument regarding subsection (b)(1) is irrelevant.

[10] To the extent Noble meant to challenge the refusal to leave element of his conviction under subsection (b)(2), he has failed to present any argument on that issue. Accordingly, Noble has waived his subsection (b)(2) argument on appeal. See Pierce v. State, 29 N.E.3d 1258, 1267 (Ind. 2015). Nonetheless, even if he had sufficiently raised the issue, we find there was sufficient evidence to permit the conviction. Noble was told to leave. Noble initially complied but returned minutes later and entered the JW despite Rae standing at the door telling him—again—to leave. Noble returned to the third floor and stayed there even though employees of the JW were telling him to leave and that the police would be called. In that way, Noble refused to leave after having been asked to do so.

[11] We therefore affirm the trial court on all issues raised.

[12] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-43-2-2(b)(2).

Felix, Judge.

Judges Vaidik and Tavitas concur. Vaidik, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.