WILLIAMS v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] In this interlocutory appeal, Aaron Gabriel Williams appeals the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence. Williams raises one issue for our review, namely, whether the trial court erred when it denied his motion. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On August 18, 2024, Deputy Dave McVoy with the Huntington County Sheriff's Department was working as a road patrol officer “running radar” on Highway 24. Tr. Vol. 2 at 35. At approximately 1:15 a.m., Deputy McVoy observed a Toyota Corolla being driven by Williams approach at a “fairly slow speed.” Id. Deputy McVoy used his radar, which showed that Williams was driving forty-two miles per hour in a sixty-mile-per-hour zone. Deputy McVoy turned onto the highway and followed Williams. Williams entered a construction zone, where the speed limit dropped to fifty miles per hour. After he exited the construction zone, Williams began to drive fifty-two miles per hour. At that point, Deputy McVoy passed him and found a location to observe traffic again. Deputy McVoy then saw Williams’ car and noted that Williams had “slowed down again,” to forty-five miles per hour. Id. at 38.

[3] Based on Williams’ “[v]ery slow speeds” and “varying speeds,” Deputy McVoy initiated a traffic stop. Id. at 39. According to Deputy McVoy's report, while speaking to Williams, Deputy McVoy “detected the odor commonly associated with alcoholic beverages.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 44. Williams admitted that he had consumed two alcoholic beverages. Deputy McVoy administered several field sobriety tests, which Williams failed. Williams also submitted to a portable breath test, which indicated an alcohol concentration “well under the legal limit.” Id. at 45. Williams then admitted to Deputy McVoy that he had smoked marijuana earlier in the evening and that he had a “THC Vape” in the car. Id. Williams agreed to a blood draw.

[4] The State charged Williams with operating a vehicle with a schedule I or II controlled substance in his blood, a Class C misdemeanor (Count I);¹ operating a vehicle while intoxicated, as a Class C misdemeanor (Count 2);² possession of marijuana, as a Class B misdemeanor (Count 3);³ and possession of paraphernalia, as a Class C misdemeanor (Count 4).⁴ Thereafter, Williams filed a motion to suppress all evidence obtained during the traffic stop and alleged that Deputy McVoy “lacked reasonable suspicion that ․ Williams was committing a crime or that ․ Williams had committed a traffic violation” because Williams’ “traveling speed was not unreasonable for the time, place, circumstances, and conditions of the roadway or the flow of traffic.” Id. at 55-56.

[5] The court held a hearing on Williams’ motion on November 20. Deputy McVoy testified that he had initiated the traffic stop because of “slow speeds,” but that he did not “observe any other driving behaviors that ․ might indicate a problem[.]” Tr. Vol. 2 at 40-41. He further testified that “common clues” to indicate “a possible OWI” are “varying speeds” and “speeds 10 miles an hour or [more] under the speed limit.” Id. at 41. The State also presented as evidence an excerpt from the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's (“NHTSA”) Instructor's Manual, which similarly provided that “[v]arying speed” and “10 mph or more under the speed limit” are indicators of potential impairment. Ex. Vol. 3 at 9. Deputy McVoy testified that he had conducted the traffic stop because of “potential signs of impairment” and a “potential safety risk that [Williams] was falling asleep[.]” Tr. Vol. 2 at 45. Following the hearing, the court denied Williams’ motion to suppress. This interlocutory appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[6] Williams appeals the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress. As our Supreme Court has explained:

Trial courts enjoy broad discretion in decisions to admit or exclude evidence. Robinson v. State, 5 N.E.3d 362, 365 (Ind. 2014). When a trial court denies a motion to suppress evidence, we necessarily review that decision “deferentially, construing conflicting evidence in the light most favorable to the ruling.” Id. However, we “consider any substantial and uncontested evidence favorable to the defendant.” Id. We review the trial court's factual findings for clear error, declining invitations to reweigh evidence or judge witness credibility. Id. See also State v. Keck, 4 N.E.3d 1180, 1185 (Ind. 2014) (explaining that “when it comes to suppression issues, appellate courts are not in the business of reweighing evidence” because “our trial judges are able to see and hear the witnesses and other evidence first-hand”). If the trial court's decision denying “a defendant's motion to suppress concerns the constitutionality of a search or seizure,” then it presents a legal question that we review de novo. Robinson, 5 N.E.3d at 365.

Marshall v. State, 117 N.E.3d 1254, 1258 (Ind. 2019), cert. denied.

[7] Williams specifically contends that the court erred when it denied his motion to suppress because the traffic stop violated his constitutional rights. “Traffic stops, for even minor violations, fall within the protections of the federal and state constitutions.” Id. When a law enforcement officer stops a vehicle, that officer seizes the vehicle's occupants under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution, and “that traffic stop must pass constitutional muster.” Id. Here, Williams contends that the traffic stop violated his rights under both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. We address each argument in turn.

Fourth Amendment

[8] Williams first argues that the traffic stop violated his Fourth Amendment rights. As our Supreme Court has stated:

The Fourth Amendment safeguards our persons, our property, and our peace by requiring that law enforcement first have a warrant supported by probable cause before executing searches or seizures. This mandate notwithstanding, one exception to the warrant and probable-cause requirements allows police to seize a person without a warrant and on a level of suspicion less than probable cause—that is, the reasonable-suspicion standard for brief investigatory stops. We often call these encounters Terry Stops, where an officer may stop and briefly detain a person for investigative purposes if the officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity may be afoot. Traffic stops typically fall into this Terry Stop category, and, therefore, must be based upon reasonable suspicion.

Id. at 1258-59 (quotation marks and citations omitted).

[9] On appeal, Williams contends that Deputy McVoy lacked reasonable suspicion to initiate the traffic stop because “slow speed, by itself, does not form the basis for a reasonable and articulable suspicion for a stop.” Appellant's Br. at 20. Williams continues that, “as there were no infractions committed by” him, “an ordinarily prudent person wouldn't believe that criminal activity was occurring just because Williams was driving below the posted speed limit or had ‘varying speeds.’ ” Id. at 21-22.

[10] It is well settled that law enforcement officers “must have at least reasonable suspicion lawbreaking occurred” and that police cannot “rely on a mere hunch simply suggesting a person committed a crime before making a Terry Stop, like a traffic stop.” Marshall, 117 N.E.3d at 1259 (quotation marks omitted). Instead, a stop must be justified by some objective manifestation that the person stopped is, or is about to be, engaged in criminal activity. Id. “Reasonable suspicion requires more than an officer's own subjective belief a person might be violating the law.” Id. The “stopping officer must be able to articulate some facts that provide a particularized and objective basis for believing a traffic violation occurred.” Id. And we “expect officers to assess whether reasonable suspicion exists by relying upon their training and experience as well as commonsense judgments and inferences about human behavior.” Ramsey v. State, 222 N.E.3d 1038, 1045 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), trans. denied. The “reasonable-suspicion standard takes into account the totality of the circumstances—the whole picture.” Marshall, 117 N.E.3d at 1261 (quotation marks omitted).

[11] Here, there is no dispute that the only reason Deputy McVoy conducted the traffic stop was because Williams was driving slowly and at varying rates of speed. But, looking at the totality of the circumstances, Deputy McVoy had reasonable suspicion to stop Williams’ car. Indeed, Deputy McVoy observed Williams driving for approximately ten minutes. When Deputy McVoy first noticed Williams, he was driving forty-two miles per hour, which was eighteen miles per hour slower than the posted sixty-mile-per-hour speed limit. Deputy McVoy began to follow Williams, who passed through a construction zone and then sped up to fifty-two miles per hour, eight miles per hour below the speed limit. At that point, Deputy McVoy passed Williams and began to observe traffic. When Deputy McVoy again saw Williams, his speed had dropped to forty-five miles per hour. In other words, over approximately five miles, Williams’ speed fluctuated, going up and down by as many as ten miles per hour. And he drove anywhere from eight to eighteen miles per hour below the posted speed limit.

[12] Further, during the suppression hearing, Deputy McVoy testified to his extensive experience as a law enforcement officer, and he testified that “varying speeds” and “speeds 10 miles an hour or [more] under the speed limit” are “common clues ․ for a possible OWI[.]” Tr. Vol. 2 at 41. In addition to relying on his experience, Deputy McVoy testified that the NHTSA Instructor's Manual also provides that “slow speed” and “varying speeds” are “indicator[s] of potential impairment.” Id. at 43.

[13] Based on the totality of the circumstances—that Williams’ speed varied by as much as ten miles per hour and that he drove as many as eighteen miles per hour under the speed limit, which are both indicators of impairment—Deputy McVoy had a particularized and objective basis for believing that Williams was impaired when he initiated the traffic stop. As such, the traffic stop did not amount to an unconstitutional seizure under the Fourth Amendment.

Article 1, Section 11

[14] Still, Williams contends that the traffic stop violated his rights under Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution.

When a defendant challenges the propriety of an investigative stop under the Indiana Constitution, the burden falls to the State to “show the police conduct ‘was reasonable under the totality of the circumstances.’ ” Robinson, 5 N.E.3d at 368 (quoting State v. Washington, 898 N.E.2d 1200, 1205-06 (Ind. 2008)). We decide whether a stop proved reasonable given the totality of the circumstances by applying our three-part Litchfield test, whereby we evaluate: “1) the degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge that a violation has occurred, 2) the degree of intrusion the method of the search or seizure imposes on the citizen's ordinary activities, and 3) the extent of law enforcement needs.” Id. (quoting Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356, 361 (Ind. 2005)).

Marshall, 117 N.E.3d at 1262.

[15] As for the first factor, as discussed above, Deputy McVoy had a high degree of concern or suspicion that Williams was impaired. Again, over approximately five miles, Williams drove as many as eighteen miles an hour below the posted speed limit, and he varied his speed by as much as ten miles per hour. And both of those behaviors are indicators of impaired driving.

[16] Second, the initial seizure, a traffic stop, amounted to a small intrusion on Williams’ ordinary activities. See id. Deputy McVoy stopped Williams and asked for his license, registration, and proof of insurance, and asked if everything was okay with the car, which are all routine procedures. The stop escalated to an OWI investigation only after Deputy McVoy detected the smell of an alcoholic beverage and noticed Williams’ red and bloodshot eyes, and after Williams admitted to having consumed a couple of alcoholic beverages earlier that night.⁵

[17] Third, as Williams concedes, “law enforcement has a need to ensure public safety and has a need to enforce state motor vehicle laws and to prevent impaired driving.” Appellant's Br. at 25.

[18] Balancing the three Litchfield factors, Deputy McVoy's actions were reasonable under the totality of the circumstances and did not violate Williams’ Article 1, Section 11 rights.

Conclusion

[19] The traffic stop did not violate Williams’ rights under either the Fourth Amendment or Article 1, Section 11. As such, the trial court did not err when it denied Williams’ motion to suppress. We affirm the trial court.

[20] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 9-30-5-1(c).

2.   I.C. § 9-30-5-2(a).

3.   I.C. § 35-48-4-11(a).

4.   I.C. § 35-48-4-8.3(b)(1).

5.   Most of Williams’ argument on this factor pertains to actions Deputy McVoy took after the initial stop became an OWI investigation. But he makes no argument that Deputy McVoy lacked probable cause to prolong the traffic stop, search him or his car, or detain him.

Bailey, Judge.

Brown, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.