FULTS v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Joshua R. Fults appeals the denial of his motion to suppress. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Prior to August 27, 2021, Johnson County Sheriff's Detective Travis Wampler was familiar with the name Gary Lane because he had completed narcotics intelligence reports on Lane and had reports of Lane's involvement in narcotics distribution throughout central Indiana. On August 27, 2021, Detective Wampler received an envelope addressed to “Greenwood Sheriff Burgess or Detective Wampler.” Exhibits Volume III at 10. The envelope, which had a postmark date of August 17, 2021, contained an unsigned handwritten letter which stated:

There is a guy distributing drugs.

Big dealer – He has no job, a 100,000 truck, a 90,000 car a boat and home on land. He sells to people to distribute. He is very careful. He has a car he races at Speedrome. He will be hard to catch but he needs to be stopped. Too many kids on drugs here. He sells lots of pot and coke. Keeps his home full of pot. He has almost a million dollars in stocks and bonds. He lives at

994 Combs RdGreenwood 46193

His name is Josh Fults. He says you will never catch him he is too smart and you are mayberry cops. I only want this stopped so my kids are safer. They do drugs. They get them from someone who gets them from this guy. Please try and stop him. His wife works but she is aware of what he does. She has 3 kids that live there with this going on. They don't care for them properly[.]

Id. at 11.

[3] Detective Wampler had not heard of Fults prior to receiving the letter. Detective Wampler, who was a Task Force Officer for the FBI or liaison for the county with the FBI Violent Crimes Task Force, conducted a de-confliction on Fults and “obtained two de-confliction hits, which is suggesting he's a high valued target.”¹ Transcript Volume II at 12. “Upon completing de-confliction,” Detective Wampler spoke with FBI agents who stated they “had actually been conducting surveillance with an airplane over top of Mr. Fults that exact day.” Id. at 16. “[T]hrough the de-confliction process,” Detective Wampler contacted federal agencies, and the FBI told him that they had “collective law enforcement knowledge regarding Mr. Fults being a high value target.” Id. at 24.

[4] Detective Wampler contacted DEA Special Agent Cline who obtained Fults's phone records. Detective Wampler determined that the phone records showed “that one Joshua Fults is communicating with Gary Lane.” Id. at 13. Detective Wampler checked with the IRS regarding tax records, and the IRS “gave specific information regarding the amounts of money that he was reporting on his income was not consistent with his assets.” Id. at 15-16.

[5] On September 20, 2021, Detective Weinhorst drove an unmarked truck, and Detective Wampler, who was in the passenger seat, obtained the trash cans from “in front of Mr. Fults's property.” Id. at 18. After placing the trash cans in their vehicle, Detective Wampler “had taken extras and left theirs.” Id. at 21. Neither Detective Weinhorst nor Detective Wampler were in uniform. They transported the trash cans to the bays at the Franklin Police Department, searched the trash, and discovered U.S. mail addressed to Joshua and Heather Fults, “lots of items related to Joshua and Heather Fults,” and “marijuana and cocaine related items,” id. at 20, including a baggie with residue on it that “tested presumptively positive for cocaine.” Exhibits Volume III at 5. Detective Wampler logged the items into evidence and began preparing a search warrant. At some point, Detective Wampler and Detective Weinhorst “took the cans that [Detective Wampler] pulled back to the original location.”² Transcript Volume II at 21.

[6] On September 21, 2021, Detective Wampler filed a Probable Cause Affidavit for Search Warrant. He alleged that he had probable cause to believe that evidence relating to the crimes of possession of cocaine, possession of marijuana, and tax evasion were contained at the dwelling and detached garage at the specific address in Greenwood with a mailbox with white lettering that stated in part “The Fults Compound.” Exhibits Volume III at 3. Detective Wampler detailed the letter he received on August 27, 2021, and stated:

Your affiant investigated the 13 allegations and found that all 13 allegations appeared to be true, just as the tipster stated. Although anonymous, the author of the letter was that of a concerned citizen, which seemed to lead to its credibility. The author stated, “I only want this stopped so my kids are safer.”

Id. With respect to corroborating the letter, Detective Wampler stated:

Initially, the letter stated that Joshua was a “big dealer.” Your affiant placed the name and address into a de-confliction computer and learned that there were two prior agencies that had recently investigated Johsua Fults of 994 N. Combs Rd, Greenwood, IN. This suggested to your affiant that indeed Fults was a high value target, just at the tipster suggested.

Secondly, the letter stated that Joshua had no job. Your affiant located a body cam video from Deputy Robison of the JCSO on Nov 21, 2020 where Joshua Fults and his wife, Heather Fults were involved in a domestic dispute and the JCSO was called. During the incident, Joshua Fults informed Deputy Robison that he has no job. Further, your affiant contacted Work Force Development and learned that Joshua has not listed a job since 2012. These two means, seemed to corroborate allegation number two of Joshua not having a job despite lots of assets, just as the letter stated.

Third, the letter stated that despite having no job, Joshua had a truck valued at $100,000. Your affiant conducted a reverse BMV vehicle registration request listing the vehicles registered to Joshua with a result: 2019 Dodge Ram (plate RA 6721). This vehicle[’]s VIN was placed into CARFAX and showed a value of $87,665, which seemed to corroborate allegation number three.

Fourth, the letter stated that despite having no job, Joshua had a car valued at $90,000. Your affiant conducted a reverse BMV vehicle registration request listing the vehicle registered to Joshua with a result: 2021 GMC Denali (plate RA 7110). This vehicle[’]s VIN was placed into TLO (paid law enforcement database) showed a value of $74,300, which seemed to corroborate allegation number four. Further, Heather Fults was found to have a 2013 Chevy (plate: SHKNB8K), with a current value of $19,665.

Fifth, the letter stated that Joshua owned land. Your affiant conducted a query upon Beacon/GIS and showed that Joshua and Heather Fults to own 994 N. Combs Rd, Greenwood, IN (parcel: 41-02-26-031-021.000-023). GIS shows an approximate value of $245[,]000, which seemed to corroborate allegation number five.

Sixth, the letter stated that Joshua was a known distributor. Your affiant contacted the de-conflicting police agencies and learned that Joshua Fults was a known high-level narcotics distributor and listed his supplier as Gary Lane. Your affiant is previously familiar with Lane from an investigation in 2017 where your affiant typed a narcotics intelligence report where Lane was known to the source to be a cocaine distributor. A criminal history of Gary Lane showed a Dealing Cocaine conviction under cause # 49G21-0508-FA-133510, where Lane was found guilty of dealing cocaine, and later had records expunged in Oct 2019. Body cam reviewed from Nov 2020, showed Joshua Fults to list his current phone number as being 317-480-[----]. Spillman, an inter-agency law enforcement database, showed Gary Lane to have a phone number as being: 317-315-[----]. Consultation with the DEA and a subsequent subpoena yielded phone records for Joshua Fults where Joshua Fults and Gary Lane spoke on August 15, 2021. These items seemed to corroborate allegation number six, which the average person would not know (inside information).

Seventh, the letter stated that Joshua was known to be a Speedrome Racer. Open source queries were conducted upon social media showing Joshua to have numerous photos of himself racing at the Indianapolis area Speedrome. Your affiant knows that despite Joshua not having a current job, this hobby costs significant amounts of money, which seemed to corroborate allegation number seven.

Eight[h], the letter stated that Joshua was known to distribute “pot and coke.” From training and years of experience, your affiant is familiar with these terms as being synonymous with marijuana and cocaine, both DEA controlled substances. Consultation with the de-conflicting police agencies revealed intel that Joshua was known to traffic up to 200 pounds of marijuana and be involved with cocaine as well. This intel (collective police knowledge) seemed to corroborate allegation number eight.

Ninth, the letter stated that Joshua was known to have 1 million dollars in stocks and bonds. On September 1, 2021, your affiant contacted IN Dept of Revenue and spoke with T. Minor. Tax records are currently pending and your affiant noted that Minor exclaimed, “Ohh something isn't right here ․ he can't afford that car ․ this isn't adding up at all.” This indicated to your affiant that IN Dept of Revenue agreed that Joshua Fults not working and having a large amount of assets was indicative of a narcotics distributor, just as the letter suggested. Your affiant contacted JP Morgan Chase Bank and learned that on Nov 10, 2020, an independent banker listed Joshua Fults banking activity upon a SAR (suspicious activity report) and SSR (streamlined structuring report) in the amount of $20,000. The Chase SAR/SSR showed the listed phone numbers for Joshua Fults: 1) 615-983-[----] and 2) 317-480-[----], while Heather Fults phone number was listed as: 317-608-[----]. Chase showed the bank accounts with current balances as follows:

1) Account 1: 83399[----] – Nov 2020 value as high as $8,850.00 and

2) Account 2: 92966[----] – Nov 2020 value as high as $157[,]150.00.

Account 92966[----] showed a $50,000 transaction on Oct 26, 2020 to a brokerage account. These amounts listed, the information from Chase, and the information from INDR seemed to corroborate the information of the letter[’]s author in regards to allegation number nine and that the average person would not be able to know (inside information).

Tenth, the letter stated that Joshua was known to own 994 N. Combs Rd. On August 31, 2021, your affiant contacted the JC Auditors Office and learned that Joshua and Heather Fults own this property with no liens, which seemed to corroborate allegation number ten.

Eleventh, the letter stated that Joshua's wife works. Your affiant conducted a query with Work Force Development and learned that Heather Fults is currently employed with Athletico Home Health (D-PT). Chase Bank records show Heather Fults to have deposits from A[th]letico twice monthly in the amount of $1959.17 or net income of approximately $50,938.42 per year (far less than their assets would allow), which seemed to corroborate allegation number eleven.

Twelfth, the letter stated that Joshua was known to have three children. Body cam from Deputy Robison of JCSO obtained from Nov 2020 showed the Fults family to have children, just as the letter stated. Further, open source queries of social media yielded that the Fults have 3 children, just as the letter[’]s author stated.

Thirteenth, the letter stated that Joshua was known to have a boat. Your affiant conducted a reverse BMV vehicle registration request showing Joshua to have an involvement with a 32 ft Runabout (BHN: RGMVA340A000), which seemed to corroborate allegation number thirteen.

Id. at 3-5.

[7] Under the heading “Trash Pull / Further Corroboration,” Detective Wampler wrote that detectives of the JCSO began conducting surveillance of 994 N. Combs Rd., Greenwood, Indiana, and, “[o]n September 20, 2021 at approximately 0931 hours detectives located two blue Republic trash cans at the curbside in front of the residence.” Id. at 5. Detective Wampler wrote that he located two “vegetative stems unique to marijuana,” three rolling papers, one of which was “previously used and known to [him] to often be called a ‘roach,’ ” and a rapid reagent test kit showed the item to test presumptively positive for marijuana. Id. He also located a “clear baggie corner ․ with white residue inside” and asserted that the “baggie corner is unique to narcotics distribution and later tested presumptively positive for cocaine.” Id. He also wrote that he located USPS mail addressed to Joshua Fults and/or Heather Fults and a pizza box that listed Fults and the telephone number of “317-480-[----].” Id. at 6. He asserted that “[t]his was the same phone number that Fults has previously been contacting distributor and convicted drug dealer Gary Lane in Aug 2021.” Id. He asserted: “From training and years of experience, your affiant is familiar that the primary way that narcotics distributors contact each other is through the usage of cellular phones (phone calls, emails, text messaging, photos, locations, social media, etc).” Id.

[8] On September 21, 2021, the court issued a search warrant for the address including the dwelling, all buildings, structures, and vehicles. A search discovered numerous firearms, $17,000 in currency, a money counter, a scale, white powder, and vegetation.

[9] On November 8, 2021, the State charged Fults with Count I, dealing in marijuana as a level 5 felony, and Count II, possession of cocaine as a level 5 felony. On May 16, 2024, Fults filed a motion to suppress “all evidence resulting from an illegal search of [his] property on the 22nd of September, 2021 in violation of the 4th Amendment of United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 11 of the Constitution of the State of Indiana.” Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 20.

[10] On May 17, 2024, the court held a hearing on the motion to suppress. Fults's counsel asked Detective Wampler, “[Y]ou stated in the warrants that were placed, uh, that are now into evidence that, um, one of the factors was that Mr. Fults and Mrs. Fults did not have a mortgage, correct?” Transcript Volume II at 15. Detective Wampler answered, “That was my understanding at the time.” Id. He also acknowledged that he later learned that to be false and that there is a mortgage on the property. He testified: “The FBI tells me that they have collective law enforcement knowledge regarding Mr. Fults being a high value target, at which point, um, after I've corroborated all thirteen points of the letter, they tell me about a secret room.” Id. at 24. Fults's counsel asked, “[Y]ou had no idea about the reliability of that law enforcement knowledge other than as people you worked with, correct?” Id. at 26. Detective Wampler answered, “Correct.” Id. On cross-examination by the prosecutor, Detective Wampler testified that he learned from other agencies that Fults was “a high value target,” “there was a hidden room,” and “[h]e was a large scale narcotics distributor.” Id. at 29. He also stated: “It is not often that the FBI is concerned with a high value marijuana distributor, but based on the violent nature of this group, they were very concerned about, in fact, that they don't often times fly airplanes over top of someone's house taking aerial surveillance of somebody.” Id.

[11] On August 12, 2024, the court entered an order denying the motion to suppress. Specifically, the court found that “the information obtained via the anonymous letter, and verified by Detective Wampler, established reasonable suspicion for the trash pull and the trash pull was conducted in a manner similar to normal trash collection efforts.” Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 44. It also found that, “[e]xamining the trash collected from [Fults's] residence, Detective Wampler found marijuana stems, rolling papers and a baggie with cocaine residue, all of which established probable cause for the search warrant that was issued in relation to this case.” Id. On September 11, 2024, Fults filed a Motion for Certification of Interlocutory Order for Appeal to the Indiana Court of Appeals, which the court granted the next day. On October 28, 2024, Fults filed a Petition to Accept Jurisdiction of an Interlocutory Appeal with this Court. On December 13, 2024, this Court accepted jurisdiction.

Discussion

[12] Fults argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because law enforcement's search and seizure of his trash was not supported by reasonable suspicion. He asserts that the Indiana Supreme Court “has held that it is unreasonable for police to ‘search indiscriminately through people's trash.’ ” Appellant's Brief at 8 (quoting Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356, 363 (Ind. 2005)). He argues that the anonymous tip comprised substantially of obvious details about him which would be easily identifiable by members of the general public and the tip provided no information demonstrating intimate familiarity with his behavior. He contends that the collective police knowledge was “nothing more than allegations which were being made against [him] at the time when Detective Wampler received the anonymous letter in the mail.” Id. at 11. He argues that the tip failed to provide any information regarding his future acts. He also argues that the trial court erred because the trash was not retrieved in substantially the same manner as the trash collector would take it.³

[13] We review a trial court's denial of a motion to suppress in a manner similar to review of other sufficiency issues. Sanders v. State, 989 N.E.2d 332, 334 (Ind. 2013), reh'g denied. There must be substantial evidence of probative value in the record to support the ruling of the trial court. Id. We do not reweigh the evidence, and we consider conflicting evidence most favorably to the trial court's ruling. Id. We review de novo the determination of reasonable suspicion for a warrantless search. Id.

[14] We note that Fults does not cite either the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution nor Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution on appeal. However, he cites Litchfield in which the Indiana Supreme Court observed that the Litchfields did not challenge the searches of their trash under the Federal Constitution and addressed whether the search and seizure occurred in violation of the Indiana Constitution. Accordingly, we focus on whether the search and seizure here violated the Indiana Constitution.

[15] Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable search or seizure, shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized.

[16] “Although this language tracks the Fourth Amendment verbatim, Indiana has explicitly rejected the expectation of privacy as a test of the reasonableness of a search or seizure.” Litchfield, 824 N.E.2d at 359. “The legality of a governmental search under the Indiana Constitution turns on an evaluation of the reasonableness of the police conduct under the totality of the circumstances.” Id. “[T]he totality of the circumstances requires consideration of both the degree of intrusion into the subject's ordinary activities and the basis upon which the officer selected the subject of the search or seizure.” Id. at 360. “One factor that may render a search unreasonable is an arbitrary selection of the subject.” Id. Reasonableness of a search or seizure turns on the “balance of: 1) the degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge that a violation has occurred, 2) the degree of intrusion the method of the search or seizure imposes on the citizen's ordinary activities, and 3) the extent of law enforcement needs.” Id. at 361.

[17] In discussing searches of trash, the Indiana Supreme Court held:

Seizure of trash that is in its usual location for pickup is no intrusion at all on the owner's liberty or property interests. The owner wants and expects the trash to go away, and who removes it is normally a matter of indifference. If the trash is located in the place where it is normally picked up, the trash collection agency, whether public or private, is invited onto the property to the extent necessary to gather and empty the trash. Police officers can perform the same acts with no greater intrusion. It is not the intrusion, but rather the concern for unwarranted official snooping that makes the identity and purpose of the collector significant. But even that consideration is more formal than substantive. At the point the trash is removed by the authorized collector it is presumably fair game. See Mast v. State, 809 N.E.2d 415, 417 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004)[, reh'g denied, trans. denied]. Prohibiting officers from examining trash before it is collected thus imposes burdens on law enforcement by forcing officers to accompany or follow trash collectors or work at the city dump to do what might be much more easily accomplished but provides no real protection to the citizen. In sum, because there is no intrusion, if properly justified by other factors, a search of trash is reasonable.

We think, however, that it is not reasonable for law enforcement to search indiscriminately through people's trash. As the majority explained in Moran [v. State], although a search of a person's garbage may be reasonable under specific circumstances, “Hoosiers are not entirely comfortable with the idea of police officers casually rummaging through trash left at curbside.” 644 N.E.2d [536, 541 (Ind. 1994), reh'g denied]. We also agree with the conclusion of the Stamper court that police should not be permitted to enter a person's property and search his or her garbage “without reason.” [State v. Stamper, 788 N.E.2d 862, 867 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied]. We think the concern for reasonable searches of trash is best addressed by the requirement that, in order for a search or seizure to be reasonable, trash must be retrieved in substantially the same manner as the trash collector would take it. If garbage has been placed out for collection at the usual place for collection and is easily accessible to any member of the public, in the absence of a mistake, any claim to possessory ownership has been abandoned. The citizen expects that trash to be collected and has effectively ceded all rights in it. See Moran, 644 N.E.2d at 541. There is therefore no material intrusion into the citizen's ordinary activities.

As already noted, however, an important factor in evaluating a reasonable search is appropriate restriction on arbitrary selection of persons to be searched. We believe a requirement of articulable individualized suspicion, essentially the same as is required for a “Terry stop” of an automobile, imposes the appropriate balance between the privacy interests of citizens and the needs of law enforcement. Allowing random searches, or searches of those individuals whom the officers hope to find in possession of incriminating evidence gives excessive discretion to engage in fishing expeditions. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663, 99 S. Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979); [State v. Bulington, 802 N.E.2d 435, 440 (Ind. 2004)]; Baldwin [v. Reagan, 715 N.E.2d 332, 337 (Ind. 1999)]. In Article I, Section 11 terms, that is unreasonable. The police need not go to the lengths elaborated in Mast v. State, 809 N.E.2d 415 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), where police rode in the trash pickup and searched it only after it was taken by its usual collectors. But police do need to ensure that they do not cause a disturbance or create the appearance of a police raid of the residence.

824 N.E.2d at 363-364.

[18] With respect to the “requirement of articulable individualized suspicion, essentially the same as is required for a ‘Terry stop’ of an automobile,” id. at 364, the Indiana Supreme Court has held that police cannot rely on “a ‘mere “hunch” ’ simply suggesting a person committed a crime before making a Terry Stop, like a traffic stop.” Marshall v. State, 117 N.E.3d 1254, 1259 (Ind. 2019) (quoting Prado Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 397, 134 S. Ct. 1683 (2014) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968))), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 113 (2019). “To be sure, ‘[s]uch a stop “must be justified by some objective manifestation that the person stopped is, or is about to be, engaged in criminal activity.” ’ ” Id. (quoting Robinson v. State, 5 N.E.3d 362, 367 (Ind. 2014) (quoting Armfield v. State, 918 N.E.2d 316, 319 (Ind. 2009))). “Reasonable suspicion requires more than an officer's own subjective belief a person might be violating the law.” Id. “In other words, the stopping officer must be able to articulate some facts that provide a particularized and objective basis for believing a traffic violation occurred.” Id.

[19] Reasonable suspicion may be established on the basis of the collective knowledge of law enforcement officers. See Dunson v. State, 64 N.E.3d 250, 253, 253 n.3 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (addressing reasonable suspicion as to a Terry stop, observing that the Indiana Supreme Court has held that information obtained by one officer may be relied upon by other law enforcement officials who are called upon to assist in the investigation and arrest of a suspect, as long as the officer who obtained the information possessed probable cause to make the arrest, (citing Heffner v. State, 530 N.E.2d 297, 300 (Ind. 1988) (citing United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 105 S. Ct. 675 (1985))), and noting that “several of the cases on which we rely discuss collective knowledge of law enforcement officials as it relates to possessing probable cause and making arrests as opposed to reasonable suspicion and investigatory stops” and “[b]ecause the former is a higher standard, we see no reason these cases should not apply equally to arrest scenarios and scenarios, like the one at issue here, involving investigatory stops”); see also Griffith v. State, 788 N.E.2d 835, 840 (Ind. 2003) (addressing probable cause and holding that “[p]robable cause can rest on collective information known to the law enforcement organization as a whole, and not solely on the personal knowledge of the arresting officer,” “[t]he police force is considered a unit,” and “[w]here there is a police-channel communication to the arresting officer, he acts in good faith thereon, and such knowledge and information exist within the department, the arrest is based on probable cause”).

[20] “The United States Supreme Court has stated that, as a general rule, an anonymous tip alone is not likely to constitute the reasonable suspicion necessary for a valid Terry stop.” Lampkins v. State, 682 N.E.2d 1268, 1271, 1997 (Ind. 1997) (citing Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 329-330, 110 S. Ct. 2412, 2415-2416 (1990)), opinion modified on reh'g, 685 N.E.2d 698 (Ind. 1997). “However, where significant aspects of the tip are corroborated by the police, a Terry stop is likely valid.” Id. (citing White, 496 U.S. at 329-330, 110 S. Ct. at 2415-2416). “[P]recedent dictates that for an anonymous tip to constitute the reasonable suspicion necessary for a valid investigatory stop, at least two conditions must be met.” Sellmer v. State, 842 N.E.2d 358, 361 (Ind. 2006). “First, ‘significant aspects of the tip [must be] corroborated by the police.’ ” Id. (quoting Lampkins, 682 N.E.2d at 1271). “Such corroboration requires that an anonymous tip give the police something more than details regarding facts easily obtainable by the general public to verify its credibility.” Id. (citing Johnson v. State, 659 N.E.2d 116, 119 (Ind. 1995) (holding that an anonymous tip that provided only information easily obtainable by members of the general public was insufficiently reliable to constitute reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop)). “Second, an anonymous tip, if it is to be considered reliable enough to constitute reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop, must also demonstrate an intimate familiarity with the suspect's affairs and be able to predict future behavior.” Id. (citing Johnson, 659 N.E.2d at 118).

[21] The record reveals that Detective Wampler had not previously heard of Fults prior to receiving the letter. Detective Wampler testified that he conducted a de-confliction and “obtained two de-confliction hits, which is suggesting he's a high valued target.” Transcript Volume II at 12. “Upon completing de-confliction,” Detective Wampler spoke with FBI agents who stated they “had actually been conducting surveillance with an airplane over top of Mr. Fults that exact day.” Id. at 16. “[T]hrough the de-confliction process,” Detective Wampler contacted federal agencies, and the FBI told him that they had “collective law enforcement knowledge regarding Mr. Fults being a high value target.” Id. at 24. Detective Wampler determined that the phone records showed “that one Joshua Fults is communicating with Gary Lane,” who he knew as being involved in narcotics distribution throughout central Indiana. Id. at 13. Detective Wampler asserted that “[c]onsultation with the de-conflicting police agencies revealed intel that Joshua was known to traffic up to 200 pounds of marijuana and be involved with cocaine as well.” Exhibits Volume III at 4.

[22] In addition, Detective Wampler corroborated the allegations in the letter that Fults was not employed, he had a truck with a value over $87,000, he had another vehicle with a value over $74,000, he owned land with a value of $245,000, and he had three children and a boat as alleged in the letter. He observed numerous photos on social media of Fults racing at the Indianapolis area Speedrome, which was a hobby costing significant amounts of money. Detective Wampler checked with the IRS regarding tax records, and the IRS “gave specific information regarding the amounts of money that he was reporting on his income was not consistent with his assets.” Transcript Volume II at 15-16. Detective Wampler contacted T. Minor with the Indiana Department of Revenue who indicated that “something isn't right here ․ he can't afford that car ․ this isn't adding up at all.” Exhibits Volume III at 4. In light of the record and viewing the facts under the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that law enforcement possessed reasonable suspicion to conduct a search of Fults's trash.

[23] As for Fults's argument that the trash was not retrieved in substantially the same manner as the trash collector would take it, we disagree. Fults does not argue that the police created a disturbance when they pulled his trash. Detective Wampler testified that the trash cans were “in front of Mr. Fults's property.” Transcript Volume II at 18. The record also contains a photograph, which was admitted as Defendant's Exhibit C, taken by Detective Wampler on the morning the trash cans were removed which shows the trash cans near a mailbox near the end of what appears to be a driveway. Detective Weinhorst and Detective Wampler rode in an unmarked truck when Detective Wampler retrieved the trash cans. Detective Wampler testified that, after placing the trash cans in their vehicle, he “had taken extras and left theirs.” Id. at 21. He also testified that “Fults's cans were replaced immediately.” Id. at 22. We conclude that the State presented evidence indicating that the trash was retrieved in substantially the same manner as the trash collector would take it.

[24] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court.

[25] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Detective Wampler testified that Fults “hit on two federal agencies, which I deemed as a high value target.” Transcript Volume II at 13-14. When asked to explain de-confliction, Detective Wampler answered:It began as a military term, so for example, if the United States is trying to eliminate ISIS and the British are also involved there, if we have special forces on the ground, you don't want them to carpet bomb our special forces, so therefore, in this case with law enforcement, you would send a request to de-conflict a person ․Id. at 12.

2.   During direct examination of Detective Wampler by Fults's counsel, the following exchange occurred:Q. ․ What did you do with the trash cans?A. I took the trash cans back to – actually, if I recall, we take Mr. Fults's trash cans and put them in our vehicle and we had taken extras and left theirs, so we took those cans back to the original location.Q. You took the cans that you pulled back to the original location?A. Yes.Q. Okay. Who's we?A. Me and Detective Weinhorst. That may have actually been – it's irrelevant in my eyes, but that may have been days later on the trash cans. I don't remember if it was that day or the next day.Q. I just didn't hear you, Detective. That may have been day – and I couldn't understand what you said.THE COURT: Days later.A. It may have been days or a week later. I don't recall when we took the cans back. It may have been that day. Mr. Fults's cans were replaced immediately.Transcript Volume II at 21-22.

3.   Fults does not argue that the probable cause affidavit lacked probable cause when including the fruits of the trash search, and therefore we need not address that aspect.

Brown, Judge.

Bailey, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.