STATE v. SNODGRASS (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] The State of Indiana appeals the trial court's order granting Mickey C. Snodgrass’ Indiana Criminal Rule 4(C) motion for dismissal. The State asserts, and Snodgrass agrees, that the trial court clearly erred when it granted his motion. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On September 15, 2021, Snodgrass allegedly threatened John Kelley with a shotgun. Officers arrested Snodgrass that day and, on September 20, the State charged him with intimidation, as a Level 5 felony.¹ The court held an initial hearing the next day. Snodgrass informed the court that he had retained counsel, and the court scheduled a hearing for October 7. Following the initial hearing, Thomas Gaunt filed an appearance on behalf of Snodgrass.

[3] On October 6, Snodgrass filed a motion to continue the hearing due to a “calendar conflict” with another case. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 33. The court granted the motion and rescheduled the hearing for November 1. Then, on October 11, Gaunt filed a motion to withdraw as counsel based on Snodgrass’ request. The court granted that motion on October 13. The court held a hearing on October 28 regarding Snodgrass’ legal representation. Snodgrass indicated that he had hired Charles Hear to represent him. At the previously scheduled November 1 hearing, Hear acknowledged that he had not yet filed an appearance but that he “anticipate[d]” doing so by the end of the week. Tr. at 20. The court then continued the matter to November 29. On November 29, the court set a new hearing for January 10. Hear filed his appearance on December 10.

[4] On January 10, 2022, the court scheduled a jury trial for July 26. Thereafter, on March 4, Hear filed a motion to withdraw his appearance based on a breakdown in the attorney-client relationship. The court granted the motion on March 7 and sua sponte scheduled a hearing “on the issue of counsel” for April 4. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 48. During the April 4 hearing, Snodgrass informed the court that he “intend[ed] to hire a new attorney[.]” Tr. at 30. Snodgrass stated that he could hire the new attorney by mid-May, and the court scheduled a hearing for May 16. On May 16, Snodgrass again stated that he intended to hire an attorney to represent him and requested additional time to do so. The court continued the matter to June 6.

[5] On May 27, William Goebel entered his appearance on behalf of Snodgrass. Following the June 6 hearing, the court reaffirmed the trial date of July 26, with a pretrial conference scheduled for July 18. At that hearing, Snodgrass moved to continue the jury trial, which motion the court granted. The court rescheduled the trial for January 16, 2023. The court then sua sponte moved the trial to January 17.

[6] On December 13, 2022, Snodgrass filed a motion to continue due to attorney illness and requested “a period of at least 90 days” to recover. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 56. The court granted Snodgrass’ motion, vacated the scheduled trial date, and scheduled a hearing for February 13, 2023. Snodgrass filed another motion to continue due to his attorney's health issues and asked the court to schedule a hearing “during the last two (2) weeks of April[.]” Id. at 59. The court granted the motion and rescheduled the February 13 hearing to April 24. At that hearing, Snodgrass again moved to continue, and the court rescheduled the jury trial for September 19, with a pretrial conference on August 21.

[7] On August 9, Goebel filed a motion to withdraw his appearance due to a breakdown in the attorney-client relationship. The court granted the motion and again scheduled a hearing for August 21. At that hearing, Snodgrass orally moved to continue the matter in order to retain legal counsel. The court granted the motion, vacated the jury trial, and scheduled a hearing for September 18. On September 18, Snodgrass appeared without counsel and requested more time to hire an attorney to represent him. The court granted the motion and scheduled a hearing for October 16. Snodgrass again appeared at the October 16 hearing without an attorney and again requested more time. The court continued the matter to November 6. On November 6, Snodgrass still did not have counsel, and the court gave him “more time to do that[.]” Tr. at 58. The court scheduled a jury trial for April 4, 2024, with a pretrial conference on March 4 and a status conference on January 22.

[8] On January 22, Snodgrass appeared without representation but informed the court that he was still attempting to hire an attorney. The court informed Snodgrass that he “may be entitled to the services of a public defender,” but Snodgrass responded: “Not in this county.” Id. at 61. The court restated the trial date of April 4 and pretrial conference for March 4. On March 4, Snodgrass appeared without counsel and again stated that he intended to hire his own. After further conversation, Snodgrass agreed to a public defender, and the court appointed Sabrina Haney to represent him. The matter remained scheduled for an April 4 jury trial.

[9] At a pretrial hearing on March 21, Snodgrass moved to continue the matter. The court rescheduled the jury trial for July 30 and scheduled a pretrial conference for June 27. On July 18, the State moved to continue the trial due to court congestion. The court granted the motion and scheduled a hearing for July 25. At the July 25 hearing, Haney notified the court that she had a “conflict” in the case and needed to withdraw as counsel. Id. at 77. The court continued the matter to August 15. On July 29, Justin Long entered his appearance for Snodgrass. Following the August 15 hearing, the court rescheduled the jury trial for January 7, 2025, with a pretrial conference on December 12, 2024. Snodgrass responded: “That should be fine.” Id. at 83.

[10] On December 29, Snodgrass filed a motion for dismissal pursuant to Indiana Criminal Rule 4(C). In that motion, Snodgrass asserted that 1,195 days had elapsed since he had been charged and that 583 of those days were not chargeable to him. In particular, he asserted that the following were all delays not caused by him: September 21, 2021, to October 7, 2021; November 1, 2021, to July 26, 2022; April 24, 2023, to September 19, 2023; and July 25, 2024, to December 29, 2024. Snodgrass asserted that those dates add up to more than one year and, as such, he was entitled to discharge. The State responded and claimed that only the days from September 21, 2021, to October 7, 2021, counted toward the one-year limit within which the State had to bring Snodgrass to trial. Following a hearing, the court granted Snodgrass’ motion.

[11] The State filed a motion to correct error and again asserted that the days of delay in September and October 2021 counted toward the one-year limit but additionally conceded that the time period from January 11, 2022, to July 26, 2022, also counted toward that limit. Even with the additional time period, the State again asserted that one year had not elapsed and that Snodgrass was not entitled to a dismissal of his charges. The trial court denied the State's motion. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[12] The State contends, and Snodgrass agrees, that the trial court clearly erred when it granted Snodgrass’ Indiana Criminal Rule 4(C) motion for dismissal. That rule provides, in relevant part:

No person can be held on recognizance or otherwise to answer a criminal charge for a period in aggregate exceeding one year from the date the criminal charge against such defendant is filed, or from the date of the arrest on such charge, whichever is later. Delays caused by a defendant, congestion of the court calendar, or an emergency are excluded from the time period. If a defendant is held beyond the time limit of this section and moves for dismissal, the criminal charge against the defendant must be dismissed.

Ind. Crim. Rule 4(C). “Thus, under Criminal Rule 4(C), a defendant may seek and be granted a [dismissal] if he is not brought to trial within the proper time period.” State v. Harper, 135 N.E.3d 962, 972 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied. However, as the rule suggests, “criminal defendants extend the one-year period by seeking or acquiescing in delay resulting in a later trial date.” Battering v. State, 150 N.E.3d 597, 601 (Ind. 2020) (quotation marks omitted). In reviewing Criminal Rule 4(C) claims, we review questions of law de novo, and we review factual findings under the clearly erroneous standard. Harper, 135 N.E.3d at 972.

[13] Both the State and Snodgrass agree that the one-year period to bring Snodgrass to trial began on September 20, 2021, which is the date he was charged with intimidation. And both parties agree that only the time periods from September 20, 2021, through October 7, 2021, and January 10, 2022, to July 26, 2022, count toward the one-year time limit required by Criminal Rule 4(C). Indeed, Snodgrass concedes that the time period from October 8, 2021, through January 10, 2022, was “attributable to him due to his counsel's unopposed motion to continue and change in counsel”; that the period from July 27, 2022, through April 24, 2023, was “attributable to him, due to his request for continuances”; that the period of April 25, 2023, through September 19, 2023, “was attributable to him, due to his counsel's repeated continuance requests caused by illness”; and that September 20, 2023, through July 25, 2024, “was attributable to him[.]” Appellee's Br. at 12. In addition, he concedes that he “failed to object” to the January 7, 2025, trial date, thus “acquiescing” to the delay from July 26, 2024, through January 7, 2025. Id.

[14] However, while both parties agree that only two date ranges count against the time limit (September 20 through October 7, 2021, and January 10 through July 26, 2022) and that Snodgrass was not entitled to dismissal, they disagree as to the number of days that the State has remaining to bring Snodgrass to trial. Snodgrass asserts that the first period contained 18 days and the second contained 198 days, for a total of 216 days that apply toward the one-year limit, leaving 149 days for the State to bring him to trial. The State, however, claims the delays were 17 days and 197 days, respectively, for a total of 214 days that apply toward the limit, which would leave the State with 151 days to bring him to trial. We agree with the State.

[15] Indiana Trial Rule 6(A)² provides that, “[i]n computing any period of time ․ the day of the act, event, or default from which the designated period of time begins to run shall not be included.” Here, excluding the first day of each period, the time period from September 20 through October 7, 2021, contains 17 days. And the time period from January 10 through July 26, 2022, contains 197 days. That equates to 214 days that apply toward the one-year time limit. As a result, and notwithstanding any further delays caused by Snodgrass, congestion of the court calendar, or an emergency, the State has 151 days remaining to bring Snodgrass to trial.

Conclusion

[16] The trial court erred when it granted Snodgrass’ motion for discharge because only 214 days of the one-year time limit had elapsed. We therefore reverse the trial court's order and remand for further proceedings.

[17] Reversed and remanded.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-45-2-1(b)(2)(A).

2.   Indiana Criminal Rule 1.1 provides that the “Indiana Rules of Court, as well as all statutes governing procedure and practice in trial courts, apply to all criminal proceedings unless they conflict with these rules.” And, here, there is no conflict between Trial Rule 6 and the relevant criminal rules.

Bailey, Judge.

Brown, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.