MOORE v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Arlace Moore battered his wife, K.M., on the late-evening of July 29 or early-morning of July 30, 2024, and was charged with Class B misdemeanor battery following the altercation. The charge was enhanced to a Level 5 felony because Moore had a prior domestic-battery conviction stemming from acts also involving K.M. A jury found Moore guilty of battering K.M., after which Moore admitted to the prior domestic-battery conviction. The trial court entered judgment of conviction on the elevated Level 5 felony charge and imposed a two-year sentence. On appeal, Moore contends that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting a recording of a telephone call that he had made to K.M. from jail (the “jail call”), arguing that the recording was unduly prejudicial because it informed the jury that he had been incarcerated following the events in question. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In 2024, Moore was unemployed and living with K.M. in Richmond. On the evening of July 29, 2024, K.M. called the police after Moore scared her and threw a jar of mayonnaise at her. The police did not take Moore into custody, but Moore left the home.

[3] Moore returned later that night or early the next morning while K.M. was asleep on a recliner. Moore “grabbed [K.M.] up by [her] bra and started hitting [her], wanting [her] phone[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 47. Moore told K.M. that he “was going to take [her] out” and called her a “b[****].” Tr. Vol. II p. 47. Moore knocked K.M. out of the chair, slapped her in the face, and punched her in the head. Moore was “acting crazy.” Tr. Vol. II p. 47. He “was drunk” and “out of his mind.” Tr. Vol. II p. 48. K.M. again called 911, and officers returned to the home.

[4] Officers observed K.M. on the floor behind a recliner. Moore appeared to be intoxicated. K.M. explained that Moore had assaulted her and the responding officers observed that K.M. had some redness on her jaw and face and a small laceration behind her ear. As a result of the attack, K.M. experienced pain and suffered a knot on her head, a cut behind her ear, a bruise on her cheek, and a bruise on her breast.

[5] On July 30, 2024, the State charged Moore with Class B misdemeanor battery, which was enhanced to a Level 5 felony because Moore had a prior domestic-battery conviction involving K.M. Two days later, while still in jail following his arrest, Moore called K.M. and the two initially discussed the need for K.M. to obtain money to post Moore's bond. Moore also instructed K.M. to talk to prosecutors and indicate that she did not want him to be prosecuted, telling her “[y]ou know what to do.” State's Ex. 16 at 1:43–1:47. Moore told K.M. that he was “sorry” and “[i]t won't happen again.” State's Ex. 16 at 2:206, 3:25–3:27. Moore also told K.M. that he was not going to drink anymore.

[6] The case proceeded to a jury trial, at which Moore objected to the admission of the jail call recording, stating it was unfairly prejudicial because it showed he had been in jail. The trial court overruled the objection, finding that the probative value of the recording outweighed the danger of unfair prejudice. After the jury found him guilty of misdemeanor battery, Moore pled guilty to the Level 5 felony enhancement, admitting that he had a prior domestic-battery conviction for acts involving K.M. The trial court accepted Moore's guilty plea, entered a judgment of conviction, and, on December 16, 2024, sentenced him to a two-year term of imprisonment.

Discussion and Decision

[7] The admission of evidence is a matter that we generally “leave to the discretion of the trial court.” Clark v. State, 994 N.E.2d 252, 259–60 (Ind. 2013). “We review these determinations for abuse of that discretion and reverse only when admission is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances and the error affects a party's substantial rights.” Id. at 260 (internal citation omitted). “[W]e will not reverse the decision to admit or exclude evidence if that decision is sustainable on any ground.” Carpenter v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1075, 1078 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied.

[8] In arguing that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the jail call, Moore claims that the jail call was unduly prejudicial. Relevant evidence is generally admissible. See Ind. Evidence Rule 402. However, “[t]he court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” Evid. R. 403. “All evidence that is relevant to a criminal prosecution is inherently prejudicial, and thus the Evidence Rule 403 inquiry boils down to a balance of the probative value of the proffered evidence against the likely unfair prejudicial impact of that evidence.” Duvall v. State, 978 N.E.2d 417, 428 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied.

[9] “When determining likely unfair prejudicial impact, courts will look for the dangers that the jury will substantially overestimate the value of the evidence or that the evidence will arouse or inflame the passions or sympathies of the jury.” Carter v. State, 766 N.E.2d 377, 382 (Ind. 2002) (internal quotation omitted). Furthermore, “[t]he balancing of the probative value against the danger of unfair prejudice must be determined with reference to the issue to be proved by the evidence.” Bryant v. State, 984 N.E.2d 240, 249 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. “Evaluation of whether the probative value of an evidentiary matter is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice is a discretionary task best performed by the trial court.” Id.

[10] “Generally, recordings of telephone calls made from jail are admissible when the defendant discusses the crime for which he is incarcerated.” King v. State, 985 N.E.2d 755, 759 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. It is undisputed that Moore and K.M. discussed the crime for which he had been incarcerated during the jail call. Moore told K.M. that he was “sorry[,]” that “it won't happen again[,]” and that he was going to stop drinking. State's Ex. 16 at 2:06, 3:25–3:27. Moore also instructed K.M. to tell the prosecutor that she did not want him to be prosecuted, telling her “[y]ou know what to do.” State's Ex. 16 at 1:43–1:47. The recording of the jail call, which included an admission of guilt and a statement of remorse, was relevant to prove Moore's guilt. The question then is whether the recording of the jail call, despite its relevance, was unduly prejudicial. We conclude that it was not.

[11] Moore asserts that “[p]resenting the jury evidence of the jail call likely aroused or inflamed the passions of the jury.” Appellant's Br. p. 8. Moore further asserts that “[t]he fact that [he] was still in jail two days after what the jury saw as a minor misdemeanor battery misled the jury into believing that Moore was guilty and so dangerous that he needed to remain locked away pending trial.” Appellant's Br. p. 9. We disagree. As Moore acknowledges, he and K.M. discussed ways for K.M. to obtain the money necessary to post his bond during the jail call. This discussion, especially when coupled with evidence indicating that Moore had been unemployed at the time of the incident, supports the reasonable inference that Moore had remained in jail for two days after the incident due to financial difficulties, not because he was especially dangerous. While the recording of the jail call was certainly prejudicial, as is all evidence of guilt, we cannot say that the jail call was unfairly prejudicial to Moore.¹

[12] In any event, even if it had been error to admit the jail call, any such error was, at most, harmless given the significant independent evidence of Moore's guilt.

Errors in the admission or exclusion of evidence are to be disregarded as harmless error unless they affect the substantial rights of a party. In other words, we will find an error in the exclusion of evidence harmless if its probable impact on the jury, in light of all of the evidence in the case, is sufficiently minor so as not to affect the defendant's substantial rights.

Barnhart v. State, 15 N.E.3d 138, 143 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (internal quotations omitted).

[13] K.M. testified at trial and unequivocally identified Moore as her assailant. K.M. indicated that she had been sleeping in a chair when Moore knocked her out of the chair, “grabbed [her] up by [her] bra[,] and started hitting” her. Tr. Vol. II p. 47. Moore called K.M. a “b[****]” and told her that he “was going to take [her] out[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 47. K.M. indicated that Moore “was just acting crazy.” Tr. Vol. II p. 47. She further indicated that Moore “was drunk ․ [and] just out of his mind.” Tr. Vol. II p. 48. K.M.’s testimony was corroborated by the testimony of the responding officers who observed that K.M. had been hiding behind a recliner when they arrived, K.M. had injuries to her face and ear, and Moore—the only other person in the home—appeared to be intoxicated.

[14] K.M.’s testimony, coupled with that of the responding officers and photographs documenting K.M.’s injuries, is significant, independent evidence of Moore's guilt. As such, even if the jail call could be said to have been unfairly prejudicial, its admission was harmless.

[15] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   We also note that Final Jury Instruction Number 16 instructed the jury that “[t]he charge that has been filed is the formal method of bringing the defendant to trial. The filing of a charge or the defendant's arrest is not to be considered by you as any evidence of guilt.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 129. “[W]hen the jury has been instructed not to consider specific evidence or argument, we will assume that the jury followed the instructions.” Poortenga v. State, 99 N.E.3d 691, 697 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (internal quotation omitted).

Bradford, Judge.

May, J., and Mathias, J., concur.