WILLIAMS v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Michael Williams appeals the dismissal of his petitions for post-conviction relief with prejudice by the post-conviction court (“PC Court”). According to Williams, the Marion County Jail lost Williams’ client file from his trial attorney, and he was unable to obtain a second copy. For this reason, Williams felt unprepared to proceed during the evidentiary hearing, and he agreed to have his petitions dismissed with prejudice in lieu of presenting his case. Williams appeals and argues that the PC Court erred by: (1) denying Williams’ request for reproduction of his client file; and (2) dismissing his petitions for post-conviction relief with prejudice. We conclude that: (1) Williams never requested that the PC Court order reproduction of his client file, so the PC Court did not err in this regard; and (2) the PC Court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Williams’ petitions with prejudice. Accordingly, we affirm.

Issues

[2] Williams raises two issues, which we restate as:

I.  Whether the PC court erred by denying Williams’ request for reproduction of his client file.

II. Whether the PC Court abused its discretion by giving Williams the option to either: (1) proceed to the evidentiary hearing without his client file; or (2) have Williams’ petitions dismissed with prejudice.

Facts

[3] In March 2017, Williams was convicted of felony murder and found to be an habitual offender in Cause No. 49G05-1601-MR-2851 (“Felony Murder Case”) and Level 3 felony robbery in Cause No. 49G05-1511-F3-40597 (“Robbery Case”). The background for Williams’ convictions is as follows:

On October 31, 2015, eighteen-year-old Raymond Alvarez and his sixteen-year-old girlfriend, N.B., stopped by Alvarez's parents’ apartment in Indianapolis to pick up N.B.’s backpack. N.B. stayed in the car while Alvarez went inside. A vehicle parked next to Alvarez's car, and Kevin Wilkerson got out of the passenger side of the vehicle and approached N.B. Williams was driving that vehicle. Wilkerson asked N.B. for a lighter, which she provided to him. Alvarez then returned, put N.B.’s backpack in the back seat of his vehicle, and started to back out.

Wilkerson made a motion to Alvarez that he needed a lighter again, and Alvarez started to pull back into the spot. Alvarez handed a lighter to Wilkerson, who turned his back to Alvarez and N.B. When Wilkerson turned back around, he had a gun in his hand. Wilkerson told Alvarez to empty his pockets, but Alvarez said he did not have anything. Wilkerson then demanded the backpack. Alvarez reached into the back seat to retrieve the backpack and placed it on his lap. Around this time, Williams said, “don't do no stupid s***, bro.” N.B. was not sure if Williams was talking to Wilkerson or Alvarez. Wilkerson grabbed the backpack and threw it onto the passenger seat of Williams's vehicle. N.B. saw the backpack, which was in the car with Williams, moving around, but she could not see Williams's hands. Wilkerson then demanded again that Alvarez empty his pockets. Alvarez said again that he did not have any money but that he did have candy that his brother gave him. Wilkerson said, “You think this s*** is funny, you think this s*** is a game.” Wilkerson then shot Alvarez, resulting in his death. Wilkerson jumped into the passenger seat, and Williams drove away quickly.

On November 15, 2015, at approximately 2:00 p.m., Williams entered a Family Dollar store in Lawrence. Williams handed the manager a note demanding cash, and she asked him “if he really wanted to do this.” Williams said, “maybe this will make you change your mind,” and he showed her something in his pocket that was black and had ridges on it. The manager believed it was a gun. The manager and assistant manager then opened the safe and gave the money to Williams. During the incident, a customer approached the counter, and Williams and the other employees told her that the store was closed. The customer, Courtney Delaney, thought the interaction was strange. She left the store, drove across the street to a gas station, and called 911.

Williams left the store and got into the passenger side of a red vehicle driven by Wilkerson. Delaney gave a description of the vehicle to the 911 operator. Officers immediately found the vehicle and attempted to stop the vehicle, but the driver refused to stop. During the pursuit, the vehicle got a flat tire and stopped. The two men started running away on foot. Officers found two young children hiding in the backseat of the vehicle. During the foot chase of Williams, an officer saw him discard an item and keep running. A black firearm with ridges on the handle was later recovered from that location. When Williams was apprehended, he had the money from Family Dollar and the note he showed to the Family Dollar manager in his possession.

Testing on the firearm revealed that it was the same gun used to kill Alvarez. Williams's DNA was found on the firearm's magazine. Williams admitted to robbing the Family Dollar but denied that he had a weapon during the robbery. Williams also admitted that he was driving when Wilkerson shot Alvarez, but he denied knowing what Wilkerson was doing.

The State charged Williams with murder, felony murder, and Level 2 felony robbery for the incident involving Alvarez and N.B. and alleged that Williams was an habitual offender. Separately, the State charged Williams with Level 3 felony robbery for the Family Dollar incident and again alleged that Williams was an habitual offender. Williams was tried for both cases at a bench trial in January 2017. With respect to the incident involving Alvarez and N.B., the trial court found Williams not guilty of murder but guilty of felony murder and Level 2 felony robbery. With respect to the Family Dollar incident, the trial court found Williams guilty of Level 3 felony robbery. Williams then pled guilty to being an habitual offender.

The trial court sentenced Williams to fifty-five years for felony murder enhanced by twenty years for his status as an habitual offender. The trial court sentenced Williams to twelve years for the Level 3 felony robbery conviction. The trial court did not sentence Williams for the Level 2 felony robbery count associated with Alvarez and N.B. or the second habitual offender allegation due to double jeopardy concerns. The trial court then ordered that the sentences run consecutively for an aggregate sentence of eighty-seven years․

Williams v. State, Case No. 49A02-1704-CR-842, slip op. pp. 2-5 (Ind. Ct. App. Dec. 15, 2017) (mem.) (record citations omitted).

[4] Williams appealed his convictions and challenged the sufficiency of the evidence. On December 15, 2017, this Court issued a memorandum decision affirming Williams’ convictions. See generally id.

[5] After his direct appeal, Williams requested that his trial counsel, a public defender from the Marion County Public Defender Agency, send him his client file, and Williams received the file on October 18, 2018. On December 17, 2018, Williams filed petitions for post-conviction relief from both the Felony Murder and Robbery cases. Williams alleged in his petitions that his trial counsel was ineffective for “casual representation”; failing to “timely and effectively communicate” with Williams during the proceedings; and failing to tender a jury instruction that “[m]ere presence alone is not sufficient to prove the Defendant aided the crime.” Pet. For Post-Conviction Relief, Cause No. 49D31-1812-PC-044348, p. 3 (Dec. 17, 2018); Pet. For Post-Conviction Relief, Cause No. 49D31-1812-PC-044349, p. 3 (Dec. 17, 2018).¹ Williams also alleged that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions. The PC Court appointed the State Public Defender's Office to represent Williams; however, Williams’ appointed counsel withdrew after Williams indicated that he wished to proceed pro se.

[6] The PC Court scheduled a status conference for September 28, 2021. According to Williams, at some point before the hearing, he “was being held in the Marion County Jail, [and] the Marion County Jail lost all of Williams[’] legal documents from his client file.” Appellant's Br. p. 5. The status conference was continued to September 30, 2021, “to give the jail time to locate Williams[’] legal documents,” but the documents were never found. Id. According to Williams, at the status conference, “Williams verbally requested that the [PC Court] order his trial attorney (a public defender) to provide him with another copy of his attorney/client file ․ but the [PC Court] denied Williams[’] request stating that he had already received a copy of his file.”² Id.

[7] Williams claims he was unable to obtain another copy of his “legal documents,” so at the April 19, 2023 status conference, he requested that his post-conviction relief petitions be withdrawn without prejudice, and the PC Court granted his request. Appellant's Br. p. 6. The PC Court directed Williams “to refile when ready to proceed to an Evidentiary Hearing.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 47.

[8] On December 21, 2023, Williams again filed petitions for post-conviction relief from the Felony and Robbery cases, alleging the same grounds as in his original petitions. On January 9, 2024, the PC Court issued an order scheduling an evidentiary hearing for September 11, 2024, and appointed the State Public Defender's Office to represent Williams. The order stated, “If [Williams] elects to proceed pro se after counsel withdraws his or her appearance, Petitioner shall, upon a timely filed request, be granted a brief continuance of the evidentiary hearing. ANY MOTION TO CONTINUE MADE BY A PRO SE PETITIONER ON THE DAY OF THE EVIDENTIARY HEARING SHALL BE DENIED.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 47 (bold, italics, and capitalization in original). The order further stated, “Any motion to withdraw the Petition without prejudice must be filed at least thirty (30) days prior to the original evidentiary hearing[.]” Id. at 48. Williams’ appointed counsel later moved to withdraw on the grounds that Williams’ petitions presented the same claims as his previous petitions, which the State Public Defender's Office had already investigated, and the PC Court granted the motion.

[9] At some point, Williams sent a letter to the Marion County Public Defender Agency requesting “exhibits,” “disc recordings,” and “any other documents” from his trials.³ Id. at 57. Williams did not mention that the previous file he received from his trial counsel was lost by the Marion County Jail. On February 12, 2024, the Marion County Public Defender Agency replied to Williams’ letter and declined to send Williams the “file” because Williams already “received all the documents [he] requested in [his] case” and noted that Williams’ trial counsel no longer worked at the Marion County Public Defender Agency. Id. at 56.

[10] On August 19, 2024, Williams filed in the PC Court a “Request for Production of Documents”; however, Williams did not list any specific requested documents. Id. at 65. The PC Court denied the request because “[n]o specific document [was] described.” Id. On October 7, 2024, Williams wrote a letter to the PC Court asking for “Disc audio transcripts” of his trial, which the PC Court denied. Id. at 21, 24, 55.

[11] At the scheduled evidentiary hearing on September 11, 2024, Williams explained that he was unprepared to proceed because the Marion County Jail had lost his client file and he had been unsuccessful in reacquiring the file. The PC Court reminded Williams that, per the January 2024 scheduling order, if Williams sought to continue the hearing, he needed to file such a motion prior to the hearing, which Williams had not done. The PC court then stated, “You can either proceed and whatever you present, that's it. You don't get, you know, necessarily another chance, or you can have me dismiss it with prejudice and then ask the Court of Appeals for permission to come back to me for another hearing.” Tr. Vol. II p. 9. Williams responded, “Okay. I'd rather you dismiss it with prejudice.” Id. Accordingly, the PC court dismissed Williams’ petitions for post-conviction relief with prejudice. Williams now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[12] Williams appeals the PC Court's dismissal of his post-conviction relief petitions with prejudice. At the outset, we note that Williams proceeds in this appeal pro se, as he did before the PC Court. Under Indiana law, “ ‘a pro se litigant is held to the same standards as a trained attorney and is afforded no inherent leniency simply by virtue of being self-represented.’ ” Stark v. State, 204 N.E.3d 957, 963 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (quoting Zavodnik v. Harper, 17 N.E.3d 259, 266 (Ind. 2014)). Like a trained attorney, a pro se defendant is responsible for “following procedural and evidentiary rules.” Jefferson v. State, 891 N.E.2d 77, 87 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (citing Piper v. State, 770 N.E.2d 880, 883 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002)), trans. denied. We, thus, must decline Williams’ request that we hold him to a “less stringent standard,” Appellant's Br. p. 14, and we instead hold him to the standard of a trained attorney.

I. Attorney-Client File

[13] Williams first argues that the PC Court erred by “denying Williams another copy of his attorney client file.” Appellant's Br. p. 15. Rule 1.16(d) of the Indiana Rules of Professional Conduct states:

Upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client's interests, such as ․ surrendering papers and property to which the client is entitled ․

This rule generally requires attorneys to return the client's legal file to the client when the attorney's representation terminates. See, e.g., In re Newman, 958 N.E.2d 792, 798 (Ind. 2011); In re Towell, 699 N.E.2d 1138, 1140 (Ind. 1998).⁴

[14] Indiana Code Section 33-43-1-9 affords clients “an opportunity for recourse in our courts” when an attorney refuses to deliver the client's file. Pigg v. State, 929 N.E.2d 799, 803 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied; accord McKim v. State, 528 N.E.2d 484, 485-86 (Ind. 1988); Smith v. State, 426 N.E.2d 402, 402 (Ind. 1981). This statute provides:

If, on request, an attorney refuses to deliver over money or papers to a person from whom or for whom the attorney has received them, in the course of the attorney's professional employment, the attorney may be required, after reasonable notice, on motion of any party aggrieved, by an order of the court in which an action, if any, was prosecuted or if an action was not prosecuted, by the order of any court of record, to deliver the money or papers within a specified time, or show cause why the attorney should not be punished for contempt.

Ind. Code § 33-43-1-9.

[15] Here, Williams requested that his trial attorney send him his client file, and Williams received the file on October 18, 2018. Williams evidently used the file in preparation for his first set of post-conviction relief petitions; however, according to Williams, the file was later lost while he was incarcerated at the Marion County Jail.

[16] Williams argues that the PC Court erred by denying his request to order reproduction of the client file, but our review of the record reveals that no such request was made to the PC Court during the proceedings subject to this appeal. Williams filed requests for production of documents in the PC Court, but the requests did not list any specific documents. See T.R. 34(B) (providing that requests for production “shall” describe each requested item “with reasonable particularity”). Williams also did not serve the requests for production on his trial counsel, see T.R. 34(C) (governing requests for production from non-parties), nor did he file a motion under Indiana Code Section 33-43-1-9.

[17] Williams did request that the PC Court order another copy of his file be produced at the September 30, 2021 status conference, but this occurred during Williams’ first post-conviction relief proceedings, which Williams withdrew without prejudice and are not subject to this appeal. It is Williams’ most recent post-conviction relief proceedings that are subject to this appeal, and Williams did not request that the PC court order that another copy of his file be produced during these proceedings. “Without a request for action, a trial court's failure to act is not error.” Parker v. State, 567 N.E.2d 105, 112 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (citing Carroll v. State, 438 N.E.2d 745, 750 (Ind. 1982)) (“Appellant cannot claim error in the trial court's failure to take any ․ actions when he did not make the motion which would have given the court the opportunity to act.”), trans. denied. Because the PC Court was not presented with a motion regarding the production of Williams’ client file, we cannot say that the PC court erred by not ordering reproduction of his client file.⁵

II. Dismissal of PCR Petitions with Prejudice

[18] Williams next argues that the PC Court erred by “dismiss[ing] Williams[’] post-conviction relief petitions with prejudice.” Appellant's Br. p. 22. But Williams agreed to have his petitions dismissed with prejudice. We, thus, restate the issue as whether the trial court abused its discretion by giving Williams the choice to either: (1) proceed to the evidentiary hearing without his client file; or (2) have his petitions dismissed with prejudice.

[19] Post-conviction proceedings are civil proceedings in which a defendant may present limited collateral challenges to a conviction and sentence. Gibson v. State, 133 N.E.3d 673, 681 (Ind. 2019), reh'g denied; Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1(1)(b). Under our post-conviction rules, a petitioner is entitled to “one collateral review of a conviction and sentence in a post-conviction proceeding.” Baird v. State, 831 N.E.2d 109, 114 (Ind. 2005) (citing P-C.R. 1).

[20] To litigate any “successive” post-conviction claim, the petitioner must obtain “prior authorization from [the Indiana Supreme Court] (in capital appeals) or the Court of Appeals (in all other appeals), either of which ‘will authorize the filing of the petition if the petitioner establishes a reasonable possibility’ that the petitioner is entitled to relief.” Shaw v. State, 130 N.E.3d 91, 92 (Ind. 2019) (quoting P-C.R. 1(12)). To avoid the requirement that a petitioner obtain the approval of an appellate court before filing a successive petition, a petitioner may move to withdraw the original petition without prejudice before the petition has been ruled upon. See P-C.R. 1(4)(c) (“At any time prior to entry of judgment the court may grant leave to withdraw the petition.”). The PC Court, however, retains the discretion to deny the motion and instead render a binding decision. Tapia v. State, 753 N.E.2d 581, 584-85 (Ind. 2001).

[21] Here, Williams never requested that the PC Court withdraw his petitions without prejudice. Instead, at the evidentiary hearing, Williams informed the PC Court that he was unprepared to proceed because he had not received another copy of his client file. The PC Court noted that Williams had not timely moved to continue the hearing or to withdraw his petitions without prejudice per the PC Court's January 2024 order. The PC Court, thus, gave Williams the option to either “proceed and whatever you present, that's it” or to have the PC Court dismiss the petitions “with prejudice and then [Williams could] ask the Court of Appeals for permission to come back ․” Tr. Vol. II p. 9. Williams chose to have the PC Court dismiss his petitions with prejudice.

[22] We take a moment to consider the proper standard of review.⁶ If Williams had moved to withdraw his petitions without prejudice, we would review the PC court's denial of that motion for an abuse of the PC court's discretion. See Tinker v. State, 805 N.E.2d 1284 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (holding PC Court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing petition with prejudice when petitioner's motion to withdraw petition without prejudice was denied and petitioner subsequently agreed to have his petition dismissed with prejudice), trans. denied; Tapia, 753 N.E.2d at 584-85. Williams, however, did not file a motion to withdraw his petition without prejudice.

[23] Still, the abuse-of-discretion standard is the appropriate standard here. As our Supreme Court explained in Tapia, the abuse of discretion standard “gives the post-conviction court the ability to curtail attempts by petitioners ․ to delay final judgment on their petitions” and is also “the well-established standard of review for voluntary motions to dismiss ․” 753 N.E.2d at 584. Both of these principles are relevant here, as Williams was attempting to postpone the proceedings and agreed to the dismissal with prejudice.⁷

[24] Accordingly, we employ the abuse-of-discretion standard. We ask whether the PC court “ ‘reached an erroneous conclusion and judgment, one clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court or the reasonable, probable and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom.’ ” Thomas v. State, 965 N.E.2d 70, 74-75 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (quoting Tapia, 753 N.E.2d at 585), trans. denied. Applying this standard, we conclude that the PC court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Williams’ petitions with prejudice.

[25] After Williams successfully withdrew his first post-conviction relief petitions without prejudice, the PC Court warned Williams not to “refile” until he was “ready to proceed to an Evidentiary Hearing.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 47. When Williams refiled his petitions, he had still not reobtained his client file. The PC Court issued an order setting an evidentiary hearing and informing Williams that any motion for continuance would need to be filed prior to the hearing and any motion to withdraw his petitions without prejudice would need to be filed at least thirty days before the hearing. Williams did not file either motion and instead appeared at the evidentiary hearing unprepared. The PC Court gave Williams the option to either present his case to the best of his ability or to have the petitions dismissed with prejudice, and Williams elected the latter.

[26] We recognize that Williams did not or was unable to obtain another copy of his client file and felt unprepared to proceed at the evidentiary hearing.⁸ And the PC Court could have permitted Williams to have the evidentiary hearing continued or to withdraw his petitions without prejudice. But the PC Court advised Williams long before the evidentiary hearing regarding his options for postponing the hearing or withdrawing his petitions without prejudice, and Williams did not avail himself of those options. Williams also did not request a continuance or that his petitions be withdrawn without prejudice at the evidentiary hearing. We, thus, conclude that the PC court did not abuse its discretion by giving Williams the option to either: (1) proceed to the evidentiary hearing without his client file; or (2) have Williams’ petitions dismissed with prejudice. See Thomas, 965 N.E.2d at 75-76 (holding PC court did not abuse its discretion by denying motion to withdraw petition without prejudice and instead holding hearing and dismissing petition with prejudice where defendant had already withdrawn first petition for post-conviction relief without prejudice and had ample time to conduct discovery prior to evidentiary hearing); Tinker, 805 N.E.2d at 1290.

Conclusion

[27] Williams never requested that the PC Court order another copy of his attorney client file be produced during these proceedings, so we cannot say that the PC Court erred by failing to issue such an order. And the PC Court did not abuse its discretion by giving Williams the choice to either: (1) proceed to the evidentiary hearing without his client file; or (2) have his petitions dismissed with prejudice. Accordingly, we affirm.

[28] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   We take judicial notice of these petitions pursuant to Evidence Rule 201(a)(2)(C), as they were not included in the appellate record.

2.   The Chronological Case Summary (“CCS”) entries for this hearing contain no information regarding this discussion, and a transcript of the hearing is not included in this appellate record.

3.   The portion of Williams’ letter included in the appellate record is undated.

4.   As one commentator has noted:The Restatement's approach, reflecting the majority of jurisdictions to have addressed the issue, is that, subject to narrow exceptions, the client is entitled to the entire file, including “such originals and copies of other documents possessed by the lawyer relating to the representation as the client or former client reasonably needs.” [Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers] § 46(3). The client's right to the file “extends to documents placed in the lawyer's possession as well as to documents produced by the lawyer[.]” Id., cmt. c. According to the Restatement, the primary exception allows a lawyer to refuse to disclose certain law-firm documents reasonably intended only for internal review. The minority view is that the client is entitled only to the end product of the lawyer's work, not internal or preliminary documents.Donald R. Lundberg, File, File, Who's Got the File? Client Rights to Return of Property, 51-SEP Res Gestae 29, 30-31 (Sep. 2007).

5.   We recognize that Williams requested certain legal documents related to his trial from the Marion County Public Defender Agency, but the Agency declined on the grounds that Williams had already received his client file. Williams’ letter did not inform the Agency that his first client file had been lost by the Marion County Jail.

6.   We note that, under the invited error doctrine, where an error “result[s] from the appellant's affirmative actions as part of a deliberate, ‘well-informed’ trial strategy,” review of the error is typically foreclosed. Batchelor v. State, 119 N.E.3d 550, 558 (Ind. 2019) (citing Brewington v. State, 7 N.E.3d 946, 954 (Ind. 2014)). The State, however, does not argue that Williams’ decision constitutes invited error, so we decline to resolve this case on such grounds.

7.   Williams claims in his Appellant's Brief that he did “not understand[ ] the implications of the decision the [PC Court] was forcing him to make and the very slim chance that a successive petition for post-conviction relief would be permitted by the Court of Appeals[.]” Appellant's Br. p. 12. But the PC Court clearly explained that permission to file a successive petition was not guaranteed. See Tr. Vol. II p. 8 (PC Court stated, “[i]f [the Court of Appeals gives] you permission, then it comes back to me and we'll have a hearing.”) (emphasis added). Post-Conviction Rule (1)(12)(b) also makes this clear by providing that the Court of Appeals will authorize the filing of the successive petition only “if the petitioner establishes a reasonable possibility that the petitioner is entitled to post-conviction relief.” (emphasis added).Moreover, even if Williams had instead presented his case without his client file at the evidentiary hearing and was unsuccessful, he would still need to seek permission to refile his petitions. In other words, no matter which option Williams chose, in both scenarios he would need to seek permission before filing a successive post-conviction relief petition.

8.   It is unclear what documents the attorney client file contained and whether Williams had other means of obtaining those documents. For example, Williams could have obtained copies of the transcripts and exhibits from his trial by requesting those documents from the trial court's records. Williams attempted to obtain these documents from the court during his first post-conviction relief proceedings but not during the proceedings subject to this appeal.

Tavitas, Judge.

Vaidik, J., and Felix, J., concur.