SCHEUERS v. SCHEUERS (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Candace Scheuers (“Mother”) and Joseph Scheuers (“Father”) (collectively, the “Parties”) were married in August of 2015, and share three children (collectively, the “Children”). Father petitioned to dissolve the Parties’ marriage in April of 2021. While a provisional custody order originally awarded the Parties joint legal and physical custody of the Children, on March 16, 2023, the trial court issued a provisional order modifying custody to award Father sole legal and physical custody of and to grant Mother supervised visitation with the Children. This order was reaffirmed in the Parties’ divorce decree (“Final Divorce Decree”) which was issued on May 19, 2023, with Father being awarded sole legal and physical custody of the Children and Mother being granted supervised visitation with the Children. Mother subsequently filed two petitions to modify custody, both of which the trial court denied in an order dated July 23, 2024. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] The Parties were married on August 7, 2015, and are the parents of the Children. The Parties separated in March of 2021, and Father petitioned for a dissolution of the Parties’ marriage on April 5, 2021. Since her separation from Father, Mother has entered into a relationship, and has two children, with Gerald “Andy” Morris, who all agree has prior convictions for sodomy and sexual abuse, with his then-infant daughter being one of his victims. Mother allowed the Children to be around Morris, despite concerns that Morris was “trying to groom” the Children. Tr. Vol. II p. 25.

[3] Provisional custody orders originally awarded the Parties joint legal and physical custody of the Children. In a January 9, 2023 provisional order, the trial court denied Father's request for sole legal custody of the Children but ordered that “no contact [was] to be permitted between” the Children and Morris. Appellee's App. Vol. II p. 3. The trial court specifically ordered that Mother “shall take all necessary steps to prevent any” contact or communication between the Children and Morris. Appellee's App. Vol. II p. 4.

[4] On March 16, 2023, the trial court issued another provisional order in which it found that “Mother has willfully violated the Court's provisional orders, which include provisional orders to which Mother agreed. The credible evidence is that Mother did so on a number of occasions and attempted to conceal the fact.” Appellee's App. Vol. II p. 8. Mother's violation of the trial court's order included allowing Morris to communicate with or be around the Children. The Children's guardian ad litem (“GAL”) opined that “Mother's actions in violating the Court's orders have had a negative impact on the [C]hildren and put the [C]hildren at risk of emotional and physical harm.” Appellee's App. Vol. II p. 9. The trial court determined that Mother's contemptuous acts, coupled with the GAL's opinion and report, supported “a provisional custodial modification and that unsupervised contact with Mother at this point might endanger the [C]hildren's physical health or significantly impair the [C]hildren's emotional development.” Appellee's App. Vol. II p. 9. The trial court granted Father sole legal and physical custody of the Children and awarded Mother supervised visitation with the Children. The trial court further ordered that “Mother shall have telephonic contact or audiovisual contact (such as FaceTime) with [the Children] on all days that Mother does not have supervised parenting time” with the Children and that Mother may only attend the Children's school events “that are open to the general public PROVIDED that Mother shall only interact with [the Children] in the presence of Father[.]” Appellee's App. Vol. II p. 10.

[5] The Parties’ Final Divorce Decree was issued on May 19, 2023. In this order, the trial court reaffirmed that Father “is awarded sole legal and physical custody of” the Children and that Mother “shall have supervised parenting time with” the Children as well as “telephonic contact or audiovisual contact (such as FaceTime) with the [C]hildren on all days that Mother does not have supervised parenting time” with the Children. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 36. The trial court further reaffirmed that Morris “shall not at any time be in the presence of or be permitted to communicate with” the Children. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 36.

[6] Following the issuance of the Final Divorce Decree, the Parties each accused the other of being in contempt of the trial court's order, and Mother filed two petitions for a modification of custody of the Children. Following a hearing on all the pending motions, the trial court found that Mother had willfully violated the trial court's orders by creating a situation that allowed for unsupervised contact with the Children during a dance recital, attending the Children's private tennis lessons, entering the Children's school and interacting with one of them, and allowing Morris to be present while she visited with the Children via FaceTime. The trial court found that Father was in contempt for, on occasion, failing to provide Mother with timely notice of the Children's availability for remote parenting time, but noted that “Father's contempt [was] not of an egregious nature.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 46. With regard to Mother's supervised visitation with the Children, the trial court found that Mother had repeatedly failed to agree to an individual to supervise her visits and amended the prior visitation order to allow Father to supervise the visits or to select an individual to supervise the visits. The trial court further limited Mother's telephonic or audiovisual visits to two days a week.

Discussion and Decision

[7] Mother contends that the trial court abused its discretion by denying her motion to modify custody. “Initially, we note that Mother proceeds pro se. A litigant is not given special consideration by virtue of [her] pro se status.” Kelley v. State, 166 N.E.3d 936, 937 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021). “It is well settled that pro se litigants are held to the same legal standards as licensed attorneys.” Basic v. Amouri, 58 N.E.3d 980, 983 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). “This means that pro se litigants are bound to follow the established rules of procedure and must be prepared to accept the consequences of their failure to do so.” Id. at 983–84.

[8] When reviewing cases involving the modification of child custody,

there is a well-established preference in Indiana for granting latitude and deference to our trial judges in family law matters. Appellate courts are in a poor position to look at a cold transcript of the record, and conclude that the trial judge, who saw the witnesses, observed their demeanor, and scrutinized their testimony as it came from the witness stand, did not properly understand the significance of the evidence. On appeal it is not enough that the evidence might support some other conclusion, but it must positively require the conclusion contended for by appellant before there is a basis for reversal. Appellate judges are not to reweigh the evidence nor reassess witness credibility, and the evidence should be viewed most favorably to the judgment.

The party seeking to modify custody bears the burden of demonstrating the existing custody should be altered. Indeed, this more stringent standard is required to support a change in custody, as opposed to an initial custody determination[ ] where there is no presumption for either parent because permanence and stability are considered best for the welfare and happiness of the child.

Steele-Giri v. Steele, 51 N.E.3d 119, 124 (Ind. 2016) (internal citations and quotations omitted, brackets added).

[9] Indiana Code section 31-17-2-21 provides, in relevant part, that

(a) The court may not modify a child custody order unless:

(1) the modification is in the best interests of the child; and

(2) there is a substantial change in one (1) or more of the factors that the court may consider under section 8 ․ of this chapter.

(b) In making its determination, the court shall consider the factors listed under section 8 of this chapter.

Indiana Code section 31-17-2-8 provides, in relevant part, that the court shall consider all relevant factors, including the following:

(1) The age and sex of the child.

(2) The wishes of the child's parent or parents.

(3) The wishes of the child, with more consideration given to the child's wishes if the child is at least fourteen (14) years of age.

(4) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with:

(A) the child's parent or parents;

(B) the child's sibling; and

(C) any other person who may significantly affect the child's best interests.

(5) The child's adjustment to the child's:

(A) home;

(B) school; and

(C) community.

(6) The mental and physical health of all individuals involved.

(7) Evidence of a pattern of domestic or family violence by either parent.

“Although a court is required to consider all relevant factors in making its determination, it is not required to make specific findings.” Russell v. Russell, 682 N.E.2d 513, 515 (Ind. 1997).

[10] Mother challenges the trial court's order denying her request to modify custody, asserting her belief that she should have been awarded sole legal and primary physical custody of the Children. Mother does not make specific references to the factors set forth in Indiana Code section 31-17-2-8 but rather appears to focus her arguments on the Children's best interests. We note, however, that Mother's arguments are largely unsupported by references to relevant Indiana law or the record on appeal. To the extent that Mother has failed to make a cogent argument supported by citation to relevant authority and the record, Mother's arguments are largely waived. See K.S. v. D.S., 64 N.E.3d 1209, 1212 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (providing that a party waives an argument for which it fails to develop a cogent argument or support with adequate citation to authority).

[11] In denying Mother's petition to modify custody, the trial court stated that

as to Mother's motions for modification of parenting time and/or custody, it is clear that no custody modifications should be ordered and it is clear that Mother's behavior and efforts to circumvent orders of the Court do not warrant any modification. There are multiple matters addressed in the dissolution decree resulting in Mother having supervised parenting time which Mother largely did not address in her evidence. Unsupervised parenting time by Mother, from the Court's observations of Mother at hearings, as well as the matters put before the Court by the [GAL] and Father, continues to pose a risk to, at a minimum, the mental health and well being of the children and remains supported. Mother has failed to carry any burden of showing any substantial or significant change in the matters to be considered for such a modification. Furthermore, the Court continues to find Mother's testimony in some areas less than credible and concerning.

Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 45. Mother's arguments on appeal, which again are largely—if not wholly—unsupported by citation to relevant authority and the record, effectively amount to a request for this court to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. Steele-Giri, 51 N.E.3d at 124. Mother has failed to convince us that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her motions to modify custody.

[12] As for Mother's arguments relating to her visitation, both in-person and remote, Mother has again failed to support her arguments with citation to relevant authority and the record. On March 16, 2023, the trial court ordered that Mother's in-person visitation with the Children be supervised, a decision that was reaffirmed in both the Final Divorce Decree and the order at issue in this appeal. The only change to the trial court's order was to allow Father to supervise—or to select someone to supervise—Mother's visitation with the Children. This change was necessitated by Mother's repeated refusal to agree to an individual to supervise her visitation with the Children. The trial court also limited Mother's remote visitation with the Children to two days a week. The trial court found that Mother had repeatedly disregarded its order that Morris may not be present or discussed during her remote visitation with the Children. Mother also admitted to making comments to the Children during remote visitation that upset the Children. Ultimately, the trial court's determination that it was necessary to limit Mother's remote visitation with the Children was necessitated by Mother's actions. We cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in this regard.

[13] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Bradford, Judge.

May, J., and Mathias, J., concur.