OBERLE v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Zackary Hunter Oberle appeals his conviction for Level 3 felony rape,¹ arguing the State failed to present sufficient evidence the victim was compelled by force or the imminent threat of force to submit to oral sex. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Oberle was a friend of K.S.’s brother. K.S. considered Oberle “pretty much family” and like a “brother” because their families had lived close to one another throughout her childhood. Tr. Vol. 2 at 66. By 2020, K.S. saw Oberle less often, but sometimes communicated with him through Snapchat.

[3] On August 17, 2020, fourteen-year-old K.S. was at her mother's house. Sometime that day, eighteen-year-old Oberle visited the house to spend time with K.S.’s brother. K.S., Oberle, and K.S.’s siblings spent much of that summer night downstairs watching television or scrolling on their phones. As the night progressed, K.S.’s siblings went to bed, leaving K.S. and Oberle alone downstairs.

[4] At some point, Oberle motioned for K.S. to join him on the couch. After a couple of requests, K.S. obliged. There, Oberle “put[ ] his hand on [K.S.’s] head and tr[ied] to ․ make [K.S.] perform oral sex on him.” Id. at 72. K.S. was “confused.” Id. Oberle had already pulled down his shorts. While using his hand to apply a “little” pressure to the back of K.S.’s neck, Oberle told her to “suck his d***,” repeating his request multiple times in a “[k]ind of like demanding” tone. Id. at 72–73. Oberle then gave “a little ․ push” to the back of K.S.’s neck and his penis entered her mouth. Id. at 73. K.S. was “shocked” and “didn't know what to do.” Id. at 74. A few seconds later, K.S. “nudge[d] back” against Oberle's hand and Oberle let go. K.S. told her sister about the incident and Oberle's conduct was reported to the police soon after.

[5] The State charged Oberle with Level 3 felony rape, alleging he knowingly or intentionally caused K.S. to perform other sexual conduct when she was compelled by force or the imminent threat of force.² A jury found Oberle guilty, and the trial court sentenced him to an aggregate ten-year sentence.

Sufficient evidence supports Oberle's conviction.

[6] Oberle targets the sufficiency of the evidence to prove K.S. was compelled by force or the imminent threat of force to submit to oral sex. This claim triggers a “deferential standard of review in which we ‘neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility[.]’ ” Hancz-Barron v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1237, 1244 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Brantley v. State, 91 N.E.3d 566, 570 (Ind. 2018), cert. denied). Instead, we respect the fact-finder's exclusive province to weigh conflicting evidence, Young v. State, 198 N.E.3d 1172, 1182 (Ind. 2022), and consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences that support the judgment of the trier of fact, Konkle v. State, 253 N.E.3d 1068, 1090 (Ind. 2025). We will affirm the conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Teising v. State, 226 N.E.3d 780, 783 (Ind. 2024). It is “not necessary that the evidence ‘overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.’ ” Konkle, 253 N.E.3d at 1091 (quoting Sallee v. State, 51 N.E.3d 130, 133 (Ind. 2016)).

[7] To prove Oberle guilty of rape as charged, the State had to show beyond a reasonable doubt Oberle knowingly or intentionally caused K.S. to perform other sexual conduct—specifically, oral sex—when K.S. was compelled by force or the imminent threat of force. See I.C. § 35-42-4-1(a)(1).³ The force necessary to sustain a rape conviction need not be physical; force can be inferred from the circumstances. Bryant v. State, 644 N.E.2d 859, 860 (Ind. 1994). We determine the presence or absence of force from the victim's perspective, not the assailant's. See Tobias v. State, 666 N.E.2d 68, 72 (Ind. 1996) (“This is a subjective test that looks to the victim's perception of the circumstances surrounding the incident in question.”). The issue is therefore whether K.S. perceived Oberle's force as compelling her to submit to his sexual advances. See id.

[8] After urging K.S. to sit next to him on the couch, Oberle placed his hand on the back of K.S.’s neck and applied a “little” pressure, pushing her head toward his exposed penis. Tr. Vol. 2 at 73. While doing so, Oberle repeatedly told K.S. to perform oral sex on him. Oberle's conduct left K.S. “confused,” “shocked,” and unsure of what to do. Id. at 72, 74. Seconds after Oberle's penis entered her mouth, K.S. nudged her head against Oberle's hand to get him to stop. Viewed from K.S.’s perspective, the evidence was sufficient, such that a reasonable fact finder could conclude K.S. perceived Oberle's force as compelling her to perform oral sex on him. See Scott-Gordon v. State, 579 N.E.2d 602, 604 (Ind. 1991) (holding the evidence was sufficient to show the victim was compelled to submit to touching by force when the assailant grabbed the victim's hand and placed it on the assailant's penis after victim's refusal).

Conclusion

[9] Sufficient evidence supports Oberle's conviction for Level 3 felony rape.

[10] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-42-4-1(a)(1) (2014).

2.   Based on other events that occurred the same night, the State also charged Oberle with another count of Level 3 felony rape (sexual intercourse) and two counts of Level 5 felony sexual misconduct with a minor. A jury found Oberle not guilty of this rape charge and guilty of the two sexual misconduct with a minor charges. The trial court later vacated one of Oberle's sexual misconduct with a minor convictions. We do not discuss these charges or convictions further because Oberle does not challenge them on appeal. For the same reason, we limit our recounting of the facts to only those relevant to Oberle's challenged conviction.

3.   Relevant here, “other sexual conduct” means an act “involving ․ a sex organ of one (1) person and the mouth ․ of another person.” I.C. § 35-31.5-2-221.5 (2014).

Kenworthy, Judge.

Bradford, J., and Pyle, J., concur.