SPRINGFIELD v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Dwayne Springfield appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, contending the court erred by rejecting his claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Finding no error, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In 2016, the State charged Springfield with numerous drug and firearm offenses, battery, and resisting law enforcement. Seven days prior to trial, the court permitted the State to amend the charges to add a habitual offender enhancement. A jury convicted Springfield of possession of cocaine and a firearm, a Level 4 felony; possession of a narcotic drug and a firearm, a Level 5 felony; unlawful possession of a firearm by a SVF, a Level 4 felony; battery resulting in bodily injury to a public safety officer, Level 5 felony; resisting law enforcement, a Class A misdemeanor; and possession of marijuana, a Class B misdemeanor. Springfield was also determined to be a habitual offender.

[3] On appeal, Springfield challenged his convictions of possession of cocaine and a firearm, possession of a narcotic drug and a firearm, and unlawful possession of a firearm by a SVF as violating the Double Jeopardy provision of the Indiana Constitution. A panel of this Court agreed and remanded the case to the trial court to vacate Springfield's conviction of unlawful possession of a firearm by a SVF. See Springfield v. State, 116 N.E.3d 1160 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 124 N.E.3d 610 (Ind. 2019). Thereafter, in an amended petition for post-conviction relief, Springfield alleged ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to object to the State's untimely filing of the habitual offender enhancement. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. Springfield appeals that denial.

Discussion and Decision

[4] To prevail in the appeal of a post-conviction proceeding, the petitioner must establish clear error by showing that the evidence as a whole leads unerringly and unmistakably to a conclusion opposite that reached by the post-conviction court. Ingalls v. State, 213 N.E.3d 544, 548 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023). In our review, we accept the post-conviction court's findings of fact unless clearly erroneous, though we do not defer to its legal conclusions. Id.

[5] Here, Springfield contends his trial counsel was ineffective because she failed to object to the State's belated filing of the habitual offender charge. When an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is based upon a failure to object, the defendant must establish that the trial court would have sustained the objection had one been made and that he was prejudiced by the failure. Pannell v. State, 36 N.E.3d 477, 496 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (quoting Jones v. State, 847 N.E.2d 190, 198-99 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied), trans denied. A presumption exists that counsel's performance is effective, and a defendant must present strong and convincing evidence to overcome this presumption. Ingalls, 213 N.E.3d at 548. Further, most ineffective assistance claims can be resolved by a prejudice inquiry alone. State v. Pearson, 191 N.E.3d 892, 898 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022).

[6] Springfield asserts an objection by defense counsel would have been sustained because the State did not make the requisite good cause showing in order to be permitted to belatedly file the habitual offender charge. Appellant's Br. p. 12. He further argues that good cause did not exist because, although plea negotiations had stalled, the State waited seventeen days to file the habitual offender charge.

[7] However, Springfield is mistaken as to the procedure for the filing of habitual offender charges pursuant to Indiana Code section 35-34-1-5(e). This statute provides that an amendment of an information to include a habitual offender charge must be made at least thirty days before the commencement of trial. However, upon a showing of good cause, the trial court may permit the filing of a habitual offender charge at any time before the commencement of the trial if the amendment does not prejudice the defendant's substantial rights. Ind Code § 35-34-1-5(e) (2014). If the court permits the filing of a habitual offender charge less than thirty days before trial begins, the court shall grant a continuance at the request of the defendant, for any reason, or the State, for good cause shown. Id.

[8] Our Supreme Court has had occasion to interpret Subsection 35-34-1-5(e) and has determined that the State does not need to make a good cause showing until the defendant requests a continuance. White v. State, 963 N.E.2d 511, 518 (Ind. 2012). Decreeing that the rule has no exceptions, the court in White held that to preserve for appellate review the issue of an untimely filing of a habitual offender charge, the defendant must request a continuance after the trial court permits the filing. 963 N.E.2d at 518. Once the defendant requests a continuance, the burden then lies with the State to make a showing of good cause to the trial court. Id.

[9] Here, the State filed the habitual offender charging information on April 5, 2018, seven days before Springfield's trial began and twenty-three days after the statutory deadline. At the hearing on Springfield's post-conviction petition, the evidence showed that plea negotiations began in February 2018 between Springfield's counsel and the State. During the negotiations, the State informed defense counsel that if Springfield did not accept the State's offer, it would likely file a habitual offender charge. PCR Tr. Vol. II, p. 13. Counsel testified that in the course of advising Springfield on the State's plea offers, she informed him of the possibility of the filing of a habitual offender enhancement. Id. at 15-16; Trial Tr. Vol. 2, p. 5. Springfield's counsel also testified that she did not remember whether she considered objecting to the State's tardy filing of the habitual offender charge but that “if I considered it and did not make the objection, it was because I did not feel that I had grounds to object[ ]” based on her experience and common practice. PCR Tr. Vol. II, p. 14. Counsel further testified that she believed good cause existed for the State's belated filing of the habitual offender charge and that she did not need any more time to prepare for trial on that charge. Id. at 15, 16; Trial Tr. Vol. 2, p. 4. Based on this record, Springfield has not shown that the trial court would have sustained an objection had his counsel made one.

[10] Next, we turn to the prejudice element of Springfield's claim. Springfield knew in advance that the filing of a habitual offender charge was possible, even likely, and he does not allege that he had an inadequate amount of time to prepare his defense to such. “ ‘The purpose of Section 35-34-1-5(e) is to allow a defendant sufficient time to prepare a defense for the habitual offender charge.’ ” Jackson v. State, 938 N.E.2d 29, 39 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (quoting Land v. State, 802 N.E.2d 45, 53 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied), trans. denied. Springfield has made no credible claim that he did not have sufficient time to prepare a defense or that he was prejudiced in any way.

Conclusion

[11] Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Springfield has failed to establish a claim for ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

[12] Affirmed.

Baker, Senior Judge.

Vaidik, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.