IN RE: the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of J.C.H. (Minor Child); (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] V.G. (Mother) appeals the involuntary termination of her parental rights to her minor child, J.C.H. (Child). Mother challenges the trial court's conclusions that: the conditions that led to Child's removal will not be remedied; continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to Child; and termination was in Child's best interests. Because the evidence clearly and convincingly supports the trial court's judgment, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Mother and Z.H. (Father) are the biological parents of Child, born in September 2012.¹ Mother has a history of mental health struggles and a criminal history including substance-related convictions. Between October 2020 and May 2024, law enforcement was dispatched to Mother's residence thirty-nine times, including thirty-two mental illness-related calls. The calls included Mother reporting that people were looking in her windows or living in her attic and Mother making unsubstantiated reports about members of the community.

[3] In December 2020, Mother became involved with the Indiana Department of Child Services (DCS) because she was unable to adequately supervise Child due to her “psychiatric condition” involving “erratic behavior, paranoia, and possible drug induced psychosis.” App. Vol. II p. 99. DCS removed Child and Mother stipulated Child was a Child in Need of Services (CHINS). Following Child's CHINS adjudication, DCS referred Mother for a mental health evaluation and she was diagnosed with “schizophrenia, major depression, PTSD, ․ methamphetamine use disorder and ․ that she was a victim of sexual abuse and neglect.” Tr. Vol. II p. 50. Mother participated in parenting skills training and mental health therapy and became more stable after receiving medication. Child was reunified with Mother in February 2022 after a trial home visit.

[4] After that CHINS case closed, DCS received other assessments throughout 2022 regarding Mother's “mental health and suspicion that she was using drugs again.” Id. at 52. In August, Mother went to Ball Memorial Hospital in Muncie, Indiana for a psychological evaluation. Medical personnel determined Mother was not a threat to herself or others at that time. Family Case Manager (FCM) Jenny Williams, who Mother knew from the prior CHINS case, picked up Mother from the hospital and drove her home. During the drive, Mother “kept seeing things in the sky and felt like [they] were being followed.” Id. at 58.

[5] In September 2022, Mother took Child to the hospital to obtain a doctor's note excusing Child from school. While there, Mother “displayed paranoid thoughts [and] hallucinations,” prompting a doctor to make a report to DCS expressing concerns for Child's long term mental health due to exposure to Mother's “severe mental health[.]” Id. at 53. FCM Williams responded to the report and began her assessment at the hospital.

[6] FCM Williams observed Mother acting “very disrespectful” to hospital personnel and saw Child “following her lead[.]” Id. Mother told FCM Williams that her father (Grandfather) had raped her and Child. Medical personnel drew blood samples from Mother that returned positive for Oxycodone and methamphetamine. Mother then alleged that Grandfather “drugg[ed] her with the Oxycodone” and that Child witnessed it. Id. at 55. Child stated that Grandfather put something in Mother's drink near the “beginning of school” and that Grandfather “probably did” rape him “while [Child] was asleep.” Id. FCM Williams “became very ․ concerned about” Child “starting ․ to lie for” Mother. Id.

[7] Mother and Child returned to their residence, where Grandfather also resided, and FCM Williams followed. The situation “just got worse there.” Id. at 54. Child was “disrespectful, bossy, [and] rude” and talked about charging something on Grandfather's credit card to “get back at him[.]” Id. at 56. Child also “physically fought [Grandfather] over a medication container.” Id. at 54. Ultimately, the police were called when Grandfather begged FCM Williams not to leave him with Mother and to remove Mother from the home.

[8] DCS filed a second petition alleging Child to be a CHINS on September 14, 2022, and placed Child in relative care with his uncle (Uncle). Uncle observed that Child had lost about thirty pounds since December 2021, when he was returned to Mother's care. Child told Uncle that he was only eating “[Mountain] Dew, chips, candies, and toaster strudels.” Id. at 25.

[9] Child was again adjudicated a CHINS on November 22. The trial court subsequently entered a dispositional order requiring Mother to, among other things: contact the FCM weekly; participate in home-based counseling with Child; abstain from illegal substance use and submit to random drug screens; complete a substance abuse assessment and follow recommendations; meet all personal medical and mental health needs in a timely and complete manner; maintain suitable, safe and stable housing for Child; and attend all visitations.

[10] Mother failed to consistently participate in services. She neither maintained regular contact with then-assigned FCM Rhonda Decker nor participated in home-based casework, counseling or psychiatric evaluations. Mother's submission to random drug screens was also inconsistent. The trial court found Mother in contempt of the dispositional order in January 2023 and sentenced her to 120 days incarcerated with 100 days suspended. After serving twenty days in jail, Mother remained noncompliant with the dispositional order.

[11] Mother was incarcerated again from June 2023 to September 2024, serving the remaining 100 days of her contempt sentence and another sentence for an invasion of privacy conviction.² While incarcerated, Mother filed over 100 grievances, including allegations that various police officers had raped her and Child.

[12] On August 26, 2024, DCS filed a petition for the involuntary termination of Mother's relationship with Child. Mother started counseling on her own on October 21. When the termination hearing was held on November 18, Mother was employed and living at a friend's house.

[13] FCM Decker testified that she believed termination of parental rights was in Child's best interests and she was concerned about Mother's ability to safely care for Child. DCS's plan was for Child to be adopted by Uncle, to whom Child was closely bonded. In Uncle's care, Child was gaining weight, regularly caring for his own hygiene and participating in multiple extracurricular activities such as wrestling, 4-H and the spelling bee.

[14] Child was diagnosed with and being treated for “ADHD and reactive attachment disorder.” Id. at 82. At some point during the CHINS case, Mother's and Father's visits with Child were suspended. Child's therapist, Connie Hawley, saw Child's bond and healthy relationships with others improve after this suspension. Hawley testified that Child remained “very scared that [Mother] would come look for [ ] him” when she was released from jail. Id. at 85. He was concerned that if the court returned him to Mother, he would not feel safe because he would not have food and would worry about people trying to break into their house. Child also talked about seeing drug use when he was with Mother. Hawley opined that Child's mental needs were being met in placement with Uncle.

[15] On November 20, 2024, the trial court issued its order terminating the parent-child relationship between Mother and Child. At that time, Child had been continuously residing with Uncle for approximately twenty-three months. The court found, among other things: Mother was previously hospitalized for erratic behavior, paranoia and possible drug induced psychosis; Mother previously stipulated that Child was a CHINS because she was unable to provide adequate supervision due to her psychiatric condition; Mother was having delusions and again acting irrationally in September 2022 when she asserted she and Child were raped; Mother failed to comply with Child's case plan and dispositional orders and was held in contempt; and Child's mental health is seriously endangered by Mother's behavior. The court concluded: the permanency plan of adoption is a satisfactory plan of care for Child; Child has been removed from Mother for at least fifteen of the most recent twenty-two months; there is a reasonable probability the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of Child; the circumstances resulting in removal are unlikely to be remedied; termination is in Child's best interests; and Child deserves permanency. Mother now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

I. Standard of Review

[16] We recognize “[a] parent's interest in the care, custody, and control of his or her children is ‘perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests.’ ” In re R.S., 56 N.E.3d 625, 628 (Ind. 2016) (quoting Bester v. Lake Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005)). “[A]lthough parental rights are of a constitutional dimension, the law provides for the termination of these rights when the parents are unable or unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities.” In re A.P., 882 N.E.2d 799, 805 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), reh'g. denied. Involuntary termination of parental rights is the most extreme sanction a court can impose, and therefore “termination is intended as a last resort, available only when all other reasonable efforts have failed.” Id.

[17] “We have long had a highly deferential standard of review in cases involving the termination of parental rights.” In re C.A., 15 N.E.3d 85, 92 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).

In considering whether the termination of parental rights is appropriate, we do not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility. We consider only the evidence and any reasonable inferences therefrom that support the judgment, and give due regard to the trial court's opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses firsthand. Where a trial court has entered findings of fact and conclusions of law, we will not set aside the trial court's findings or judgment unless clearly erroneous. [Ind. Trial Rule 52(A)]. In evaluating whether the trial court's decision to terminate parental rights is clearly erroneous, we review the trial court's judgment to determine whether the evidence clearly and convincingly supports the findings and the findings clearly and convincingly support the judgment.

In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1229-30 (Ind. 2013) (citations and quotation marks omitted). Any unchallenged findings of fact are accepted as true by this Court. In re S.S., 120 N.E.3d 605, 609 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). As such, if the unchallenged findings clearly and convincingly support the judgment, we will affirm. Kitchell v. Franklin, 26 N.E.3d 1050, 1059 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied; T.B. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 971 N.E.2d 104, 110 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied.

[18] A petition to terminate a parent-child relationship must allege and prove, in relevant part:

the existence of one or more of the following circumstances:

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(3) That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(4) That there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being, safety, physical health, or life of the child.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(d)(3)-(4) (2024).³ In addition, DCS must allege and prove:

(2) that there is a satisfactory plan for care and treatment of the child; and

(3) that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c)(2)-(3) (2024).

[19] DCS must prove each element by “clear and convincing evidence.” R.S., 56 N.E.3d at 629; Ind. Code § 31-37-14-2 (1997). If the trial court finds the allegations in the petition are true, the court shall terminate the parent-child relationship. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-8(a) (2012).

II. Termination of Mother's parental rights was not clearly erroneous.

A. Remedying Conditions

[20] Mother does not challenge the trial court's findings of fact, so we accept them as true. In re S.S., 120 N.E.3d at 609 n.2. Rather, she contends the uncontested findings do not clearly support the trial court's conclusions that: 1) the conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied and 2) the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to Child's well-being. Because the amended Indiana Code Section 31-35-4-2(d) is still written in the disjunctive, only one of these conclusions was necessary to terminate Mother's parental rights. See generally In re S.K., 124 N.E.3d 1225, 1233 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (Where former Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) (2017) was disjunctive, “the trial court need only find that one of the three requirements of that subsection has been established by clear and convincing evidence.”), trans. denied. The remedying conditions issue is dispositive.

[21] First, Mother misreads the statute in arguing “there is insufficient evidence to demonstrate a reasonable probability that [Mother] could not remedy the conditions” that led to Child's removal. Appellant's Br. p. 15 (emphasis added). In support of her argument, Mother points to evidence that she was incarcerated during the CHINS case; had no positive drug screens since her incarceration; maintained contact with Child while incarcerated; and obtained employment, housing, and counseling after her release. She also contends that her “first chance to show the court that she could comply with the disposition order” came after her release from incarceration in September 2024. Id. at 16.

[22] But the statute requires there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that led to Child's removal will not be remedied, not that the conditions could not be remedied. I.C. § 31-35-4-2(d)(3); See also, In re B.J., 879 N.E.2d 7, 18-19 (DCS need not rule out all possibilities of change; rather, DCS need only establish there is a reasonable probability that parent's behavior will not change), trans. denied. In reviewing a trial court's finding that conditions will not be remedied, we engage in a two-step analysis: first, “we must ascertain what conditions led to [Child's] placement” and second, “we determine whether there is a reasonable probability that those conditions will not be remedied.” K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1231 (citations and quotation marks omitted).

[23] First, Child was removed in September 2022 because “Mother was again having delusions and acting irrationally” and “Mother tested positive for methamphetamine and oxycodone.” App. Vol. II p. 99. Child had also started “following [Mother's] lead” in being disrespectful to others and was observed physically fighting Grandfather. Tr. Vol. II. p. 53. In addition, since Child's reunification with Mother, Child had lost about thirty pounds.

[24] Second, the unchallenged findings and the evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrate that these conditions will not be remedied. Child had been adjudicated a CHINS twice due to Mother's “psychiatric condition” and substance use issues. App. Vol. II p. 99. In the second CHINS case, Mother did not comply with her dispositional orders between November 2022 and January 2023, failing to complete psychological evaluations, counseling, home-based case work and refusing to maintain contact with the FCM. And some of Mother's visits with Child “were stopped because of her behavior[.]” Tr. Vol. II. p. 68. Following a January 2023 finding of contempt and twenty days of incarceration, Mother remained noncompliant with her ordered services until she was again incarcerated in June 2023.

[25] Contrary to Mother's assertion, she had ample opportunity to comply with her dispositional orders: the record shows that—except for twenty days—Mother was under the court's dispositional orders and not incarcerated from November 2022 to June 2023. Her refusal to participate in services alone supported the trial court's conclusion that there is a reasonable probability that the removal conditions will not be remedied. See, e.g., Lang v. Starke County Office of Family and Children, 861 N.E.2d 366, 372 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (non-cooperation with those charged with remedying the situation support trial court's finding of reasonable probability that condition will not be remedied), trans. denied. Further, Mother's emphasis on her efforts after incarceration and shortly before the termination hearing is a request to reweigh evidence, which we will not do. K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1229. The court's conclusion that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions which led to Child's removal will not be remedied was not clearly erroneous.

B. Best Interests

[26] Mother also challenges the trial court's conclusion that terminating her parental rights was in Child's best interests. In determining best interests of a child, “trial courts must look at the totality of the evidence and, in doing so, subordinate the parents’ interests to those of the children.” In re Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d 41, 49 (Ind. 2019) (citations omitted), cert. denied. “Central among these interests is children's need for permanency[,]” as “children cannot wait indefinitely for their parents to work toward preservation or reunification.” Id. (citations omitted). A trial court considers whether the child's emotional and physical development is threatened and “need not wait until a child is irreversibly harmed such that their physical, mental, or social development is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship.” In re P.B., 199 N.E.3d 790, 799 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (citing K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1235), reh'g. denied, trans. denied.

[27] Here, the trial court found Child's “mental health is seriously endangered by [M]other's behavior.” App. Vol. II p. 99. Child was “very scared” that Mother would find him after her release from jail. Tr. Vol. II p. 85. He told his therapist that he “just never feel[s] safe with mom” because she would always say people were “coming to the house attacking them” and “tryin[g] to break in[.]” Id. at 86. Child's therapist, Hawley, opined that Child's mental health needs were being met while in placement with Uncle. At the time of termination, Child had resided with Uncle for twenty-three consecutive months. In that time, Child's physical and mental conditions improved: he gained back weight, participated in multiple extracurriculars, and his relationships and bond with others improved. FCM Decker also believed termination of Mother's parental rights was in Child's best interests due to concerns about Mother's ability to safely care for Child.

[28] The totality of the evidence supports the court's determination that termination of Mother's parental rights was in Child's best interests.

[29] We affirm.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Father voluntarily relinquished his parental rights and does not participate in this appeal.

2.   While incarcerated, Mother was convicted of invasion of privacy for texting Uncle after Uncle had obtained a protection order against Mother; on October 9, 2023, she was sentenced for up to one year in jail for this conviction. Ex. Vol. III p. 7. The record contains conflicting testimony about whether Mother's incarceration began in May or June 2023. An Order dated June 12, 2023, indicates Mother's suspended sentence for contempt was stayed, so we refer to her incarceration as beginning in June 2023. Id. at 103.

3.   Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4 was substantially amended effective March 11, 2024. In her brief, Mother cites to the previous version of the statute but challenges conclusions that are substantially similar in the previous and current versions of the statute. DCS filed its petition in this case on August 26, 2024, citing to the amended version of the statute, so we do the same.

Scheele, Judge.

May, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.