H.R., Appellant-Petitioner v. REVIEW BOARD OF INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] After H.R. was discharged from her employment, she applied for unemployment benefits. She appeals the final decision of the Review Board of the Department of Workforce Development (“Review Board”) that she is not eligible for benefits because she was discharged for just cause. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] H.R. began working for Employer in 2015. She was discharged effective September 27, 2024, for being intoxicated while on duty. H.R.’s application for unemployment benefits was denied.

[3] H.R. filed an administrative appeal of that denial. An administrative law judge (“ALJ”) conducted a telephonic hearing and issued an opinion affirming the denial of H.R.’s application. The ALJ's findings included:

• Employer had a policy that employees are expected to conduct themselves during work hours in a manner that reflects favorably on Employer. Employees must not begin work intoxicated; violating the policy may subject the employee to disciplinary action. Employer provided the policy to H.R. both verbally and in writing.

• H.R. had brain surgery in July 2022 and was granted accommodations through July 2024 after providing medical documentation to Employer. H.R. did not provide any medical documentation to support additional accommodations after that date.

• In November 2023, H.R. received a Notice of Removal over concerns she was under the influence of alcohol at work but filed a successful grievance.

• On July 9, 2024, Employer observed H.R. asleep on work premises, noted a bottle that smelled of alcohol and lemonade, and thought she was passed out. H.R. claimed she was just napping. Then while walking, H.R. fell into a closed locker door. Employer asked H.R. if she had been drinking and H.R. admitted she was drunk.

• At a meeting with Employer on August 5 about the incident, H.R. confirmed she had been drinking on July 9.

• At the ALJ hearing, H.R. denied admitting to drinking and claimed her behavior was due to cold medicine, an early start to her day, the aftermath of her brain surgery, and balance issues because she is deaf in one ear.

See Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 8–9. The ALJ concluded H.R. was discharged for just cause as defined by Indiana Code Section 22-4-15-1:

“Discharge for just cause” includes a “knowing violation of a reasonable and uniformly enforced rule of an employer, including a rule regarding attendance.” Ind. Code § 22-4-15-1(d)(2). To find that a discharge was for just cause, substantial evidence must demonstrate that “(1) there was a rule; (2) the rule was reasonable; (3) the rule was uniformly enforced; (4) the claimant knew of the rule; and (5) the claimant knowingly violated the rule.”

Employer discharged [H.R.] for violating its written policy to [not] be at work intoxicated․ [H.R.] violated it when she showed up [to] work on July 9, 2024, under the influence – an offense she admitted to not once but twice.

Id. at 8 (case citation omitted).¹

[4] H.R. appealed the ALJ's decision to the Review Board. The Review Board did not hold a hearing or accept additional evidence. It stated the issue as “solely whether the Employer discharged [H.R.] for just cause as defined” by statute.² Id. at 10. It modified the ALJ's decision in two substantive ways. First, by adding the following finding: H.R.’s “sleeping and stumbling was the result of being under the influence of alcohol and not due to a medical condition.” Id. And second, by adding the following conclusion:

“Discharge for just cause” includes “reporting to work under the influence of alcohol or drugs or consuming alcohol or drugs on employer's premises during working hours.” Ind. Code § 22-4-15-1(d)(6). “Under the influence of intoxicating liquor” is defined as “an impaired condition of thought and action and, to a marked degree, the loss of the normal control of one's faculties.”

Even without a uniformly enforced rule against intoxication at work, the mere act of reporting to work under the influence of alcohol is grounds for discharge for just cause. As [H.R.] demonstrated an impaired condition by stumbling and sleeping, and this was the result of consuming alcohol, the Employer had just cause to discharge [her].

Id. at 10–11 (case citation omitted). The Review Board affirmed the ALJ's decision as modified.

[5] H.R. filed a timely Notice of Appeal from the Review Board decision. Her Notice of Appeal did not request preparation of a transcript of the ALJ hearing.

H.R. is not entitled to unemployment benefits.

[6] H.R. appeals the Review Board's determination that she was discharged for just cause and is ineligible for unemployment benefits. “The standard of review on appeal of a decision of the [Review] Board is threefold: (1) findings of basic fact are reviewed for substantial evidence; (2) findings of mixed questions of law and fact—ultimate facts—are reviewed for reasonableness; and (3) legal propositions are reviewed for correctness.” Recker v. Review Bd. of Ind. Dep't of Workforce Dev., 958 N.E.2d 1136, 1139 (Ind. 2011).

[7] Before addressing H.R.’s claims, we address a threshold issue raised by the Review Board: did H.R. waive her right to appellate review of the Review Board's decision? H.R. brings this appeal pro se. A litigant is not given special consideration because of her pro se status. Kelley v. State, 166 N.E.3d 936, 937 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021). “It is well settled that pro se litigants are held to the same legal standards as licensed attorneys. This means that pro se litigants are bound to follow the established rules of procedure and must be prepared to accept the consequences of their failure to do so.” Basic v. Amouri, 58 N.E.3d 980, 983-84 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (internal citations omitted).

[8] H.R. does not cite to any legal authority in her brief and does not support her one paragraph of argument with cogent reasoning. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a) (requiring the appellant's argument be “supported by cogent reasoning” and “citations to the authorities, statutes, and the Appendix or parts of the Record on Appeal relied on”). She claims “there is not substantial evidence to conclude [she] was intoxicated during work hours on the date in question” and her brief primarily consists of presenting alternate or additional facts she believes are in her favor. Appellant's Br. at 6. But “[i]f the appellant intends to urge on appeal that a finding of fact or conclusion thereon is unsupported by the evidence or is contrary to the evidence, the Notice of Appeal shall request a Transcript of all the evidence.” App. R. 9(F)(5). Because H.R. did not request a transcript of the proceedings so we might review the evidence and arguments presented at the hearing, she has waived her claim.

[9] Waiver notwithstanding, we cannot say the Review Board erred. An individual is not eligible to receive unemployment benefits if she was discharged from employment for just cause. J.M. v. Rev. Bd. of Ind. Dep't of Workforce Dev., 975 N.E.2d 1283, 1286 (Ind. 2012). Indiana law defines “discharge for just cause” as including (but not limited to) “reporting to work under the influence of alcohol or drugs or consuming alcohol or drugs on employer's premises during working hours[.]” Ind. Code § 22-4-15-1(d)(6) (2023). The Review Board, in adopting the ALJ's decision, found Employer observed H.R. in what appeared to be a state of intoxication during work hours and H.R. admitted she had been drinking. As noted above, H.R.’s brief asserts contrary facts, but a decision of the Review Board is “conclusive and binding as to all questions of fact” and we cannot reweigh the evidence. I.C. § 22-4-17-12(a); J.M., 975 N.E.2d at 1286. The Review Board's conclusion that H.R. was discharged for just cause is reasonable in light of its findings.

Conclusion

[10] The Review Board's determination that H.R. is ineligible for unemployment benefits is affirmed.

[11] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The ALJ also found the policy was reasonable, uniformly enforced, and H.R. knew of the policy “because she was almost successfully fired in November of 2023 for a similar violation.” Id.

2.   The ALJ decision had also discussed “gross misconduct.” See id. at 8–9.

Kenworthy, Judge.

Foley, J., and Scheele, J., concur.