PROPHET v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] The trial court found that Edward Prophet violated the conditions of his community corrections placement and probation by committing the crime of battery by bodily fluid, a Class B misdemeanor. As a sanction, the trial court revoked Prophet's placement and probation and ordered him to serve the remaining portion of his suspended sentence in the Department of Correction (“DOC”). On appeal, Prophet argues that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to prove that Prophet violated the terms of his community corrections placement and probation by intentionally committing battery by bodily fluid. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm.

Issue

[2] Prophet raises one issue, which we restate as whether the State presented sufficient evidence to prove that Prophet violated the terms of his community corrections placement and probation by intentionally committing battery by bodily fluid.

Facts

[3] In 2023, Prophet was charged with resisting law enforcement, a Level 5 felony; operating a vehicle while intoxicated, a Level 6 felony; operating a vehicle while being a habitual traffic violator, a Level 6 felony; and possession of marijuana, a Class B misdemeanor. Prophet pleaded guilty to resisting law enforcement, a Level 5 felony, and operating a vehicle while intoxicated, a Level 6 felony, and in exchange, the other charges were dismissed. The trial court sentenced Prophet for resisting law enforcement, a Level 5 felony, to four years, with two years suspended to probation, and for operating a vehicle while intoxicated, a Level 6 felony, to two years to be served concurrently. The trial court ordered two years of the sentence to be executed at Residential Services under Community Correction's supervision and two years of the sentence to be suspended to probation.

[4] Prophet began his sentence at the Allen County Community Corrections (“ACCC”) on September 7, 2023. On October 16, 2024, the State filed a petition to revoke Prophet's community corrections placement. The State alleged that he violated the terms of his placement, which required him to maintain good behavior and refrain from committing new offenses.¹ Specifically, the State alleged that, while in community corrections, Prophet committed battery by bodily fluid, a Class B misdemeanor. On October 24, 2024, the State filed a petition to revoke Prophet's probation on the same grounds.

[5] The trial court held a hearing on the petitions to revoke in November 2024. Home Detention Officer Renee Jennings testified that, on October 15, 2024, she entered a pod at Allen County Community Corrections and observed Prophet and another inmate arguing. She later learned that an inmate, Denzel,² had filed an incident report with a Residential Services Officer, alleging that Prophet spit on him. Officer Jennings investigated the incident and reviewed the security footage, which depicted Prophet “spit on the victim”; Prophet's head went back, “cock[ed]” forward, and a “whitish object” flew from his mouth onto Denzel's face. Tr. Vol. II p. 45, 49. The video then captured Denzel wiping his face. The Residential Services Officer also observed Denzel wiping his face on the video.³

[6] The trial court found that Prophet violated the conditions of his community corrections placement and probation by committing battery by bodily fluid. The trial court revoked Prophet's community corrections placement and probation and ordered that he serve the remainder of his sentence in the DOC. Prophet now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[7] Prophet argues that the State presented insufficient evidence to prove that he violated the conditions of his community corrections placement and probation by intentionally committing the crime of battery by bodily fluid. We disagree.

[8] Our standard of review “for revocation of a community corrections placement is the same standard as for a probation revocation.” Bennett v. State, 119 N.E.3d 1057, 1058 (Ind. 2019) (citing Cox v. State, 706 N.E.2d 547, 549 (Ind. 1999)). “Both probation and community corrections programs serve as alternatives to commitment to the DOC and both are made at the sole discretion of the trial court.” Johnson v. State, 62 N.E.3d 1224, 1229 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (citing Cox, 706 N.E.2d at 549). Accordingly, placement in a community corrections program or on probation is a “matter of grace and a conditional liberty that is a favor, not a right.” Gray v. State, 234 N.E.3d 920, 924 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024). The State need only prove the alleged violations by a preponderance of the evidence. Johnson, 62 N.E.3d at 1229. “[W]e will consider all the evidence most favorable to supporting the judgment of the trial court without reweighing that evidence or judging the credibility of witnesses.” Id. “[I]f there is substantial evidence of probative value to support the court's conclusion that a defendant has violated any terms of [probation or community corrections], we will affirm its decision to revoke [probation or community corrections].” Id.

[9] The violation of a single condition of probation is sufficient to support the revocation of that probation. Pierce v. State, 44 N.E.3d 752, 755 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). “ ‘The requirement that a probationer obey federal, state, and local laws is automatically a condition of probation by operation of law.’ ” Hammann v. State, 210 N.E.3d 823, 832 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (quoting Luke v. State, 51 N.E.3d 401, 421 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016)), trans. denied; see also Ind. Code § 35-38-2-1(b). If the State alleges that the defendant violated his probation or placement in community corrections by committing a new criminal offense, the State is required to prove only by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant committed the offense. Pierce, 44 N.E.3d at 755.

[10] To prove that Prophet committed the offense of battery by bodily fluid, the State had to show that he “knowingly or intentionally ․ in a rude, insolent, or angry manner, place[d] bodily fluid or waste on another person.” Ind. Code 35-42-2-1(c)(2).⁴ Prophet argues that the State presented insufficient evidence to prove that he knowingly or intentionally spat on Denzel's face. “Knowledge and intent are both mental states and, absent an admission by the defendant, the jury must resort to the reasonable inferences from both the direct and circumstantial evidence to determine whether the defendant has the requisite knowledge or intent to commit the offense in question.” Stubbers v. State, 190 N.E.3d 424, 432 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (citing Stokes v. State, 922 N.E.2d 758, 764 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010)), trans. denied. “Knowledge or intent may be proven by the defendant's conduct and the natural and usual sequence to which such conduct logically and reasonably points.” Id. (citing Stokes, 922 N.E.2d at 764). A direct statement of the defendant's intent is not required. Coleman v. State, 546 N.E. 2d 827, 831 (Ind. 1989).

[11] Prophet's intent to commit battery by bodily fluid can be inferred from his conduct when he spat on Denzel. Officer Jennings testified that, in reviewing the security footage, she saw Prophet and two other inmates approach Denzel, and she saw Prophet “spit on the victim.” Tr. Vol. II p. 45. She saw Prophet's head go back, “cock” forward, and a “whitish object” flew from Prophet to Denzel. Id. at 49. From this, the trial court could reasonably find by a preponderance of the evidence that Prophet knowingly, in a rude, insolent, or angry manner, placed bodily fluid—saliva—on Denzel. Thus, Prophet's argument that Officer Jennings’ testimony is insufficient is little more than a request that we reweigh evidence and judge credibility of the witness—matters that we leave to the trial court. Pierce, 44 N.E. 3d at 756.⁵

Conclusion

[12] The State presented sufficient evidence to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Prophet violated his community corrections placement and probation by committing battery by bodily fluid. Accordingly, we affirm.

[13] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   In its initial sentencing order, the trial court outlined the general rules and special conditions of Prophet's community corrections placement and probation, which included Prophet's signed acknowledgment that “I understand that I will ․ [o]bey all laws and maintain good behavior while under the supervision of ACCC. I further understand that ․ if I am charged with or convicted of any criminal offense while under supervision, including but not limited to Escape or Failure to Return to Lawful Detention, I may be sanctioned, violated, terminated and/or arrested.” Ex. Vol. pp. 43, 49.

2.   The record does not indicate Denzel's full name.

3.   The security footage referenced in Officer Jennings’ testimony was not admitted as an exhibit at the revocation hearing and, thus, is not part of the record on appeal.

4.   “A person engages in conduct ‘intentionally’ if, when he engages in the conduct, it is his conscious objective to do so.” Ind. Code § 35-41-2-2(a). “A person engages in conduct ‘knowingly’ if, when he engages in the conduct, he is aware of a high probability that he is doing so.” Id. § 2(b).

5.   Prophet's counsel did not object to the admission of Officer Jennings’ sworn testimony regarding her observations from the security camera footage, nor does he argue on appeal that the admission of this testimony was improper.

Tavitas, Judge.

Altice, C.J., and Brown, J., concur.