JAMERSON v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Sarail D. Jamerson appeals his convictions for two counts of Level 5 felony burglary and one count of Level 6 felony theft. Jamerson raises six issues, which we restate as:

1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted statements made by the deceased victim, Gregory French;

2. Whether the police line-up presented to the victim was unduly suggestive;

3. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted the detective's testimony concerning evidence obtained from electronic service providers and Facebook;

4. Whether the evidence is sufficient to support Jamerson's convictions;

5. Whether Jamerson's trial counsel was ineffective; and,

6. Whether the alleged cumulative errors and irregularities infringed on Jamerson's right to a fair trial.

[2] Concluding that Jamerson has not established any reversible error and the evidence is sufficient to support his convictions, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] In December 2021, Samuel French lived on the same property as his father Gregory French in Waynetown, Indiana. Samuel lived in a mobile home on the property and Gregory lived in a house behind Samuel's mobile home. Samuel operated his mechanic's business on the property.

[4] On some date prior to December 11, Steven Shephard transported his trailer to Samuel because it needed repairs. Eventually, Shephard decided that the trailer needed more repairs than he wanted to pay for and decided to sell the trailer. Samuel allowed Shephard to leave the trailer on Samuel's property while Shephard placed the trailer for sale on Facebook Marketplace.

[5] On December 11, Chris Myles and Jamerson arrived on the Frenches’ property to purchase Shephard's trailer. Myles and Jamerson inquired about other items they observed on the property and asked whether those items were for sale. Samuel told them only the trailer was for sale. Eventually, Myles purchased the trailer, hooked it to a blue Chevrolet Tahoe, and hauled it from the property.

[6] Four days later, at approximately 7:30 a.m., Gregory observed that the door to his garage was open. Upon entering the garage, he determined that his air compressor and a black battery charger were missing. Samuel also determined that the following items were missing from his own garage: an air compressor, a floor jack, and a vehicle code reader. Gregory contacted the police, who began to investigate the thefts.

[7] Later that same day, Samuel observed his and Gregory's missing items posted for sale on Facebook Marketplace. Ads for the items had been posted from Jamerson's Facebook account. Samuel recognized Jamerson from his profile picture on Facebook. Samuel took screenshots of Jamerson's Facebook Marketplace posts. Samuel's fiancée messaged Jamerson to ask about purchasing the items. Jamerson blocked her from being able to continue to message him. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 155. Samuel provided the screenshots of the Marketplace posts to Detective Ethan Redmon.

[8] The detective obtained search warrants for Jamerson's Facebook account, his cell phone, and Google Gmail account. After reviewing the data obtained from Jamerson's cell phone, the detective determined that Jamerson's cell phone had been located in the vicinity of the Frenches’ property at the approximate time that the items were stolen. Jamerson later admitted that the Facebook account belonged to him but claimed he did not create the Marketplace posts selling the Frenches’ stolen items.

[9] On March 10, 2022, the State charged Jamerson with two counts of Level 5 felony burglary, one count for breaking into Gregory's garage and the other for breaking into Samuel's garage, and one count of Level 6 felony theft for stealing “air compressors, [a] battery charger, [a] floor jack, [a] Zurich vehicle code reader, and hand tools” belonging to Gregory and/or Samuel. Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p 24.

[10] Gregory French died before Jamerson's jury trial commenced. The three-day trial began on June 4, 2024. Jamerson was found guilty as charged. Jamerson now appeals.

Jamerson Waived his Claim that the Trial Court Abused its Discretion by Admitting Gregory French's Statements

[11] Jamerson first argues that the trial court erred when it admitted statements Gregory had made to the police during their investigation of the burglaries and theft. Jamerson claims that the admission of Gregory's statements violated his federal and state constitutional rights to confront witnesses against him. The State responds that Jamerson did not object to the admission of Gregory's statements at trial, and, therefore, he has waived his argument on appeal.

[12] Jamerson did not object to any of the arguments and testimony he complains of in his brief.¹ See Appellant's Br. at 17-18. “It is axiomatic that to preserve a claim of evidentiary error for purposes of appeal, a defendant must make a contemporaneous objection at the time the evidence is introduced.” Shoda v. State, 132 N.E.3d 454, 460 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (citations omitted). Failure to make an objection at trial waives the issue for review, absent fundamental error. Halliburton v. State, 1 N.E.3d 670, 678 (Ind. 2013). In his brief, Jamerson does not acknowledge that he failed to object to the complained-of testimony and he does not argue that the trial court committed fundamental error by admitting Gregory's statements. We therefore agree with the State that Jamerson's claim is waived.

[13] We also observe that the statements and arguments cited in Jamerson's brief are references to Gregory's ownership of the garage that was burglarized. Jamerson has not provided any record citations to statements Gregory made to the police during the investigation. He has therefore waived our review of his argument for this additional reason. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a).

Jamerson Waived his Claim that Samuel's Out-of-Court Identification of Jamerson Was the Product of Unduly Suggestive Procedures

[14] Next, Jamerson claims that law enforcement used “suggestive identification procedures, infringing on his due process rights as protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.” Appellant's Br. at 18. Specifically, he argues that a photo line-up was unduly suggestive.

[15] After Samuel saw his stolen items listed for sale on Facebook Marketplace, he looked at the seller's profile picture. He then identified the person depicted in the Facebook profile picture as the same person who came with Myles to purchase Shephard's trailer. Tr. Vol. 2, pp. 132-33.

[16] During Detective Redmon's investigation, Samuel also identified Jamerson from a photo line-up. Prior to viewing the photo line-up, Samuel was able to give only minimal details describing Jamerson's physical appearance to the detective. However, he recognized Jamerson when he saw the photo of him. Id. at 140. Samuel's testimony was admitted without objection. Jamerson also did not object to the admission of State's Ex. 24, which was the photo line-up Detective Redmon presented to Samuel. Id. at 204. Samuel identified Jamerson's photograph in the line-up by circling the number next to the picture, dating the line-up, and writing his name next to Jamerson's photo. Ex. Vol. 4, p. 25. Samuel also identified Jamerson in court. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 133.

[17] Jamerson waived his claim that the photo line-up was unduly suggestive when he failed to raise this objection at trial. Halliburton, 1 N.E.3d at 678; McBride v. State, 992 N.E.2d 912, 918 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. Jamerson does not acknowledge his waiver or argue that admission of the line-up constituted fundamental error. We therefore do not consider his argument that the line-up evidence was unduly suggestive.

Detective Redmon's Testimony Concerning Evidence Obtained from Electronic Service Providers and Facebook was Properly Admitted

[18] Third, Jamerson argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted Detective Redmon's testimony “concerning digital evidence, including Facebook Marketplace postings,” because the officer was not qualified as an expert in digital forensic evidence. Appellant's Br. at 22. The challenged testimony includes Detective Redmon's review of Jamerson's cell phone data to determine his location at the time of the burglaries and theft. Id. at 23 (citing Tr. Vol. 2, p. 243).

[19] We review the trial court's ruling on the admission of evidence for an abuse of that discretion. Jones v. State, 982 N.E.2d 417, 421 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. “We reverse only where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances.” Id.

[20] The trial court admitted Detective Redmon's testimony after determining that the officer qualified as a skilled witness. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 211. “The Indiana Rules of Evidence contain two rules for opinion testimony—lay witness opinions under Rule 701 and expert witness opinions under Rule 702.” Wilburn v. State, 177 N.E.3d 805, 810 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021). “A ‘skilled witness’ is a person with a degree of knowledge short of that sufficient to be declared an expert under Ind. Evid. Rule 702, but somewhat beyond that possessed by the ordinary jurors.” Jones v. State, 957 N.E.2d 1033, 1040 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (citation and internal quotation omitted). Evidence Rule 701 “encompasses both ordinary lay witness opinions and skilled witness opinions. ‘The difference between skilled witnesses and ordinary lay witnesses is their degree of knowledge concerning the subject of their testimony.’ ” Wilburn, 177 N.E.3d at 811 (quoting Satterfield v. State, 33 N.E.3d 344, 352 (Ind. 2015)). The testimony of a skilled witness “is not a matter of ‘scientific principles’ governed by Indiana Evidence Rule 702(b); rather, it is a matter of the observations of persons with specialized knowledge.” Jones, 957 N.E.2d at 1040 (citation and internal quotation omitted). Skilled witnesses may be permitted to testify both about their observations and their “opinions or inferences that are based solely on facts within their own personal knowledge.” Id. at 1041 (citation omitted).

[21] “The requirement that the opinion be ‘rationally based’ on perception simply means that the opinion must be one that a reasonable person could normally form from the perceived facts, which are facts received directly through any of the witness's own senses[.]”Satterfield, 33 N.E.3d at 352 (citations and brackets omitted). A witness's opinion is helpful “if the testimony gives substance to facts, which were difficult to articulate.” Id. (citation and internal quotation omitted). “Skilled witness testimony generally needs only rise to a relatively low bar in order to be admissible ․” Hawkins v. State, 884 N.E.2d 939, 945 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied.

[22] Here, Detective Redmon explained that he has attended many hours of training to understand how to obtain and interpret data from electronic service providers, including data from Facebook, Instagram, TikTok, IP addresses, etc. Tr. Vol. 2, pp. 191-92, 195, 209, 232-33. The detective stated that his training included using data from electronic service providers to “place and create geographic locations” for the purposes of investigations. Id. at 198. And Detective Redmon testified that he has used data from electronic service providers in many prior investigations.² Id. at 199. The detective explained how he used the information obtained from Facebook and Jamerson's cell phone provider ³ to determine where Jamerson's cell phone was located on the date and time that the Frenches’ items were stolen from their garages. Id. at 241-43, 250; Tr. Vol. 3, pp. 4-5.

[23] Detective Redmon testified that Jamerson's cell phone was “hitting” a cell phone tower in close proximity to the Frenches’ property when the burglary occurred. Tr. Vol. 2, pp. 242-43; Tr. Vol. 3, p. 50. That same cell phone was used to access Jamerson's Facebook account and to create the Facebook Marketplace posts listing the stolen items for sale.⁴ Tr. Vol. 3, p. 50. Jamerson admitted that the Facebook account that listed the stolen items for sale belonged to him. Id. at 14-15.

[24] Jamerson's arguments concerning the admissibility of Detective Redmon's testimony rely on his claim that Redmon was not qualified to provide the testimony since he was not an expert in digital forensics. But “we have repeatedly recognized that law enforcement officers need not have an expert-level understanding of cell-phone location mapping programs and may instead testify ‘based on [their] specialized training about general principles’ in such matters.” Jones v. State, ––– N.E.3d ––––, 24A-CR-1102, 2025 WL 1096520, at *11 (Ind. Ct. App. April 14, 2025) (citing McCowan v. State, 10 N.E.3d 522, 533 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), summarily aff'd in relevant part, 27 N.E.3d 760, 768 (Ind. 2015)). Moreover, Jamerson does not challenge the trial court's determination that Detective Redmon qualified as a skilled witness. And the detective's testimony established that he had the necessary training to understand and interpret the information he obtained from Facebook and Jamerson's cell phone providers. For all of these reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted Detective Redmon's testimony.

Sufficient Evidence Supports Jamerson's Convictions

[25] Next, Jamerson challenges the sufficiency of the evidence underlying his convictions. For challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, we consider only the probative evidence and the reasonable inferences therefrom that support the judgment of the trier of fact. Hall v. State, 177 N.E.3d 1183, 1191 (Ind. 2021). We will neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility. Id. We will affirm a conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

[26] Jamerson complains that the State rested largely on circumstantial evidence and that there was no physical evidence linking Jamerson to the scene of the crime. Appellant's Br. at 24-25. Jamerson also cites Myles's testimony that another individual accompanied him to purchase the trailer from Shephard, and that person was not Jamerson. See Tr. Vol. 3, p. 74.

[27] Jamerson's arguments are simply a request to reweigh the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses. After the items were stolen from the Frenches’ garages, Samuel saw that Jamerson had posted those items for sale on Facebook Marketplace. Samuel also identified Jamerson as the person who was with Myles when Myles came to his property to purchase Shephard's trailer. Finally, Jamerson's cell phone, which was also the device used to create the Marketplace ads, was in close proximity to the Frenches’ property on the date and near the time the items were stolen. This evidence is sufficient to support Jamerson's convictions for two counts of burglary and theft.

Jamerson's Trial Counsel was not Ineffective

[28] Jamerson argues that his trial counsel was ineffective. To evaluate a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, we apply the two-part test articulated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). See Helton v. State, 907 N.E.2d 1020, 1023 (Ind. 2009).

To satisfy the first prong, “the defendant must show deficient performance: representation that fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, committing errors so serious that the defendant did not have the ‘counsel’ guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.” McCary v. State, 761 N.E.2d 389, 392 (Ind. 2002) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88). To satisfy the second prong, “the defendant must show prejudice: a reasonable probability (i.e.[,] a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome) that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).

Humphrey v. State, 73 N.E.3d 677, 681-82 (Ind. 2017). Failure to satisfy either of the two prongs will cause the claim to fail. French v. State, 778 N.E.2d 816, 824 (Ind. 2002).

[29] We observe that a defendant may raise a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal, but he is then foreclosed from relitigating that claim in a later petition for post-conviction relief. Heyen v. State, 936 N.E.2d 294, 303 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied. And claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel often require the development of new facts not present in the trial record. See Jewell v. State, 887 N.E.2d 939, 941-42 (Ind. 2008).

[30] Jamerson argues that his trial counsel was ineffective because his counsel failed “to review and introduce crucial video recordings of State witnesses, Sam French and Steven Ryan Shep[hard], from December 2021.” Appellant's Br. at 26. Jamerson claims that the statements French and Shephard made in those videos were not consistent with their trial testimony. Id. Jamerson also claims that his trial counsel should have presented evidence concerning a purported alibi. Finally, he claims that this evidence constitutes “newly discovered” evidence.

[31] We cannot evaluate Jamerson's claims that his trial counsel was deficient, and counsel's performance prejudiced him, when the evidence that he relies on, i.e., the videos and other evidence of his alibi, is not part of the record on appeal. Because the record does not include any evidence to support his claims, Jamerson cannot establish that his trial counsel was ineffective.

Jamerson Was Not Denied His Right to a Fair Trial

[32] Lastly, Jamerson argues that the “combined procedural errors and irregularities during” his trial “fundamentally deprived him of his right to a fair trial under Article 1, Section 12 of the Indiana Constitution.” Appellant's Br. at 27 (emphasis in original). Our Supreme Court has held that, “under some circumstances the cumulative effect of trial errors may warrant reversal even if each might be deemed harmless in isolation,’ but not where it has been ‘clear in light of the evidence of guilt that no prejudice resulted from any of the erroneous rulings, individually, or cumulatively.’ ” Inman v. State, 4 N.E.3d 190, 203 (Ind. 2014) (quoting Hubbell v. State, 754 N.E.2d 884, 895 (Ind. 2001)).

[33] Jamerson argues that the following alleged errors and irregularities deprived him of a fair trial: 1) testimony concerning the size of Jamerson's foot compared to a shoe print observed in the mud on the Frenches’ property, 2) Myles's inadvertent violation of the separation of witnesses order, 3) the trial court's admission of Detective Redmon's testimony after determining that he qualified as a skilled witness, 4) admission of the Facebook Marketplace posts selling the Frenches’ stolen property, 5) admission of Detective Redmon's testimony on cross-examination featuring “remarks that hinted at racial bias[,]” and 6) the State's attempt to introduce evidence of a jail phone call containing hearsay, which evidence would have been used to speculate that Jamerson had attempted to bribe Myles to testify. Appellant's Br. at 27-29. Jamerson only claims that these alleged “intertwined legal errors” had a “cumulative impact on trial integrity and adherence to judicial fairness principles.” Id. at 30.

[34] A defendant is entitled to a fair trial, not a perfect one. Myers v. State, 887 N.E.2d 170, 175 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied. And many of Jamerson's alleged errors are not errors at all. The testimony concerning Jamerson's foot size was conflicting, see Tr. Vol. 3, 22-23, but the admission of conflicting testimony is not error and simply affects the weight afforded to that evidence. Defense witness Myles was in the courtroom during Samuel's testimony for less than ten minutes, and the trial court allowed him to testify over the State's objection. His presence in the courtroom during other testimony was briefly noted by the State during cross-examination. This was not error. Id. at 62, 70-101. And as we decided above, the trial court properly admitted Detective Redmon's testimony. Further, Jamerson attempted to elicit the testimony concerning whether the detective had a racial bias, therefore, any alleged error was invited error. Id. at 27. Jamerson also failed to establish any error in the admission of the Facebook posts. Finally, the trial court struck the State's question regarding the jail phone call, which was the remedy Jamerson requested. Id. at 53.

[35] For all of these reasons, Jamerson has not persuaded us that any of the complained of procedures or admission of evidence was error, and he has certainly failed to convince us that he was denied his right to a fair trial.

Conclusion

[36] Jamerson has not established any reversible error and the evidence is sufficient to support his convictions. Finally, Jamerson has not persuaded us that he was denied his right to a fair trial.

[37] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Jamerson's pre-trial motion in limine did not preserve his claim of error on appeal.

2.   Detective Redmon stated on numerous occasions that he was not an expert in digital forensics and that this investigation was “probably the first going this deep into digital forensics.” Tr. Vol. 3, p. 19. But we conclude that the detective qualified as a skilled witness; therefore, his knowledge and use of digital forensics was applicable to the weight the jury gave to his testimony and not its admissibility. See McCowan v. State, 10 N.E.3d 522, 533 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), summarily aff'd in relevant part, 27 N.E.3d 760, 768 (Ind. 2015). Jamerson also argues that the court “curtailed the defense's opportunity to effectively challenge the qualifications” of Detective Redmon “to determine his ability to testify competently regarding digital forensic evidence.” Appellant's Br. at 23. But Jamerson was given the opportunity to cross-examine the detective about his training and qualifications, and, therefore, his argument lacks merit.

3.   Without citation to authority, Jamerson claims that the State's digital-evidence exhibits were admitted improperly under the business records exception to the rule against hearsay. By failing to support his argument with citation to proper authority, he has waived this argument on appeal. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a). And Jamerson complains that the State failed to admit every page of the warrant return Detective Redmon received from Facebook. But the trial court explicitly stated that Jamerson could offer “additional portions of the documents received” into evidence, but Jamerson never did so. See Tr. Vol. 2, p. 221.

4.   We observe that Jamerson did not object to this testimony elicited from Detective Redmon during the State's redirect examination or request a continuing objection to the admission of evidence obtained from the electronic service providers.

Mathias, Judge.

Foley, J., and Felix, J., concur.