Stephen L. Hunter, Appellant-Defendant, v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff. (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Stephen L. Hunter appeals from his convictions of Level 1 felony child molesting and Level 4 felony child molesting. He argues on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion by: (1) denying his motions for mistrial; and (2) excluding the evidence of the victim's dating relationship. Concluding that the court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Victim 1 was approximately three years old when she moved to the Elkhart Mobile Home Park with her mother and her older sister, Katie. Hunter also lived in the mobile home park. When Katie was twelve years old, she started mowing Hunter's grass, and she would enter his trailer to be paid. Inside his trailer, Hunter kept children's movies on a shelf, and he had Pokémon cards and figurines on his kitchen table. He allowed the neighborhood children to borrow his DVDs and he provided snacks and drinks for them. Hunter also displayed a “big picture of [Victim 1] that he took when he took her to the flea market.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 21.

[3] Victim 1 began spending time with Hunter when she was around six years old. She would go to Hunter's trailer with Katie when Katie was mowing the grass. Over time, Victim 1 was alone with Hunter more often. He would take her to the flea market and church. While at the flea market, he would buy toys and then take her somewhere to have a meal. Victim 1 also used Hunter's phone to make videos on an app.

[4] On one occasion, when Victim 1 was ten or eleven years old, she was lying on Hunter's couch. She intended to take a nap, but was not yet asleep, when Hunter pulled her pants down and digitally penetrated her. Victim 1 said it “felt weird,” and she “didn't know what was happening” to her. Id. at 230. He said he was going to “pop her cherry,” but she did not know what that meant until she looked it up later. Id. at 228. Hunter then lowered his head and licked the outside of Victim 1's vagina. She recalled feeling his beard and tongue.

[5] On another occasion, Victim 1 planned to take a nap in Hunter's trailer, and he allowed her to use his bed. As she settled in, her feet were hanging off the bed somewhat. Hunter came into the room, picked up her foot, and rubbed his groin on her foot before going into the bathroom.

[6] On yet another occasion, Victim 1 and Hunter played catch. When she dropped the ball and was on her knees to pick it up, Hunter put his face “in [her] butt area.” Id. at 238. And at a different time, Victim 1 was lying down on one of Hunter's couches, trying to fall asleep. She was still awake when Hunter started “messing with [her] chest area.” Id. at 234. She was not sure how long Hunter had his mouth on her breasts, but she recalled seeing her sister Katie through the window.

[7] Katie searched for Victim 1 one afternoon because she was not playing where she was supposed to be. Katie went to Hunter's trailer and saw that the blinds were open, although his door was not. Katie saw Victim 1 on the couch with her shirt up and Hunter “kind of like hovering over her” torso. Id. at 34. Katie entered the trailer and asked Hunter what he was doing. He claimed that he was blowing raspberries. Katie returned home, but Victim 1 remained behind. Hunter told her that she was “never going to see [him] again.” Id. at 236.

[8] Katie reported what she saw to her mother. When Victim 1 returned home, her mother asked her if Hunter had abused her. Victim 1 replied that he had not, but explained at trial that she responded that way because she did not want him to go to jail. If he was incarcerated, she would no longer have access to games, movies, and snacks. However, Katie and her mother noticed that Victim 1 spent less time with Hunter after this incident and avoided being alone with him.

[9] When Victim 1 was in middle school she had a close relationship with another middle school student. Victim's 1's friend told her about her own experience with sexual abuse and encouraged Victim 1 to report what Hunter had done. Around Christmas 2019 when Victim 1 and her mother were looking at Christmas lights, Victim 1 disclosed to her mother the extent of Hunter's sexual abuse.

[10] On January 22, 2020, Hunter spoke with police and described the rules he had for children who visited his house. He claimed he would not allow one child to be alone with him in the house until he had spoken with the parents beforehand and was comfortable with the situation. He told the officers that he was merely blowing raspberries on Victim 1's stomach when Katie saw him, and that he had done so with Victim 1 a couple of times. He admitted that on some of those occasions Victim 1 was asleep.

[11] On May 14, 2021, the State charged Hunter with molesting Victim 1. On June 28, 2023, the State moved to have any reference to Victim 1's other romantic relationships or sexual history excluded under Evidence Rule 412. Hunter did not object and the motion was granted. Hunter moved to prohibit the admission of evidence that would be inadmissible under Evidence Rules 404(b) (character evidence; crimes or other acts) or 609 (impeachment by evidence of criminal conviction). In his motion, he included statements of his belief that some of the State's witnesses might volunteer evidence of his other arrests, convictions, or bad acts. The State responded that they did not anticipate presenting such evidence against him, but noted that there was a specific incident with Victim 1 close in time to the charged offenses. Hunter had no objection to the admission of that evidence.

[12] During cross-examination, Katie confirmed that she was suspicious of Hunter yet continued to borrow money from him and mow his lawn. Hunter's counsel asked Katie, “And you would want to borrow money from him because he's suspicious, in order to get back at him for something?” Tr. Vol. 2, p. 64. She responded, “There were two separate incidents with children that happened.” Id. Hunter's counsel moved for a mistrial. The State responded that it had admonished Katie to not talk about other incidents, and her answer was in response to prodding by the defense. The State further noted that Katie's statement was vague and “could mean anything[.]” Id. at 67. The court found that Hunter had opened the door because counsel's question was about why Katie was suspicious. The court agreed that Hunter's question was not posed with the intention of eliciting that response, but denied the request for a mistrial. The jury was admonished to “disregard the last question and answer and not to consider either one in any way.” Id. at 71, 75.

[13] Victim 1's mother also testified. During her testimony, she explained that she noticed a change in Victim 1's behavior after the last incident. She no longer wanted to be around him, did not want to talk about him or to look at him. She would only go places with him if Katie went as well. Victim 1's mother explained why she did not do anything more after learning about that incident.

No. No, she had said that everything was okay that day and she didn't want me to proceed with it, so I did not push the issue, because Katie had already went [sic] in then and freaked out, and so I knew that if—had anything happened, it wasn't going to happen again because Katie had taken care of it. So, if that was like – to me, I'm thinking that was the only thing, I didn't know other stuff had happened and I figured that probably nipped it in the bud.

Id. at 91. Hunter objected and again requested a mistrial, stating this was the “second time a witness has talked about other incidents.” Id. The court denied the motion, concluding that the answer did not leave an improper inference with the jury. The court also noted that Hunter was charged with two counts of child molesting.

[14] During Hunter's cross-examination of Victim 1, he asked about her decision to come forward after talking with her friend. Hunter asked if Victim 1 and her friend “dated for a little while[.]” Tr. Vol. III, p. 33. Victim 1 replied, “Correct.” Id. at 34. The State objected, citing the order in limine about Victim 1's dating history. Although Hunter argued that the question was not about Victim 1's sexual behavior, the court disagreed and sustained the objection, noting that dating inferred sexual behavior. The court instructed the jury to disregard the question and answer.

[15] Hunter then elicited testimony that Victim 1 and her friend had a close relationship for around six months and that her friend had disclosed she had experienced sexual abuse. In an offer to prove outside the presence of the jury, Hunter established that Victim 1 described her relationship as dating. Victim 1 said they would talk over Facetime and that they were closer than normal friends.

[16] The jury found Hunter guilty of both counts. Hunter now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

I. Denial of Motions for Mistrial

[17] Hunter contends that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motions for mistrial. Our standard of review is well settled.

The trial court is in the best position to assess the impact of a particular event upon the jury. Thus, the decision of whether to grant or deny a motion for mistrial is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court and will be reversed only upon an abuse of that discretion. The denial of a motion for mistrial will be reversed only upon a showing that the defendant was placed in a position of grave peril to which he should not have been subjected. The declaration of a mistrial is an extreme action and is warranted only when no other action can be expected to remedy the situation. The burden on appeal is upon the defendant to show that he was placed in grave peril by the denial of the mistrial motion. The defendant on appeal also has the burden to show that no other action could have remedied the perilous situation into which he was placed.

Wilson v. State, 865 N.E.2d 1024, 1027-28 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (quoting Anderson v. State, 774 N.E.2d 906, 911 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (citations omitted)). And gravity of peril is measured by the conduct's probable persuasive effect on the jury. Pittman v. State, 885 N.E.2d 1246, 1255 (Ind. 2008).

[18] Hunter's first request for mistrial related to his questioning of Victim 1's sister, Katie. After Hunter questioned Katie's motive for continuing to borrow money from Hunter and mow his lawn when she found his behavior to be suspicious, she replied that “[t]here were two separate incidents with children that happened.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 64.

[19] We conclude that Hunter has not demonstrated that he was subjected to grave peril. Hunter's question seemed to invite Katie's comment. Nevertheless, the trial court admonished the jury to disregard the answer. “ ‘[A] mistrial is an extreme remedy that is only justified when other remedial measures are insufficient to rectify the situation.’ ” Isom v. State, 31 N.E.3d 469, 481 (Ind. 2015) (quoting Mickens v. State, 742 N.E.2d 927, 929 (Ind. 2001)). “ ‘On appeal, we must presume that the jury obeyed the court's instructions in reaching its verdict.’ ” Id. (quoting Tyson v. State, 386 N.E.2d 1185, 1192 (1979)). Our Supreme Court has observed that “a ‘clear instruction, together with strong presumptions that juries follow courts’ instructions and that an admonition cures any error, severely undercuts the defendant's position.’ ” Id. (quoting Lucio v. State, 907 N.E.2d 1008, 1010-11 (Ind. 2009)). We are unpersuaded that Hunter was placed in grave peril in this instance and, therefore, find no abuse of discretion. See Vanzandt v. State, 731 N.E.2d 450, 454 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (holding court's refusal to grant mistrial ordinarily not reversible error if jury admonished to disregard what occurred), trans. denied.

[20] The second motion for mistrial came during Victim 1's mother's testimony. Victim 1's mother described her observations about her daughter's changed behavior after the incident Katie reported to her. In her explanation of why she did not confront Hunter, Victim 1's mother said her decision was based on the fact that Victim 1 said everything was alright, and that Katie had already taken care of the matter with Hunter. The inference drawn from the rest of her comments—“I'm thinking that was the only thing, I didn't know other stuff had happened”—is that she was only aware of the one incident between Victim 1 and Hunter. Tr. Vol. II, p. 91. Mother did not refer to incidents with other children. And the court noted that there were two charges filed against Hunter. We conclude that Hunter has not demonstrated that he was placed in grave peril by Victim 1's mother's comment, and, therefore, there was no abuse of discretion in denying the motion for mistrial. See Smith v. State, 872 N.E.2d 169, 175 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (no grave peril where witness’ statement made in passing did not unambiguously inform jury that defendant had prior criminal charges), trans. denied.

II. Exclusion of Evidence Under Rule 412

[21] Next, Hunter argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying the admission of evidence relating to Victim 1's relationship with her close friend in middle school. “The admission of evidence is a matter of discretion for the trial court, so we review such decisions only for an abuse of discretion.” Killian v. State, 149 N.E.3d 1189, 1190 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020). “An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's ruling is clearly against the logic, facts, and circumstances presented.” Sallee v. State, 785 N.E.2d 645, 650 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied. “In determining the admissibility of evidence, this court will only consider the evidence in favor of the trial court's ruling and unrefuted evidence in the defendant's favor.” Id.

[22] The admission of evidence pertaining to a victim's past sexual conduct is governed by Indiana Evidence Rule 412. Rule 412(a) provides as follows:

The following evidence is not admissible in a civil or criminal proceeding involving alleged sexual misconduct:

(1) evidence offered to prove that a victim or witness engaged in other sexual behavior; or

(2) evidence offered to prove a victim's or witness's sexual predisposition.

Rule 412(b)(1) lists exceptions applicable for criminal cases.

The court may admit the following evidence in a criminal case:

(A) evidence of specific instances of a victim's or witness's sexual behavior, if offered to prove that someone other than the defendant was the source of semen, injury, or other physical evidence;

(B) evidence of specific instances of a victim's or witness's sexual behavior with respect to the person accused of the sexual misconduct, if offered by the defendant to prove consent or if offered by the prosecutor; and

(C) evidence whose exclusion would violate the defendant's constitutional rights.

Hunter's argument, that the exclusion of the evidence prevented him from conducting a “full, adequate and effective cross-examination as well as eroding [his] theory of defense,” appears to be directed to Rule 412(b)(1)(C). Appellant's Br. p. 11.

[23] Although we agree with the trial court's conclusion that dating implied a sexual relationship, the evidence was inadmissible under the Rule's prohibition of evidence of a victim's sexual predisposition. Evid. Rule 412(a)(2). “The purpose of the Rule is to prevent the victim of a sexual assault from being placed on trial and to remove impediments to reporting sex crimes.” Smith v. State, 140 N.E.3d 363, 370 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied.

[24] Nevertheless, Hunter elicited testimony that Victim 1 and her friend had a close relationship for around six months, and that during that relationship Victim 1's friend disclosed her own experience with sexual abuse. The friend was participating in the legal process when she told Victim 1 about the abuse and encouraged her to report Hunter's conduct to authorities. Thus, Hunter was allowed to challenge Victim 1's credibility and motivation for making her claims against Hunter, even though he could not elicit testimony that they had dated. And Hunter's defense was not hindered by the exclusion of the evidence. His defense merely could not overcome Victim 1's consistent and corroborated testimony about his abuse of her.

[25] We conclude that the trial court did not err by excluding the evidence.

Conclusion

[26] In light of the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Hunter's motions for mistrial. And the court did not abuse its discretion by excluding evidence of Hunter's victim's sexual behavior or predisposition.

[27] Affirmed.

Robb, Senior Judge.

Judges May and Brown concur. May, J., and Brown, J., concur.