IN RE: the Involuntary Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of: A.C. (Minor Child) (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] A.C. (“Child”) was born in October 2021 and is the biological child of R.C. (“Father”) and A.B. (“Mother”).¹ In October 2022, while father was incarcerated, the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) removed Child from Mother's care due to allegations of neglect. In November 2022, Child was adjudicated a child in need of services (“CHINS”), and a dispositional order was entered. After Father failed to visit Child and meaningfully engage in services, his parental rights to Child were terminated. Father now challenges that termination and presents one issue for our review, which we restate as follows: Whether the trial court's decision to terminate Father's parental rights was clearly erroneous.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On October 26, 2021, Child was born with Smith-McGenes syndrome. Child's condition causes her to frequently stop breathing, necessitating CPR to save her life. Child cannot eat anything by mouth that is not pureed and often chokes, so Child has a feeding tube for nourishment. At the time of Child's birth, Father was on probation for being convicted of battery resulting in bodily injury to a pregnant woman, as a Level 5 felony, as well as residential entry, as a Level 6 felony. While on probation, Father was convicted of theft and incarcerated in Kentucky. From July 2022 through September 1, 2023, Father's probation sentence was stayed pending his release from Kentucky incarceration.

[4] On October 22, 2022, while Father was incarcerated in Kentucky, DCS received a report alleging that Child was a victim of neglect after Child was treated at Riley Hospital for Children (“Riley”) for severe malnutrition, infection on her fingers, and pneumonia. Child had been treated at Riley multiple times for failure to thrive, both before and after Father's incarceration. Although Child was able to gain weight in the hospital, she lost weight at home due to not being fed properly.

[5] On October 24, DCS filed a petition alleging Child was a CHINS. Child was removed from the home and placed in foster care. Child was adjudicated a CHINS, and Mother voluntarily relinquished her parental rights to Child. As Father remained incarcerated, the trial court's dispositional order simply compelled Father to “take advantage of any services available while he is incarcerated and contact the DCS within 48 hours of his release.” Ex. Vol. I at 24.

[6] Once Father was released from incarceration, he was ordered to participate in services. In addition to being ordered to participate in the Fatherhood Engagement Program, obtain a substance abuse and mental health assessment, remain drug and alcohol free, and attend supervised visitation, Father was instructed to take CPR classes before visiting with Child so that he could provide life-saving intervention in case she stopped breathing while in his care. Father failed to participate in the CPR classes, initially, because he could not afford the $117.00 fee. Father later failed to attend a scheduled CPR class because of a scheduling conflict. While Child was in the hospital, Father was not required to know CPR to visit Child; nevertheless, he did not once visit Child during the year-long period between his September 1, 2023, release and the October 23, 2024, termination fact-finding hearing. DCS was willing to assist Father with travelling to Indianapolis to see Child, but Father did not attempt to see her. Father also did not attempt to visit Child when he traveled to Indianapolis for his own medical care because he failed to make advance plans with Child's care providers.

[7] Likewise, despite the order to remain drug and alcohol free, Father continued testing positive for THC until March of 2024 when DCS filed a motion for rule to show cause and the trial court held Father in contempt for failing to comply. Father began complying only after the trial court sentenced him to 90 days incarceration, suspended on the condition that Father begin complying. Relatedly, in March and April, Father's probation officer filed petitions to revoke Father's probation for his failure to participate in court-ordered probation requirements. Father also failed to consistently participate in the Fatherhood Engagement Program, until after DCS made three referrals for his participation and filed a petition to involuntarily terminate Father's parental rights.

[8] At the fact-finding hearing on DCS's termination petition, both the family case manager (“FCM”) and the child advocate (“CASA”) testified that termination of Father's parental rights was in Child's best interest. The trial court terminated Father's parental rights over Child. Father now appeals. Additional facts will follow.

Discussion and Decision

The Trial Court's Decision to Terminate Father's Parental Rights to Child Was Not Clearly Erroneous

[9] Father challenges the trial court's termination of his parental rights over Child. “Parents have a fundamental right to raise their children—but this right is not absolute. When parents are unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities, their parental rights may be terminated.” In re Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d 41, 45–46 (Ind. 2019) (internal citations omitted) (citing In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1230 (Ind. 2013)), cert. denied. To terminate Father's parental rights under Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4, DCS had to prove by clear and convincing evidence that either (a) “there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in [Child's] removal ․ will not be remedied,” or (b) “there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of” Father's relationship with the Child “poses a threat to the well-being, safety, physical health, or life of [Child]”, and (c) termination of the parent-child relationship is in Child's best interests.² See Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c)(3), (d)(3)-(4); id. § 31-37-14-2.

[10] We will affirm a trial court's termination of parental rights unless that decision is clearly erroneous. Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 45 (citing In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 642 (Ind. 2014)). A trial court's termination decision is clearly erroneous if the court's findings of fact do not support its legal conclusions or if the legal conclusions do not support its ultimate decision. Id. (citing E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 642). We will not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility, and we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that support the court's decision. Id. (citing In re K.E., 39 N.E.3d 641, 646 (Ind. 2015)). Furthermore, we accept as true any findings which are not challenged on appeal. See R.M. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 203 N.E.3d 559, 564 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (citing Madlem v. Arko, 592 N.E.2d 686, 687 (Ind. 1992)), trans. not sought.

a. Failure to Remedy Circumstances

[11] Father first challenges the court's conclusion that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in Child's removal and continued placement outside the home will not be remedied. In reviewing the trial court's findings regarding whether Father has or will remedy the conditions resulting in Child's removal or the reasons Child was placed outside the home, we first “identify the conditions that led to removal” and then “determine whether there is a reasonable probability that those conditions will not be remedied.” In re J.S., 133 N.E.3d 707, 715 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (citing E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 643).

In the second step, the trial court must judge parental fitness as of the time of the termination hearing, taking into consideration the evidence of changed conditions. The trial court is entrusted with balancing a parent's recent improvements against habitual patterns of conduct. The trial court has discretion to weigh a parent's prior history more heavily than efforts made only shortly before termination. Requiring trial courts to give due regard to changed conditions does not preclude them from finding that parents’ past behavior is the best predictor of their future behavior.

J.S., 133 N.E.3d at 715 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

[12] Child was removed and adjudicated a CHINS due to Mother and Father's neglect in ensuring Child received appropriate nourishment both before and during Father's 17-month incarceration in Kentucky. Father challenges twelve of the eighteen factual findings, claiming that the evidence fails to support the trial court's findings. However, all but one of his challenges to the factual findings amount to requests for us to reweigh the evidence and reassess witness credibility which we cannot do. See Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 45 (citing E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 642). For instance, Father challenges the finding that he “has a history of committing crimes, including some that were violent, that continued through the CHINS matter.” Appellant's App. Vol II at 21. Father claims the only evidence of his criminal activity “was that he took a theft charge for the Mother ․ and that he successfully completed probation for a charge of battery on a pregnant woman.” Appellant's Br. at 13. However, even in his argument, he admits to committing more than one criminal offense and that one was for battery—which makes the trial court's findings accurate. Additionally, although Father would prefer to put a different spin on the facts detailing his failure to visit Child or attend training that would enable him to give Child lifesaving care, we decline his invitation to reweigh the evidence undergirding these facts. See Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 45.

[13] One factual finding is inaccurate, and the State concedes as much. The trial court found that Father failed to attend feeding tube training despite being told that he must do so. While it is accurate that Father did not ever attend feeding tube training, even though he knew Child required one to eat, there was no evidence that anyone ever told him that he was required to attend a training. Regardless, disregarding the contention that he was told to get training on how to use a feeding tube does not alter our conclusion. Considering only the evidence and reasonable inferences that support the trial court's decision, we cannot say that the trial court clearly erred in concluding that Father has not and likely will not remedy the reasons for Child's removal or placement outside of Father's care.³

b. Best Interests

[14] Father also argues that the trial court erred in concluding that termination was in the best interests of Child. To determine the best interests of a child, a trial court looks at the totality of the evidence and subordinates the interests of the parents to those of the child. In re P.B., 199 N.E.3d 790, 799 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (citing In re A.B., 887 N.E.2d 158, 167–68 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008)), reh'g denied (Jan. 25, 2023), trans. denied sub nom. A.B. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 209 N.E.3d 1168 (Ind. 2023). A central consideration in this determination is the child's need for permanency. Id. (citing K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1235). The trial court also considers whether a child's emotional and physical development is threatened by the parent-child relationship. Id. (citing K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1235). Permanent impairment of physical, mental, or social development is not necessary before a trial court may terminate the parent-child relationship. Id. (citing K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1235). “We have previously held that the recommendation by both the [FCM] and [CASA] to terminate parental rights, in addition to evidence the conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied, is sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child's best interests.” In re P.B, 199 N.E.3d at 799 (citing L.S. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1158 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied.).

[15] Father challenges virtually all of the trial court's factual findings as they relate to the best interest's determination. While doing so, Father acknowledges that both the FCM and the CASA testified that termination of Father's parental rights was in Child's best interests. Even though such testimony is sufficient evidence that termination is in Child's best interest, see In re P.B, 199 N.E.3d at 799, Father nevertheless argues that their testimony “alone should not serve as the basis for the termination in this matter solely because [Child] has a better place to live.” Appellant's Br. at 19. He further argues that he should be given more time to receive training needed to care for Child because “there is no indication that delaying termination would affect [Child] negatively.” Id. at 20. These are clear requests to reweigh the evidence or reassess witness credibility, which, again, we will not do. See Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 45 (citing E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 642).

[16] Child has been in the care of foster parents since December 2022, and her foster parents have demonstrated an ability to properly care for Child's specific medical needs. Throughout the time Child has been with her foster parents, Father failed to engage with DCS, comply with the trial court's orders, or make any attempt to visit Child. Based on the foregoing, we cannot say that the trial court clearly erred in concluding that termination of Father's parental rights was in the best interests of Child.

Conclusion

[17] The evidence supports the trial court's findings, and those findings support the trial court's judgment. Therefore, the trial court did not clearly err in terminating Father's parental rights over Child, and we affirm the trial court's decision.

[18] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Mother relinquished and consented to termination of her parental rights to Child, so she does not participate in this appeal.

2.   Father concedes there is a satisfactory plan of care and treatment for Child.

3.   Father also argues that the trial court erred by concluding that there was a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship posed a threat to Child's well-being. See I.C. § 31-35-2-4(d)(4). Because Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(d) is written in the disjunctive, the trial court was required to find only that one listed circumstance was established. See In re A.K., 924 N.E.2d 212, 220 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (addressing the prior version of the statute), trans. dismissed. We have already concluded that the trial court did not err in its decision under (d)(3), so we need not address his argument directed at the “threat” prong of Section 4(d)(4). See id.

Felix, Judge.

Judges Vaidik and Tavitas concur. Vaidik, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.