Richard A. Mitchell, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Richard A. Mitchell appeals his adjudication as a habitual offender ¹ following his conviction of Level 6 felony possession of methamphetamine.² Mitchell presents two issues for our review:

(1) whether the trial court committed fundamental error by failing to give final jury instructions during the habitual offender phase of trial; and

(2) whether the State presented sufficient evidence to prove Mitchell's identity as the defendant who committed one of the alleged prior felonies.

We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On July 6, 2023, West Lafayette Police Officer Jayden Fackelman observed Mitchell driving over the speed limit and conducted a traffic stop. A K-9 unit alerted to the presence of narcotics in Mitchell's vehicle, so officers searched the car and discovered a substance in a blue plastic pill bottle on the driver's side floorboard. Subsequent testing revealed the substance to be methamphetamine.

[3] The State charged Mitchell with Level 6 felony possession of methamphetamine. On October 20, 2023, the State amended the charging information to add an allegation that Mitchell was a habitual offender. The trial court held a jury trial on February 8, 2024. Mitchell did not attend, and he was tried in absentia.

[4] During the first phase of trial when the jurors were to determine whether Mitchell committed Level 6 felony possession of methamphetamine, the trial court read aloud to the jury preliminary and final instructions covering the burden of proof, presumption of innocence, credibility of witnesses, manner of weighing evidence, and the elements of possession of methamphetamine. The trial court also gave the jury written copies of the phase one final instructions. After deliberating for less than an hour, the jury returned a guilty verdict for Level 6 felony possession of methamphetamine.

[5] The trial court immediately proceeded to the second phase of the trial for the habitual offender determination. The trial court orally told the jury: “You were instructed earlier about the burden of proof, reasonable doubt, the presumption of innocence, the credibility of witnesses, and how to evaluate the evidence. Those instructions apply here as well.” (Tr. Vol. II at 149-50.) The court read aloud for the jury the elements required for a habitual offender finding and informed them they could consider the evidence presented during the first phase of the trial. The trial court again distributed written copies of its preliminary instructions to the jurors.

[6] The State introduced certified records of three prior felony convictions for individuals named Richard Mitchell, Richard Alexander Mitchell, and Richard A. Mitchell: a 2013 conviction of Class D felony resisting law enforcement ³ (“2013 Conviction”); a 2019 conviction of Level 6 felony possession of methamphetamine (“2019 Conviction”); and a 2021 conviction of Level 6 felony possession of methamphetamine (“2021 Conviction”). The State had admitted Mitchell's Bureau of Motor Vehicles (“BMV”) record during the first phase of the trial. That record showed his full name as Richard Alexander Mitchell. The date of birth and all three addresses listed in the prior conviction records matched those on Mitchell's BMV record.

[7] After both parties rested, the trial court released the jurors for deliberations but did not read or distribute written copies of final jury instructions specific to the habitual offender phase. Mitchell's counsel did not object. The jury determined Mitchell was a habitual offender.

[8] The trial court entered a conviction of Level 6 felony possession of methamphetamine and adjudicated Mitchell a habitual offender. On June 10, 2024, the trial court held a sentencing hearing. Mitchell was present at that hearing. After brief testimony and argument, the trial court sentenced Mitchell to 730 days for possession of methamphetamine, enhanced by 1,095 days due to the habitual offender finding, for an aggregate sentence of 1,825 days. The trial court ordered Mitchell to serve 1,645 days in the Indiana Department of Correction followed by 180 days in community corrections.

Discussion and Decision

1. Jury Instructions

[9] Mitchell argues the trial court abused its discretion when it did not give final jury instructions prior to the jury's deliberations of the habitual offender allegation. Our standard of review regarding a claim of instructional error is well-settled:

The purpose of jury instructions is to inform the jury of the law applicable to the facts without misleading the jury and to enable it to comprehend the case clearly and arrive at a just, fair, and correct verdict. In reviewing a trial court's decision to give a tendered jury instruction, we consider (1) whether the instruction correctly states the law, (2) is supported by the evidence in the record, and (3) is not covered in substance by other instructions. The trial court has discretion in instructing the jury, and we will reverse only when the instructions amount to an abuse of discretion. To constitute an abuse of discretion, the instructions given must be erroneous, and the instructions taken as a whole must misstate the law or otherwise mislead the jury. We will consider jury instructions as a whole and in reference to each other, not in isolation.

Yeary v. State, 186 N.E.3d 662, 679-80 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (quoting Murray v. State, 798 N.E.2d 895, 899-900 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (internal citations omitted in Murray)).

[10] Because Mitchell did not object at trial, he argues the trial court committed fundamental error. Fundamental error is “an extremely narrow exception to the waiver rule” that exists only when the alleged error is “so prejudicial to [the defendant's] rights as to make a fair trial impossible.” Cruz Rivera v. State, 127 N.E.3d 1256, 1259 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied. When reviewing instructional decisions for fundamental error, we “consider the instructions as a whole and in reference to each other.” Id.

[11] Trial courts are required to “read appropriate final instructions” that include “the applicable burdens of proof[,]” “the credibility of witnesses[,]” and “the manner of weighing the testimony received.” Ind. Jury Rule 26(a). Courts also “shall provide each juror with written instructions before the court reads them” and “[j]urors shall retain the written instructions during deliberations.” Id.

[12] During phase one of the trial in which the jury was to determine if Mitchell committed Level 6 felony possession of methamphetamine, the trial court provided comprehensive preliminary and final instructions, covering all topics required by Jury Rule 26(a), including burden of proof, presumption of innocence, credibility of witnesses, and manner of weighing evidence. As part of the final instructions in phase one, the trial court provided the jurors with written copies of its instructions. The jury returned a guilty verdict.

[13] At the beginning of phase two of the trial, in which the jury was to determine if Mitchell was a habitual offender, the trial court stated:

You may consider all of the evidence presented in the first part of the trial. You were instructed earlier about the burden of proof, reasonable doubt, the presumption of innocence, the credibility of witnesses, and how to evaluate the evidence. Those instructions apply here as well. Also as previously instructed, under the Constitution of Indiana you have the right to determine both the law and the facts. The court's instructions are your best source in determining the law․ You are to consider all the instructions together. Do not single out any certain sentence or individual point or instruction and ignore the others.

(Tr. Vol. II at 150.) The trial court then proceeded to orally instruct the jurors regarding the elements they needed to consider when determining if Mitchell was a habitual offender. The trial court distributed written copies of the phase two preliminary instructions to the jurors. However, after the presentation of evidence and argument, the trial court did not read aloud or distribute written copies of the phase two final jury instructions regarding the State's allegation that Mitchell was a habitual offender.

[14] This case is akin to Cruz Rivera, 127 N.E.3d at 1257. In Cruz Rivera, the trial court gave preliminary instructions on, among other things, “the credibility of witnesses and the manner of weighing testimony.” Id. The trial court told the jury to “consider all the instructions together[.]” Id. (citation to the record omitted). The parties then presented argument and evidence. Id. During its final instructions, the trial court reminded the jury to consider all instructions together. Id. at 1258. However, during final instructions, the trial court did not instruct the jury on how to consider the credibility of witnesses and manner of weighing testimony. Id. The jury returned a guilty verdict on one of the charges against Cruz Rivera. Id.

[15] Cruz Rivera argued on appeal that even though he had not objected to the final jury instructions at trial, the trial court's failure to read final jury instructions regarding the credibility of witnesses and the manner of weighing testimony constituted fundamental error. Id. at 1259. We noted that, during the final instructions, the trial court told the jury to “consider all of the jury instructions (both preliminary and final) together.” Id. (citation to the record omitted). We held the trial court did not commit fundamental error because the trial was one day long, the jury received the preliminary and final instructions on the same day, and the jury was reminded to consider all instructions as a whole. Id.

[16] The same is true here. The two phases of Mitchell's trial were held on the same day. At the conclusion of phase one of Mitchell's trial, during which the jury considered whether Mitchell committed Level 6 felony possession of methamphetamine, the trial court read the jury final instructions regarding, as is relevant here, burden of proof, reasonable doubt, presumption of innocence, and credibility of witnesses. The trial court also gave the jury a written copy of its phase one final instructions. The jury deliberated for less than an hour and returned a guilty verdict as to the Level 6 felony.

[17] Immediately thereafter, the trial court moved on to phase two of the trial regarding the State's allegation that Mitchell was a habitual offender. At the beginning of phase two, the trial court reminded the jury to consider all instructions together. It then listed the elements the jury was to consider when determining if Mitchell was a habitual offender. It also distributed written copies of its phase two preliminary instructions to jurors. Based thereon, we conclude Mitchell has failed to demonstrate that the trial court's failure to read or distribute final jury instructions at the end of the presentation of argument and evidence during phase two was fundamental error. See id. (no fundamental error in failure to give certain final jury instructions when those instructions were given earlier in the day during preliminary instructions and the jury was told twice to consider the jury instructions as a whole).

2. Sufficiency of Evidence

[18] Mitchell also argues the State did not present sufficient evidence he was a habitual offender because the State did not prove he was the same person listed in the 2013 Conviction records.⁴ When faced with challenges to the sufficiency of evidence, we apply a “well settled” standard of review that leaves determination of the weight of the evidence and credibility of the witnesses to the fact-finder. Teising v. State, 226 N.E.3d 780, 783 (Ind. 2024). “We consider only the evidence most favorable to the trial court's ruling and will affirm a defendant's conviction unless ‘no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” Id. (quoting Jenkins v. State, 726 N.E.2d 268, 270 (Ind. 2000)).

[19] To prove Mitchell was a habitual offender, the State had to establish he had three prior unrelated felony convictions within the required time frame. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-8. To do so, the State presented certified records for the 2013 Conviction, 2019 Conviction, and 2021 Conviction.

Certified copies of judgments or commitments containing a defendant's name or a similar name may be introduced to prove the commission of prior felonies. While there must be supporting evidence to identify the defendant as the person named in the documents, the evidence may be circumstantial. If the evidence yields logical and reasonable inferences from which the finder of fact may determine beyond a reasonable doubt that it was a defendant who was convicted of the prior felony, then a sufficient connection has been shown.

Tyson v. State, 766 N.E.2d 715, 718 (Ind. 2002) (quoting Hernandez v. State, 716 N.E.2d 948, 953 (Ind. 1999) (internal citations omitted).

[20] Mitchell contends the State's evidence concerning the 2013 Conviction was insufficient because the record did not contain enough information to connect him to the conviction. We analyzed this issue in Woodward v. State, 187 N.E.3d 311, 323 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022). There, the State was required to present evidence to prove Woodward was a serious violent felon. Id. at 320. To do so, the State presented a certified copy of a conviction record for a person with the same name and birthdate as Woodward. Id. It also entered into evidence several records related to that conviction such as the charging information, police incident reports with a physical description of the suspect, the trial court's order on the guilty plea, the sentencing order, an abstract of judgment, and the bond record in the case. Id. Finally, the State provided a video recording of Mitchell's statement to police in the case for which he was being tried in which Woodward admitted he “was not allowed to possess firearms and that he would be in substantial trouble if caught possessing a firearm.” Id. at 321-2. The State argued the video recording was additional evidence outside of the certified conviction record that proved Woodward was a serious violent felon because the video demonstrated Woodward had a “subjective awareness” that he was not allowed to possess firearms. Id. at 322. We disagreed. Id. We held Woodward's awareness that he was prohibited from possessing a firearm did not prove that prohibition stemmed from any specific crime and thus the video was not sufficient to prove Woodward was the person who committed the prior conviction the State alleged. Id.

[21] We then considered the documentary evidence provided by the State regarding that prior conviction. Id. at 321. In our analysis, we first noted the longstanding precedent that a person's name and date of birth were insufficient to prove they are the person in prior conviction records. Id. Therefore, we noted that the State was required to present additional evidence outside of Woodward's name and date of birth to link Woodward to the prior conviction records. Id. We analyzed the additional records, which included

(1) the charging information from a 2007 incident for which Zachary A. Woodward ․ DOB: 10-26-1988 was charged with, among other things, dealing in a Schedule IV controlled substance, then a Class C felony; (2) the probable cause affidavit underlying that charge, complete with police incident reports; (3) the attendant guilty plea, dated November 20, 2008; (4) the trial court's order on the guilty plea; (5) the pertinent sentencing order; (6) the abstract of judgment; and (7) the bond record. Furthermore, the police incident reports included the 2007 offender's height, weight, ethnicity, eye color, hair color, and social security number.

Id. at 320-1) (internal citations to the record omitted). In holding these records were not sufficient to prove Woodward was the person referenced in the prior conviction documents, we noted the State provided no corroborating evidence that the person in those documents was Woodward, such as testimony that the person described in the police incident reports matched Woodward's description or that the social security number on the records matched Woodward's social security number. Id. As we rejected the sufficiency of the video interview and the certified prior conviction record, we reversed the trial court's determination that Woodward was a serious violent felon because the State did not present evidence independent of the name and birthdate on the certified conviction record to prove Woodward was the person listed on the certified conviction record. Id. at 323.

[22] However, in the instant case, the State presented evidence beyond the certified conviction documents we found insufficient in Woodward. Mitchell's BMV record included not only Mitchell's name and date of birth, but also his history of addresses. The address listed for Mitchell in the documents related to the 2013 Conviction matched Mitchell's address listed in the BMV record for that same timeframe. This additional piece of corroborating information provided supporting evidence by which the jury could infer Mitchell was the person on the certified conviction record. Mitchell's argument that the BMV record was insufficient corroborating information to prove his identity is an invitation for us to reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do. Teising, 226 N.E.3d at 783. We therefore conclude the State presented sufficient evidence Mitchell was the same person as the defendant with the 2013 Conviction. See contra Payne, 96 N.E.3d at 613 (after the trial court rejected the State's evidence of a plea agreement that contained Payne's alleged signature, the evidence was insufficient to prove Payne was a serious violent felon because the only remaining evidence presented was a certified copy of a conviction record bearing a name and date of birth that matched Payne's).

Conclusion

[23] The trial court's failure to read and distribute final jury instructions during the habitual offender phase was error, but not fundamental error, and the State presented sufficient evidence that Mitchell was the person listed in the records for the 2013 conviction. Accordingly, we affirm Mitchell's adjudication as a habitual offender.

[24] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-50-2-8(d).

2.   Ind. Code § 35-48-4-6.1(a).

3.   Ind. Code § 31-44.1-3-1 (2012).

4.   Mitchell does not challenge the evidence supporting the 2021 Conviction and 2019 Conviction.

May, Judge.

Judges Tavitas and DeBoer concur. Tavitas, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.