IN RE: H.W. (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] T.W. (“Mother”) appeals the trial court's adjudication of her six children— H.W., E.W., S.W., B.W., O.W., and V.W. (“the Children”)—as Children in Need of Services (“CHINS”) and the imposition of certain requirements in the dispositional order. We restate the issues as the following three issues:

I. Whether the Department of Child Services (“DCS”) used improper procedures when removing the Children;

II. Whether there was sufficient evidence the Children were CHINS; and

III. Whether there was a lack of record support for certain dispositional requirements imposed upon Mother.

[2] We conclude Mother did not establish error in the removal procedures and that sufficient evidence supported the order adjudicating the Children as CHINS. However, because the dispositional order contained several requirements that did not relate to actual concerns in the CHINS case—such as requirements related to food, housing, and education—we reverse those unsupported requirements and remand for entry of a corrected dispositional order.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Mother is the biological mother of the Children. D.W. (“Father”) is the biological father of the two youngest children, O.W. (born October 2020) and V.W. (born April 2023), and the adoptive father of the four older children, H.W. (born October 2011), E.W. (born November 2012), S.W. (born April 2014), and B.W (born August 2015).¹ Before O.W. and V.W. were born, the four oldest children were involved in CHINS cases that led to their placement in foster care from April 2017 until September 2019. Father was in the household at the time. DCS became involved due to Father's physical abuse of the Children, and the case later revealed evidence of domestic violence between Father and Mother. The CHINS cases closed in September 2019 when the family was reunified. Thereafter, Father adopted the four oldest children.

[4] Beginning in 2020, H.W. received regular mental health treatment at LifeSpring. H.W. was diagnosed with conduct disorder, disruptive mood dysregulation disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, ADHD, and PTSD. The PTSD related to H.W. having witnessed domestic violence in the past. Ashley Wilson, a LifeSpring therapist (“Therapist Wilson”), worked with H.W. from July 2020 until mid-February 2024. Therapist Wilson was off work for a few months and resumed working with H.W. in May 2024. In 2021, Therapist Wilson recommended “wraparound services” for then-ten-year-old H.W., which would be more intensive, holistic services with weekly counseling, weekly case management, and a dedicated wraparound facilitator. H.W. ultimately did not receive those additional services. At times, H.W. engaged in self-harming behaviors. In November 2023, Therapist Wilson wrote a written recommendation that H.W. was “in need of residential or long[-]term inpatient care to address behaviorial and mental health concerns,” explaining that H.W. was “unable to function in the home or in the school setting at th[at] time” and was “destructive and physically aggressive towards siblings in the home[,] causing bodily harm.” Ex. Vol. 5. p. 66. Therapist Wilson wrote that Mother “ha[d] been supplied with a residential list at th[at] time and [was] in need of help finding placement for [H.W.]” Id. H.W. ultimately did not receive residential care. At that time, Father was working in Maryland while Mother was the Children's primary caregiver. Father began working in Maryland in the middle of 2023. Father's schedule was such that he would typically return every six to twelve weeks, staying for four days before returning to Maryland.

[5] In February 2024, Mother called LifeSpring to report that H.W. was cleaning the floor with bleach when ten-month-old V.W. crawled on the floor, got bleach in her mouth, and began choking. Mother said H.W. “didn't do anything” and just sat on the couch and threw “a fit.” Tr. Vol. 1 p. 10. Mother thought matters with H.W. “would escalate into something more[.]” Id. Mother also told school administration that H.W. “gave the baby bleach.” Id. at 142. In late February 2024, Mother and H.W. argued before school. The argument related to school lunch. That morning, Mother pulled H.W.’s hair and took H.W. “to the ground.” Id. at 38. When Mother later took H.W. to school, H.W. refused to get out of the car. The incident “resulted in an intervention at the school and ultimately [H.W.’s] ․ placement” at Valle Vista, a residential mental health facility. Id. H.W. was placed at Valle Vista from February 28 to March 5, 2024, with H.W. receiving a medication adjustment. As H.W. was about to be discharged, Mother was late for the discharge planning session. Staff called Mother to obtain a “new ETA” and Mother was “extremely rude and disrespectful of staff's time,” hanging up on them. Ex. Vol. 2 p. 107.

[6] On March 6, 2024, the day after H.W. returned from Valle Vista, Mother and H.W. engaged in a physical altercation at home. Mother and H.W. provided somewhat different accounts of what happened. According to H.W., Mother asked her to go to her room and H.W. refused. The two argued, and H.W. went to her bedroom after Mother's male friend told her to do so. Mother then entered the bedroom, told H.W. to get up, and said “something to the effect of, [‘]you don't deserve a bed.[’]” Tr. Vol. 1 p. 100. Mother was holding a bottle of water, which she threw at H.W. At that point, H.W. became “furious” and kicked Mother. Id. The two “started fist fighting,” exchanging blows. Id. The other five children were in the residence, where they were “kind of in and out” during the altercation. Id. at 101. Eleven-year-old S.W. tried to intervene, yelling at Mother and H.W. to stop fighting. S.W. was inadvertently struck in the face when H.W. tried to strike Mother, with S.W. sustaining a black eye. As the fight continued, H.W. threw a portable heater at Mother that hit eight-year-old B.W.’s leg instead. Mother pinned H.W. down on the ground and was on top of her, holding her face down, which resulted in H.W. receiving a “goose egg” on her forehead. Id. H.W. also sustained a bloody nose. Later, H.W. reported that the physical altercation with Mother “wasn't necessarily uncommon” and that she felt “very targeted” by Mother. Id. at 101–02. H.W. specifically reported feeling targeted since the previous CHINS matter, at which point Mother made her feel “very isolated[.]” Id. at 132.

[7] The next day, Mother called LifeSpring to report the altercation. LifeSpring mobile crisis specialists, Sarah Clark and Jessica Higdon (collectively, “the Crisis Specialists”), responded to the home. Mother recounted the events and told the Crisis Specialists that H.W. had recently returned from Valle Vista, had a medication change, and had a history of self-harm. Mother said H.W. had been “upset because she wanted to have friends come over” and that H.W. “started a fight ․ to the point where ․ Mother had to become physical with her” and “had to tackle [H.W.] to the floor.” Tr. Vol. 1 p. 11. Mother said H.W. threw a water bottle at her “and she raised her hand to block it and the bottle bounced off of her arm and ․ must have hit [H.W.],” who “proceeded to attack her.” Id. Mother said she called law enforcement but was told “it [was] not [their] problem that [Mother] cannot parent [her] children correctly” and that they “d[id not] have time to keep coming out there and messing with this.” Id. at 13.

[8] The Crisis Specialists observed a laceration on H.W.’s eyebrow and a bleeding cut on her wrist, which H.W. was actively picking at. They believed H.W. needed immediate medical treatment. H.W. kept saying “nobody cares about her,” using language the Crisis Specialists felt indicated H.W. “needed to be evaluated.” Id. at 12. H.W. did not want to go to the hospital because she felt medical providers would “drug her up and then send her back home.” Id. at 64. The Crisis Specialists expressed “with great concern” that Mother “need[ed] to take [H.W.] to the ER, if at all possible[.]” Id. at 16. Mother refused to take H.W. to the hospital but told the Crisis Specialists she “was going to the ER to get documentation and pictures taken” of S.W. and B.W because Mother “wanted it to be documented[,] ․ what [H.W.] did.” Id. at 13. The Crisis Specialists explored the possibility of having someone else care for H.W. so “things could cool down,” however, Mother said H.W. “had burnt all of her bridges” and there was nowhere else she could stay. Id. at 15. When the Crisis Specialists offered to take H.W. to the hospital, Mother said it was “not worth the fight” if H.W. did not want to go. Id. at 16. The Crisis Specialists left, went to the police station, and obtained an “Emergency Detaining Order which would enforce [sic] ․ [H.W.] to go to the Emergency Room.” Id.

[9] Meanwhile, DCS Family Case Manager Brett Lawrence (“FCM Lawrence”) was assigned to assess a report involving concerns about a child in the home with “suicidal ideations” and “self-harm.” Id. at 239. Officer Jennie Dotts of the French Lick Police Department (“Officer Dotts”) also responded to the home. When FCM Lawrence arrived at the home, Mother was already at the hospital with “a few of [the] [C]hildren,” but H.W. was present. Id. FCM Lawrence was familiar with the family from a prior assessment and knew H.W. had a history of suicidal ideation and self-harming. FCM Lawrence said the initial plan was for Officer Dotts to take H.W. to the hospital for evaluation, with Mother agreeing to this plan. During the investigation, FCM Lawrence remained in contact with the director of the local DCS office, Crystal Howell (“Director Howell”). At one point, FCM Lawrence sent Director Howell photographs of H.W.’s injuries and relayed that the other children had witnessed the altercation between Mother and H.W. In response, Director Howell authorized the removal of all six of the Children, identifying, among other things, “the endangering environment”—specifically, the “physical altercation ․ between [Mother] and [H.W.]” that resulted in a “very clear ․ bump” on H.W.’s forehead—and that there were cuts on H.W.’s body, but Mother “was not taking [H.W.] to receive medical treatment[.]” Id. at 98.

[10] During the removal process, there was confusion about whether a court order existed for the Children's detention. FCM Lawrence recalled receiving a call from Director Howell that someone had spoken to a judge and there was a court order to detain the Children. FCM Lawrence said he was “in shock” when he heard about a potential court order authorizing removal, wondering: “[W]hy are we removing all six (6) kids?.” Id. at 247, 249. FCM Lawrence later learned there was not actually a court order at that time. Similarly, Officer Dotts understood that DCS had obtained a removal order but was “not sure where it came from” and later discovered there was no court order at the time of removal. Id. at 220. Director Howell later testified about the confusion, clarifying that she did not tell Officer Dotts there was a court order and thought “there was a miscommunication” where Officer Dotts “did not hear [her] correctly,” noting “[t]here was a lot happening” at the time. Id. at 106. Eventually, Mother returned from the hospital with the younger children

[11] When Mother learned DCS was removing the Children, she became angry and yelled at Officer Dotts and FCM Lawrence. While H.W. was standing in the driveway, Mother pointed at H.W. and said, “you can have that one,” which H.W. heard. Id. at 86. Mother was “verbally blaming everything on [H.W.],” who was “visibly upset” and walked across the road to her grandfather's truck. Id. at 89–90. After the Children were removed, Director Howell separately interviewed H.W., S.W., B.W., and E.W., who used the term “Dad” to refer to Father. Id. at 103. B.W. said the violent altercation between H.W. and Mother “was scary,” and she reported “a lot of fighting” between Mother and Father. Id. at 102, 103. B.W. recounted one violent episode where Father pressed Mother's face to the floor with his foot and “kicked it,” spraying blood everywhere. Id. at 103. B.W. said that Mother “went to the [d]octor and got her nose fixed,” and S.W. “got in trouble” for trying to intervene, with Father taking her phone away. Id. B.W. reported that, at times, the Children were sent outside while Father and Mother fought. On those occasions, B.W. would “tr[y] to watch in the window” because “[s]he was scared [Mother] would get hurt.” Id. S.W. also told Director Howell about the “broken nose incident,” and reported feeling scared. Id. at 104. In general, S.W. was “fearful of ․ Father” and “very much ․ worried about [Mother].” Id. Director Howell deduced that the domestic violence against Mother took place after the prior CHINS matters were closed because the Children did not have phones during the CHINS case.

[12] The Children were placed in foster care. Before long, Dr. Linda McIntire (“Pscyhologist”) evaluated H.W., B.W., and S.W., and observed that S.W. and B.W. exhibited symptoms of “a lot of trauma.” Id. at 51. B.W. exhibited anxiety, depression, and “multiple elevations that were indicative of Sypothology [sic] and PTSD.” Id. at 41. B.W. also exhibited “overt dissociation,” which Psychologist explained is “a splintering of someone's conscious experience” and “kind of fragmentation of their memory and[/]or their sensory experience.” Id. at 41–42. Psychologist said “distortive disorders are always a product of ․ trauma” in that the disorder reflects “psychological breakdown” related to the “inability to cope with fear inducing or terrifying or painful situations.” Id. at 42. Psychologist recommended that eight-year-old B.W. undergo a comprehensive evaluation and receive ongoing counseling, emphasizing that B.W. would not be able to move forward and heal in an environment where physical altercations occurred. The evaluation of S.W. revealed similar results. S.W. also had elevated levels of “Sexual Distress or Sexual Pre-occupation” such that, although Psychologist had not “seen anything in the records that substantiate[d]” sexual abuse, Psychologist was concerned about the possibility of sexual trauma. Id. at 43–44. Psychologist testified in favor of a “close examination within a safe trusted relationship” to help identify “where the sexual distress came from.” Id. at 44.

[13] As for H.W., Psychologist's evaluation revealed that H.W.’s symptoms of anxiety and depression appeared to be “secondary ․ to the PTSD that was pretty significant in her testing.” Id. at 39. Psychologist said H.W. was “significantly self-harming and had [done so] right before [Psychologist] saw her,” which H.W. acknowledged. Id. at 40. H.W. said Mother had been abusing her “for years[.]” Id. at 36. H.W. described the argument with Mother related to school lunch that ultimately led to H.W.’s recent hospitalization at Valle Vista. H.W. reported that Father once hit her with a belt twenty times, bruising her “whole bottom so [she] couldn't sit.” Id. at 37. H.W. said that Father struck other children with his hands, but “she g[ot] hit with objects.” Id. at 38. H.W. relayed that Father had “never really been nice to [her], maybe once or twice.” Id. at 37. H.W. felt that Father “had corrupted Mo[ther],” and H.W. wanted “the old Mo[ther] back.” Id. H.W. said she “doesn't believe [Father] wants her” and that Father had “share[d] his statements” to that effect, telling H.W. he wished she were dead or in foster care. Id. at 38. Following the evaluation of H.W., Psychologist recommended that H.W. receive ongoing mental health services, including medication, therapy, and behavioral support. Psychologist emphasized H.W. needed a supportive environment with a caregiver who would respond appropriately to her behaviors without escalation, which could exacerbate her mental health issues.

[14] On March 11, 2024, DCS requested authorization to file CHINS petitions and take the Children into custody, filing a preliminary inquiry report along with a completed state form that was called “Taking Custody of a Child without a Verbal or Written Court Order: Description of Circumstances.” Appellee's App. Vol. 2 pp. 24–26. The trial court granted DCS's request, prompting DCS to file CHINS petitions later that day. Also on the same day, the court held a hearing and found adequate grounds to detain the Children. On June 3, 2024, DCS petitioned to admit the Children's out-of-court statements as evidence. Mother objected. Following a hearing, the trial court granted the petition.

[15] The trial court conducted fact-finding hearings on June 18, October 4, and October 7, 2024. Around the time of the first hearing date, Father began working locally in Indiana. At the conclusion of the June 18 hearing, Mother asked that the youngest five children be returned to the family home, such that only H.W. would remain in foster care. DCS objected, arguing Mother and Father had not engaged in parenting services or individual therapy, and the children witnessed violence in the home. The trial court granted Mother's motion only as to E.W., V.W., and O.W., such that H.W., S.W., and B.W. remained in foster care.

[16] The fact-finding hearings included evidence that H.W. worked with Therapist Wilson in June 2024, stopping therapy with Therapist Wilson because H.W. was placed in a foster home in a different county. As of early July 2024, there were no longer reports H.W. was engaging in self-harming. Therapist Wilson also worked with E.W. to address anxiety, and he was making progress. Since July 2024, Cheyenne Poe (“Poe”) had supervised eight visits where B.W. and S.W. spent time with Mother and Father in the family home. Poe observed that B.W. and S.W. seemed bonded to Mother and Father and did not appear fearful of either parent. A different visit supervisor also observed no concerns with bonding or fear and did not identify other concerns during the visits.

[17] Mother testified that she did not believe H.W.’s therapy had been beneficial, partly because Mother thought H.W. “needed medication that at her age she was not able to take.” Tr. Vol. 2 p. 26. Mother denied that she punched H.W. during their altercation and denied that the Children had witnessed domestic violence between Mother and Father. Mother also spoke about her personal experience with depression in 2020. When asked if engaging in individual therapy might be necessary to improve her relationship with H.W., Mother responded: “Are you trying to say that I have something wrong with me? I don't believe that I need therapy. I think that I've [sic] very well adjusted.” Id. at 45. Mother expressed some willingness to engage in therapy with H.W. “if [her] and [H.W.’s] relationship needed work[.]” Id. Mother did not consent to H.W. obtaining a psychological evaluation through a DCS provider because Mother suspected DCS might “twist things” and that DCS was “pushing this case on [her] mentally ill daughter.” Id. at 47. As to Father, he testified that H.W.’s issues began when she returned home after the first CHINS case. He did not believe H.W.’s mental health treatment had been effective. Father recalled that, on at least four occasions, the police came to the home due to matters involving H.W. Father agreed something needed to change to avoid having the police come to the home. Father denied engaging in domestic violence toward Mother. He also denied physical abuse of the Children.

[18] At the conclusion of the fact-finding hearings, the trial court orally adjudicated the Children as CHINS. In a subsequent written order, the trial court specifically found that the physical and mental condition of each child was “seriously impaired or endangered as a result of [their] parents’ inability, refusal, or neglect to provide [them] with appropriate care,” adding that the Children were endangered by Mother's and Father's “chaotic and erratic parenting.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 p. 147. Regarding “chaotic parenting,” the court referred to the child hearsay proceedings and noted Mother and Father equipped two of the Children with recording devices “prior to undergoing their child hearsay evaluations.” Id. at 148. The court further found that “[p]roper and appropriate discipline is essential to a child's over-all well-being,” but that Mother's and Father's “chaotic discipline, parenting, and interactions with the [C]hildren negatively impact[ed] [their] well-being.” Id. at 147. The trial court expressed “serious concerns for [the] parents’ erratic behaviors and parenting style, particularly toward [H.W.]” and found that Mother's and Father's “attitude and behavior toward [H.W.] [was] very odd and inappropriate.” Id. The trial court further found that some of the Children “ha[d] expressed fear of Father” and that they witnessed “violence in the home between Mother and Father, and between Mother and [H.W.]” Id. The trial court added that Mother's and Father's “reaction towards [H.W.]’s behavior [was] alarming and chaotic” and that Mother and Father were “unwilling to participate in services [they] need and instead desire[d] to only do things [they] chose.” Id. at 147–48.

[19] Ahead of the dispositional hearing held on October 31, 2024, DCS filed a predispositional report recommending that Mother complete parenting and psychological assessments, meet with medical and psychiatric personnel, participate in individual therapy and home-based counseling with the Children, refrain from committing domestic violence, participate in and complete all recommendations as a result of any domestic violence assessments or programs, and ultimately follow all service providers’ recommendations, timely enrolling in recommended programs. Mother objected to these recommendations. In addition to these challenged recommendations, DCS recommended that Mother be ordered to meet her own medical and mental health needs, meet the Children's medical and mental health needs, maintain safe and suitable housing, maintain a legal source of income, ensure that the Children are properly fed and clothed, and ensure that the Children attend school.

[20] At the dispositional hearing, the trial court said it was adopting DCS's recommendations “in total” because they adequately addressed the court's concerns. Tr. Vol. 2 p. 78. The trial court entered its dispositional order on November 1, 2023. See Appellant's App. Vol. 2 pp. 149–55. Mother now appeals. After initiating this appeal, Mother consented to H.W.’s maternal grandfather being appointed as H.W.’s guardian, and H.W. was placed in grandfather's care in March 2025. See Appellee's App. Vol. 2 pp. 70–72.

Discussion and Decision

I. Removal Procedures

[21] Mother argues DCS “wrongfully removed [the Children] without a court order and deceived law enforcement in doing so.” Appellant's Br. p. 25.² Mother ultimately argues the removal procedures offended her right to due process. Mother directs us to Indiana Code section 31-34-2-3(a), which authorizes the emergency removal of a child from a home, without a court order, so long as:

(1) it appears that the child's physical or mental condition will be seriously impaired or seriously endangered if the child is not immediately taken into custody;

(2) there is not a reasonable opportunity to obtain an order of the court; and

(3) consideration for the safety of the child precludes the immediate use of family services to prevent removal of the child.

Moreover, Indiana Code section 31-34-2-6(a)(3) provides that, if DCS conducts an emergency removal, it must file a document concerning “why [it] is unable to obtain a court order and what steps have been taken to obtain a court order.”

[22] On appeal, Mother disputes whether the “evidence justified [emergency] removal” under the statutory framework. Appellant's Br. p. 25. But there was evidence that, when the Crisis Specialists arrived, H.W. had a visible injury on her forehead from the altercation between Mother and H.W., and H.W. had cuts on her wrists that were indicative of self-harming. Upon seeing these physical injuries and hearing H.W. engage in negative self-talk, the Crisis Specialists strongly recommended to Mother that H.W. receive immediate medial care. H.W. did not wish to go to the hospital, and Mother refused to take H.W., instead indicating she would take the younger children to the hospital to document what H.W. had done. Further, there was evidence that the five younger children were in the home during the violent altercation. S.W. got a black eye trying to intervene, and B.W. was hit by a thrown appliance.

[23] Mother emphasizes that Officer Dotts and FCM Lawrence were confused about whether DCS obtained a court order authorizing removal. However, a court order is not required for emergency removal, and the apparent confusion with respect to the existence of a court order is not material to the question of whether DCS met the statutory requirements for emergency removal. Further, to the extent Mother argues the evidence of confusion indicates DCS was being deceptive about the existence of a court order, these arguments distill to a request to reweigh evidence, which we must decline. See, e.g., D.C. v. J.A.C., 977 N.E.2d 951, 953 (Ind. 2012) (reiterating that “in family law matters, trial courts are afforded considerable deference”). Notably, Director Howell testified that any confusion was unintentional, acknowledging that the circumstances might have led to miscommunication or misunderstanding in that “[t]here was a lot happening” with multiple authorities responding to the emergency. Tr. Vol. 1 p. 106. Furthermore, at the detention hearing, the trial court approved the Children's removal and detention, and the hearing was timely held the same day DCS initiated the CHINS proceedings. Based on the foregoing, Mother has not established any error—statutory or otherwise—in the emergency removal of the Children.

II. CHINS Adjudication

[24] Mother challenges the sufficiency of evidence that the Children were CHINS. To establish that a child is a CHINS, DCS must prove by a preponderance of the evidence the child met the statutory definition. Ind. Code § 31-34-12-3. A preponderance of the evidence means the greater weight of the evidence presented. Kishpaugh v. Odegard, 17 N.E.3d 363, 373 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).

[25] There is no statutory requirement to enter findings supporting a CHINS adjudication. See In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d 1283, 1287 (Ind. 2014). However, where—as here—the trial court makes sua sponte findings supporting its CHINS adjudication, those findings control only as to the issues or matters they cover, with a general judgment standard applicable to any other issue or matter. Ind. Trial Rule 52(D). Under a general judgment standard, a reviewing court will affirm on any legal theory supported by the evidence. Yanoff v. Muncy, 688 N.E.2d 1259, 1262 (Ind. 1997). When the findings control, we look to whether the evidence supported the findings and the findings supported the judgment, reversing only if the judgment was clearly erroneous. In re D.J., 68 N.E.3d 574, 578 (Ind. 2017). A judgment is clearly erroneous if the evidence did not support the findings or the court applied the wrong legal standard to properly found facts. Id. In conducting our review, we consider only the evidence that supported the judgment, together with reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. Id. We will not “reweigh evidence or judge witness credibility.” Id. at 577–78.

[26] Indiana Code section 31-34-1-1 provides that a minor child is a CHINS if:

(1) the child's physical or mental condition is seriously impaired or seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or neglect of the child's parent, guardian, or custodian to supply the child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education, or supervision:

(A) when the parent, guardian, or custodian is financially able to do so; or

(B) due to the failure, refusal, or inability of the parent, guardian, or custodian to seek financial or other reasonable means to do so; and

(2) the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that:

(A) the child is not receiving; and

(B) is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the court.

Our Supreme Court synthesized this statute, explaining that DCS is ultimately required to prove three elements: “(1) that the parent's actions or inactions have seriously endangered the child, (2) that the child's needs are unmet, and (3) that those needs are unlikely to be met without State coercion.” In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d at 1287. Notably, the purpose of a CHINS adjudication is to protect a child, not to punish a parent. In re N.E., 919 N.E.2d 102, 106 (Ind. 2010). In other words, a CHINS adjudication is not a determination of parental fault. Id. at 103. Rather, a CHINS adjudication reflects that a child currently needs services and is unlikely to receive those services without court intervention. Id. at 106.

[27] In this case, prior CHINS proceedings revealed evidence of domestic violence in the home, and DCS presented evidence that, after prior CHINS proceedings closed, domestic violence persisted in the home. Moreover, there was evidence Mother responded improperly, and at times violently, to parenting challenges—insulting H.W., throwing a water bottle at her, and initiating a fist fight, all while five younger children were present. H.W. had a lump on her head from the violent altercation with Mother. Another child was struck by a portable heater as a result of the altercation; a third child ended up with a black eye. The altercation took place shortly after H.W. returned from residential treatment to stabilize her mental health. Regarding H.W., there was evidence she had significant mental and emotional health needs, among them, primary symptoms of PTSD resulting from witnessing domestic violence. There was also evidence H.W. required ongoing therapy and medication, along with support from an emotionally regulated caregiver who could refrain from escalation and better help H.W. navigate her intense emotions and behavioral responses—including negative self-talk and self-harming. The evidence indicated that Mother was not yet equipped to support H.W. in the ways she needed, and that Mother's behaviors had a detrimental effect on H.W's mental health. Notably, H.W. reported that Mother engaged in scapegoating behaviors and generally blamed H.W. for issues in the household. Mother's concerning treatment of H.W. was evidenced by Mother's response to emergency removal procedures, when Mother pointed to H.W. and—within earshot of H.W.—told authorities they could take “that one[.]” Tr. Vol. 1 p. 86. Mother's conduct was especially concerning because of H.W.’s history of self-harm and suicidal ideation. There was also evidence that, in addition to H.W.’s significant mental health needs, two other children required psychological intervention. These were three of the four oldest children; the youngest children—O.W. and V.W.—were quite young when DCS intervened, both under the age of four.

[28] Collectively, the foregoing evidence supported the order adjudicating the Children CHINS, indicating that (1) Mother's actions or inactions seriously endangered the emotional and physical welfare of the Children, (2) the Children had unmet needs—among them, to live in a home where a caregiver would not provoke a physical fight with a child—and (3) the Children's needs were unlikely to be met without State coercion, in that violence in the household persisted after a prior CHINS case was closed. Indeed, as of the fact-finding hearings, Mother had not demonstrated meaningful insight or changes to her parenting approaches to obviate concerns of escalating responses to parenting challenges that ultimately precipitated ongoing violence in the household. The violent altercation between Mother and H.W. frightened S.W. and B.W., who were also fearful of Father because they witnessed him break Mother's nose.

[29] Mother argues reversal is warranted based on V.H. v. Indiana Department of Child Services, 967 N.E.2d 1066 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), where this court reversed a CHINS determination when a child had behavioral issues, the child was violent with the parent, and the parent called for help with the behavioral issues. V.H. is distinguishable in that there was evidence the child was the aggressor and the parent had been proactive in trying to address the child's needs. Id. at 1069, 1072–73. Here, the evidence favorable to the judgment indicated that Mother initiated the altercation by confronting H.W. in her bedroom after an argument, telling H.W. she “di[d not] deserve a bed,” and then throwing a water bottle at H.W. Tr. Vol. 1 p. 100. To the extent Mother points out that she contacted LifeSpring the day after the incident, Mother refused to bring in H.W. for health care and later pointed at H.W. and told responding authorities, “[Y]ou can have that one,” which was not indicative of a willingness to proactively address H.W.’s needs. Cf. V.H., 967 N.E.2d at 1072–73. Regarding domestic violence, Mother claims the Children were confused in reporting violence in the household, which Mother argues did not involve Father but instead the biological father of some of the Children. But we must view the evidence favorable to the judgment, which included Director Howell's testimony specifically clarifying that the Children “were talking about domestic violence between who they refer to as Dad in their home,” which was Father. Tr. Vol. 1 p. 131. Mother also directs us to evidence that she tried to address H.W.’s behavioral issues by securing therapy and educational services for H.W. We note, however, that the aim of a CHINS proceeding is not to punish a parent, but instead to protect a child, and there was evidence that, despite any attempt to address H.W.’s underlying needs, problems in the home persisted and escalated to physical violence in front of other children.

[30] Mother also challenges the trial court's characterizations of her parenting as “chaotic and erratic,” arguing this language is vague and unsupported by the evidence. Yet, regardless of the trial court's characterization of Mother's approach to parenting the Children, there was ample evidence that the Children were detrimentally affected by Mother's volatile response to parenting challenges that precipitated a frightening altercation between Mother and H.W.

[31] Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the judgment, we conclude that the preponderance of the evidence supported the CHINS adjudication.³

III. Dispositional Order

[32] Mother challenges several of the dispositional requirements, arguing the requirements lacked evidentiary support and were improper boilerplate services unrelated to the facts and circumstances that led to the CHINS adjudication. In fashioning a dispositional order, a trial court generally has “broad discretion in determining what programs and services in which a parent is required to participate[.]” In re K.D., 962 N.E.2d 1249, 1258 (Ind. 2012) (quoting In re A.C., 905 N.E.2d 456, 464 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009)). At the same time, the requirements “must relate to some behavior or circumstances that [were] revealed by the evidence.” Id. (quoting In re A.C., 905 N.E.2d at 464). In general, we review dispositional orders for an abuse of discretion. See In re R.G., 130 N.E.3d 1171, 1180 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied. An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances, or if the decision reflects that the court misinterpreted the law. Auto. Fin. Corp. v. Liu, 250 N.E.3d 406, 410 (Ind. 2025).

[33] We begin by addressing Mother's challenge to requirements related to meeting her own personal medical and mental health needs, meeting the Children's medical and mental health needs, completing parenting and psychological assessments, meeting with medical and psychiatric personnel, participating in domestic violence services, individual therapy and family therapy, and generally following resulting recommendations, including taking any prescribed medications. Mother argues these were improper “boilerplate” services and that, “aside from general statements by the court about ‘chaotic parenting’ particularly towards H.W., no evidence demonstrated that the [C]hildren were parented inappropriately or required mental health intervention.” Appellant's Br. p. 31. Mother also questions the record support for requiring her to participate in a psychological assessment, claiming the evidence related to Mother's mental health was limited to “Mother's statement that she had never been told that she needed help.” Id. At times, Mother again directs us to V.H., arguing that she “exhausted her resources getting H.W. treatment,” id., and that, “[a]lthough the record is clear that H.W. required mental health treatment, there is no evidence that [Mother] needed court intervention to provide her with the necessary care, treatment, or rehabilitation that she required.” Id. at 32. Further, Mother challenges the propriety of ordering mental health services for any of the Children, and she claims services related to domestic violence were unsupported because “[t]here [was] no evidence that the [C]hildren have ever witnessed domestic violence between Mother and Father” and that “service providers in the home on a regular basis” did not witness violence. Id. at 33.

[34] There was record support for these challenged requirements. The evidence established that Mother had a volatile response to parenting challenges that culminated in a physical altercation with H.W. witnessed by other children. The record also indicated that Mother experienced depression in the past. Furthermore, there was evidence of Mother's alarming conduct, behaviors, and escalated responses, which included provoking a fist fight with H.W. and later refusing to bring in H.W. for medical care when H.W. had a lump on her head and cuts on her wrists. Mother also lacked insight into the mental health needs of the younger children, who exhibited signs of trauma. Based on the evidence presented, there were sufficient grounds to order assessments and therapeutic services for Mother to explore any mental health component to her behavior. Similarly, although Mother challenges the propriety of any mental health interventions for the Children, there was record support for these aspects of the trial court's order in light of evidence three of the Children needed ongoing therapeutic intervention. As to Mother's reliance on V.H., as earlier discussed, the case is distinguishable because in that case—unlike the case at hand—there was no indication that the parent provoked a fight with a child, lacked insight into any child's mental health needs, or otherwise engaged in scapegoating behaviors directed toward a child with a history of suicidal ideation and self-harming. Furthermore, although Mother argues domestic violence services were unsupported, she declines to address evidence that multiple children reported witnessing violence between Father and Mother, with B.W. and S.W. reporting an incident where Father kicked Mother in the face and broke Mother's nose.

[35] Having identified sufficient evidence supporting the foregoing aspects of the dispositional order, we turn to the requirements set forth in subsections “j,” “k,” and “l,” of the order, which included that Mother maintain a lawful source of income, provide adequate food and shelter for the Children, and ensure that the Children attend school. Mother argues the requirements are unsupported because there was no evidence she was neglectful in providing food, shelter, or basic resources, nor was there evidence of educational neglect or income instability. On appeal, DCS “acknowledges that [it] did not remove [the] Children due to the condition of the home or due to the Children not attending school, or issues related to Mother's income.” Appellee's Br. p. 48. However, DCS argues Mother waived any challenge to these requirements because it recommended the requirements in the predispositional report and, although Mother challenged certain aspects of DCS's recommendations at the dispositional hearing, Mother did not specifically challenge the requirements the trial court ultimately adopted in subsections “j”, “k”, and “l”. In short, DCS argues Mother's challenges are improperly brought “for the first time on appeal.” Appellee's Br. 47. But we note that DCS does not identify, nor are we aware of, any requirement that a parent object to recommendations in the predispositional report or challenge specific requirements in the dispositional order through proceedings before the trial court as opposed to through appellate proceedings challenging a final order. Cf. Ind. Trial Rule 59(A) (providing that a motion to correct error is generally “not a prerequisite for appeal”). We therefore proceed to the merits of Mother's challenge to these requirements. Cf. In re Eq.W., 124 N.E.3d 1210, 1214 (Ind. 2019) (noting a general preference to resolve cases on the merits instead of on procedural grounds such as waiver).

[36] As to the merits, we agree with Mother that the evidentiary basis for the CHINS adjudication—i.e., the justification for state intervention—revolved around the Children's unmet need to live in a home free from violence, with a caregiver who did not resort to violence or scapegoating and who was prepared to adequately address their emotional and mental health needs. Although the CHINS order reflected an overall concern about volatile, chaotic parenting, there was no indication Mother's parenting was deficient when it came to meeting the Children's basic needs for food and shelter, or ensuring they attended school. Absent record support the Children's needs were unmet in these ways, we conclude the challenged requirements in sections “j,” “k,” and “l” of the dispositional order were improper under the circumstances. See Appellant's App. Vol. 2 p. 150–51 (imposing requirements to, among other things, “[m]aintain suitable, safe[,] and stable housing with adequate bedding, functional utilities, adequate supplies of food and food preparation facilities,” “maintain a legal and stable source of income,” and ensure that school-age children were “attending school” or “participating in an approved educational program”). We therefore reverse the requirements set forth in sections “j,” “k,” and “l,” and remand with instructions to enter a corrected dispositional order.

Conclusion

[37] Mother has not identified a defect in the removal procedures, nor has she identified error in the CHINS adjudication or dispositional requirements related to the reasons for DCS's involvement in the case. However, due to a lack of record support for dispositional requirements in subsections “j,” “k,” and “l” related to Mother's income or other basic needs of the Children, we reverse those requirements and remand for entry of a corrected dispositional order.

[38] Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

[39] I concur with the majority in all but its decision to remove that part of the dispositional order that requires Mother to maintain a lawful source of income, provide adequate food and shelter for the Children, and ensure that the Children attend school. Mother objects to these components of the order, citing cases in which programming was ordered for alleged criminal conduct that was neither admitted nor proved. These cases are easily distinguishable from the case before us.

[40] The facts make clear that the circumstances in this household that resulted in the Children's removal were chaotic and volatile and included domestic violence in the presence of the Children.

[41] It is always hoped that CHINS removals are temporary. These components of the dispositional order seek to ensure stability in the home to which the Children might be returned and are, therefore, both appropriate and necessary.

[42] I would therefore affirm the trial court's judgment in all respects.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Father does not participate on appeal.

2.   Subsequent to the alleged improper removal procedures, E.W., V.W., and O.W. were returned to Mother's care and Mother consented to H.W.’s placement with her maternal grandfather. DCS argues these events preclude Mother from challenging the emergency removal of E.W., V.W., O.W., and H.W. We ultimately decline to address DCS's argument, preferring in this instance to instead address the merits of Mother's challenge to the emergency removal procedures. Cf. In re Eq.W., 124 N.E.3d 1201, 1214 (Ind. 2019) (noting that appellate courts generally prefer to resolve cases on the merits instead of on procedural grounds).

3.   For the first time in her reply brief, Mother challenges the sufficiency of evidence supporting a finding that Mother and Father equipped two of the Children with recording devices before the child hearsay evaluations. In general, a party waives issues presented for the first time in a reply brief. Monroe Guar. Ins. Co. v. Magwerks Corp., 829 N.E.2d 968, 977 (Ind. 2005). In any case, having identified independent evidence supporting the order adjudicating the Children as CHINS, we do not further address this finding. See In re B.J., 879 N.E.2d 7, 20 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (regarding even an erroneous finding as “merely harmless surplusage” when there was record support for other findings that provided “ample support” for the ultimate determination the children were CHINS).

Foley, Judge.

Judge Felix concurs and Mathias concurs and dissents with a separate opinion. Felix, J., concurs. Mathias, J., concurs and dissents, with a separate opinion.