IN RE: the Commitment of D.H. (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] D.H. appeals his involuntary civil commitment and claims it was not supported by sufficient evidence. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On May 13, 2025, forty-six-year-old D.H. was taken by police to the medical psychiatric unit at St. Vincent Hospital after he was found wandering around Carmel. On May 14, 2025, he was transferred to the St. Vincent Stress Center (the “Stress Center”) and was admitted on an application for Emergency Detention which alleged that he had “presented to the hospital as a John Doe. He [was] confused and unable to provide any information.” Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 8. The application was granted on May 20, 2025.

[3] On May 21, 2025, the Stress Center filed a petition, along with a physician's statement, seeking a temporary mental health commitment. The petition alleged that D.H. is suffering from a psychiatric disorder, namely schizophrenia. The petition further alleged that D.H. is gravely disabled due to a substantial impairment or an obvious deterioration of his judgment, reasoning, or behavior that results in his inability to function independently. Specifically, the physician's statement provided:

Patient presented with active psychosis. Is not able to use reality based thinking to make decisions. Believes that he arrived here via a portal. In addition to delusional thoughts[,] patient has auditory hallucinations. Both impair patient's ability to [make] decisions that are appropriate and safe.

Id. at 17.

[4] The court held a hearing on May 29, 2025. The Stress Center presented the testimony of D.H.’s treating physician, Dr. Erika Cornett, and D.H. Dr. Cornett testified that D.H. presented to the hospital as “John Doe,” that they “didn't know who he was” for several days, but “after some medication ․ he was able to tell us his name.” Expedited Transcript Volume I at 5. She testified that D.H. was “extremely impaired” and in “a state of active psychosis,” and when asked where he was from, “he would say Disneyland or from an alien spaceship or something like that.” Id. at 5, 10. She also stated that “he was very disheveled ․ clearly had not bathed or showered” and he was “extremely ill” with “scabies.” Id. Dr. Cornett testified that she diagnosed D.H. with schizophrenia based upon a review of his medical records and her clinical interview with him. Dr. Cornett stated that although D.H. has been “improving” with medication, as of the date of the hearing, he was still experiencing “some psychosis” and was maintaining that “he lives in the television, that his family lives in there as well.” Id. at 7, 11. Dr. Cornett testified that just the day before the hearing D.H. stated that he “wanted to go downtown because he could get to Egypt and then get to his family.” Id. at 7. Dr. Cornett testified that she had given D.H. his cell phone but that he has “been unable to open it” claiming that “his phone only works when he's in the TV.” Id. Dr. Cornett stated that D.H. does not have a stable place to live and no known way of earning income. She opined that D.H. needed long-acting injectable antipsychotic medication, and that she did not believe he would “be capable of being compliant with his medication and treatment” if discharged because he has no insight into his condition and is unable to “grasp” exactly “what's happening.” Id. at 8-9.

[5] D.H. testified, and when asked about his schizophrenia diagnosis, he responded, “Don't think I had schizophrenia. It's just stuff I've seen on the street and stuff chasing people. I had that fear. They were on the street running around out of the ground or somewhere they shouldn't be.” Id. at 20. When asked about his statements to Dr. Cornett regarding living in the television, D.H. confirmed that he is “trying to get back to TV” so that he could “get around people I know and get a job a lot better.” Id. D.H. also stated that he thinks he is “from Egypt” and that his “family might be downtown, somewhere around that area.” Id. at 21. He testified that he could “maybe find [his] family on TV.” Id. D.H. also equated his schizophrenia diagnosis with “just getting hungry” and that prior medications he took “a long time ago” made him “fall on the floor” and caused “plastic ․ [to] run up on [his] leg and g[e]t loose[.]” Id. at 22. D.H. admitted that he has no job, and he became confused when asked about social security disability payments and how he might be able to access those. D.H. stated that he believed he could cook food for himself, but he was unable to explain how he would do so without the proper supplies. When asked if he knows “how to get a bus pass,” D.H. responded affirmatively but then rambled on about irrelevant topics. Id. at 25. When asked by the court if his plan was to “be homeless,” D.H. stated, “[f]or a little bit until I find my family and see what's going on.” Id. at 28.

[6] At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court entered its order granting the petition for involuntary commitment finding that: D.H. suffers from schizophrenia which is a mental illness as defined in Ind. Code § 12-7-2-130; D.H. is gravely disabled as defined by Ind. Code § 12-7-2-96; D.H. is in need of custody, care and treatment at the Stress Center for a period of time not expected to exceed ninety days; such placement is the least restrictive environment suitable for treatment and stabilization as well as protecting D.H.; and that the benefits of the treatment plan outweigh any risks of harm. The court ordered D.H. involuntarily committed to the Stress Center until August 27, 2025, unless discharged prior.

Discussion

[7] In Indiana, an individual who is alleged to be mentally ill and either dangerous or gravely disabled may be temporarily committed to a facility for not more than ninety days. Ind. Code § 12-26-6-1. The petitioning facility is required to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the individual is mentally ill and either dangerous or gravely disabled and detention or commitment of that individual is appropriate. Ind. Code § 12-26-2-5(e). The clear and convincing evidence standard is an intermediate standard of proof greater than a preponderance of the evidence and less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. T.D. v. Eskenazi Health Midtown Cmty. Mental Health Ctr., 40 N.E.3d 507, 510 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). We consider only the evidence favorable to the judgment and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom and do not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses. Id.

[8] “Gravely disabled” means “a condition in which an individual, as a result of mental illness, is in danger of coming to harm because the individual:”

(1) is unable to provide for that individual's food, clothing, shelter, or other essential human needs; or

(2) has a substantial impairment or an obvious deterioration of that individual's judgment, reasoning, or behavior that results in the individual's inability to function independently.

Ind. Code § 12-7-2-96. “Because the definition of grave disability is written in the disjunctive, the evidence needs to support only one of those two prongs for a person to be found gravely disabled.” A.S. v. Ind. Univ. Health Bloomington Hosp., 148 N.E.3d 1135, 1140 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020).

[9] D.H. does not challenge the trial court's finding that he is mentally ill. Rather, he argues the trial court's finding that he is gravely disabled is not supported by clear and convincing evidence. We disagree.

[10] The court heard considerable evidence to support its finding that D.H. is gravely disabled as a result of his mental illness. Dr. Cornett testified at length regarding D.H.’s schizophrenia diagnosis and how his mental illness had caused an obvious deterioration in his judgment, reasoning, or behavior that resulted in his inability to function independently. She testified that, although he was improving, D.H. remained extremely delusional and was still experiencing psychosis as of the morning of the hearing. She stated that she did not believe he was capable of understanding or maintaining his treatment outside of the hospital setting, she was concerned about his ability to make rational decisions, and she believed he would rapidly decompensate both mentally and physically if discharged. Significantly, the court heard D.H.’s testimony, during which he clearly displayed delusional and severely disorganized thinking. He admitted that he was homeless and jobless, and he demonstrated a complete lack of understanding of how to function independently.

[11] Although D.H. attempts to downplay the evidence presented by claiming that there was some evidence that he could complete basic activities of daily living, this amounts to a request for us to reweigh the evidence and reassess witness credibility, which we may not do. Further, unlike the authority relied upon by D.H., this is not a case in which a decision ordering an involuntary commitment was made on the basis of mere “unusual decisions” or “certain behaviors characteristic of a person with [a mental illness],” without the requisite showing that the individual is presently in danger of coming to harm due to a substantial impairment of judgment, reasoning, or behavior resulting in the inability to function independently. See K.F. v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc., 909 N.E.2d 1063, 1067 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (finding insufficient evidence to support commitment because establishment of grave disability required more than just “unusual decisions” or the display of “certain characteristic of a person” with mental illness), disapproved of on other grounds by T.K. v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 27 N.E.3d 271, 273 (Ind. 2015).

[12] Based upon our thorough review of the record, which includes the videorecording of the commitment hearing, we conclude that clear and convincing evidence supports the trial court's conclusion that D.H. is in danger of coming to harm because he has a substantial impairment or an obvious deterioration of judgment, reasoning, or behavior that results in his inability to function independently and therefore that he is gravely disabled. See A.O. v. Cmty. Health Network, Inc., 206 N.E.3d 1191, 1194 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (finding sufficient evidence of grave disability based on lack of insight into patient's condition and that her delusional thoughts had compromised her treatment, judgment, and ability to function independently).

[13] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court's commitment order.

[14] Affirmed.

Brown, Judge.

Judge Weissmann and Senior Judge Robb concur. Weissmann, J., and Robb, Sr.J., concur.