Eve Baker Sparks, Appellant v. 2006 11 2006 11 (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Eve Baker Sparks, pro se, appeals from the entry of summary judgment in favor of Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as Trustee, in Trust for Registered Holders of Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-11 Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-11 (“Bank”). We dismiss.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On March 1, 2024, Sparks filed a complaint against Bank.¹ Sparks filed a motion for default judgment, and the court denied the motion. On October 29, 2024, Sparks filed a motion for leave to amend complaint, and the court granted the motion. In her amended complaint, Sparks alleged that Bank “breached the mortgage contract ․ when [she] cured the default on her mortgage on or about July 2023,” “[a]t the time [Bank] had a foreclosure judgment against [her],” and the mortgage provided “Borrower can cure such a default[.]” Appellee's Appendix Volume II at 19. She alleged that Bank “breached the mortgage contract when [it] did not pay [her] Spring property taxes,” when it “did not disburse the Insurance proceeds to repair [her] residence after it sustained damage and funds were disbursed by the insurance company,” and when it “filed for a Sheriff sale on or about March 2024 even though [her] defaulted mortgage had been cured on or about July 2024 and ․ an Automatic stay was still in effect.” Id. at 20. She stated that she “is seeking monetary compensation in the amount of $668,550.00 ․ and is seeking the deed to her property free and clear of a mortgage by [Bank] ․” Id. at 22.

[3] In November 2024, Sparks filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that she provided proof that Bank “breached the mortgage contract” and “bypassed the automatic stay that was in place due to [her] Chapter 7 filing.” Id. at 27. In December 2024, Bank filed a cross-motion for summary judgment with respect to the allegations in Sparks's amended complaint arguing that the court “lacks jurisdiction to resolve any alleged violation of the Bankruptcy Code” and that Sparks “concedes that Bank cured any alleged defaults of the mortgage.” Id. at 31. Bank argued that it paid the Spring 2024 real estate taxes, that it disbursed all insurance proceeds and Sparks concedes that repairs were complete, and that the remedies and damages sought by Sparks are not recoverable. The designated evidence included an affidavit of a “Document Control Officer” of Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. (“SPS”), the loan servicer for Bank, a promissory note dated October 19, 2006, signed by Sparks in the original principal amount of $151,110, and a mortgage securing the note. Id. at 48.

[4] On January 10, 2025, the trial court issued an order denying Sparks's motion for summary judgment and granting Bank's cross-motion for summary judgment. On January 13, 2025, Sparks filed a “Motion for Correction of Record.” Id. at 104. On February 13, 2025, Sparks filed a motion for default judgment. Bank filed responses. The court denied Sparks's motions.

Discussion

[5] A pro se litigant is held to the same established rules of procedure that trained legal counsel are bound to follow, and the fact that a litigant proceeds pro se does not excuse the litigant from complying with appellate rules. Foster v. Adoption of Federspiel, 560 N.E.2d 691, 692 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990). Where an appellant fails to substantially comply with the appellate rules, dismissal of the appeal is warranted. Hughes v. King, 808 N.E.2d 146, 147 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). This Court has discretion to dismiss an appeal for the appellant's failure to comply with the Rules of Appellate Procedure. See Miller v. Hague Ins. Agency, Inc., 871 N.E.2d 406, 407 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (“Although we will exercise our discretion to reach the merits when violations are comparatively minor, if the parties commit flagrant violations of the Rules of Appellate Procedure we will hold issues waived, or dismiss the appeal.”), reh'g denied.

[6] Sparks has failed to comply with the requirements of the Indiana Rules of Appellate Procedure.² Appellate Rule 46(A)(6) governs the statement of facts and provides “[t]he facts shall be supported by page references to the Record on Appeal or Appendix in accordance with Rule 22(C).” Under the heading “Statement of facts,” Sparks's brief includes conclusions and includes no citations to the record.³ Appellant's Brief at 5. While Sparks filed an appendix, she filed each document in a separate volume, resulting in her filing eleven volumes. The appendices do not include the trial court's chronological case summary as required by Appellate Rule 50(A)(2). The section in Sparks's brief titled “Questions presented on appeal” does not “concisely and particularly describe each issue presented for review” as required by Appellate Rule 46(A)(4).⁴

[7] Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a) provides “[t]he argument must contain the contentions of the appellant on the issues presented, supported by cogent reasoning” and “[e]ach contention must be supported by citations to the authorities, statutes, and the Appendix or parts of the Record on Appeal relied on ․” Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(b) provides the argument “must include for each issue a concise statement of the applicable standard of review” and “a brief statement of the procedural and substantive facts necessary for consideration of the issues presented on appeal, including a statement of how the issues relevant to the appeal were raised and resolved by any ․ trial court.” This Court has previously stated:

We demand cogent argument supported with adequate citation to authority because it promotes impartiality in the appellate tribunal. A court which must search the record and make up its own arguments because a party has not adequately presented them runs the risk of becoming an advocate rather than an adjudicator. Keller v. State, 549 N.E.2d 372, 373 (Ind. 1990). A brief should not only present the issues to be decided on appeal, but it should be of material assistance to the court in deciding those issues. Hebel v. Conrail, Inc., 475 N.E.2d 652, 659 (Ind. 1985). On review, we will not search the record to find a basis for a party's argument ․ nor will we search the authorities cited by a party in order to find legal support for its position.

Young v. Butts, 685 N.E.2d 147, 151 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (footnote omitted).

[8] Sparks's claims in the “Argument” section of her brief are not supported by cogent argument or citations to the record.⁵ In light of the multiple violations of the Indiana Appellate Rules and lack of a cogent argument, we dismiss Sparks's appeal. See Keller, 549 N.E.2d at 373-374 (dismissing appeal where appellant failed to provide cogent argument and adequate citation of authority).

[9] For the foregoing reasons, we dismiss.

[10] Dismissed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The chronological case summary (“CCS”) does not indicate that a summons or copy of the complaint was served on Bank.

2.   Recently, in Sparks v. Jefferson Cap. Sys., LLC, & Exeter Fin. LLC, No. 25A-PL-251, 2025 WL 1662651 (Ind. Ct. App. June 12, 2025) (“Sparks I”), we dismissed Sparks's appeal in light of multiple violations of the Indiana Appellate Rules, including lack of a cogent argument.

3.   Sparks states in part that Bank “breached the contract” when “they did not file a motion of dismissal on or about July 2023 with the Court in the Foreclosure case ․ when [she] cured the default,” “by not paying [her] Spring 2024 property taxes on time,” and “by not disbursing the insurance proceeds in a timely manner to [her] to repair her residence.” Appellant's Brief at 5. She also states Bank “bypassed bankruptcy laws when they filed for a Sheriff Sale on or about March 2024 after [she] cured the default and while the automatic stay was still in place.” Id. at 5-6.

4.   Under the heading “Questions presented on appeal,” Sparks lists six questions, including “Did the trial court err in ruling in favor of the Defendant on two Motions for Default Judgment,” “Did the trial court err in ruling in favor of the Defendant SPS, by not acknowledging that SPS Breached the contract several times between them and the Plaintiff,” “Did the trial court err in ruling in favor of the Defendant SPS, because they never answered the Plaintiff's Complaint in the time allotted by the Court,” “Did the trial court err in ruling in favor of the Defendant SPS, because SPS hasn't reported a loan to the Credit Bureaus on the Plaintiff since on or about March 2023,” “Did the trial court err in ruling in favor of the Defendant SPS, by not acknowledging that SPS harassed the Plaintiff several times over the course of 2 years,” and “Did the trial court err in ruling in favor of the Defendant SPS, by not acknowledging that SPS bypassed Bankruptcy laws.” Appellant's Brief at 4.

5.   The content of the “Argument” section of Sparks's brief in this appeal is very similar or identical to the content of the “Argument” section of her brief in Sparks I. As in Sparks I, here Sparks cites cases from the Oregon Supreme Court and states “[p]ublic bodies are ordinarily liable for the torts of employees acting within the scope of employment under ORS 30.265(1),” “Plaintiff in this case did not invoke a special relationship, status, or conduct which creates, defines, or limits defendant's duty,” “Defendant's [sic] in this case did not invoke a special relationship, status, or conduct which creates, defines, or limits defendant's duty,” and “[t]he trial court in this case did not invoke a special relationship, status, or conduct which creates, defines, or limits defendant's duty.” Appellant's Brief at 7. She states “[t]he complaint in Donaca [v. Curry Co., 734 P.2d 1339 (Or. 1987),] had been dismissed by the trial court for failure to state ultimate facts sufficient to constitute a claim for relief,” “[t]o summarize the Supreme Court's guidance from Donaca, if the pleadings do not constitute a basis for invoking the ‘special relationship’ rule under Fazzolari [v. Portland School Dist., 734 P.2d 1326 (Or. 1987)], ‘no duty’ defenses are either broad, seeking exclusion of categories of claimants or claims; or narrow, amounting to a claim in a particular case that no rational factfinder could find a defendant's conduct unreasonably to pose a foreseeable risk to the plaintiff.” Id. at 8-9. She further states, “[a]lthough a factfinder is free to reject imposing liability on hearing the evidence, it cannot be said that no rational factfinder, on the allegations in plaintiffs’ pleading, could find defendant's conduct unreasonably to pose a foreseeable risk to plaintiffs,” sets forth elements for a claim of negligence citing Oregon case law, and states, “Plaintiffs have pleaded facts from which a factfinder could make a determination in plaintiffs’ favor in accordance with the foregoing requirements.” Id. at 9. In her conclusion, Sparks argues “[t]he trial court erred when it ruled against the Plaintiff twice on her Motion's [sic] for Default Judgment when the Defendant repeatedly missed deadlines” and “[t]he denials should be reversed and recorded as granted Motion's [sic] and award her the resolution's [sic] she requested and any other relief the Court of Appeal's [sic] deems appropriate.” Id. at 10. To the extent Sparks presents new argument in her reply brief, the argument is waived. See Weldon v. Asset Acceptance, LLC, 896 N.E.2d 1181, 1186 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied; Ind. Appellate Rule 46(C).

Brown, Judge.

Judges Bailey and Weissmann concur. Bailey, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.