IN RE: the Involuntary Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of X.W. and J.W. (Minor Children) and C.W. (Father) (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] C.W. (“Father”) appeals the trial court's order terminating his parental rights to two of his children.¹ Father raises one issue: Did the Department of Child Services (“DCS”) present clear and convincing evidence to support the trial court's termination decision? We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Father and J.M. (“Mother”) have two children, X.W. (born in May 2021) and J.W. (born in February 2022) (collectively, the “Children”).² Prior to J.W.’s birth, the family began participating in an informal adjustment largely to address Parents’ illegal substance use. Shortly after J.W. was born sixteen weeks premature, drug-exposed, and weighing under two pounds, DCS filed CHINS petitions for both boys.³ X.W. was removed from Mother but lived with Father at paternal grandmother's house while J.W. remained in the hospital for several weeks. The trial court adjudicated Children CHINS in May 2022. Mother was reunited with X.W. in June, and J.W. was released to Parents’ care in July. J.W. required ongoing medical care, including use of a feeding tube. The CHINS proceedings were terminated in September.

[3] In April 2023, DCS investigated a report of neglect and filed CHINS petitions alleging verbal and physical domestic violence between Parents and ongoing illegal substance use by Parents. As to J.W., DCS alleged Parents were failing to follow medical directives for his care and had missed appointments to address his ongoing medical and developmental needs.⁴ J.W. was removed from Parents’ care and placed in foster care; X.W. was removed and initially placed in paternal grandmother's home. X.W. was ultimately transferred to J.W.’s placement in June, where both boys remained as of the termination hearing.

[4] The trial court adjudicated Children CHINS in June and entered a dispositional order in July. Father was ordered to maintain regular contact with the family case manager (“FCM”); obey the law and notify the FCM of any arrest or criminal charges; keep all appointments with service providers; refrain from using drugs and alcohol; complete a substance use/mental health assessment and complete all recommended treatment; participate in random drug screens; meet Children's medical needs and attend all appointments; and attend scheduled supervised visitations.

[5] Josie Hawkins was assigned as the FCM in July 2023. She put in place referrals for Father to have a substance use assessment and drug screening. Later, she made referrals for individual therapy, “case work/life skills,” and supervised visitations. Tr. Vol. 2 at 21.

[6] Over the course of the CHINS case, Father did not maintain regular contact with the FCM. He did not regularly participate in drug screens even after DCS began conducting the screens instead of a third party to accommodate Father's work schedule. When Father did screen, he often tested positive for methamphetamine, including about a month before the termination hearing. Father acknowledged his continued methamphetamine use to the FCM but did not engage in substance use treatment.

[7] In October 2023, a warrant was issued for Father's arrest on six criminal charges including possession of methamphetamine and operating while intoxicated. In part because of the outstanding warrant and Father's failure to comply with random drug testing and in part because Father's inconsistent participation in visitation caused “pretty severe behaviors” in Children, DCS moved to suspend Father's visits with Children. Id. at 51. The trial court ordered visits suspended in November. Father's last visit with Children was on September 27, 2023.

[8] After the warrant was issued, Father “was more worried about the rehab and satisfying what [he] needed to do for [his] kids versus satisfying a warrant.” Id. at 94. He and the FCM spoke about his substance use, lack of engagement in services, and “what would need to be done to address the safety concerns that resulted in the case opening.” Id. at 30. Father finally completed a substance use assessment. He started but voluntarily left two inpatient treatment programs before completing them. Then Father was arrested on the warrant in January 2024 and held in jail until March. Father became more engaged in services following his release. He contacted the FCM when he was released. He participated in individual therapy and home-based casework between April and August, when he was re-incarcerated. Father's home-based caseworker testified Father made “some progress,” but she said Father “admitted that he had used drugs from time to time ․ when his emotions had gotten too high[.]” Id. at 98, 100.

[9] At the time of the termination hearing in September 2024, Father had not seen Children in almost a year. He had pleaded guilty to the criminal charges and was in jail awaiting sentencing.⁵ He also had pending charges for driving offenses in a different case. Father did not have steady employment or a driver's license but planned to get his license reinstated and find a job. He identified his “biggest issue” for reunification with Children as “getting [his] legal issues behind [him] and [getting] back to work and work on getting back ․ [his] license and [his] insurance[.]” Id. at 73. He intended to enlist paternal grandmother's assistance in caring for Children if they were returned to his care. Paternal grandmother acknowledged this plan and her willingness to help but testified she has been diagnosed with dementia and would need additional support.

[10] J.W. was in speech, physical, and occupational therapies and continued to use a feeding tube for supplemental nutrition. X.W. required services to work on anger issues. But overall, Children were “thriving in placement and doing really well[.]” Id. at 110. The FCM's concerns about Children being reunified with Father were his “substance use, mental health issues[,] stability and his pending criminal issues.” Id. at 34. The FCM recommended termination and adoption by placement as the plan for Children going forward. Children's court-appointed child advocate (“CASA”) testified termination was in Children's best interests.

[11] The trial court issued findings of fact, including:

Despite significant involvement with DCS dating back to June of 2021, Father has:

i. Failed to establish and maintain a pattern of sobriety.

ii. Failed to refrain from criminal activity that makes him unavailable to provide for [Children's] care and supervision.

iii. Failed to minimally participate in the Court's Dispositional Orders such that visitation could be reestablished in fashion that was in [Children's] best interests and did not leave [Children] at risk for confusingly inconsistent contact with Father.

Since the removal of the [Children], Father has not been able to fulfill his parental obligations as a safe, sober caregiver to the [Children] and has not progressed to the point that the [Children] could be safely returned to his care.

Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 63.⁶ Concluding DCS had proved the statutory elements by clear and convincing evidence, the trial court terminated the parent-child relationships. See id. at 59.

Standard of Review

[12] Parents have a constitutionally protected right to establish a home and raise their children. In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1230 (Ind. 2013). That said, “this right is not absolute.” In re Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d 41, 45 (Ind. 2019), cert. denied. “When parents are unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities, their parental rights may be terminated.” Id. at 45–46.

[13] To terminate a parent's rights to a child, DCS must prove there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the child and termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c)(2), (3) (2024). DCS must also allege and prove the existence of one or more statutory circumstances warranting termination. I.C. § 31-35-2-4(c)(1), (d).⁷ DCS alleged the following circumstances warranted termination in this case:

That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

That there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being, safety, physical health, or life of the child.

I.C. § 31-35-2-4(d)(3) & (4); see Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 22.

[14] If the trial court finds the allegations of a termination petition have been proven by clear and convincing evidence, the court “shall” terminate the parent-child relationship and “shall enter findings of fact” supporting that conclusion. I.C. § 31-35-2-8(a), (c); see also I.C. § 31-37-14-2 (burden of proof). We will set aside the trial court's judgment only if it is clearly erroneous. In re V.A., 51 N.E.3d 1140, 1143 (Ind. 2016). We apply a two-tiered standard of review to a termination decision: first, we determine whether the evidence supports the findings and second, whether the findings support the trial court's judgment. In re R.S., 56 N.E.3d 625, 628 (Ind. 2016). When findings of fact are unchallenged, we accept them as true. In re C.C., 153 N.E.3d 340, 348 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied. If the unchallenged findings clearly and convincingly support the judgment, we will affirm. Moriarty v. Moriarty, 150 N.E.3d 616, 626 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied.

Clear and convincing evidence supports the trial court's termination decision.

[15] The trial court made factual findings and determined DCS proved: (1) there was a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of Children, (2) termination was in Children's best interests, (3), there is a reasonable probability the conditions that resulted in Children's removal from and continued placement outside Father's care and custody will not be remedied, and (4) there is a reasonable probability the continuation of the parent-child relationship between Father and Children poses a threat to the well-being of Children. See Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 59.

[16] Here, the trial court's findings include: Father had significant involvement with DCS for over three years; Father failed to address his substance use issues during the CHINS cases by not regularly participating in drug screening and failing to complete inpatient substance use treatment; Father tested positive for methamphetamine several times during the CHINS cases, including one month before the termination hearing; Father was charged with and pleaded guilty to drug and alcohol offenses and was incarcerated periodically during the CHINS cases; Father was serving a custodial sentence at the time of the termination order and had other pending charges; and Father had been unable to fulfill his parental obligations as a safe, sober caregiver since Children's removal. In addition, the trial court found Father had not seen Children for a year; Father was unemployed and had no driver's license; Children are young and rely on their caregivers to meet their needs, including J.W.’s special medical needs; Children are well cared for and have progressed well in their placement; and the CASA supports termination of parental rights and adoption by placement. Father does not challenge the trial court's findings but claims the trial court's ultimate determinations regarding remediation of conditions and Children's best interests are clearly erroneous.⁸

Remediation of Conditions 9

[17] To determine whether there is a reasonable probability that the reasons for a child's continued placement outside of a parent's home will not be remedied, the trial court looks first at what conditions led to the child's placement outside the home and then determines whether there is a reasonable probability those conditions will not be remedied. K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1231. The trial court should judge a parent's fitness to care for a child at the time of the termination hearing, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions. See In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 643 (Ind. 2014). But the court must balance any recent improvements against a parent's habitual patterns of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation. “We entrust that delicate balance to the trial court, which has discretion to weigh a parent's prior history more heavily than efforts made only shortly before termination.” Id. The evidence presented by DCS need not rule out all possibilities of change; DCS need only establish there is a reasonable probability the parent's behavior will not change. C.C., 153 N.E.3d at 348.

[18] The court's unchallenged findings support its determination that the reasons for Children's removal and continued placement outside of Father's home will not be remedied. Children were removed from Father's care mainly because of his substance use and remained outside his care because he did not take adequate steps to address that issue. The trial court could determine from Father's history that there was a reasonable likelihood he would not remedy that condition—DCS became involved with the family in 2021 due in part to Father's substance use, DCS again became involved in 2023 because of Father's substance use, and one month before the termination hearing in this case, Father tested positive for illegal substances. In addition, Father was periodically incarcerated, including at the time of the termination hearing, because of criminal charges related to drug and alcohol use. Those charges contributed to Father's visitation with Children being suspended and consequently, he had not visited with Children for nearly one year at the time of the termination hearing. As the trial court summarized,

Since the removal of the [Children], Father has not been able to fulfill his parental obligations as a safe, sober caregiver to the [Children] and has not progressed to the point that the [Children] could be safely returned to his care.

Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 63.

[19] Father concedes he “struggled to stay consistent in services and continued to use methamphetamine during the life of the CHINS case,” but asserts he was making progress in services and had a plan to address his sobriety after his release from incarceration. Appellant's Br. at 10. This amounts to a request for us to reweigh the evidence in Father's favor. But we do not reweigh the evidence before the trial court; we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences most favorable to the judgment. V.A., 51 N.E.3d at 1143. Moreover, the time for Father to progress in services and address his sobriety was before the termination petition was filed. Sufficient evidence supports the trial court's determination that there is a reasonable probability conditions will not be remedied.

Best Interests

[20] Father also asserts the trial court's determination that termination is in Children's best interests is clearly erroneous. When deciding whether termination is in a child's best interests, courts look to the totality of the evidence and “must subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the children.” In re A.I., 825 N.E.2d 798, 811 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied. A child's need for permanency is a central consideration, and they “cannot wait indefinitely for their parents to work toward preservation or reunification[.]” E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 648. Recommendations of the FCM or CASA, in addition to evidence that conditions will not be remedied, are enough to show by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child's best interests. In re A.S., 17 N.E.3d 994, 1005 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied.

[21] Father asserts DCS failed to prove termination is in Children's best interests because he testified he has a plan to address his sobriety and establish stability when he is released from jail and has supports in place to assist him. He notes there were no safety issues when he had visitation with Children. And he notes the fact Children are in a pre-adoptive home is not alone sufficient to say termination is in Children's best interests. We agree parental rights may not be terminated just because there might be a better home available for the child. V.A., 51 N.E.3d at 1152. The need for permanency is also an insufficient reason on its own to terminate rights where the parent has a relationship with the child and has taken positive steps toward reunification. Id. But Father had not visited with Children in a year, and he had not yet made positive steps toward addressing his substance use issues or establishing independent stability. The FCM was concerned about reunification because of Father's substance use issues, lack of stability, and pending criminal cases. The CASA testified termination was in Children's best interests. This testimony, as well as the other evidence discussed above, supports the trial court's conclusion that termination was in Children's best interests.

Conclusion

[22] Clear and convincing evidence supports the trial court's termination decision.

[23] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Father has four other children: two older children who are not in his care and two who are deceased.

2.   Father and Mother were not married, and they were no longer together at the time the termination petitions were filed. Mother consented to the Children's adoption, did not participate in the termination factfinding hearing, and does not participate in this appeal. As much as possible, we have limited the facts to only those pertinent to Father.

3.   The trial court took judicial notice of the CCS and orders from these 2022 CHINS cases at DCS’ request.

4.   As with the earlier CHINS, the trial court took judicial notice of the CCS and orders from these 2023 CHINS cases at DCS’ request.

5.   The trial court's termination order indicates Father's sentencing hearing was held five days after the termination hearing and he was sentenced to 365 days in jail, with credit for time served.

6.   The trial court entered separate termination orders for X.W. and J.W. They are identical in all respects, but for the addition of a single line in J.W.’s order referencing his special medical needs.

7.   The statute enumerates twelve circumstances that may be alleged in a petition to terminate parental rights. See I.C. § 31-35-2-4(d)(1)–(12).

8.   Father does not challenge the trial court's determination that DCS proved it has a satisfactory plan for Children's care and treatment.

Kenworthy, Judge.

Judges Foley and Scheele concur. Foley, J., and Scheele, J., concur.