Joce-Joce Sergio Bueno, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Joce-Joce Sergio Bueno appeals his conviction for domestic battery as a level 6 felony following a jury trial. He asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting certain testimony. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On May 21, 2024, Nichole Gerick and her seventeen-year-old son, K.C., were at Bueno's new apartment “dropping off his couch” and helping him move the couch into his apartment. Transcript Volume II at 94. Gerick and Bueno “were in the middle of a breakup” at that time and he was “screaming at her” as they moved the couch. Id. at 100. The full-size couch was very difficult to move because they had to try to “hoist” it to “get it over the, [the apartment] had like a porch with a banister on it.” Id. at 95-96.

[3] Gerick suddenly “screamed” and quite loudly yelled, “He hit me.” Id. at 97. Bueno's neighbor, Dion Collins, who had been asleep in his living room, was awakened by Gerick's “[b]lood curdling” scream and K.C.’s screams for “help.” Id. at 77. Collins ran outside and saw Gerick with “blood all over her face and on her shirt,” and he observed that “[K.C.] was trying to get away from [Bueno]” as Bueno was “going back and forth” on the porch by the couch. Id. 77-78. Bueno then turned his focus on Collins and “directed all of this anger and everything onto [Collins] now.” Id. at 77. Bueno threatened Collins, “I'm going to f-ing kill you. You don't know who I am. I run this shit․ I run this neighborhood. What. Don't even get involved.” Id. at 79. Bueno “jumped” towards Collins while still threatening, “I'm going to f---ing kill you. I'm going to f---ing kill you.” Id. at 80. Because Bueno was distracted by Collins, Gerick and K.C. were able to enter their car.

[4] As they were in the car trying to leave, K.C. called 911 and told the operator, “He f---ing hit her ․ she's bleeding ․ please hurry.” State's Exhibit 1 at 00:00-00:12. He explained, “We were getting my mom's ex-boyfriend's couch in his apartment ․ and he f---ing started hitting my mom, and my mom's bleeding now.” Id. at 00:59-01:07. K.C. identified his mother's attacker as “Joce-Joce Bueno.” Id. at 01:28-01:29. Bueno began “beating on [Gerick's] car.” Id. at 02:08. Gerick spoke in the background on the call, saying, “I'm not dying here” but “it f---ing hurts ․ he might have broke my f---ing nose.” Id. at 03:10-03:14. Gerick took the phone from K.C., began crying and explained to the operator that Bueno was “trying to go after [her] son.” Id. at 03:59-4:03. While still on the phone with the 911 operator, Gerick and K.C. drove just a few blocks to a nearby high school where police and medics responded within minutes.

[5] In the parking lot, Gerick told Mishawaka Police Officer Miles Andrews that she was “injured,” explaining, “It hurts all in here,” while pointing to her nose and brow bridge, and stating, “That's where he f---ing punched me.” State's Exhibit 4, Clips 1 and 3. Gerick identified Bueno to Officer Andrews as the man who had punched her, and she advised the medics who evaluated her on the scene that her “ex-boyfriend” punched her with a “closed fist” in the face. State's Exhibit 4, Clips 4 and 5.

[6] On May 23, 2024, the State charged Bueno with one count of domestic battery resulting in moderate bodily injury as a level 6 felony, two counts of intimidation as level 6 felonies, and one count of domestic battery as a class A misdemeanor. The trial court subsequently dismissed one of the intimidation charges. The court held a jury trial on October 24, 2024. During trial, the court admitted the 911 call without objection from Bueno. The court also admitted, over Bueno's hearsay objection, four brief clips of Officer Andrews's body camera footage of Gerick's parking lot conversation with officers and medics. Bueno subsequently called Gerick as a witness. She denied that Bueno had punched her, stating that the couch slipped while they were lifting it over their heads, striking her in the face. She claimed that she only said that Bueno hit her because “emotions were extremely high” due to the breakup, and she was “already extremely upset.” Transcript Volume II at 97. She stated that her son called police “because he heard [her] say [Bueno] hit her” and that she stuck with that story when she met with police and medics because she “had to play the narrative of what [she] had just said.” Id. at 98. She claimed that she was changing her story for the first time at trial because she feared that “Karma” for “what [she] did” had caused “a lot of bad things” to happen and because she did not believe “anyone should be wrongfully convicted.” Id. at 99.

[7] At the conclusion of trial, the jury found Bueno guilty of both counts of domestic battery and not guilty of intimidation. The court merged the domestic battery convictions and sentenced Bueno to thirty months, with eighteen months executed in the Department of Correction, and twelve months suspended to probation.

Discussion

[8] Bueno contends that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting, over his hearsay objection, Gerick's “out-of-court statements regarding [his] guilt.” Appellant's Brief at 7. Specifically, he challenges the court's admission of State's Exhibit 4, Clips 1, 3, 4, and 5, which consisted of brief excerpts of Officer Andrews's body camera footage of Gerick's statements to police and medics in the high school parking lot shortly after the battery.

[9] Generally, the trial court has broad discretion to rule on the admissibility of evidence. Bradley v. State, 54 N.E.3d 996, 999 (Ind. 2016). A trial court's ruling on the admission of evidence is generally accorded a great deal of deference on appeal. Hall v. State, 36 N.E.3d 459, 466 (Ind. 2015), reh'g denied. We do not reweigh the evidence; rather, we consider only evidence that is either favorable to the ruling or unrefuted and favorable to the defendant. Beasley v. State, 46 N.E.3d 1232, 1235 (Ind. 2016).

[10] Hearsay is “a statement that: (1) is not made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing; and (2) is offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Ind. Evidence Rule 801(c). Hearsay is generally inadmissible, subject to a handful of specific and limited exceptions. Cornell v. State, 139 N.E.3d 1135, 1143 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied; Ind. Evidence Rule 802. We will affirm the trial court's hearsay ruling on any legal basis apparent in the record. Robinson v. State, 730 N.E.2d 185, 194 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), trans. denied.

[11] Upon review of the challenged evidence, we have little difficulty concluding that the statements made in the body camera footage clips were admissible under the excited-utterance exception to the hearsay rule. An excited utterance is “[a] statement relating to a startling event or condition, made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement that it caused.” Ind. Evidence Rule 803(2). The party seeking admission of hearsay under this exception must show: (1) a startling event; (2) a statement made by the declarant while under the stress of excitement caused by the event; and (3) a relationship between the statement and the event. Jenkins v. State, 725 N.E.2d 66, 68 (Ind. 2000). This “is not a mechanical test” and “turns on whether the statement was inherently reliable because the witness was under the stress of an event and unlikely to make deliberate falsifications.” Id. Factors to consider in determining admissibility include the lapse of time between a statement and the startling event and whether a statement was made in response to questioning, though neither factor is dispositive. Hardiman v. State, 726 N.E.2d 1201, 1204 (Ind. 2000).

[12] Gerick spoke to police and medics just minutes after Bueno punched her in the face and her son had called 911 pleading for help. She was still visibly upset and bleeding profusely when she spoke to the officers and medics, informing them about what had transpired that caused her injuries. As Gerick's statements were made while she was still clearly under the stress of a startling event, they were properly admitted as excited utterances. See Turner v. State, 183 N.E.3d 346, 359 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (holding statement by shooting witness identifying the defendant made to police “less than an hour” after shooting was admissible as an excited utterance because witness “was still under stress caused by that event” and her identification of defendant “was clearly related to the event”), trans. denied.

[13] We note that, in addition to being admissible as an excited utterance, Gerick's statement to medics on the scene was admissible pursuant to the hearsay exception for statements made for the purpose of receiving a medical diagnosis or treatment. Ind. Evidence Rule 803(4); Walters v. State, 68 N.E.3d 1097, 1100 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. denied. This exception is based on the understanding that a person is unlikely to lie to medical professionals because doing so might jeopardize the provider's ability to treat her. VanPatten v. State, 986 N.E.2d 255, 260 (Ind. 2013). A two-step analysis applies to evidence that is admitted pursuant to Evidence Rule 803(4): First, “is the declarant motivated to provide truthful information in order to promote diagnosis and treatment,” and second, “is the content of the statement such that an expert in the field would reasonably rely on it in rendering diagnosis or treatment.” Id.

[14] Gerick's statement to medics indicating that she had been punched in the face with a closed fist by her ex-boyfriend meets both of the above-mentioned requirements. First, Gerick understood that she was providing information about her injury for the purpose of medical assessment and thus, she was motivated to provide truthful information. Second, the content of her statement was such that a medical professional would reasonably rely on it in rendering treatment. We agree with the State that this conclusion is not undermined by Gerick naming Bueno as the cause of her injuries. See Chambless v. State, 119 N.E.3d 182, 190-191 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (observing that while “[s]uch statements usually do not include statements that identify the perpetrator because the identity of the perpetrator is usually not necessary to provide effective medical care,” in domestic abuse cases “the identity of the perpetrator is relevant to appropriate diagnosis and treatment”), trans. denied. Under the circumstances, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the challenged evidence.

[15] Moreover, in light of the unchallenged admission of the recording of K.C.’s 911 call clearly identifying Bueno as the cause of Gerick's injuries, any error in the admission of the challenged body camera footage was harmless. Errors in the admission of evidence “are to be disregarded as harmless unless they affect the substantial rights of the party.” Mathis v. State, 859 N.E.2d 1275, 1280 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). An error in the admission of evidence may be harmless when the evidence is merely cumulative of other properly admitted evidence. Id. As the evidence in the body camera footage was cumulative of other identification evidence, any error in the admission of that evidence was harmless.

[16] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Bueno's conviction.

[17] Affirmed.

Brown, Judge.

Judges Bailey and Weissmann concur. Bailey, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.