IN RE: the Adoption of E.H. (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] T.C., the biological mother of E.H., appeals the trial court's decree granting the petition for adoption of E.H. by A.H. (“Adoptive Father”) and K.H. (“Adoptive Mother,” and together with Adoptive Father, “Adoptive Parents”). T.C. raises two issues which we consolidate and restate as whether the court erred in granting Adoptive Parents’ petition for adoption. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] T.C. and B.H. are the biological parents of E.H., who was born in June 2019. In January 2020, T.C. called E.H.’s great-grandmother, D.H., and informed her that E.H. had been injured and that she and B.H. had taken him to the emergency room. At the hospital, D.H. observed that E.H. had bruising on his face and a black eye, the left side of his head was swollen, he was “not clean,” and he “smelled really bad.” Transcript Volume II at 42. The police and the Department of Child Services (“DCS”) were present, and T.C. asked D.H. if she would take E.H. Between January 25, 2020, and March 2022, E.H. resided with D.H. and her husband. At some point, T.C. and B.H. separated.¹

[3] In January and February 2022, E.H. began transitioning to live with his paternal uncle, Adoptive Father. On March 3, 2022, Adoptive Father became E.H.’s guardian. In May 2023, Adoptive Parents married.

[4] On July 21, 2023, Adoptive Parents filed a Petition for Adoption. Adoptive Parents alleged that T.C.’s consent was not required pursuant to Ind. Code § 31-19-9-8(a)(2)(B) “as she has knowingly failed to provide for the care and support of the child when able to do so as required by law or judicial decree.” Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 23. On August 17, 2023, T.C. filed a document contesting the adoption and asserting that she had “tried to provide for [E.H.] but when I ask [Adoptive Father] tells me he does not need help with anything” and that she keeps in contact with Adoptive Father about E.H. but receives “little information back.” Id. at 32.

[5] On January 15, 2024, Adoptive Parents filed a Notice of Filing of Home Study completed by Protect Our Children, a licensed child placing agency. The home study indicated that the background checks of Adoptive Parents found them to be qualified.

[6] On June 5, 2024, the court held a hearing on the petition for adoption and T.C.’s motion to contest the adoption. Adoptive Parents’ counsel asked the trial court to take judicial notice of cause number 49D14-2010-JP-220 (“Cause No. 220”), and the court granted the request.² Adoptive Parents presented the testimony of multiple witnesses including E.H.’s therapist, D.H., and Adoptive Father. On cross-examination, Adoptive Father acknowledged that he had told T.C. that he did not need anything when she asked about E.H.’s needs. On redirect examination, Adoptive Father indicated he did not see any text messages from T.C. offering any cash or periodic cash assistance in the messages between he and T.C. between February 27, 2022, through September 24, 2023. He also indicated that T.C. never gave him cash.

[7] On October 8, 2024, the court continued the hearing. Adoptive Parents each testified in support of their petition for adoption. T.C. testified that she helped provide for E.H. during the time he had been with Adoptive Father, she and her grandmother sent items, and she offered Adoptive Father money during the time that E.H. was living with him. She testified:

I would ask [Adoptive Father] if they needed anything. [He] would tell me no, they're fine. But I guess I wasn't very specific on what I was meaning by that. So whenever I did ask him if they needed money, most of the time it would be no. So instead of asking if they needed money, I would ask how can I send you guys money? Because I'm not comfortable sending money in the mail. I don't know if they received it or not, and I don't want money just floating around. [Adoptive Father] told me they don't use Walmart. They don't use Chime, Cash App, because I can only use Chime or Cash App or Walmart, really.

Transcript Volume II at 145.

[8] On cross-examination, T.C. detailed her employment history and indicated that she lived with her mother for a period of time and then obtained an apartment with assistance from Section 8. She also indicated that she knew how “to get things” to E.H. and to Adoptive Father. Id. at 157. She acknowledged that she did not give any money to E.H. or Adoptive Father during the times she worked at Fed Ex, Saia Freight, or Circle K. When asked if she had been able to support herself since 2022, T.C. answered affirmatively.

[9] On December 20, 2024, the court entered a thirteen-page Order Granting Petition for Adoption. The court found that Adoptive Parents had shown that T.C.’s consent to adoption was not required pursuant to Ind. Code § 31-19-9-8(a)(2)(b) because T.C. knowingly failed for a period of at least one year to provide for the care and support of E.H. when able to do so. It found that adoption was in E.H.’s best interest. It acknowledged T.C.’s argument that Adoptive Parents had failed to submit the DCS background check, but the court noted that “[a] Home Study was submitted by Protect Our Children on January 15, 2024,” and “Criminal and CPS checks were submitted with said Home Study.” Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 20.

Discussion

[10] T.C. argues that Adoptive Parents limited their argument with respect to her failure to support E.H. to July 21, 2022, to July 21, 2023.³ She asserts that, “[s]ince May of 2022, [she] was not consistently employed and there were a few months where [she] was unemployed.” Appellant's Brief at 9. She argues the trial court clearly erred when it found she was able to support E.H. She contends the court used periods of employment after the petition for adoption was filed when it considered any period after July 21, 2023. She asserts the transcript was void of any evidence regarding her necessary and reasonable living expenses. She contends that the evidence established that she provided items for the support of E.H. from January 2020 through July 2023. She asserts that Adoptive Parents cannot dismiss her attempts to provide for E.H. and then argue that she failed to provide support.

[11] T.C. also argues that the trial court erred in granting the petition for adoption when the Adoptive Parents did not submit evidence that they completed the necessary background checks. She contends that the Adoptive Parents never offered the home study report as evidence and the trial court still relied on the report in its order. She argues that, while the home study report contained a copy of the results of the criminal background check completed by the Indiana State Police, it did not contain a copy of the results of the DCS background check.

[12] In family law matters, we generally give considerable deference to the trial court's decision because we recognize that the trial judge is in the best position to judge the facts, determine witness credibility, and obtain a feel for the family dynamics and a sense of the parents and their relationship with their children. E.B.F. v. D.F., 93 N.E.3d 759, 762 (Ind. 2018). Accordingly, when reviewing an adoption case, we presume that the trial court's decision is correct, and the appellant bears the burden of rebutting this presumption. Id. The trial court's findings and judgment will be set aside only if they are clearly erroneous. Id. A judgment is clearly erroneous when there is no evidence supporting the findings or the findings fail to support the judgment. Id. We will not reweigh evidence or assess the credibility of witnesses. Id. The specific findings control only as to the issues they cover, and a general judgment standard applies to issues upon which the trial court made no findings. Zukerman v. Montgomery, 945 N.E.2d 813, 818 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). A general judgment may be affirmed based on any legal theory supported by the evidence. Angel v. Vanderburgh Cnty. Treasurer, 53 N.E.3d 457, 460 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). When reviewing the trial court's ruling in an adoption proceeding, we will not disturb that ruling unless the evidence leads to but one conclusion and the trial judge reached an opposite conclusion. In re Adoption of T.L., 4 N.E.3d 658, 662 (Ind. 2014).

[13] Ind. Code § 31-19-9-1(a) provides in part that, “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this chapter, a petition to adopt ․ may be granted only if written consent to adoption has been executed” by “[t]he mother of a child born out of wedlock.” However, Ind. Code § 31-19-9-8(a)(2)(B) provides that “[c]onsent to adoption, which may be required under section 1 of this chapter, is not required from” a parent of a child in the custody of another person “if for a period of at least one (1) year the parent ․ knowingly fails to provide for the care and support of the child when able to do so as required by law or judicial decree.” It is well-settled that parents have a common law duty to support their children, and that the duty exists independently of any court order or statute. In re Adoption of E.B., 163 N.E.3d 931, 936-937 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (quotation marks and citations omitted). This Court has previously held that “ ‘the relevant time period’ for determining whether a non-custodial parent has supported his or her child, ‘is not limited to either the year preceding the hearing or the year preceding the petition for adoption, but is any year in which the parent had an obligation and the ability to provide support, but failed to do so.’ ” In re Adoption of M.S., 10 N.E.3d 1272, 1279 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (quoting In re Adoption of J.T.A., 988 N.E.2d 1250, 1255 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), reh'g denied, trans. denied) (emphasis added in In re Adoption of M.S.).⁴

[14] If a petition for adoption alleges that a parent's consent to adoption is unnecessary under Ind. Code § 31-19-9-8(a)(2) and the parent files a motion to contest the adoption, a petitioner for adoption has the burden of proving that the parent's consent to the adoption is unnecessary under Ind. Code § 31-19-9-8. Ind. Code § 31-19-10-1.2(a). “A petitioner for adoption must show that the noncustodial parent had the ability to make the payments that she failed to make.” Matter of Adoption of I.B., 163 N.E.3d 270, 277 (Ind. 2021) (citing In re Adoption of Augustyniak, 508 N.E.2d 1307, 1308 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987), trans. denied). “A court must look at the totality of the circumstances to determine the parent's ability to pay, not just his or her income (or lack of income).” Id. (citing In re Adoption of Augustyniak, 508 N.E.2d at 1308). “Assistance in covering necessary expenses is relevant to a finding that a parent was able to pay child support.” Id. (citing In re Adoption of M.S., 10 N.E.3d at 1281). Further, certain gifts do not constitute support. See id. at 278 n.3 (“Mother did use some of her money to purchase Christmas gifts for Child. But these gifts don't constitute support.”) (citing In re Adoption of M.A.S., 815 N.E.2d 216, 220 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (“The occasional provision of [groceries, diapers, formula, clothing, presents, and cash] are gifts, not child support.”); Irvin v. Hood, 712 N.E.2d 1012, 1013 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (father's provision of six items of clothing and some food did not constitute support of the child)).

[15] Ind. Code § 31-19-10-0.5 provides that “[t]he party bearing the burden of proof in a proceeding under this chapter must prove the party's case by clear and convincing evidence.” The clear and convincing evidence standard is an intermediate standard of proof greater than a preponderance of the evidence and less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. K.H. v. M.M., 151 N.E.3d 1259, 1267 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied. In order to be clear and convincing, the existence of a fact must be highly probable. Id. “The clear and convincing standard is employed in cases where the wisdom of experience has demonstrated the need for greater certainty, and where this high standard is required to sustain claims which have serious social consequences or harsh or far reaching effects on individuals.” Id. (quoting Civil Commitment of T.K. v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 27 N.E.3d 271, 276 (Ind. 2015) (citation and quotations omitted)).

[16] In its order, the trial court found:

10. [T.C.] has never provided for the financial support of [E.H.] to either [D.H.] or to the [Adoptive Parents].

11. [T.C.] testified that she offered to provide financial support for [E.H.] to [Adoptive Parents] electronically or through WalMart gift cards. [T.C.] testified that she would not send cash through the United States Postal Service due to the possibilities that it could be lost or stolen. However, according to [T.C.], [Adoptive Parents] always refused support. She would be told that they did not need it, that [Adoptive Parents] were not receptive to digital transfer of funds and that Walmart was not near by.

12. [T.C.] had the ability to provide funds to [Adoptive Parents] for the support of [E.H.] if she had desired to get funds to them.

13. [T.C.’s] grandmother would regularly send boxes to the [Adoptive Parents] for [E.H.]. Boxes would include things like toys, clothes, diapers, etc. [T.C.] testified that she purchased items to include in the boxes that her grandmother sent. [Adoptive Parents] acknowledge the boxes sent by the grandmother, however, they were without knowledge what items, if any, came from [T.C.]. [T.C.] testified that in-kind items were sent because [Adoptive Parents] would not accept financial forms of contribution. No evidence was submitted as to what particular items came from [T.C.] and what items from [T.C.’s] grandmother.

* * * * *

18. [T.C.] testified that she has been employed. From September, 2023 until August 5, 2024, she worked for Indiana Center For Recovery at $18.00 per hour. She left employment to give birth to a child that she had with her boyfriend. From May of 2022 until September of 2023, she had worked for Federal Express at $23.00 per hour. She testified to being employed at [Saia] Freight from October, 2023 to February 23, 2024 at $500.00 ever [sic] week. She worked at Circle K from July 1, 2023 to October 1, 2023 at $800.00 every two weeks. Before Federal Express, she worked in the health care [sic] for various companies at $13.00 per hour.

19. [T.C.] testified to living with her [mother]. She went to Bloomington for Section 8 housing. She is now cohabitating with a boyfriend. She testified that she has had transportation[,] [a]lthough[ ] she said that she did not have a vehicle during part of 2023. She got around by walking to employment and by relying on other individuals. She also testified that she has received food stamps.

* * * * *

22. Here, evidence does establish that [T.C.] had shelter. She was able to get around to satisfy her employment and needs. [T.C.] had assistance in meeting her expenses from her mother, from the boyfriend with whom she is cohabitating and from government programs.

23. As in J.P. v. V.B. (In re I.B.), 163 N.E.3d 270 (Ind. 2021), “her actual earnings reflect an ability to pay at least a minimal amount of support.” Id.

24. The Court would also note that evidence was presented of an unspecified number of in-kind contributions and gifts. However, occasional gifts do not constitute child support under Indiana Code 31-19-9-8(a)(2)(b). M.A.S. V. Murray, 815 N.E.2d 216, 224 n. 1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004); Irwin v. Hood, 712 N.E.2d 1012, 1013 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999).

25. Indiana Code 31-19-9-8(a)(2)(B) has been satisfied by clear and convincing evidence.

Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 11-14 (some italics added and omitted).

[17] The trial court heard the testimony of multiple witnesses and was able to assess their credibility, weigh their testimony, and observe their demeanors and the family dynamics. D.H. testified that she received boxes from T.C.’s grandmother. On redirect examination, Adoptive Parents’ counsel asked, “You did not receive any boxes from [T.C.]?” Transcript Volume II at 63. D.H. answered, “No I did not.” Id. When asked if “the only financial assistance [she] received from [T.C.] during the two years that you had [E.H.] was a box of diapers,” D.H. answered affirmatively. Id. at 64. Adoptive Parents’ counsel asked, “[W]as it your understanding that the boxes that you received from [T.C.’s grandmother] were only from [T.C.’s grandmother]?” Id. D.H. answered, “Yes, I'm sure they were. She told me that.” Id.

[18] When asked if he received any financial support from T.C. since E.H. came to live with him, Adoptive Father answered, “Very little to none.” Id. at 81. When asked to describe what T.C. had provided financially, Adoptive Father answered, “I've mostly got toys from [T.C.]. I, it is possible that I have received maybe diapers from her at one point, but I can't say for certain whether I have or haven't.” Id. He also indicated that anything T.C. provided had never been on a routine basis and she never provided any cash or monetary assistance. Adoptive Father indicated he did not see any text messages from T.C. offering any cash or periodic cash assistance between February 27, 2022, through September 24, 2023. He also indicated that T.C. knew his address because she sent “some gifts” for E.H. and had been to his house. Id. at 97. Adoptive Parents’ counsel asked, “So, other than these token gifts for [E.H.], has [T.C.] provided any financial support for [E.H.] from February of 2022 until you filed the Petition for Adoption in July of 2023?” Id. at 98. Adoptive Father answered, “No.”⁵ Id.

[19] With respect to her employment and financial situation, T.C. indicated that she was employed at Indiana Center for Recovery between September 2023, and August 5, 2024, and earned eighteen dollars per hour. She indicated that she previously worked at Fed Ex Express where she earned twenty-three dollars per hour,⁶ Saia Freight where she earned about $500 a week between October 1, 2022, and February 23, 2023, and Circle K where she earned $800 every two weeks between July 1, 2023, to October 1, 2023. She indicated that she lived with her mother for a period of time and then obtained an apartment with assistance from Section 8. She acknowledged that she did not give any money to E.H. or Adoptive Father during the times she worked at Fed Ex, Saia Freight, or Circle K. When asked if she had been able to support herself since 2022, T.C. answered affirmatively. In light of the record, we conclude that clear and convincing evidence supports the trial court's findings and order granting the petition for adoption.

[20] As for T.C.’s argument regarding the background checks, Ind. Code § 31-19-2-7.5(b) provides that every petitioner for adoption “shall submit the necessary information, forms, or consents for: (1) a licensed child placing agency; or (2) the local office; that conducts the inspection and investigation required for adoption of a child under IC 31-19-8-5[⁷ ] to conduct a criminal history check (as defined in IC 31-9-2-22.5) of the petitioner as part of its investigation.” Ind. Code § 31-9-2-22.5 in turn defines “Conduct a criminal history check” to include a request that the state police department conduct a national and state fingerprint based criminal history background check or national name based criminal history record check; collection of each substantiated report of child abuse or neglect reported in certain jurisdictions; a check of the national sex offender registry; and a check of local criminal records in every jurisdiction where a person has resided within the previous five years, unless DCS or a court grants an exception to conducting the check.

[21] On January 15, 2024, Adoptive Parents filed a Notice of Filing of Home Study completed by Protect Our Children, a licensed child placing agency. The home study stated the following under the heading “VERIFICATIONS”:

No record was found with Child Protective Services for [Adoptive Father] or [Adoptive Mother] on August 15, 2023. [Adoptive Mother] lived in Illinois prior to moving to Indiana. The Illinois Department of Children and Family Services reported “No Priors” for [Adoptive Mother] on August 16, 2023.

A search of public courts in Indiana revealed no criminal history for [Adoptive Father] or [Adoptive Mother] on August 30, 2023. The National Sex Offender Public Website also indicated no history for [Adoptive Parents] on August 30, 2023.

The results of a fingerprint-based national criminal history background check conducted on August 26, 2023 for [Adoptive Father] and August 24, 2023 for [Adoptive Mother] finds them to be Qualified.

Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 42. The Notice of Filing of Home Study also included documents titled “Inkless – Complete Record Detail” that listed Adoptive Father and Adoptive Mother as the applicants, included Results of “Qualified,” and contained the logo for the Indiana State Police in the letterhead. See id. at 44-45. Based upon the record, we cannot say that reversal is warranted on this basis.

[22] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

[23] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   On February 23, 2024, B.H. filed a consent to the adoption of E.H.

2.   The trial court stated, “It appears that [Cause No. 220] was then actually venued out by the Marion County Clerk on March 11th ․ And it's been docketed in this Court under cause number 41D01-2403-JP-49” (“Cause No. 49”). Transcript Volume II at 37. The court took judicial notice of both causes. Adoptive Parents’ counsel introduced and the court admitted a March 3, 2022 Order Granting Intervenors’ Petition for Modification of Custody under Cause No. 220 which found that E.H.’s best interests were served by placing him with Adoptive Father. The March 3, 2022 order also indicated that the Marion Superior Court Juvenile Division issued an order under cause number 49D14-2001-JC-330 (“Cause No. 330”) finding that E.H. was a child in need of services on April 7, 2020, issued a dispositional decree on May 27, 2020, and issued an order changing E.H.’s permanency plan from reunification to guardianship on November 3, 2021. Indiana's Odyssey Case Management System indicates that the case under Cause No. 330 was closed on March 14, 2022. Odyssey indicates that the Marion Superior Court entered an order under Cause No. 220 on January 19, 2024, which granted Adoptive Father's Motion to Transfer Paternity Proceedings. Odyssey also indicates that the most recent entry in Cause No. 49 occurred in March 2024 and provided that the Johnson Superior Court accepted transfer and assumed jurisdiction.

3.   At the June 5, 2024 hearing, the trial court asked Adoptive Parents’ counsel “what's the one year timeframe” with respect to Ind. Code § 31-19-9-8(a)(2)(B), and counsel answered, “Your Honor, it is the one year prior to the filing, so from 7-21-2022 ․ [u]ntil the day it was filed on 7-21-2023.” Transcript Volume II at 15-16.

4.   In its December 20, 2024 order, the trial court found: “At hearing, [Adoptive Parents], by counsel, represented that ․ the time period under Indiana Code 31-19-9-8(a)(2)(B) was the year prior to filing, namely: July 21, 2022 to July 21, 2023.” Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 10. The court also found: “For purposes of Indiana Code 31-19-9-8(a)(2), the one year period is any one year in which the parent had the obligation. In re Adoption Of J.T.A., 998 N.E.2d 1250, 1255 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). The Court of Appeals held that the one (1) year period did not have to precede the date of filing of the petition for adoption as required under the abandonment provision. Id. At 1254.” Id. (italics added).

5.   In her brief, Mother asserts that she submitted “receipts of items purchased through Amazon and some items she purchased and delivered.” Appellant's Brief at 11 (citing “Tr. Vol. Exhibits p. 49-110”). Many of the documents Mother cites do not identify whether T.C. or her grandmother purchased the items.

6.   When asked how long she worked at Fed Ex Express, T.C. answered, “Since May of I believe it was ’22” and “[n]ot too long before I worked at Indiana Center for Recovery.” Transcript Volume II at 152. Adoptive Parents’ counsel asked, “Well how long?” Id. T.C. answered, “I'm not sure.” Id.

7.   Ind. Code § 31-19-8-5 provides in part:(a) Except as provided in subsection (c), not more than sixty (60) days from the date of reference of a petition for adoption to each appropriate agency:(1) each licensed child placing agency, for a child who is not adjudicated to be a child in need of services; or(2) if the child is the subject of an open child in need of services action, each local office;shall submit to the court a written report of the investigation and recommendation as to the advisability of the adoption.(b) The report and recommendation:(1) shall be filed with the adoption proceedings; and(2) become a part of the proceedings.

Brown, Judge.

Judges Bailey and Weissmann concur. Bailey, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.