S.J. (Mother), Appellant-Respondent v. Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee-Petitioner (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] S.J. (Mother) appeals the termination of her parental rights as to her daughter, S.W. (Daughter).¹ Mother claims the Indiana Department of Child Services (DCS) violated her right to due process by prejudging her case based on her history of losing her parental rights as to five other children and by failing to make reasonable efforts to reunite her with Daughter. But the evidence showed that Mother did not engage in the services offered to her and essentially abandoned Daughter by moving out of state without maintaining contact with DCS or the court. Finding no due process violation, we affirm.

Facts

[2] In June 2023, DCS received a hotline report alleging that then five-month-old Daughter had been left alone several times in a hotel room where the family was living. Upon investigation, DCS found Daughter's father (Father) sitting in a car outside of a hotel room, “partak[ing] in some THC.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 6. Father initially denied having a child, and DCS called police to assist. Father then admitted to being Daughter's father.

[3] Daughter was found alone inside the hotel room, strapped in a car seat that was placed on a bed. She was crying and screaming, and music was blasting at a volume that appeared to be intentionally set to mask the infant's cries. Daughter appeared dirty and unkempt, with visible rashes on her neck and thighs. The hotel room itself was in poor condition: it smelled of marijuana and cigarettes and lacked appropriate bedding for an infant. Father informed DCS that Mother worked at the hotel, but she had fled the premises and refused to return until police left.

[4] Based on these circumstances, DCS removed Daughter, placed her in foster care, and soon after filed a petition to adjudicate Daughter a child in need of services (CHINS). DCS referred Mother to various services providers for drug screening, therapy, and supervised visitation.

[5] As the case progressed, Mother failed to maintain regular contact with DCS. The family case manager, Jessica Nelson (FCM Nelson), later recalled that during this time, Mother's “phone numbers changed frequently” and she “never would really respond back to text messages or phone calls.” Id. at 9. To maintain contact, FCM Nelson had to make unannounced visits to the hotel where Mother lived and worked as a way to “catch her there.” Id.

[6] Mother's participation in services was similarly minimal. She provided just one drug screen in June 2023, and it was positive for THC and cocaine. She completed a clinical assessment that recommended therapy, home-based casework services, and family therapy, but Mother never followed through with any of these recommendations. Mother attended some supervised visits with Daughter, at first twice per week, then once per week. She later stopped visiting Daughter all together.

[7] In October 2023, the trial court conducted a fact-finding hearing on the CHINS petition and found that Daughter was a CHINS. The court ordered Mother and Father to participate in services, including home-based casework, a parenting assessment, and supervised visitation. However, that same month, Mother informed FCM Nelson that she and Father were moving to Florida for a job opportunity. FCM Nelson warned Mother that leaving would jeopardize Daughter's permanency plan, which was still reunification, but Mother stated that “she had to go with [Father].” Id. at 11.

[8] After the reported move, Mother had no contact with DCS or Daughter and did not participate in any services. Mother failed to attend court hearings or case meetings, even though they were conducted both virtually and in-person. FCM Nelson tried to locate Mother in Florida through investigative referrals, letters to her last known address, and through Mother's older children who were still in touch with her. These efforts were largely unsuccessful until March 2024, when DCS reached Mother through a new phone number. FCM Nelson told Mother that the plan for reunification was still in place. Mother responded that “because she had lost her rights to the previous children ․ she thought that she didn't have a chance to get [Daughter] back.” Id. at 13. FCM Nelson scheduled a virtual case meeting with Mother, but Mother did not attend.

[9] After this failed meeting in March 2024, DCS lost all contact with Mother for months. DCS petitioned to terminate Mother's parental rights in July 2024, but did not locate Mother until November 2024, when DCS received a hotline tip that she had given birth to a drug-exposed infant at an Indiana hospital. Mother had not notified DCS that she had returned to Indiana. When FCM Nelson interviewed Mother at the hospital, Mother did not mention or ask about Daughter at all.

[10] Soon after, Mother failed to appear at the termination hearing. There, FCM Nelson recounted Mother's minimal initial participation in services, lack of communication with DCS, and virtual abandonment of Daughter's case upon moving to Florida. Nearly two years old by the time of the hearing, Daughter had been living in foster care for most of her life. FCM Nelson testified to her success there, stating that she was “doing amazing,” meeting her milestones, and “even talking, walking, and being very self-sufficient.” Id. at 15. Her foster parents had completed all the requirements to adopt her, and Daughter had never “known anyone else as her parents.” Id. at 16. After hearing the evidence, the trial court terminated Mother's parental rights to Daughter.

[11] Mother appeals the termination, claiming that DCS's actions violated her due process rights.

Discussion and Decision

[12] The Fourteenth Amendment protects “the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children.” Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000). When the State seeks to terminate parental rights, “it must do so in a manner that meets the requirements of due process.” In re G.P., 4 N.E.3d 1158, 1165 (Ind. 2014) (citation omitted).

[13] Determining whether a parent's due process rights have been violated requires balancing three factors: “(1) the private interests affected by the proceeding; (2) the risk of error created by the State's chosen procedure; and (3) the countervailing governmental interest supporting use of the challenged procedure.” In re K.D., 962 N.E.2d 1249, 1257 (Ind. 2012). Both a parent's interest in maintaining their parental rights and the State's interest in protecting children's welfare are substantial. S.L. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 997 N.E.2d 1114, 1120 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). Therefore, we typically focus our analysis on the risk of error created by the State's actions. Id.

[14] Mother argues that her due process rights were violated by DCS's failure to make reasonable efforts to provide her reunification services, particularly after she moved to Florida. Though due process requires that “DCS must have made reasonable efforts to preserve and/or reunify the family unit” in the underlying CHINS case, those required efforts “vary by case.” In re T.W., 135 N.E.3d 607, 615 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019).

[15] Here, the record demonstrates that DCS went above and beyond to work with Mother despite her lack of effort. DCS made referrals for all court-ordered services and facilitated contact between Mother and the service providers. When traditional contact methods proved ineffective in reaching Mother, DCS adapted its approach by making in-person visits. After Mother moved to Florida against FCM Nelson's explicit warning, DCS still attempted to maintain contact through various means. FCM Nelson ultimately offered virtual meeting options—precisely the type of remote accommodation Mother now claims DCS should have provided—but Mother still failed to show up.

[16] Parents “may not sit idly by without asserting a need or desire for services and then successfully argue that [they were] denied services.” In re B.D.J., 728 N.E.2d 195, 201 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). Though Mother now claims that DCS should have offered her services in person in Florida or by virtual means, she never once requested such services and would not stay in touch with FCM Nelson. This demonstrates that Mother's limited participation in Daughter's case was a matter of choice rather than lack of opportunity.

[17] Also unavailing is Mother's related argument that DCS prejudged her case and therefore gave up on reunification due to her history with the department. DCS's awareness of Mother's history did not stop it from offering her reunification services during the thirteen months between the CHINS determination and the termination hearing. DCS's efforts included: (1) making referrals for court-ordered services; (2) facilitating supervised visitation; (3) obtaining a dispositional order with the goal of reunification; (4) maintaining reunification as the permanency plan for seven months after Mother abandoned services; (5) attempting to find Mother in Florida; and (6) re-engaging Mother in March 2024. We therefore cannot agree with Mother's contentions that there was “no evidence of any sincere attempt by [DCS] to engage Mother” or that “DCS had given up on [her] family.” Appellant's Br., p. 10-11.

[18] Because Mother has not shown that DCS failed to make reasonable efforts to provide reunification services, her due process claim fails. Even if DCS had failed to make these efforts, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of Mother's rights was minimal given the ample evidence supporting the termination.

[19] The conditions that led to Daughter's removal—substance abuse, lack of supervision, and unsafe living conditions—remained unremedied by the time of the termination hearing. Mother never participated in court-ordered services like substance abuse treatment, parenting classes, and therapy. A week before the termination hearing, she gave birth to a drug-exposed infant, demonstrating her continued substance use. Mother had no contact with Daughter for more than a year, and she ultimately exhibited the same pattern of minimal participation in her child's case that led to the termination of her parental rights as to five other children. Courts “must consider [a] parent's habitual patterns of conduct as a means of determining the probability of future detrimental behavior. In re B.D.J., 728 N.E.2d at 201.

[20] The record overwhelmingly demonstrates that the conditions causing Daughter's removal were unlikely to be remedied, that continuing the parent-child relationship posed a threat to Daughter's well-being, and that Daughter's foster parents were ready to adopt her. See Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c) (requirements for termination as alleged in the petition). We find no error and affirm the trial court's termination of Mother's parental rights as to Daughter.

[21] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Daughter's father also had his parental rights terminated, but he does not participate in this appeal.

Weissmann, Judge.

Judges Bailey and Brown concur. Bailey, J., and Brown, J. concur.