IN RE: the Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights of: A.K. (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] N.K. (“Father”) and A.A. (“Mother”) appeal the termination of their parental rights to A.K., Bra.K., X.K., and K.K. (collectively, “Mutual Children”). Father also appeals the termination of his parental rights to Bre.K. and N.K. Jr. (collectively, “Older Children”) (collectively with Mutual Children, “All Children”). Father presents one issue for our review regarding the termination of his parental rights to All Children, which we restate as whether the trial court's findings support its conclusion that termination of Father's parental rights to All Children was in the children's best interests. Mother presents two issues for our review:

1. Whether the trial court's findings supported its conclusion that the conditions under which Mutual Children were removed from Mother's care would not be remedied; and

2. Whether the trial court's findings supported its conclusion that there was a satisfactory plan for Mutual Children's care following termination of Mother's parental rights.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Mother and Father are the parents of A.K., born June 18, 2018; Bra.K. and X.K., born July 5, 2017; and K.K., born July 9, 2016. Father is also the father of Bre.K.,¹ born January 4, 2012, and N.K. Jr.,² born May 25, 2014. Prior to the facts discussed herein, All Children lived with Mother and Father.

[4] On August 31, 2022, the Department of Child Services (“DCS”) received a series of anonymous reports alleging “lack of supervision, one child had a black eye, [Mother] had relapsed into drug use and had mental health issues, and one of the children had taken a pill bottle to school.” (Mother's App. Vol. II at 32.) Family Case Manager Jamie Quire (“FCM Quire”) investigated the reports in “September or October of 2022[.]” (Tr. Vol. II at 23.) Upon arriving at the family home, she discovered Mother “on the floor, she had been having seizures” and “it just appeared that the family was just in a really – in a state of crisis and there was just a lot of chaos.” (Id. at 24.) FCM Quire spoke with Father, who admitted he had fought with Mother, Mother was having seizures, and Mother was having mental health issues. FCM Quire also spoke with Mother, who indicated that she was having seizures but did not know why, that she had relapsed into methamphetamine use, and that she was experiencing mental health issues.

[5] On October 19, 2022, DCS filed petitions alleging All Children were Children in Need of Services (“CHINS”) because All Children had been the subject of a former CHINS proceeding, Mother and Father struggled with their mental health, and Mother and Father struggled with addiction to illegal substances. All Children were initially allowed to stay in the family home; however they were removed on November 3, 2022, because of “[Mother's] methamphetamine use, domestic violence in the home, the family's impending eviction from their home, and the second oldest child was not receiving medical services for cerebral palsy.” (Mother's App. Vol. II at 33.) All Children were placed in foster homes, where they have remained throughout these proceedings.

[6] On December 19, 2022, the trial court held a fact-finding hearing. During the hearing Mother and Father admitted they had substance abuse problems and needed assistance from DCS. The same day, the trial court adjudicated All Children as CHINS. On January 13, 2023, the trial court entered its dispositional decree. Father was required to, as is relevant here, maintain appropriate housing, maintain a legal source of income, complete a substance abuse assessment and complete all recommended services, refrain from using illegal substances, and provide random drug screens. In addition, the trial court ordered Father to attend “father engagement services[,]” attend supervised visitation with All Children, engage in case management services, and participate individual therapy. (Ex. Vol. I at 36.)

[7] As part of its dispositional order, the trial court noted Mother had “volunteered to participate in, and has been admitted to, the Family Recovery Court (FRC) program.” (Id. at 34.) The Family Recovery Court (“FRC”) was designed to designed to “support [Mother] with [her] substance use, getting [her] treatment, and getting [her] through [her] DCS case.” (Tr. Vol. II at 159.) As to that program, the trial court ordered Mother to “follow all requirements and successfully complete the terms of participation in the FRC program.” (Ex. Vol. I at 34.) In addition, the trial court ordered Mother to, as is relevant here, maintain appropriate housing, maintain a legal source of income, complete a substance abuse assessment and complete all recommended services, refrain from using illegal substances, and provide random drug screens, attend supervised visitation with Mutual Children, engage in case management services, and participate in individual therapy.

[8] Father was partially compliant with services. Father attended sessions with an individual recovery coach to help him with his substance abuse from October 2022 to March 2024, but did not complete the program because of “[a]ttendance and lack of engagement.” (Tr. Vol. II at 104.) Father also attended a Relapse Prevention group to help with his substance abuse recovery, but he was removed from the group because he began drinking alcohol. Over the course of the CHINS case, Father missed fifty-six of ninety-seven random drug screens. Most completed screens were negative for drugs, but he tested positive for alcohol four times.

[9] On February 3, 2023, Father pled guilty to Level 6 felony operating a vehicle while intoxicated in a manner that endangered a person,³ based on an incident that occurred prior to the CHINS adjudication. The criminal court sentenced Father to one year of incarceration but ordered execution of the sentence suspended to probation. The criminal court also suspended his driving privileges for one year.

[10] Father also participated in individual therapy, where he made some progress and “understood what the issues were, [but] it was just hard to implement [the therapy techniques] outside of the office.” (Id. at 113.) Father consistently participated in the father engagement program. He attended supervised visitation with Mutual Children, which initially “went pretty well” but “towards the end ․ children were acting out a lot[.]” (Id. at 179.) Father did not consistently visit with Older Children and supervised visitation with All Children was temporarily suspended by the trial court because of some of the children's “negative behaviors, including violent outburst, following the parenting time sessions, in part because of confusions about when the children may return to Mother's and/or Father's care after conversations with Mother and/or Father.” (Ex. Vol. I at 59.) Home-based Service Caseworker Lisa Dampier worked with Father on housing, budgeting, employment, and transportation. Father was “good at getting jobs, but hop[ped] around from job to job, looking for more money.” (Mother's App. Vol. II at 38.) Father and Dampier working on “developing a budget” but Dampier did not know if Father was following it. (Id.)

[11] Mother was also partially compliant with services. She met with a substance abuse counselor and was making progress, but the counselor was concerned that Mother continued to hang out with “[p]eople that we know that [she] used [drugs] with.” (Tr. Vol. II at 78.) Mother attempted multiple substance abuse programs, but she did not complete any of them. Mother attended group sessions designed to assist with substance abuse recovery but was ultimately removed from the group because she stopped attending.

[12] Mother participated in FRC and made some progress. From July 2023 to January 2024, Mother tested negative for illegal substances but admitted drinking alcohol starting in November 2023. After she started drinking alcohol she became “inconsistent with her meetings with her providers.” (Id. at 159.) Mother ultimately “had to be released” from Family Recovery Court “due to a conflict of interest that arose with appointment of a new FRC judge.” (Mother's App. Vol. II at 40.) Between November 1, 2022, and October 28, 2024, Mother tested positive nine times for methamphetamine. Mother also participated in individual therapy from November 2023 to February 2024 but attended only four visits during that time frame.

[13] Mother struggled with employment. She was able to obtain jobs but lost them shortly thereafter. She told DCS that she lost jobs because she had seizures, though one employer reported Mother was “terminated for coming to work while intoxicated” and possessing what the employer “classified as a crack pipe.” (Tr. Vol. III at 16.)

[14] Mother attended seventeen of her twenty-two supervised visits with Mutual Children. During the visits, Mother had difficulty “having [a] routine” with Mutual Children and “keeping them together and disciplined[.]” (Tr. Vol. II at 177.) DCS suspended these visits in early March 2024 because of Mutual Children's behavior during and after visitation.

[15] On October 22, 2024, based on Mother's and Father's noncompliance with services, DCS filed petitions to terminate Father's parental rights to All Children and to terminate Mother's parental rights to Mutual Children. On November 18, 2024, Father was arrested and subsequently charged with Level 6 felony operating a vehicle while intoxicated.⁴ On December 17, 2024, Mother was arrested and subsequently charged with Class A misdemeanor operating a vehicle while intoxicated,⁵ Class A misdemeanor driving while suspended,⁶ and Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement ⁷ after being found intoxicated and slumped over in her car.⁸ On December 20, 2024, Father pled guilty to Level 6 felony operating a vehicle while intoxicated. The trial court sentenced Father to “two and a half (2 1/2) years of incarceration, with two (2) months being executed in jail and twenty-eight (28) months being suspended with formal probationary supervision[.]” (Mother's App. Vol. II at 43.) In addition, the trial court suspended Father's driver's license for one year.

[16] On January 8, 2025, the trial court held a fact-finding hearing on the termination petitions. The trial court heard testimony regarding Mother's progress in services, Father's progress in services, and their supervised visits. The trial court also heard testimony regarding All Children's placements. On January 12, 2025, the trial court terminated Mother's parental rights to Mutual Children and Father's parental rights to All Children.

Discussion and Decision

[17] Mother and Father appeal the trial court's orders terminating their respective parental rights. “The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children.” In re A.L., 223 N.E.3d 1126, 1137 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023). However, a juvenile court must subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the child when evaluating the circumstances surrounding a termination. Id. The termination of parental rights is appropriate when parents are “unable or unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities[.]” Id. (quoting Bester v. Lake Cnty. Ofc. of Family & Children, 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005)). The termination of the parent-child relationship is “an ‘extreme measure’ and should only be utilized as a ‘last resort when all other reasonable efforts to protect the integrity of the natural relationship between parent and child have failed.’ ” K.E. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 39 N.E.3d 641, 646 (Ind. 2015) (quoting Rowlett v. Vanderburgh Cnty. Ofc. of Family & Children, 841 N.E.2d 615, 623 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006)).

[18] To terminate a parent-child relationship in Indiana, DCS must allege and prove “one (1) or more” of the circumstances listed in Indiana Code section 31-35-2- 4(d). Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c). As relevant here, Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(d) provides DCS can prove:

(3) That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(4) That there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being, safety, physical health, or life of the child.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(d) (2024). In addition, DCS must prove that termination is in the children's best interests, Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c)(3) (2024), and that there exists a satisfactory plan for the children's care following termination. Ind. Code 31-35-2-4(c)(2) (2024). DCS must provide clear and convincing proof of these allegations at the termination hearing. In re T.W., 135 N.E.3d 607, 612 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied. “[I]f the State fails to prove any one of these statutory elements, then it is not entitled to a judgment terminating parental rights.” Id. at 1261. Because parents have a constitutionally protected right to establish a home and raise their children, the State “must strictly comply” with the statutory requirements for terminating parental rights. In re Q.M., 974 N.E.2d 1021, 1024 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (quoting Platz v. Elkhart Cnty. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 631 N.E.2d 16, 18 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994)).

[19] When reviewing a trial court's termination of parental rights,

we do not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility. We consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that are most favorable to the judgment and give due regard to the trial court's unique opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses. We will set aside the trial court's judgment only if it is clearly erroneous.

In re V.A., 51 N.E.3d 1140, 1143 (Ind. 2016) (internal quotations and citations omitted). When, as here, a judgment contains specific findings of fact and conclusions thereon, we apply a two-tiered standard of review. In re Adoption of T.L., 4 N.E.3d 658, 662 (Ind. 2014). First, we must determine whether the evidence supports the findings and then whether the findings support the trial court's judgment. Id. A finding is clearly erroneous when the record lacks evidence or reasonable inferences from the evidence to support it. Steele-Giri v. Steele, 51 N.E.3d 119, 125 (Ind. 2016). “We accept unchallenged findings as true.” Henderson v. Henderson, 139 N.E.3d 227, 232 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019).

1. Father's Argument

[20] Father argues the trial court's findings do not support its conclusion that termination of his parental rights to All Children was in their best interests. When considering whether termination of a parent's rights is in a child's best interests, the trial court is “required to look at the totality of the evidence.” Z.B. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 108 N.E.3d 895, 903 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied. When it does so, the trial court “must subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the children involved.” Id. The trial court “need not wait until a child is irreversibly harmed” before terminating the parent-child relationship. Id. Additionally, testimony from service providers may support a finding that termination is in a child's best interests. Id.

[21] Father directs us to findings regarding his compliance with services and progress made toward the goal of reunification and contends: “Leaving [the] children in their current placements to provide Father more time to establish stability would allow the children to eventually be reunited with Father and with one another.” (Father's Br. at 12.) He asserts giving him more time to complete services and obtain stability “also would not create a hardship on the children because their placements would not change until Father was able to bring them home.” (Id.)

[22] Father's argument, however, ignores the multitude of unchallenged findings that support the trial court's conclusion. Regarding Father's participation in services, the trial court found:

53 [Brooke Kidd, a Recovery Coach] took Father through Recovery 101 orientation in October 2022. She worked with Father again in the Relapse Prevention group in January and February 2024. Father attended six (6) session[s] and was removed due to [a] relapse with alcohol.

* * * * *

58. [Huston Clark] worked with Father, starting in October 2022, as a Recovery Coach, and in July 2023 in the Living in Balance group. Father did not complete Living in Balance, and was removed due to attendance issues.

59. Mr. Clark suggested to Father that he might benefit from inpatient treatment, however Father declined due to employment obligations.

* * * * *

72. During her work with Father [starting in April 2024], [Care Coordinator Lisa Dampier] noticed that Father is good about getting jobs, but hops from job to job, looking for more money. While they worked on developing a budget, she was not sure Father was following it.

73. Ms. Dampier's assessment is that alcohol abuse is Father's main issue.

* * * * *

91. Parenting time was suspended for Father and [Mother] in early 2024.

* * * * *

98. [Ireland Home-based Services Case Worker Byron Certain] felt that Father made progress while in this service, noting that it is difficult to find good housing in the area, and further noting that Father was good about finding jobs, but did not keep them long.

* * * * *

101. Mr. Certain still supervises some parenting time sessions for Father and [All Children]. He has observed that [Older Children] are usually excited about visiting with Father, however when Father was recently incarcerated, both boys told Mr. Certain that they were tired of the “back and forth” and just wanted things to wrap up one way or the other.

* * * * *

104. [Home-based case worker Melissa Krepp] worked with Father, starting in November 2024, while Father was incarcerated. They met six (6) or seven (7) times, focusing on sobriety, housing, and employment.

105. Father refused to meet with Ms. Krepp on December 23, 2024. Ms. Krepp went to the jail, [Father] was brought to the meeting room, but said he was not going to “do it” and left.

106. Father had not met with Ms. Krepp since his release from jail.

107. Cindy Gilmore is a case worker for Ireland Home-Based Services. She was assigned to provide supervised visits for Father and [All Children] in early 2024. She called and texted Father, but got no response and was not able to provide any services for him.

108. Peyton Haney is a case worker for Ireland Home-Based Services. She was assigned to work with Father and [Mother] in November 2024. She texted them, left voicemail messages for them, and tried to locate them in person at a hotel in Batesville, but was not able to make contact and provided no services as a result.

(Mother's App. Vol. II at 37-40) (emphases in original omitted). The trial court also made findings about Father's criminal history:

144. Father was on probation following conviction for Operating While Intoxicated in March 2021. He completed his probation supervision requirements early, and was released from probation in June 2021.

145. On February 3, 2023, Father pleaded “guilty” to one count of Operating While Intoxicated, a Level 6 Felony, in Union County. He was sentenced to one (1) year of incarceration. The sentence was suspended in full, and he was placed on formal probation and ordered to serve sixty (60) days of home detention. A one (1) year license suspension was imposed.

146. On November 18, 2024, Deputy Nicholas Mustin of the Fayette County (Indiana) Sheriff's Department conducted a traffic stop in Connersville. He found Father to be the driver of the vehicle he had stopped.

147. Deputy Mustin noted that Father smelled of alcohol, and that there was an open alcohol container and a “shooter” of alcohol in the vehicle's center console. He arrested Father and took him to jail.

148. On December 20, 2024, Father plead guilty to Operating While Intoxicated as a Level 6 Felony, in Fayette County. He was sentenced to two and a half (2 1/2) years of incarceration, with two (2) months being executed in jail and twenty-eight (28) months being suspended with formal probationary supervision, and a one (1) year license suspension was imposed.

(Id. at 43) (internal citations to the record omitted).

[23] Additionally, the trial court found “Father and [Mother] changed residences several times and lived in several different cities. They moved into a large home with rent of $1200 per month and got behind on rent payments quickly. They received rental assistance that caught them up, but once again fell in arrears.” (Id.) Finally, the trial court found that Karen Bowen, the Court Appointed Special Advocate felt “termination of parental rights is in the children's best interests[.]” (Id. at 45.) In its conclusion that termination of Father's parental rights to All Children was in their best interests, the trial court stated:

The evidence also clearly and convincingly supports the conclusion that termination of the parent-child relationship is in each child's best interest. As noted above, the children have remain[ed] placed outside of their parents’ care for over two (2) full years now. During that time, [Father and Mother] have participated in a broad spectrum of reunification services, but have not advanced their ability to parent or provide a home for their children․ The children have remained emotionally and mentally scarred, most of them exhibiting extreme behaviors requiring high levels of care. The children are now in services and specialized placements have been arranged for their care.

(Id. at 46.)

[24] Father's focus on the findings that suggest that he made progress in services ignores those findings noting Father's failure to complete services and his ongoing alcohol abuse issues. All Children need stability and cannot languish, waiting for Father to engage in court-ordered services so that he is able to properly care for them. See Baker v. Marion Cnty. OFC, 810 N.E.2d 1035, 1040 n.4 (Ind. 2004) (limitations on trial court's ability to approve long-term foster care are designed to ensure a child does not “languish, forgotten, in custodial limbo for long periods of time without permanency”) (quoting In re Priser, No. 19861, 2004 WL 541124 at *6 (Ohio Ct. App. March 19, 2004)). In the two years since All Children were removed from Father's care, he had not completed numerous services, continued using alcohol, and was unable to obtain and maintain employment. Because of his December 2024 conviction, Father was on probation and his license was suspended. Because he had not completed numerous services and continued using alcohol, the trial court concluded, and Father does not challenge, that the conditions under which All Children were removed from his care were not remedied. See, e.g., In re A.P., 882 N.E.2d 799, 809 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (father's failure to visit with child and participate in services, as well as pending criminal charges, supported the trial court's conclusion that conditions under which child was removed from his care would not be remedied), reh'g denied.

[25] Further, the trial court found that All Children were making progress in their individual placements and were receiving services to address their behavioral issues. Finally, the trial court found that the Court Appointed Special Advocate felt that termination of Father's parental rights was in All Children's best interests. Therefore, we conclude the trial court's findings support its conclusion that termination of Father's parental rights was in All Children's best interest. See, e.g., In re N.G., 51 N.E.3d 1167, 1173 (Ind. 2016) (trial court's findings that mother had not benefitted from services and that the Court Appointed Special Advocate and Guardian Ad Litem testified termination was in children's best interests supported its conclusion that termination of mother's parental rights was in the child's best interests).

2. Mother's Arguments

2.1. Conditions Under Which Mutual Children Were Removed

[26] Mother contends the trial court's findings do not support its conclusion that the conditions under which Mutual Children were removed from her care would not be remedied. When considering whether the conditions under which a child is removed from a parent's care would be remedied, we engage in a two-step analysis. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 642-3 (Ind. 2014). First, we identify the reasons for the child's removal and then we determine whether there is a reasonable probability those conditions will be remedied. Id. at 643. As we stated in In re A.L.:

It is well-established that “[a] trial court must judge a parent's fitness as of the time of the termination hearing and take into consideration evidence of changed conditions.” In judging fitness, a trial court may properly consider, among other things, a parent's substance abuse and lack of adequate housing and employment. The trial court may also consider a parent's failure to respond to services. “[H]abitual patterns of conduct must be evaluated to determine whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation.” A trial court “need not wait until the child[ ] [is] irreversibly influenced by [its] deficient lifestyle such that [its] physical, mental and social growth is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship.”

223 N.E.3d 1126, 1138-9 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (internal citations omitted) (brackets in original).

[27] Mother directs us to findings that support her contentions that she “made great strides in addressing the concerns regarding her mental health and substance abuse” and that she had engaged “with a significant number of providers throughout the case and successfully completed evaluations and programs.” (Mother's Br. at 8.) She also asks that we consider that she participated successfully in Family Recovery Court and therein was “communicative and compliant and had obtained sobriety – returning negative drug screens consistently for a substantial period.” (Id.) Mother asserts that “with the correct supports, Mother can remedy the circumstances” under which Mutual Children were removed from her care. (Id.)

[28] Mother's argument, however, ignores the multitude of unchallenged findings that support the trial court's conclusion. Regarding Mother's participation in services, the trial court found:

46. [Vera Crowl, a Peer Recovery Specialist with Centerstone] worked with [Mother] through October 2023. At that point, [Mother] moved from the area and Ms. Crowl lost track of her.

47. During the time she worked with [Mother], Ms. Crowley [sic] could not get her to change her friends that she was getting high with. Regarding sobriety, Ms. Crowley [sic] noted of [Mother] that “she could get there, she couldn't stay there.”

* * * * *

50. [Brook Kidd, a Recovery Coach for Centerstone] worked with [Mother] again in April 2023, when [Mother] was put into the Relapse Prevention group. [Mother] attended two sessions, and was moved to a different group (Living in Balance) because she was being disruptive and was not ready for the level of care provided in the Relapse Prevention program.

51. [Mother] eventually made it back to the Relapse Prevention group. She did four (4) sessions and was removed again in November 2023, due to not showing up.

52. During her work with [Mother], Ms. Kidd observed periods of sustained sobriety, two to three months at a time, but no change in [Mother's] lifestyle, leading to repeated relapse.

* * * * *

65. [Lucas Krickenbarger, a therapist at Centerstone was] scheduled to meet with [Mother] every other week [for individual therapy]. She only attended one time in November, not at all in December, twice in January, and only once in February.

* * * * *

78. [Shelley Wilburn-Flemming, a Recovery Coach at Centerstone who worked with Mother on her substance abuse issues starting in August 2024] has not heard from [Mother] since October 2024, and had heard that [Mother] had possibly moved.

* * * * *

80. [Mother] received inpatient substance use treatment two times at Volunteers of America (“VOA”). She was at a VOA facility in Indianapolis for seven (7) days in October 2022, and at a facility in Columbus for thirty (30) days in March 2023.

81. The VOA program is eighty-four days, if the participant completes both phases. In both instances, [Mother] left the treatment facility before completing the program.

* * * * *

87. During the time [Jessica Morgan, a home-based caseworker for Ireland Home-Based Services] was supervising parenting time for [Mother] and [Mutual Children], there were twenty-two (22) possible sessions. [Mother] missed five (5) of the possible sessions. Some sessions were wrapped up early, due to [Mother] not being able to control [Mutual Children].

88. Ms. Morgan noticed that it was tough to get [Mutual Children] back into the transport vehicle after visits wrapped up.

89. [Mother] became hostile to Ms. Morgan at the last session.

* * * * *

91. Parenting time was suspended for Father and [Mother] in early 2024.

92. Ms. Morgan stopped providing the home-based case work services for [Mother] around the same time that parenting time was suspended.

* * * * *

102. Melissa Krepp is a home-based case worker for Ireland Home-Based Services, and in June 2024 was assigned to work with [Mother]. They met for two to three weeks, focusing on sobriety and employment.

103. Ms. Krepp lost contact with [Mother] when [Mother] moved and changed phones.

* * * * *

108. Peyton Haney is a case worker for Ireland Home-Based Services. She was assigned to work with Father and [Mother] in November 2024. She texted them, left voice mail messages for them, and tried to locate them in person at a hotel in Batesville, but was not able to make contact and provided no services as a result.

109. [Mother] joined the local Family Recovery Court (“FRC”) program in January 2023.

* * * * *

112. From July 2023 through January 2024, [Mother] had only “negative” drug screens as part of the FRC, however she started using alcohol around November 2023.

113. [Mother] had to be released from FRC in February 2024, due to a conflict of interest that arose with appointment of a new FRC judge.

(Mother's App. Vol. II at 37-40) (emphases in original omitted). In addition, the trial court made findings regarding Mother's arrest in December 2024:

140. On December 13, 2024, Deputy Lunsford investigated a single-car accident in which the involved vehicle had hit a floodgate.

141. Deputy Lunsford found [Mother] in the car, slumped over, and that she exhibited signs of alcohol intoxication. [Mother] admitted to Deputy Lunsford that she had drank quite a bit.

142. [Mother] exhibited seizures on the side of the road, and Deputy Lunsford took her to a local hospital. She denied treatment, removed an IV that had been started in her arm, and threw the IV at the attending doctor. Deputy Lunsford then arrested [Mother] and took her to jail.

143. On December 17, 2024, [Mother] was charged with OWI, Driving While Suspended, and Resisting Law Enforcement misdemeanors, in Fayette County.

(Id. at 42-3) (citations to the record omitted). The trial court also found Mother changed residences multiple times during the proceedings and was unable to secure and maintain housing despite rental assistance. Based on these findings, the trial court concluded:

Additionally, despite reasonable efforts made by the DCS to preserve and reunify the children's family, their respective parents have been unable to remedy the circumstances that resulted in the children being removed from home in the first place. As detailed in the findings of fact set out above, the DCS has provided a huge array of services for [Mother] and Father. For the most part, they both participated in services, completing many of them. Nonetheless, they have not moved off of square one. They both continue to struggle mightily with substance use issues that greatly impact their ability to parent their children, and those substance use issues have turned into criminal matters as recently as the few weeks prior to this trial. They have not established a consistent income for their family. They have moved multiple times, being evicted from various houses and apartments, and still do not have a home for the children to return to.

(Id. at 45-6.)

[29] While Mother made some progress, the trial court's findings indicate that she was unable to maintain sobriety. Mother did not complete substance abuse recovery, frequently relapsing into substance abuse or failing to attend those services, which resulted in removal therefrom. When Mother visited Mutual Children, she was unable to manage their behavior and Mutual Children frequently left visits exhibiting poor behavior. Mutual Children need permanency and that need is greater than continued efforts for family reunification when Mother has not made a consistent effort to participate in or complete services. See, e.g., In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 649 (Ind. 2014) (children's need for permanency was more important than giving father additional time to complete services when he had not done so after three and a half years). Based thereon, we determine the trial court's findings support its conclusion that the conditions under which Mutual Children were removed from Mother's care would not be remedied. See, e.g., In re C.S., 190 N.E.3d 434, 439 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (mother's continued drug use, pending criminal charges, and inability to demonstrate she could care for her child supported the trial court's conclusion that the conditions under which child was removed from her care would not be remedied), trans. denied.

2.2. Satisfactory Plan for Mutual Children

[30] Mother argues the trial court's findings do not support its conclusion that there was a satisfactory plan for Mutual Children's care following termination of her rights. Pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(c)(2), DCS must set forth a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the children following termination of parental rights. “This plan need not be detailed, so long as it offers a general sense of the direction in which the child will be going after the parent-child relationship is terminated.” In re J.C., 994 N.E.2d 278, 290 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (quoting In re L.B., 889 N.E.2d 326, 341 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), abrogated on other grounds by In re G.P., 4 N.E.3d 1158, 1163-4 (Ind. 2014)).

[31] Regarding the post-termination plans for Mutual Children, the trial court found:

160. Jennifer Carroll is an adoption facilitator with the DCS, and helps find pre-adoptive homes for children.

* * * * *

162. [A.K.] is visiting with a pre-adoptive home at this time. Ms. Carroll feels the visits have gone well, and have advanced to overnight visits. [A.K] is an attention seeker, and this preadoptive home was specially selected because there are no other children, and the parents will be able to give extra attention to [A.K.].

163. [X.K.] is in a pre-adoptive home, as his foster parents have agreed to adopt him.

164. [Bra.K.] has been in a pre-adoptive home since August 2024. He exhibits tantrums and defiance, and the pre-adoptive home has done a good job of contacting Ms. Carroll for help in dealing with those behaviors.

165. As of the date of this trial for the TPR cases, [K.K.] has been at DAMAR for a thirty (30) day diagnostic evaluation. She will return to her foster home in Elkhart County soon. A preadoptive home has been identified for [K.K.], and she has started visiting with that family. She has been kicked out of school twice due to aggressive behaviors. The preadoptive mother works with the local schools and works with children who exhibit difficult behaviors.

* * * * *

167. The six (6) children are in six (6) different placements. All of the pre-adoptive homes set out above have agreed to maintain contact between the sibling group.

168. Ms. Carroll regularly checks in with each placement and provides them support as needed.

(Mother's App. Vol. II at 44.) Based on those findings, the trial court concluded “the evidence clearly and convincingly established that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of each child, that plan being adoption.” (Id. at 46.)

[32] Mother contends the trial court's findings do not support its conclusion that there exists a satisfactory plan for the care of Mutual Children because they have “been in separate placements throughout the entirety of the case and the plan is to keep the children separated in adoptive placements.” (Mother's Br. at 9.) She also asserts that Mutual Children “have behavioral [problems] and other issues which require assistance, yet there is little to no evidence regarding what treatment plan exists for Children” after termination of her parental rights. (Id.) Finally, Mother argues that while the trial court made findings about potential adoptive families, “this is insufficient given the myriad of placement disruptions [Mutual Children] have faced.” (Id.)

[33] The trial court made findings that Mutual Children were all in pre-adoptive homes. The trial court also made findings about support available to Mutual Children following the termination of Mother's parental rights. Additionally, the trial court found Carroll regularly interacts with each of Mutual Children's placements and provides them support if they need it. Based thereon, we conclude the trial court's findings support its conclusion that there existed a satisfactory plan for Mutual Children's care following termination of Mother's parental rights. See, e.g., In re A.S., 17 N.E.3d 994, 1007 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (post-termination plan for care of children does not have to include a guarantee that children will be adopted by pre-adoptive placement, and the plan is satisfactory “even if the plan is for the children to have separate adoptive homes”), trans. denied.

Conclusion

[34] The trial court's findings support its conclusion that the termination of Father's parental rights is in the best interests of All Children. The trial court's findings also support its conclusions that the conditions under which Mutual Children were removed from Mother's care would not be remedied and that there was a satisfactory plan for Mutual Children's care following termination of Mother's rights. Accordingly, we affirm.

[35] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Bre.K.’s mother is Ka.K. Ka.K.’s parental rights to Bre.K. were also terminated, but she does not participate in this appeal

2.   N.K. Jr.’s mother is N.M. N.M. signed a consent to N.K. Jr.’s adoption and does not participate in this appeal.

3.   Ind. Code § 9-30-5-2(b) (operating a vehicle while intoxicated in a manner that endangers a person); Ind. Code § 9-30-5-3(a) (crimes described in Ind. Code § 9-30-5-2 enhanced to Level 6 felony when a person has a prior conviction of operating a vehicle while intoxicated within seven years prior to commission of the current crime).

4.   Ind. Code § 9-30-5-3(a).

5.   Ind. Code § 9-30-5-1(b).

6.   Ind. Code § 9-24-19-2.

7.   Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-1(a) (2024).

8.   The record does not indicate the outcome of Mother's case.

May, Judge.

Judges Mathias and Bradford concur. Mathias, J., and Bradford, J., concur.