Stacey St. Clair, Appellant-Defendant v. Robert David Curtiss, Appellee-Defendant (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Stacey St. Clair (“Stacey”) appeals the trial court's judgment for her father, James St. Clair (“James”), on his complaint against Stacey and her ex-husband, Robert David Curtiss, in which James alleged, among other things, breach of contract and promissory estoppel. Stacey raises four issues for our review, which we consolidate and restate as two issues:

1. Whether James's claims are barred by the statute of frauds.

2. Whether the trial court erred when it calculated James's damages.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] In November 2016, James ¹ loaned Stacey and Curtiss, who were then married, $130,000 to buy a house on Lake Michigan in Michigan. The loan was not reduced to writing or secured, but, consistent with past short-term loans James had made to Stacey and Curtiss, they agreed to pay ten percent annual interest. Stacey and Curtiss also agreed to pay twenty percent annual interest if they had not paid off the loan by January 2020.

[4] Stacey and Curtiss paid James $6,000 per month until Curtiss filed a petition for dissolution of his marriage in January 2018. At that time, the remaining debt to James was $68,849. Neither Stacey nor Curtiss made any additional payments to James after that.

[5] In the dissolution proceeding, the parties agreed that, as of July 1, 2020, they owed James $94,809.11 on the loan for the Lake Michigan house “due to late fees and interest.” Curtiss v. Curtiss, No. 21A-DC-723, 2022 WL 259467, at *1 (Ind. Ct. App. Jan. 28, 2022) (mem.). However, the dissolution court valued the loan as of the date the dissolution petition was filed ($68,849) and assigned the debt to Stacey.

[6] In November 2021, James filed a complaint against Stacey and Curtiss alleging breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and promissory estoppel.² Following a bench trial in July 2024, the trial court entered judgment against Stacey and Curtiss in the amount of $175,016.22. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

Standard of Review

[7] Stacey appeals the trial court's findings and conclusions following a bench trial. Our standard of review in such appeals is well established:

We may not set aside the findings or judgment unless they are clearly erroneous. In our review, we first consider whether the evidence supports the factual findings. Second, we consider whether the findings support the judgment. Findings are clearly erroneous only when the record contains no facts to support them either directly or by inference. A judgment is clearly erroneous if it relies on an incorrect legal standard. We give due regard to the trial court's ability to assess the credibility of witnesses. While we defer substantially to findings of fact, we do not defer to conclusions of law. We do not reweigh the evidence; rather we consider the evidence most favorable to the judgment with all reasonable inferences drawn in favor of the judgment.

State v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 51 N.E.3d 150, 158 (Ind. 2016) (citations and quotation marks omitted).

[8] James did not file an appellee's brief. Accordingly, we may reverse upon a showing of prima facie error, which means error at first sight or on the face of it. Trinity Homes, LLC v. Fang, 848 N.E.2d 1065, 1068 (Ind. 2006). This standard relieves us from developing arguments on behalf of a party who did not file an appellate brief. Morton v. Ivacic, 898 N.E.2d 1196, 1199 (Ind. 2008). Nevertheless, this standard does not relieve us from our obligation to faithfully apply the law to the facts in the record. Ivankovic v. Ivankovic, 228 N.E.3d 1143, 1146 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024).

Issue One: Statute of Frauds

[9] Stacey first contends that James's claims under the parties’ oral agreement are barred under the statute of frauds because the loan was used for the purchase of real property and was, therefore, required to be in writing. As this Court has explained,

[t]he statute [of frauds] requires that contracts for the sale of real property be in writing. Ind. Code § 32-21-1-1. The statute is intended to preclude fraudulent claims that would probably arise when one person's word is pitted against another's and that would open wide the flood-gates of litigation. Perkins v. Owens, 721 N.E.2d 289, 292 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999). Nevertheless, oral contracts for the sale of real property are voidable, not void. Id.

Fox Dev., Inc. v. England, 837 N.E.2d 161, 166 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).

[10] We do not reach the merits of Stacey's contention on this issue because she raises it for the first time on appeal. Indeed, not only did Stacey not argue this issue to the trial court, but she did not assert the statute of frauds as an affirmative defense, and affirmative defenses must be specifically pled.³ See Ind. Trial Rule 8(C). Thus, Stacey has waived this issue for our review, and we do not address it.⁴ See E & L Rental Equip., Inc. v. Wade Const., Inc., 752 N.E.2d 655, 660 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (holding defendant's failure to plead the statute of frauds as an affirmative defense resulted in waiver).

Issue Two: Damages

[11] Stacey next contends that the trial court erred when it calculated James's damages. Stacey makes three arguments on this issue, and we address each in turn.

Interest Rate

[12] Stacey argues that there is no evidence to support the trial court's determination that there was a “meeting of the minds” regarding any interest on the loan. Appellant's Br. at 11. She maintains that the interest rate was an “essential element” of the agreement and that, without evidence to show a “meeting of the minds” on that element, “no contract was formed.” Id. at 12. We cannot agree.

[13] First, Stacey does not support her argument that the interest rate is an essential element of an oral contract with citation to relevant authority.⁵ And, second, her argument amounts to a request that we reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. James testified that the interest rate on the loan was ten percent and increased to twenty percent “after so long” if the loan was not repaid. Tr. Vol. 2, pp. 75-76. That evidence supports the trial court's conclusion regarding the interest rates on the loan.⁶

[14] In any event, and moreover, Stacey concedes that “[i]t is established that James loaned Stacey $130,000 so that Stacey could buy the Michigan property. She could not have purchased the property without the loan. It is established that Stac[e]y agreed to pay back the $130,000 and that payments were made at the rate of $6,000 per month.” Appellant's Br. at 12. In other words, Stacey concedes that she had an oral contract with James, and her argument that the contract was unenforceable therefore lacks cogency. The trial court did not err when it concluded that the parties had an enforceable contract and that the interest rate was ten percent and increased to twenty percent on any balance remaining after January 15, 2020.⁷

Calculation of Damages

[15] Next, Stacey argues that the trial court's finding that the balance owed as of July 1, 2020, was $94,809.11 “is arbitrary and the decision provides no basis for its calculation other than to say it is a number contained in contentions pertinent to the divorce case.” Id. at 13. First, Stacey does not explain why it was wrong for the trial court to rely on the parties’ submissions in the dissolution court, where both parties agreed that the amount owing on July 1, 2020, was $94,809.11. And, second, in addition to its references to the dissolution court submissions, the trial court noted that it relied on the “Payment Schedule appended to the Trial Brief filed [in this case] on July 3, 2024.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 26. Because Stacey has not included the trial brief referenced by the trial court in her appendix on appeal, and because her argument makes no reference to said brief, she has not met her burden of persuasion on appeal to show error on this issue.

Alleged Set-offs

[16] Finally, Stacey contends that she was entitled to a set-off against the damages award in light of insurance proceeds ⁸ paid to James after damage to her Lake Michigan house, as well as the value of a vehicle Stacey owned after James “took possession and control” of it. Appellant's Br. at 14. Stacey argues that the trial court erred when it did not award any set-off. But she does not support her argument with any citations to the record or citations to authority. Accordingly, she has waived this issue for our review. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a); Dridi v. Cole Kline LLC, 172 N.E.3d 361, 366 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021). Waiver notwithstanding, Stacey's argument amounts to a request that we reweigh the evidence, which we will not do.

[17] For all these reasons, we affirm the trial court's judgment for James.

[18] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   James was married at that time, but his wife, Sandra, died in December 2017.

2.   Stacey has not included the complaint or amended complaint in her appendix on appeal. We assume for purposes of this appeal that she has accurately described the claims James made against her.

3.   Stacey has not included any pleadings in her appendix on appeal. However, James's complaint and Stacey's answer are a part of the record on appeal and available to this Court through the Odyssey case management system. See Ind. Appellate Rule 27. Stacey asserted various affirmative defenses in her answer, but she did not assert the statute of frauds affirmative defense. Further, our review of the transcript shows that Stacey did not make any argument to the trial court that James's claims were barred by the statute of frauds.

4.   Waiver notwithstanding, Stacey makes no argument that the part performance exception to the statute of frauds does not apply here. See Perkins v. Owens, 721 N.E.2d 289, 292 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999).

5.   While the case law she cites sets out the law regarding the meeting of the minds requirement, generally, none of the cases hold, specifically, that interest is an essential term of a contract.

6.   Stacey contends that it is inconsistent for the trial court to find both that James forged documents showing that he has a security interest in the real estate and to find him credible regarding the applicable interest rates. We do not agree. In any event, Stacey's own testimony, while not definitive by any means, shows that, in her history of taking out short term loans from her father, she and Curtiss consistently agreed to high interest rates but always paid off the loans ahead of schedule.

7.   Stacey's argument in the alternative regarding unjust enrichment is one sentence and also lacks cogency, and we do not address it.

8.   The trial court found that “James was the owner and primary beneficiary of [a] policy of insurance insuring the Real Estate against certain property damage. He collected proceeds when the Real Estate was damaged and, perhaps as a result of the dispute between the parties, kept the proceeds.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 27.

Mathias, Judge.

Judges May and Bradford concur. May, J., and Bradford, J., concur.