Justin M. Credico, Appellant-Plaintiff v. LNU (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] In May 2024, Justin M. Credico was charged with felony intimidation and arrested. In August, he pled guilty and was sentenced to time served. See Cause No. 29D05-2405-F5-3571. Two weeks later, he filed a “Small Claims Complaint for Civil Conversion, Trespass to Chattels, IIED” against “Carmel City Police,” “Westfield Police,” “Hamilton County Sheriffs,” “Unknown John/Jane Doe(s),” and “Unknown DBA Entity(ies).” Appellees’ App. Vol. II pp. 20-26. He alleged that his car was in a store parking lot when he was arrested, that the store manager said the car could be left there, and that when he got out of jail the car was no longer there. He claimed, without specifics, that “the defendants” had the car towed and that “[n]one of the Police” would assist him in finding it. Id. at 22, 23.

[2] The named law-enforcement defendants requested a jury trial and asked the trial court to transfer the case from its small-claims docket to its plenary docket. The court transferred the case and scheduled a jury trial, but the defendants failed to pay the required transfer fee, so the court vacated the jury trial and returned the case to the small-claims docket.

[3] Credico moved to have the case transferred back to the plenary docket, stating that he was now seeking $150,000 in damages. The trial court denied the motion, explaining: “By filing this case as a small claims case, the Plaintiff waived any damages over $10,000. The Plaintiff would have to dismiss and refile the case on the plenary docket.” Id. at 44. The defendants then moved for judgment on the pleadings, citing Credico's failure to file tort-claim notices before bringing suit, as required by the Indiana Tort Claims Act. The court granted the motion and dismissed Credico's complaint.

[4] Credico now appeals. He purports to challenge both the denial of his motion to transfer the case back to the plenary docket and the grant of the defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings. But his brief is largely incomprehensible. It doesn't include a coherent statement of the case or statement of facts, and there are no citations to the record on appeal, as required by Indiana Appellate Rule 46(A)(5), (6), and (8). More importantly, the arguments aren't supported by cogent reasoning, as required by Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a). Aside from lengthy quotations from two of this Court's decisions, Credico's argument on the issue of transfer to the plenary docket is as follows:

If we turn to IN Code § 33-28-3-6 which handles venue and jurisdictional monetary limits we see that there is no direct intent mentioned. The court was faced with this issue and decided to view situations in favor of the underdog's due process rights.

․

Moreover, when faced with this very issue where plaintiff's and defendants begin arguing over $, vis-a-vis for jurisdiction in court, the case law favors the Appellant once again so long judgment had not foreclosed both small claim and plenary matters.

․

So, had they notified the court BEFORE judgment, the NOTICE served its purpose and the case; COULD HAVE, and, SHOULD HAVE been transferred

All that is needed to show abuse of discretion in this, is a prima facie showing of case errors; therefore I serve you 3: defendants’ gaming the system with perjurious (contract law) agreements before open court, my notice of motion for change of venue, and two case laws above

Appellant's Br. pp. 9-10.

[5] His argument about judgment on the pleadings is equally indecipherable. The trial court granted judgment on the pleadings based on Credico's failure to file tort-claim notices before he filed suit, but he barely mentions that issue. Instead, his argument consists of passages like this:

We know only this from a GLOMAR defense, they confirm outside scope, and deny outside scope. Therein, exists a prima facie showing because of the “nor deny” aspect of this particular defense. So in part, theyre admitting outside scope, serving prima facie, and to jury it should have gone.

Id. at 11-12.¹ And this:

Because the undisputed facts are they cant deny and yet cant confirm, liability flows and meets a scintilla of prima facie showing:

Conversion: $14K in the car, they had it, it's gone, no process— prima facie met. Glomar doesn't kill this

Scope: Last custody + no due process + Glomar dodge = a genuine issue. Was it theft (outside scope) or botched FISA impound (within)? Jury's call.

Glomar's Boost: Not an admission, but its evasiveness + my facts = suspicious. Indiana courts only need a “scintilla” prima facie for trial

Id. at 12.

[6] Having failed to present cogent argument, Credico hasn't shown any error in the trial court's decisions. Therefore, we affirm the judgment.

[7] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Credico's brief contains several references to “GLOMAR” and “Glomar.” This appears to refer to a “Glomar response” to a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request, in which an agency declines “either to confirm or deny the existence of any responsive records.” Am. Civ. Liberties Union v. CIA, 710 F.3d 422, 425-26 (D.C. Cir. 2013).

Vaidik, Judge.

Judges Tavitas and Felix concur. Tavitas, J., and Felix, J., concur.