III v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Larry J. Planck, III, appeals his convictions, following a jury trial, of the following seventeen counts: two counts of promotion of child sexual trafficking, as Level 3 felonies;¹ two counts of conspiracy to commit child exploitation, as Level 4 felonies;² seven counts of child exploitation, as Level 5 felonies;³ five counts of possession of child pornography, as Level 5 felonies;⁴ and one count of possession of child pornography, as a Level 6 felony.⁵ We affirm.

Issues

[2] Planck raises the following consolidated and restated issues:

I. Whether the trial court erred when it admitted evidence obtained from Planck's iPhone.

II. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support Planck's convictions of possession of child pornography depicting bestiality.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On the night of April 2, 2023, Winchester Police Department officers were dispatched to Planck's house in response to a 9-1-1 call. When the officers arrived, they encountered Planck and found Isabel Hernandez on the ground with a gunshot wound to her chest. A sixteen-year-old girl, Z.W., was also present at Planck's house at the time of the shooting. Hernandez died at the house while the police were still there.

[4] Planck told the police that Hernandez had broken into his house, that she had a gun, and that he shot her in self-defense. The officers observed that there were no signs of forced entry at Planck's house and no signs that Hernandez had a gun. The police also learned that Planck and Hernandez had a prior sexual relationship. The police officers considered Planck to be a murder suspect, so they arrested him and seized his iPhone and iPad. The police also seized Hernandez's iPhone.

[5] The State charged Planck with Hernandez's murder on April 5, 2023. That same day, Detective Bradley Tucker of the Indiana State Police sought and obtained a search warrant for Hernandez's iPhone. The detective also sought a search warrant for Planck's iPhone and iPad. Detective Tucker's affidavit in support of the latter search warrant stated that police officers were dispatched at approximately 7:15 p.m. on April 2, 2023, to Planck's house for a call about a “possible woman in distress.” Ex. v. 4 at 6. The affidavit explained that, when the officers arrived at the house, they saw three people in the backyard, including Planck. The affidavit noted that Planck told the police that Hernandez had arrived at his house and kicked in the front door, so he “put one in her chest.” Id. Detective Tucker stated that the officers then found Hernandez lying on the ground in the front yard with a bullet wound in her chest.

[6] The affidavit explained that the police had detained Planck and considered him a murder suspect. It further stated that law enforcement had found Planck's iPhone and iPad and believed that Planck had communicated with Hernandez on those devices. The affidavit requested authorization to search the devices for the following items:

Any data or electronically stored information that may be related to the crime of Murder including:

1. Records of dialed and/or received phone calls, text messages, voicemails, emails, media messages, media searches, video recordings, audio recordings, photographs, contact logs/address book, GPS Device data, application data and other digital evidence located within the electronic device(s);

2. Indicia of ownership consisting of telephone number, images, nicknames, and other information which will assist law enforcement in establishing the identity of the person or persons who own, rent, lease, or purchased the electronic device(s).

Id. at 11. The affidavit further stated:

Some artifacts recovered may be only partial information or missing associated timestamp information but could still be of evidentiary value. Additionally, many mobile devices allow for the user to change the time and date settings on their mobile device. A knowledgeable individual could alter the date/time of the mobile device to falsify timestamps associated with logged activities. For these reasons, this affiant requests for this search warrant to not be restricted to analysis or examination of activity during a specific timeframe.

Id.

[7] A judge approved the application and issued a search warrant for Planck's iPhone and iPad on April 5, 2023 (“First Warrant”).⁶ Specifically, the warrant authorized police to search for and seize “[a]ny data or electronically stored information that may be related to the crime [of] Murder,” including the information identified in the affidavit for the warrant. Ex. v. IV at 12. The warrant did not contain time or date limitations.

[8] The police were unable to access Planck's iPad and did not obtain any information from it but were eventually able to access Planck's iPhone. When the police examined Planck's iPhone on June 9, 2023, they found that he had used a messaging application called Telegram to communicate with people. They found text message conversations between Hernandez and Planck and conversations between Z.W. and Planck in the Telegram application. They also came across photos of Z.W. participating in various sexual acts with Planck. The police then sought a second warrant for Planck's iPhone to search for evidence of child pornography and obtained that warrant (“Second Warrant”) on June 12.

[9] After the Second Warrant was issued, the police found messages between Hernandez and Planck discussing child pornography in the Telegram application on Planck's phone. They also found such messages in their search of Hernandez's phone. In Hernandez's phone, Planck was listed as a contact in the Telegram application as “LJP,” and Hernandez referred to him as “Larry” during Telegram conversations. Ex. 53, Ex. v. 5 at 74-96; Ex. 69, Ex. v. 5 at 152-56. In the conversations, Planck repeatedly asked Hernandez to take nude photographs of Hernandez's daughters, who were between the ages of seven and sixteen, and send the photographs to him. Specifically, Planck repeatedly asked that Hernandez take and send him photographs of her daughters’ vaginas and anuses. Planck also asked Hernandez to take pictures of her daughters while they showered and to send him the pictures.

[10] In March 2023, Planck and Hernandez messaged each other about having sex in front of her children. They also discussed creating more nude photos of her children. At times, Planck asked Hernandez to engage in sexual activity with one of her younger daughters, videotape it, and allow him to watch. On some occasions, Hernandez agreed and sent photographs to Planck. Some of the photographs were of Hernandez's younger daughters, who were under the age of ten, wearing only their underwear, and one photograph depicted the vagina of one of the younger daughters.

[11] Also on Planck's iPhone, the police found numerous photographs and videos that Planck had created of him performing various sexual acts with sixteen-year-old Z.W. in four different states. At Planck's house in Indiana, he had taken a photograph of Z.W. lying on her back naked with her arms and legs spread open next to a dog that was lying in a similar position. At a house in Florida, Planck had created several videos of Z.W. in various states of nudity, one of which depicted Z.W. naked on a lounge chair with a dog next to her vagina. Another video from Florida depicted Z.W. on her hands and knees performing oral sex on Planck while a dog is behind Z.W. with its head near her vagina. In the video Planck asked Z.W., “Is she licking your p***y?” State's Ex. 43.

[12] Separately from the murder case, the State charged Planck with the seventeen counts of child sex trafficking, conspiracy to commit child exploitation, child exploitation, and possession of child pornography, and that case proceeded to a three-day jury trial on August 26-28, 2024. Before the trial began, Planck filed a motion to suppress the evidence found on his cell phone. Planck alleged that the affidavit for the First Warrant failed to establish probable cause that evidence of a crime would be found on his phone and that the First Warrant was overbroad in violation of the Fourth Amendment and unreasonable under the Indiana Constitution.

[13] The trial court held a hearing on Planck's motion on August 6, 2024, at which Detective Tucker testified about the police investigation of the events of April 2, 2023, the seizure of Planck's iPhone and iPad, the chain of custody of those items, the request for and issuance of the First Warrant, and his search of Planck's iPhone pursuant to the First Warrant. Regarding the latter, Detective Tucker stated that, while he was looking through Planck's communications for evidence related to the murder, he discovered photographs and videos of drugs and child pornography. Detective Tucker stated that he then stopped his search and applied for the Second Warrant to search Planck's iPhone for evidence of drugs and child pornography. The trial court issued a written order denying Planck's motion to suppress.

[14] On August 23, Planck filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude the evidence obtained from his cell phone under Indiana Rules of Evidence 403 and 404(b). On the first day of the jury trial, before any evidence was presented to the jury, the trial court held a hearing outside the presence of the jury regarding Planck's motion. The trial court again denied Planck's motion to suppress that evidence.

[15] During the trial, Planck objected to the admission of Exhibits 53 and 69, which contained text messages between himself and Hernandez. Planck again argued that the messages were inadmissible under Rules of Evidence 403 and 404(b). The trial court admitted the text messages over Planck's objection. The jury subsequently found Planck guilty as charged. On September 27, 2024, the trial court held a sentencing hearing and imposed a thirty-nine-year aggregate sentence. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

Issue One: Admission of Evidence

Standard of Review

[16] Planck challenges the admission of evidence and raises both constitutional claims and claims under the Indiana Rules of Evidence. Generally, we review a trial court's ruling on the admission of evidence for an abuse of discretion. E.g., Albrecht v. State, 185 N.E.3d 412, 419 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), trans. denied. “When we review a trial court's ruling on the admissibility of evidence resulting from an allegedly illegal search, we do not reweigh the evidence, and we consider conflicting evidence most favorable to the trial court's ruling.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). However, we review de novo constitutional claims of a lack of probable cause for a search warrant. Id.

Constitutional Claims

[17] Planck contends that the First Warrant was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution, and therefore any evidence obtained from his iPhone should not have been admitted.⁷ Both constitutional provisions require probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant and prohibit the admission of evidence seized in unconstitutional searches. See id. These constitutional rights are codified in Indiana Code Section 35-33-5-2, which, among other things, requires that a search warrant affidavit must particularly describe “the house or place to be searched and the things to be searched for[,]” allege “substantially the offense in relation thereto and that the affiant believes and has good cause to believe that ․ the things sought are concealed there[,]” and set “forth the facts known to the affiant through personal knowledge or based on hearsay, constituting the probable cause.” Ind. Code § 35-33-5-2(a).

[18] As this Court recently stated,

[i]n determining whether to issue a search warrant, “ ‘[t]he task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, commonsense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit ․ there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.’ ” Jaggers v. State, 687 N.E.2d 180, 181 (Ind. 1997) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983)) (brackets and ellipsis in Jaggers). “The duty of the reviewing court is to determine whether the magistrate had a ‘substantial basis’ for concluding that probable cause existed.” Id. (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 238-39, 103 S. Ct. 2317). “Probable cause is a fluid concept incapable of precise definition and must be decided based on the facts of each case.” Smith [v. State], 982 N.E.2d [393,] 404 [(Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied]. “The level of proof necessary to establish probable cause is less than that necessary to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jellison v. State, 656 N.E.2d 532, 534 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995). “Probable cause means a probability of criminal activity, not a prima facie showing.” Fry v. State, 25 N.E.3d 237, 244 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied. It “may be established by evidence that would not be admissible at trial.” Jellison, 656 N.E.2d at 534. Such evidence may include hearsay, which is an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Ind. Evidence Rule 801(c).

When we review whether probable cause supported the issuance of a search warrant, we “afford ‘significant deference to the magistrate's determination’ ” and “focus on whether reasonable inferences drawn from the totality of the evidence support that determination.” [State v.] Spillers, 847 N.E.2d [949,] 953 [(Ind. 2006),] (quoting Houser v. State, 678 N.E.2d 95, 98-99 (Ind. 1997)). We consider only the evidence presented to the issuing judge and not post hoc justifications for the search. Jaggers, 687 N.E.2d at 182. “ ‘A presumption of validity of the search warrant exists, and the burden is upon the defendant to overturn that presumption.’ ” Rios v. State, 762 N.E.2d 153, 156-57 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (quoting Snyder v. State, 460 N.E.2d 522, 529 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984)). “In determining whether an affidavit provided probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant, doubtful cases should be resolved in favor of upholding the warrant.” State v. Shipman, 987 N.E.2d 1122, 1126 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013).

Albrecht, 185 N.E.3d at 419-20.

Fourth Amendment

[19] Planck asserts that both the affidavit in support of the First Warrant and the warrant itself violate the Fourth Amendment. First, he contends that the affidavit failed to show a sufficient link between the items to be seized and the crime of murder. “[T]he central question in a probable cause determination is whether the affidavit presents facts, together with reasonable inferences, demonstrating a sufficient nexus between the suspected criminal activity and the specific place to be searched.” Carter v. State, 105 N.E.3d 1121, 1128 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (citing Eaton v. State, 889 N.E.2d 297, 300 (Ind. 2008)), trans. denied. In the case of a search of a cell phone, this Court has noted that “the affidavit must allege more than just the fact that the person who is suspected of criminal activity has a cell phone.” Banks v. State, 231 N.E.3d 853, 860 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024), trans. denied. Rather, “ ‘there must be specific, not speculative, evidence linking the device in question to the criminal conduct.’ ” Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Henley, 171 N.E.3d 1085, 1109 (Mass. 2021)). Planck contends that no such evidence was referenced in the affidavit for the First Warrant, and that, instead, the police merely provided insufficient “boilerplate” language related to cell phones. Appellant's Br. at 19.

[20] We agree with the trial court's apparent conclusion that the affidavit stated specific evidence showing a sufficient nexus between the crime of murder and the contents of Planck's cell phone. The affidavit stated that the police were investigating the murder of Hernandez and believed Planck was the suspect. It noted that Planck claimed he had shot Hernandez after she had allegedly “kicked in the front door of his residence.” Ex. v. IV at 6. The affidavit stated that the police had reason to believe that Planck and Hernandez had communicated with each other using their cell phones. It further explained that cell phones provide a variety of methods for people to communicate with each other and that cell phones often store those communications. Obviously, any such communications between Hernandez and Planck could have provided evidence of the nature of their relationship and possible motivations for murder and/or self-defense. Thus, the affidavit established a sufficient nexus between the crime of murder and the recorded communications on Planck's cell phone.

[21] Second, Planck maintains that the affidavit in support of the First Warrant was constitutionally insufficient because it omitted material facts.

[A] probable cause affidavit [in support of a search warrant] must include all material facts, which [include] those facts that “cast doubt on the existence of probable cause.” Query [v. State], 745 N.E.2d [769,] 771 [(Ind. 2001)]. When the State has failed to include a material term in its application, we will determine the validity of the warrant by considering the omitted information and the information contained in the affidavit together. See id.

When the State omits information from a probable cause affidavit, in order for the warrant to be invalid, the defendant must show: “(1) that the police omitted facts with the intent to make, or in reckless disregard of whether they thereby made, the affidavit misleading, ․ and (2) that the affidavit if supplemented by the omitted information would not have been sufficient to support a finding of probable cause.” United States v. Lakoskey, 462 F.3d 965, 978 (8th Cir. 2006)․.

Ware v. State, 859 N.E.2d 708, 718 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (string citation omitted), trans. denied.

[22] Planck contends that the affidavit omitted the allegedly material facts that the police were able to determine through doorbell surveillance footage, “with great specificity, when on April 2, 2023, the shooting had occurred,” and that the police had also located and seized Hernandez's cell phone. Appellant's Br. at 26. He asserts that the magistrate issuing the warrant would have limited the scope of the warrant—including the dates of communications to be searched—had it known these allegedly material facts. We disagree.

[23] As noted above, the communications between Planck and Hernandez that were on Planck's cell phone were relevant to the nature of their relationship and possible motivations for murder or self-defense. This is no less so merely because the time of the shooting could be determined with great specificity or because Hernandez's cell phone could have contained the same or similar communications. Moreover, the affidavit noted that date and time stamps on cell phones may be missing and can be manipulated by users. Considering the omitted information and the information contained in the affidavit together, there was probable cause supporting the First Warrant.

[24] Finally, Planck contends that the First Warrant itself was constitutionally infirm because it was overbroad. Under the Fourth Amendment, “a warrant must contain a particular description of the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.” Carter, 105 N.E.3d at 1129. “While the items to be searched for and seized must be described with some specificity, there is no requirement that there be an exact description.” Overstreet v. State, 783 N.E.2d 1140, 1158 (Ind. 2003). However, “the warrant must be specific enough so that officers can, ‘with reasonable effort,’ ascertain the place to be searched and the items to be seized.” Price v. State, 119 N.E.3d 212, 224 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (quoting Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498, 503 (1925)), trans. denied. “Ultimately, the description in a search warrant should be as particular as circumstances permit.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

[25] In Price, for example, this Court rejected a claim that the search of the defendant's phone should have been limited to the few hours before the phone was seized during a murder investigation. We noted that, “[l]ike looking through drawers in a home or office file cabinet for specific files or letters that are relevant to the investigation, a great deal of other information had to have been sifted through [the defendant's] phone to find the relevant information.” Id. at 226. Thus, it was sufficient that the warrant “described the place law enforcement could search,” which had a “close nexus” to the investigation of a possible murder. Id. at 225, 226; see also Carter, 105 N.E.3d at 1130 (quoting Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987)) (holding a warrant was not overbroad where it was “ ‘tailored to its justifications’ ”).

[26] Here, the warrant particularly described what property could be searched, including the following description:

Any data or electronically stored information that may be related to the crime of Murder including:

1. Records of dialed and/or received phone calls, text messages, voicemails, emails, media messages, media searches, video recordings, audio recordings, photographs, contact logs/address book, GPS Device data, application data and other digital evidence located within the electronic device(s);

Ex. v. IV at 11. That is a sufficiently specific description of what law enforcement could search for on Planck's cell phone. See Albrecht v. State, 159 N.E.3d 1004, 1017-18 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (holding that a search warrant that specified the type of information that police could search for on a cell phone was sufficiently particular), trans. denied; Price, 119 N.E.3d at 225-26 (same); Carter, 105 N.E.3d at 1130 (same).

[27] There was probable cause for the issuance of the First Warrant; therefore, the warrant and the search done pursuant to it did not violate the Fourth Amendment.⁸

Article 1, Section 11

[28] Planck also argues that the search of his cell phone was unreasonable under Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution.

Under the Indiana Constitution, the legality of a search “turns on an evaluation of the reasonableness of the police conduct under the totality of the circumstances.” Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356, 359 (Ind. 2005). In evaluating the reasonableness of a search, we balance three factors: (1) the degree of suspicion of unlawful activity; (2) the degree of intrusion the method of the search imposes on the citizen's ordinary activities; and (3) the extent of law enforcement needs. Id. at 361.

Carter, 105 N.E.3d at 1131.

[29] Here, the degree of suspicion of murder was high, and Planck does not argue otherwise. At the scene of the shooting, Planck had admitted to law enforcement that he had shot Hernandez, and, although he claimed that he did so in self-defense after Hernandez “kicked in the front door of his residence” while armed with a gun, that claim was undercut by the facts that the police observed no evidence of a forced entry into Planck's residence, and there was no sign that Hernandez had been armed with a gun. Ex. v. IV at 6.

[30] In addition, while the degree of intrusion into Planck's cell phone was high, it was not unreasonably so. The police searched Planck's phone only for communications related to Hernandez's murder, as authorized by the First Warrant. In doing so, the police came across, in plain view, communications suggesting other crimes, such as “child sexual abuse” and drug possession. Tr. v. II at 14; see Frasier v. State, 794 N.E.2d 449, 466 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (holding child pornography images that police “inadvertently come across” on a computer while searching for evidence of drug trafficking pursuant to a search warrant were in plain view and therefore admissible under the Indiana Constitution), trans. denied. However, Detective Tucker testified at the suppression hearing that “at that point” he “stopped [his] search” pursuant to the First Warrant and sought and obtained the Second Warrant authorizing a search of Planck's cell phone for evidence of the additional crimes. Tr. v. II at 14. Thus, law enforcement did not intrude into Planck's cell phone any further than necessary and reasonable to search for evidence related to the murder of Hernandez as authorized by the First Warrant.

[31] Finally, the extent of law enforcement's need for the search was high. Planck admitted to the police that he had shot the woman who had just died at the scene. He claimed he had done so in self-defense. In addition to law enforcement's need “to deter crime, to intercept criminal activity, and to apprehend its perpetrators[,]” the police had a great need to discover any evidence related to Planck's relationship and communications with Hernandez, as such information could shed light on whether the shooting was murder or self-defense. State v. Washington, 898 N.E.2d 1200, 1206 (Ind. 2008).

[32] In short, the balance of the Litchfield factors weighs in favor of the reasonableness of the search of Planck's cell phone under Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution.

Evidentiary Claims

[33] Planck challenges the admission of State's Exhibits 53 and 69 under the Indiana Rules of Evidence. Exhibit 53 consists of “screenshotted photos of the [T]elegram communication” between Planck and Hernandez “from what looks [like] March 14th to around the 18th” of 2023. Tr. v. II at 220. Exhibit 69 consists of “IOS messages between” Planck and Hernandez “recovered off of Isabel Hernandez's [cell] phone.” Id. at 240.

[34] First, Planck challenges the admission of Exhibit 53 as lacking authentication per Rule of Evidence 901. However, neither party directs us to where in the record it is shown that Planck objected in the trial court to the admission of Exhibit 53 based on a lack of authentication, and we have been unable to find any such objection. Therefore, it appears that Planck has waived that argument on appeal. See, e.g., State v. Allen, 187 N.E.3d 221, 228 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (“Arguments raised for the first time on appeal, even ones based upon constitutional claims, are waived for appeal.”), trans. denied. Furthermore, Planck's argument that authentication is essentially impossible because “Telegram accounts can be faked to look exactly like other accounts” is not supported by citation to any evidence in the record. Appellant's Br. at 31. Therefore, Planck has also waived the argument on that basis. See, e.g., Hoback v. State, 225 N.E.3d 208, 211 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (“When a party refers to facts without citation to the record in support, we need not consider those facts.”), trans. denied.

[35] Second, Planck objected to the admission of both Exhibits 53 and 69 on the ground that they are inadmissible under Rule of Evidence 404(b), which states: “Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a person's character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.” This restriction is designed to prevent the jury “from indulging in the forbidden inference that a criminal defendant's prior wrongful conduct suggests present guilt.” Fairbanks v. State, 119 N.E.3d 564, 568 (Ind. 2019) (internal quotation and citation omitted).

[36] However, here, the challenged evidence is not evidence of “other” wrongful conduct for purposes of Rule 404(b); rather, it is evidence of the crime itself. Planck was charged with two counts of conspiracy to commit child exploitation, as Level 4 felonies. “A person conspires to commit a felony when, with intent to commit the felony, the person agrees with another person to commit the felony.” I.C. § 35-41-5-2(a). Thus, the agreement to commit the felony is an element of the crime of conspiracy. Jester v. State, 724 N.E.2d 235, 239 (Ind. 2000). That agreement can be proven through either direct or circumstantial evidence. Id.

[37] Here, State's Exhibits 53 and 69 contain messages exchanged between Planck and Hernandez on their cell phones in which they agreed to produce, disseminate, or possess nude images of Hernandez's young daughters. That is not evidence of “other” wrongs, but of the conspiracy crimes with which Planck was charged. See I.C. § 35-42-4-4(b) (child exploitation); I.C. § 35-41-5-2 (conspiracy). Therefore, Rule of Evidence 404(b) is inapplicable. Cf., e.g., Bean v. State, 913 N.E.2d 243, 254 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (holding evidence of confession to the crime charged was not evidence of “other crimes, wrongs, or acts” under Rule 404(b)), trans denied.

[38] The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted State's Exhibits 53 and 69.

Issue Two: Sufficiency of the Evidence

[39] Planck challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his two convictions of possession of child pornography depicting bestiality, i.e., Counts 12 and 13. When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence needed to support a criminal conviction,

we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses ․ [W]e only consider the evidence supporting the judgment and any reasonable inferences that can be drawn from such evidence. A conviction will be affirmed if there is substantial evidence of probative value supporting each element of the offense such that a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. It is the job of the fact-finder to determine whether the evidence in a particular case sufficiently proves each element of an offense, and we consider conflicting evidence most favorably to the trial court's ruling.

Willis v. State, 27 N.E.3d 1065, 1066-67 (Ind. 2015) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

[40] To support Planck's two counts of possession of child pornography depicting bestiality, as Level 5 felonies, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) Planck, (2) with intent to view the image, (3) knowingly or intentionally, (4) possessed or accessed (5) an image that depicts or describes (6) sexual conduct, matter, performance or incident (7) by a child who Planck knows is less than eighteen years of age (8) who knowingly or intentionally (9) performs an act (10) involving a sex organ of the person and the mouth or anus of an animal. I.C. § 35-42-4-4(d)(1), (e)(1)(A); I.C. § 35-46-3-14(1). “In the context of child exploitation, ․ the intent element may be established by circumstantial evidence and may be inferred from the actor's conduct and the natural and usual sequence to which such conduct usually points.” Delagrange v. State, 5 N.E.3d 354, 357 (Ind. 2014).

[41] Here, there is no dispute that State's Exhibits 15, 42, and 43 were all images on Planck's cell phone that depicted Z.W., who Planck knew to be sixteen years old, naked next to a dog. The video in Exhibit 42 also depicted Z.W. lying in a sexual pose with the dog in the same pose. And the video in Exhibit 43 depicted Z.W. performing oral sex upon Planck while the dog is next to Z.W.’s vagina and Planck asks, “Is she licking your p***y?” State's Ex. 43. Despite these facts, Planck asserts that the evidence was insufficient because “there is no evidence that an act of bestiality actually occurred.” Appellant's Br. at 34. We disagree; rather, we hold that the jury could reasonably conclude that the specified exhibits “depict” the child, Z.W., engaging in bestiality as prohibited by the statute. I.C. § 35-42-4-4(e)(1)(A).

[42] The statute prohibits, in relevant part, possession of images “depict[ing]” a child engaged in bestiality but does not define the word “depict.” Id. When we are presented with a question of statutory interpretation, we strive to ascertain the legislature's intent, looking first to the statutory language itself. Moriarity v. Indiana Dep't of Nat. Res., 113 N.E.3d 614, 621 (Ind. 2019). “If the legislature has not defined a word, we give the word its plain, ordinary, and usual meaning, consulting English language dictionaries when helpful in determining that meaning.” Id. The dictionary definition of the word “depict” is “to represent by or as if by a picture.” Depict, Merriam-Webster Dictionary, found at https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/depict [https://perma.cc/XGT9-L49R]. And the word “represent” includes “to give a clear understanding or impression of.” Represent, Merriam-Webster Dictionary, found at https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/represent [https://perma.cc/46SG-Q8P2]. A reasonable fact-finder could infer from the nudity of the child, the location of the dog, Planck's question to the child, and the existence of other depictions of the child engaged in explicit sexual acts on the same cell phone that the exhibits gave the impression of a child engaged in acts of bestiality. The State presented sufficient evidence to support Counts 12 and 13.

Conclusion

[43] Neither the affidavit in support of the First Warrant nor the First Warrant itself violated the Fourth Amendment or the Indiana Constitution; therefore, the trial court did not err in admitting evidence obtained pursuant to the First Warrant. Nor did the trial court abuse its discretion in admitting State's Exhibits 53 and 69, as they were not evidence of “other” wrongs as prohibited by Rule of Evidence 404(b). And the State presented sufficient evidence to support Planck's convictions of Counts 12 and 13.

[44] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-42-3.5-1.2(a).

2.   I.C. § 35-42-4-4(b), (c)(1)(F); I.C. § 35-41-5-2.

3.   I.C. § 35-42-4-4(b)(1).

4.   I.C. § 35-42-4-4(d)(1), (e)(1)(A).

5.   I.C. § 35-42-4-4(d)(1).

6.   A different detective sought and obtained a separate warrant on April 6 specifically authorizing the search of Planck's Facebook account. That warrant is not at issue in this appeal.

7.   Planck asserts that, because the Second Warrant was based on information obtained from the allegedly unconstitutional First Warrant, evidence obtained pursuant to either warrant must be excluded as “fruit of the poisonous tree.” Appellant's Br. at 17.

8.   Because we find the warrant was supported by probable cause, we do not address Planck's assertion that the warrant was “so lacking in indicia of probable cause” that the police could not have relied upon it in good faith. Appellant's Br. at 27 (quoting Heuring v. State, 140 N.E.3d 270, 277 (Ind. 2000)).

Bailey, Judge.

Judges Brown and Weissmann concur. Brown, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.