Rio Blake Michaels, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Rio Blake Michaels appeals his adjudication as a habitual offender ¹ following his conviction of Level 6 felony criminal mischief.² Michaels argues the State did not present sufficient evidence that he was the same person listed on certified conviction records that the State provided to prove Michaels is a habitual offender. The State concedes. We reverse his habitual offender adjudication and remand for a new determination of whether Michaels is a habitual offender.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On November 16, 2023, the State charged Michaels with Level 6 felony criminal mischief after Michaels broke off a sprinkler head inside his apartment complex resulting in $57,000 in damages. The State also alleged Michaels was a habitual offender. The case proceeded to a bifurcated jury trial on July 16-17, 2024.

[3] To support its allegation that Michaels is a habitual offender, the State introduced certified copies of the charging information, probable cause affidavits, abstract of judgments, and sentencing orders for three convictions indicating that a person named Rio Blake Michaels born on October 13, 1973, committed felony burglary in Wisconsin in 2010 (“2010 Conviction”); Class C felony carrying a handgun by a convicted felon ³ and Class D felony criminal recklessness ⁴ with a deadly weapon in 2012 (“2012 Convictions”); and Level 5 felony battery by means of a deadly weapon ⁵ in 2020 (“2020 Conviction”). In addition to including the offender's name and birthdate, the records for the 2012 Convictions and the 2020 Conviction included a driver's license number for a person named Rio Blake Michaels. That driver's license number was consistent in those two records. Based on the State's evidence, the jury returned a verdict determining Michaels is a habitual offender. On August 14, 2024, the trial court sentenced Michaels to 730 days for the criminal mischief conviction, enhanced by 2,190 days for the habitual offender finding, for a total term of 2,920 days in the Indiana Department of Correction.

Discussion and Decision

[4] Michaels argues the State did not present sufficient evidence he is a habitual offender because the State did not prove he was the same person listed in the records that the State provided to support its allegations. When faced with challenges to the sufficiency of evidence, we apply a “well settled” standard of review that leaves determination of the weight of the evidence and credibility of the witnesses to the fact-finder. Teising v. State, 226 N.E.3d 780, 783 (Ind. 2024). “We consider only the evidence most favorable to the trial court's ruling and will affirm a defendant's conviction unless ‘no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” Id. (quoting Jenkins v. State, 726 N.E.2d 268, 270 (Ind. 2000)).

[5] To prove Michaels was a habitual offender, the State had to establish he had three prior unrelated felony convictions within the required time frame. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-8. To do so, the State presented certified records for the 2010 Conviction, 2012 Convictions, and 2020 Conviction.

Certified copies of judgments or commitments containing a defendant's name or a similar name may be introduced to prove the commission of prior felonies. While there must be supporting evidence to identify the defendant as the person named in the documents, the evidence may be circumstantial. If the evidence yields logical and reasonable inferences from which the finder of fact may determine beyond a reasonable doubt that it was a defendant who was convicted of the prior felony, then a sufficient connection has been shown.

Tyson v. State, 766 N.E.2d 715, 718 (Ind. 2002) (quoting Hernandez v. State, 716 N.E.2d 948, 953 (Ind. 1999) (internal citations omitted). Nevertheless, certified records with a “matching name and birth date, absent other identifying evidence, are not sufficient to prove identity.” Payne v. State, 96 N.E.3d 606, 613 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied.

[6] The State concedes that the evidence it presented to prove Michaels is a habitual offender was insufficient. At trial the State presented certified conviction records for an individual named Rio Blake Michaels with a birth date for that person. Two of the conviction records contained driver's license numbers for the person named Rio Blake Michaels. After entering those records into evidence, the State rested without entering into evidence any documentation to prove that Michaels’ birth date was the same as the birth date on the certified conviction records. The State also did not present evidence that the driver's license number was affiliated with Michaels or that Michaels lived in Wisconsin in 2010. Based on the State's concession and our review of the evidence, we conclude the State did not present sufficient evidence that Michaels was a habitual offender. See, e.g., Woodward v. State, 187 N.E.3d 311, 322 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (evidence of prior conviction to support an allegation that Woodward was a serious violent felon was insufficient because the only evidence thereof was a document with a name and birth date matching Woodward's information).

[7] When we reverse a sentence enhancement based on insufficient evidence, a proper remedy is remand for a retrial on the habitual offender allegation.⁶ Dexter v. State, 959 N.E.2d 235, 240 (Ind. 2012). As our Indiana Supreme Court explained in Dexter:

Generally, a defendant may be retried after his or her conviction is reversed on appeal or on collateral attack. It is true, however, that the Double Jeopardy Clause bars retrial when the defendant's conviction is reversed due to insufficient evidence because such a reversal is tantamount to an acquittal. To allow the government to retry a defendant where it failed to provide sufficient evidence in the first trial would afford it an opportunity for the proverbial second bite at the apple.

Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). However, “retrial on a sentencing enhancement based on a prior conviction is permitted even where the enhancement is reversed because of insufficient evidence.” Id. Therefore, we reverse the trial court's adjudication of Michaels as a habitual offender and remand for retrial on the State's allegation that Michaels is a habitual offender. Also see Calvin v. State, 87 N.E.3d 474, 479 (Ind. 2017) (remand for retrial appropriate when evidence insufficient to support habitual offender sentence enhancement).

Conclusion

[8] The State presented insufficient evidence to prove that Michaels was the same person convicted of the prior felonies necessary to support the habitual offender enhancement. We therefore reverse the habitual offender adjudication and remand for a new trial on that enhancement, during which the State may present additional evidence to establish the necessary connection between Michaels and the prior convictions.

[9] Reversed and remanded.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-50-2-8(d).

2.   Ind. Code § 35-43-1-2(a)(2)(A).

3.   Ind. Code § 35-47-2-1 (2012) (carrying a handgun without a license) & Ind. Code § 35-47-2-23(c) (2012) (making violation of Ind. Code § 35-47-2-1 a Class C felony).

4.   Ind. Code § 35-42-2-2(c)(2) (2012).

5.   Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(g)(2) (2020).

6.   Michaels also argues the trial court committed fundamental error when it failed to give final instructions to the jury following the presentation of the habitual offender evidence. As we have determined the evidence was insufficient to prove Michaels was a habitual offender, the issue is moot. Nevertheless, we encourage the trial court to comply with Indiana Jury Rule 26(a).

May, Judge.

Judges Weissmann and Scheele concur. Weissmann, J., and Scheele, J., concur.