IN RE: the Involuntary Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of D.A. and K.A (Minor Children) and D.H. (Father) (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] D.H. (“Father”) appeals the trial court's termination of his parental rights over his two minor children, D.A. and K.A. (“the Children”).¹ Father raises the following two issues for our review:

1. Whether certain findings of fact are supported by the record.

2. Whether the trial court clearly erred when it concluded that termination of Father's parental rights is in the Children's best interests.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] In October 2019, M.A. (“Mother”) gave birth to the Children. Father is the biological father of the Children. In November 2020, the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) filed its first petitions alleging the Children to be Children in Need of Services (“CHINS”). At that time, Father was incarcerated and the Children lived with Mother. The first CHINS petitions alleged that the Children were CHINS based on Mother's substance abuse issues and housing instability. Both parents stipulated that the Children were CHINS. The trial court closed the first CHINS cases in January 2022 after the Children were reunited with Mother.

[4] DCS filed its second CHINS petitions in March 2022. Father was again incarcerated at that time. The second CHINS petitions alleged that Mother had been arrested on drug-related offenses and had exhibited new drug use. Father admitted that the Children were CHINS, and the court adjudicated them to be CHINS.

[5] Father was released from incarceration in May 2024 and requested visitation with the Children. However, in June, before any services could commence, he was again arrested and remained incarcerated throughout the ensuing proceedings.

[6] In August 2024, DCS filed its petitions to terminate the parents’ parental rights over the Children. Mother then executed a consent to the adoption of the Children. Father, however, contested the petitions. After an ensuing fact-finding hearing, the trial court found in relevant part as follows:

13. Since his most recent incarceration, Father has put forth some effort to better himself by participating in a vocational program through Ivy Tech and obtaining a welding certificate․

14. Father indicated that he expects to be released from incarceration in July or August of 2025; however, Father's current Earliest Possible Release Date ․ is February 9, 2026.

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16. Father remains incarcerated and is presently unable to remedy the circumstances that resulted in the [C]hild[ren] being placed in care outside the parent's home.

17. There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the [C]hild[ren's] removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied and/or that the continuation of the parent-child relationship[s] would pose a threat to the well-being, safety, physical health[,] or life of the [C]hild[ren] in that:

A. Father has a habitual pattern of criminal conduct and has a criminal history that includes the following convictions:

a. Attempted Auto Theft, a Level 5 Felony ․ ;

b. Escape, a Level 6 Felony ․ ;

c. Attempted Robbery, a Level 5 Felony ․ ; and

d. Possession of Marijuana, a Class B Misdemeanor ․

B. As of the date testimony was heard, Father had been incarcerated for 79% of his [C]hild[ren's] li[ves]. Although he was released from incarceration on May 2, 2024, he was later arrested on June 2, 2024, released on June 3, 2024, and subsequently arrested again on June 5, 2024, for a parole violation related to the June 2 arrest.

C. Father has not completed recommended services and did not fully take advantage of the opportunity he had to complete services while incarcerated. After his re-incarceration in June of 2024, Father was offered and began Fatherhood Engagement, which reportedly started well. However, Father was apparently in segregation for thirty (30) days and thereafter refused services. Although Father indicates that he only refused one (1) session after his removal from segregation, Father took no steps to reengage in said services despite the service provider's purported unsuccessful attempts to meet with Father. Nevertheless, Father did not complete Fatherhood Engagement and has not been in said services since October[ ] 2024.

D. Father has not maintained contact with DCS. Although it is understandably difficult for an incarcerated parent to maintain contact with DCS and/or fully comply with a dispositional decree while incarcerated, the Court believes the effort to do so put forth by Father to be insufficient․

E. Father has not developed any bond with his [C]hild[ren] since [their] birth ․ , and he has failed to take sufficient steps to attempt to establish a bond ․ There is some dispute in the record as to whether Father has ever had a visit with his [C]hildren. According to the Family Case Manager, no visits have occurred. According to CASA, the [C]hildren had one (1) visit with Father on July 30, 2021. Nevertheless, whether no visits or one (1) visit three and one-half (3 1/212) years ago, the [C]hild[ren] certainly do[ ] not know Father. Because of these facts, the establishment of a bond with his [C]hild[ren] should have been a primary concern for Father. Testimony indicates that both the service provider and Family Case Manager recommended and encouraged Father to write letters to his [C]hildren in order to attempt to create a bond. Despite the recommendation, Father only wrote one letter to his [C]hildren in December of 2023 ․

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H. Father is presently unable to care for the [C]hild[ren] due to his incarceration and has demonstrated an inability to maintain long-term stability.

I. Subsequent to Father's future release, there is no guarantee Father would be a responsible caregiver for the [C]hild[ren], that he would be a suitable parent, or that he would even obtain custody. To date, Father has absolutely no relationship with the minor [C]hild[ren] and has not reasonably attempted to establish one.

Appellant's App. Vol. 2, pp. 92-95, 98-101. The court then ordered that Father's parental rights over the Children be terminated. This appeal ensued.

Standard of Review

[7] Indiana appellate courts have long adhered to a highly deferential standard of review in cases involving the termination of parental rights. In re S.K., 124 N.E.3d 1225, 1230-31 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). In analyzing the trial court's decision, we neither reweigh the evidence nor assess witness credibility. Id. We consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences favorable to the court's judgment. Id. In deference to the trial court's unique position to assess the evidence, we will set aside a judgment terminating a parent-child relationship only if it is clearly erroneous. Id.

[8] To determine whether a termination decision is clearly erroneous, we apply a two-tiered standard of review to the trial court's findings of facts and conclusions of law. Bester v. Lake Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005). First, we determine whether the evidence supports the findings; second, we determine whether the findings support the judgment. Id. “Findings are clearly erroneous only when the record contains no facts to support them either directly or by inference.” In re A.D.S., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1156 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (quoting Quillen v. Quillen, 671 N.E.2d 98, 102 (Ind. 1996)), trans. denied. If the evidence and inferences support the court's termination decision, we must affirm. In re L.S., 717 N.E.2d 204, 208 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied. We will accept unchallenged factual findings as true. See In re S.S., 120 N.E.3d 605, 614 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019).

[9] It is well-settled that the parent-child relationship is one of society's most cherished relationships. See, e.g., In re A.G., 45 N.E.3d 471, 475 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied. Indiana law thus sets a high bar to sever that relationship by requiring DCS to prove the requisite statutory elements by clear and convincing evidence. Ind. Code § 31-34-12-2 (2024). And, as relevant here, DCS's petition to terminate Father's parental rights over the Children required DCS to prove that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the Children's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied; that there was a satisfactory plan for care and treatment of the Children; and that termination of the parent-child relationships was in each child's best interests. I.C. § 31-35-2-4(c), (d)(3).

1. The trial court's findings of fact are supported by the record.

[10] We first address Father's challenges to the trial court's findings 17(A), 17(E), and 17(I). For finding 17(A), Father challenges the first sentence, namely, the court's finding that “Father has a habitual pattern of criminal conduct.” Appellant's Br. at 13; Appellant's App. Vol. 2, pp. 93, 99. According to Father, while that finding “is technically correct,” it is also “highly misleading” because his criminal history consists of “misdemeanors and low level felonies,” all but one of which occurred prior to the Children's birth. Appellant's Br. at 13. But we discern no error. Father concedes the factual accuracy of the court's finding, and nothing in the challenged language demonstrates a mischaracterization of the evidence.

[11] For finding 17(E), Father asserts that the record does not support the court's assessment that he had not developed a bond with the Children and had failed to take sufficient steps to attempt to develop a bond with them. But Father is incorrect. Gretchen Peterson, Father's service provider for Fatherhood Engagement, testified that she had emphasized to Father the need to complete the Fatherhood Engagement curriculum to establish and maintain a “bond and communication” with the Children. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 36. But, after a handful of meetings, Father told her to “F off” and discontinued his participation in the service. Id. She also specifically testified that Father was “not successful” in establishing a bond with the Children. Id. at 37-38. Father's Family Case Manager, Grace McDonald, similarly testified that Father has had essentially no communication with the Children. Father's arguments on appeal challenging this finding simply emphasize his own testimony, which is a request for this Court to reweigh the evidence that we do not accept. Finding 17(E) is supported by the record.

[12] As for finding 17(I), Father asserts that the court erred in relying on its assessment that “there is no guarantee” that Father will be a responsible caregiver for the Children upon his release from prison. Appellant's Br. at 14. According to Father, there is “never” any such guarantee, and “the law does not require such a guarantee.” Id. But the trial court is permitted to draw reasonable inferences from the facts before it, and finding 17(I) represents a reasonable inference from the record. We therefore affirm the trial court's findings of fact.

2. The trial court did not clearly err when it concluded that termination of Father's parental rights is in the Children's best interests.

[13] Father also contends that the trial court erred when it concluded that the termination of his parental rights over the Children is in the Children's best interests. To determine what is in a child's best interests, a court is required to look beyond the factors identified by DCS and consider the totality of the evidence. In re A.K., 924 N.E.2d 212, 223 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). The court must subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the child. See In re J.S., 906 N.E.2d 226, 236 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). “The court need not wait until a child is irreversibly harmed before terminating the parent-child relationship.” Id. Further, recommendations of the case manager and CASA, in addition to evidence that the conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied or that the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the child's well-being, are sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child's best interests. In re J.C., 994 N.E.2d 278, 290 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013).

[14] Father argues that he has post-incarceration living arrangements in place until he obtains stable employment, that he has taken steps to improve himself while incarcerated, and that there “is no evidence of any problems with Father's visits” with the Children when he briefly saw them in 2021. Appellant's Br. at 15-16. But, as explained above, the trial court's findings of fact underlying its conclusion that the conditions that resulted in the Children's removal will not be remedied are supported by the record. Further, based in substantial part on Father's lack of compliance with services and his unwillingness to develop a bond with the Children, both Family Case Manager McDonald and the CASA opined that termination of Father's parental rights is in the Children's best interests.

[15] Accordingly, the trial court's conclusion is supported by the record. Father's arguments to the contrary are again a request for our Court to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do.²

Conclusion

[16] For all of these reasons, we affirm the trial court's termination of Father's parental rights over the Children.

[17] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The trial court also terminated the mother's parental rights over the Children, but she does not participate in this appeal.

2.   We are not persuaded by Father's arguments on appeal that DCS is to blame for his lack of a developed bond with the Children, and we do not consider it.

Mathias, Judge.

Judges May and Bradford concur. May, J., and Bradford, J., concur.