Jordon Scott Lord, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Jordon Scott Lord ¹ appeals his conviction for dealing in methamphetamine as a level 2 felony and the trial court's finding of contempt. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Beginning in May or June 2023, Lord and his then girlfriend Jessica Omand lived in the basement of a house in Lafayette. The basement had a door which led directly outside. Lord sometimes spent time in the detached garage and worked on mopeds. On August 17, 2023, police conducted surveillance of the house. At 11:14 a.m., officers observed the garage door open and Lord smoke a cigarette. At 12:28 p.m., Mark Smith and Andrew Winkler arrived in an SUV, exited their vehicle, and entered the garage. Winkler agreed to purchase approximately seven grams of methamphetamine from Lord. The methamphetamine “was in his garage in part of like the ceiling.” Transcript Volume II at 109. Winkler saw that, when Lord retrieved the seven grams of methamphetamine, “[t]here was a lot more” and “a large amount” of methamphetamine “in this big Ziplock bag.” Id. Lord weighed the methamphetamine on a digital scale and said, “be careful it's getting hot around here.” Id. at 108. Smith and Winkler left.

[3] A short time later, police initiated a traffic stop of the vehicle occupied by Smith and Winkler and discovered 7.21 grams of methamphetamine in Winkler's pocket. Winkler told police that he had purchased the methamphetamine from Lord. Meanwhile, at the house, Lord handed Omand a backpack containing a safe which had methamphetamine in it, and she took it to the basement. Lord and Omand took an Uber to a Taco Bell, a friend of Omand picked them up, and the police stopped their vehicle. Police found a white crystal-like substance believed to be methamphetamine in a prescription container with Omand's name on it in her bag which was located on the floorboard of the front passenger area where Omond was seated. Police obtained a warrant to search the house and discovered two safes in the basement. One safe, which police were able to open because Omand provided the combination, contained plastic bags, a digital scale, a tray with methamphetamine residue, and a ziplock plastic bag of methamphetamine. The other safe contained methamphetamine residue and a tourniquet consistent with drug use. In the garage, police found a second ziplock bag containing methamphetamine in a toaster on top of a box. Subsequent analysis found that one of the ziplock bags contained methamphetamine with a net weight of 17.28 grams and the other contained methamphetamine with a net weight of 15.85 grams.

[4] The State charged Lord with Count I, dealing in methamphetamine in an amount of at least five grams but less than ten grams as a level 3 felony ² ; Count II, dealing in methamphetamine in an amount of at least ten grams as a level 2 felony ³ ; Count III, possession of methamphetamine of at least ten grams but less than twenty-eight grams as a level 4 felony; Count IV, unlawful possession of syringe as a level 6 felony; Count V, dealing in methamphetamine in an amount of at least five grams but less than ten grams while having a prior conviction for dealing in a controlled substance as a level 2 felony; and Count VI, possession of methamphetamine of at least ten grams but less than twenty-eight grams while having a prior conviction for dealing in a controlled substance as a level 3 felony. The State also alleged Lord was an habitual offender.

[5] The court held a jury trial at which Omand, Winkler, and Lafayette Police Detective Ronald Dombkowski among others testified. Krystal Wise testified that she rented the house, she and her children lived on the first and second floors, and Lord and Omand lived in the basement. She testified that another person, Riley Campbell, lived at the house for a short time and moved in around May 2023. She testified that Campbell had a bedroom on the second floor of the house and that he kept items “[e]verywhere,” including in the basement and the garage. Id. at 188. The jury found Lord guilty on Counts I, II, and III and not guilty on Count IV.

[6] At one point during a discussion regarding setting a sentencing date, Lord stated “You lied Dombkowski.” Transcript Volume III at 147. The court said, “Alright, sir. No comments, please. I'm just looking for a sentencing date for you.” Id. Lord stated “They're putting me in f---ing prison for the rest of my life․ Over some f---ing lies.” Id. The court stated, “Alright, sir. One more outburst I'm just gonna have you removed from the courtroom.” Id. Lord admitted to the prior convictions supporting Counts V and VI and the habitual offender allegation. The court started to discuss the merger of some of the counts, and Lord stated, “We can do sentencing now.” Id. at 169. The following exchange occurred:

THE COURT: What they're saying they believe that some of the six counts are duplications and some merge to the others and so, we're trying to clarify.

THE DEFENDANT: I, I understand that. I was just saying we can do the sentencing now.

THE COURT: I can't. The law requires me to have this presentence report and we have to wait thirty days.

THE DEFENDANT: But the law also requires you to notice when the State makes mistakes and the witnesses literally perjured themselves on the stand.

THE COURT: We're not talking about that. You just asked me about the sentence. I just told you ․ why we can't do the sentence.

* * * * *

THE COURT: Anything else you need to talk to your attorney.

THE DEFENDANT: That's the amazing part. It's - You don't care about the law. You care about the conviction.

* * * * *

THE COURT: We'll leave the record as is and then I expect that you guys will talk and discuss and determine merger issues by the time of sentencing. Okay. That's it then, we're adjourned.

* * * * *

(Proceedings concluded at 11:53:03 a.m.)

(Back on record at 11:53:52 a.m.)

THE COURT: Mr. Lord, I have been patient with you. I understand you're upset with the verdict. You have used vulgar language. I have warned you several times to refrain from using that kind of language in this court of law. It's to be respected. On your way out, on, stop. On your way out I heard you address the detective saying have a nice day and then you said what detective?

DETECTIVE DOMBKOWSKI: It was either quote fat f---ing bastard unquote or that f---ing bastard.

THE COURT: You used, you used vulgarity in this courtroom.

THE DEFENDANT: I was already out -

THE COURT: You used vulgarity in this courtroom on your way out. I will not tolerate it. Two options here. I am either going to hold you in contempt right now or you may apologize to this detective.

THE DEFENDANT: You can hold me in contempt, sir.

THE COURT: And you understand if I hold you in contempt I can penalize you for up to ninety days in jail no, no credit time.

THE DEFENDANT: Sir -

THE COURT: Do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: You're already penalizing me twenty years when you've heard people lie on me on the stand.

THE COURT: Just giving you the chance.

THE DEFENDANT: And he lied on the stand, too.

THE COURT: Those are your options. Either apologize to him or I'm holding you in contempt. Which will it be?

THE DEFENDANT: I'm not apologizing, nothing.

THE COURT: Alright. I'm finding you in contempt. I'm ordering ninety days contempt. That's it.

THE DEFENDANT: So, you ain't even gonna hear that are you though?

THE COURT: I'm not gonna hear any (inaudible mic off).

THE DEFENDANT: But you're gonna let the cops and -

THE COURT: We're done.

THE DEFENDANT: You're gonna let the cops and the prosecutor just get away with f---ing lying on me.

THE COURT: It's ninety days without credit time.

Id. at 169-172.

[7] At sentencing, the State moved to vacate the findings of guilt on Counts I, III, V, and VI and to proceed to sentencing on Count II and the habitual offender enhancement, and the court granted the motion. The court entered a judgment of conviction on Count II, dealing in methamphetamine in an amount greater than ten grams as a level 2 felony. The court sentenced Lord to twenty-four years on Count II, enhanced the sentence by eight years due to Lord being an habitual offender, and ordered that three years be served in Tippecanoe County Community Corrections.

Discussion

I.

[8] Lord asserts the evidence was insufficient to support the conclusion that he possessed more than ten grams of methamphetamine. He argues “the premises were non-exclusive,” “the proximity of the contraband to [him] was not close,” the methamphetamine found “in a toaster in the garage ․ was mixed in with various other household items left by former tenant Riley,” and “the basement was shared with Omand who was later discovered possessing methamphetamine[.]” Appellant's Brief at 14. The State maintains the evidence was sufficient to establish that Lord was in actual or constructive possession of the ziplock bags of methamphetamine, that both bags contained more than ten grams of methamphetamine, and that Lord's argument is a request to reweigh the evidence.

[9] When reviewing claims of insufficiency of the evidence, we do not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses. Jordan v. State, 656 N.E.2d 816, 817 (Ind. 1995), reh'g denied. We look to the evidence and the reasonable inferences therefrom that support the verdict. Id. We will affirm the conviction if there exists evidence of probative value from which a reasonable jury could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1.1 provides that “[a] person who ․ possesses, with intent to ․ deliver; or ․ finance the delivery of ․ methamphetamine, pure or adulterated ․ commits dealing in methamphetamine” and that “[t]he offense is a Level 2 felony if ․ the amount of the drug involved is at least ten (10) grams[.]”

[10] It is well-established that possession of an item may be either actual or constructive. See Lampkins v. State, 682 N.E.2d 1268, 1275 (Ind. 1997), modified on reh'g, 685 N.E.2d 608 (Ind. 1997). Actual possession occurs when a person has direct physical control over the item. Gee v. State, 810 N.E.2d 338, 340 (Ind. 2004). Constructive possession occurs when a person has the capability and intent to maintain control over the contraband. Id. The capability element is met when the State shows the defendant is able to reduce the contraband to his personal possession. Goliday v. State, 708 N.E.2d 4, 6 (Ind. 1999). To show the intent element, the State must demonstrate the defendant's knowledge of the presence of the contraband. Id. This knowledge may be inferred from either the exclusive control over the premises containing the contraband or, if the control is non-exclusive, evidence of additional circumstances pointing to the defendant's knowledge of the contraband's presence. Id. Some possible examples of such circumstances include incriminating statements; attempting to leave or making furtive gestures; the location of contraband like drugs in settings suggesting manufacturing; the item's proximity to the defendant; the location of contraband within the defendant's plain view; and the mingling of contraband with other items the defendant owns. Gray v. State, 957 N.E.2d 171, 175 (Ind. 2011). Knowledge is a mental state, and thus the jury must resort to reasonable inferences as to its existence. Young v. State, 761 N.E.2d 387, 389 (Ind. 2002).

[11] The record reveals that law enforcement found a ziplock plastic bag of methamphetamine in a safe in the basement and another ziplock bag of methamphetamine in a toaster in the garage. The State presented the results of analyses performed by the Indiana State Police Laboratory indicating that one of the ziplock bags contained 17.28 grams of methamphetamine and the other bag contained 15.85 grams of methamphetamine. The evidence was sufficient to establish the quantity of methamphetamine discovered in the ziplock bags.

[12] As for possession, one of the ziplock bags was found in a safe in the basement where Lord was living, and Omand testified that Lord handed her a backpack, the safe was in the backpack, she knew the safe contained methamphetamine, and she took it to the basement. Omand also testified that she and Lord had the combination to the safe, and she provided the combination to the police. Police found the other ziplock bag in a toaster on a box in the garage where Lord worked on mopeds and where police observed Lord smoke a cigarette and meet with Smith and Winkler. Winkler testified that he purchased about seven grams of methamphetamine from Lord in the garage and that, when Lord retrieved the methamphetamine, Winkler saw “[t]here was a lot more methamphetamine] in this big Ziplock bag.” Transcript Volume II at 109. Wise was thoroughly questioned about Campbell living in the house, the property he left behind, and his items in the basement and garage. The evidence most favorable to the judgment shows that Lord had the capability to maintain control of the contraband and knew of its presence. Based upon the record, we conclude that the State presented evidence of probative value from which a reasonable trier of fact could find Lord guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of dealing in methamphetamine as a level 2 felony.

II.

[13] Lord asserts the trial court “erred in imposing a direct contempt sentence for an issue that occurred after the court recessed, and for an incident which did not occur within the judge's presence.” Appellant's Brief at 18. The State argues that Lord was properly held in contempt after cursing at a State's witness and that “the record does not support [his] claim that his statement occurred out of the court's presence.” Appellee's Brief at 17.

[14] We afford great deference to trial courts’ contempt decisions. Carroll v. State, 54 N.E.3d 1081, 1085 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). We accept as true the statement of facts entered by the trial court. Id. We will only interfere with a contempt finding “where it clearly appears the acts do not constitute contemptuous acts.” Id. at 1085-1086 (citing In re Nasser, 644 N.E.2d 93, 95 (Ind. 1994)).

[15] Direct contempt includes those “actions occurring near the court, interfering with the business of the court, of which the judge has personal knowledge.” Davidson v. State, 836 N.E.2d 1018, 1020 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (citing Hopping v. State, 637 N.E.2d 1294, 1296 (Ind. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1017 (1994); In re Nasser, 644 N.E.2d at 95). Courts have inherent power to punish summarily acts of direct contempt without formal charges or an evidentiary hearing.⁴ Id. (citing Nasser, 644 N.E.2d at 95; Ind. Code § 34-47-2-4). While a party's presence in the courtroom was historically an element of direct contempt, the Indiana Supreme Court has held “that direct contempt can occur within the area of the judge's knowledge, not merely within the judge's personal presence.” Id. at 1021 (citing Nasser, 644 N.E.2d at 95 (citing LaGrange v. State, 238 Ind. 689, 153 N.E.2d 593 (1958))).

[16] In Hopping v. State, the following transpired:

As the deputy sheriff was leading Appellant from the courtroom, Appellant said, “Well, I had a lot of friends killed in World War II by the Japanese. It might've been some of [Judge Witte's] relation, you don't know.” Judge Witte, who is of Japanese ancestry, ordered Appellant returned to his seat in the courtroom and held an additional contempt hearing based on these remarks. Judge Witte offered Appellant the opportunity to respond, retract or apologize but he denied making the statement. Judge Witte found Appellant guilty of a second count of direct criminal contempt and sentenced him to an additional thirty (30) days in jail, to be served consecutively to the earlier imposed sentence.

637 N.E.2d at 1296. The appellant argued “that such proceedings are not appropriately employed unless the relevant act was committed in the presence and with the knowledge of the court and disrupted an ongoing proceeding requiring immediate punishment to maintain order in the court and respect for its authority.” Id.

[17] The Indiana Supreme Court held:

Direct contempt involves actions occurring near the court, interfering with the business of the court, of which the judge has personal knowledge․

It is true that this Court has frequently employed phraseology which could be read to indicate that direct criminal contempt requires a finding of disruption of an actual court proceeding. ․ However, while such disruption may be a sufficient condition for a finding of direct criminal contempt, it is clearly not a necessary condition․

․ Appellant's claim that direct criminal contempt can only occur in the context of a hearing is simply a misstatement of the law. This Court has long recognized that it is not the actual interference with a legal proceeding that is to be prevented, but the undermining of the judicial process․

Contempt of court involves disobedience of a court which undermines the court's authority, justice, and dignity. Any act related to a current or pending proceeding which tends to deter the court from the performance of its duties may support a contempt proceeding. Any act which manifests a disrespect and defiance of a court may constitute direct criminal contempt․

In summation, where, as here, the court has firsthand and immediate knowledge of acts demonstrating a clear disregard for its authority which threaten to undermine the integrity of the judicial process and impede the performance of court work, summary proceedings for direct criminal contempt are available. We do not seek to ascertain the presence of a formal hearing but merely that the inappropriate behavior bears a close relationship to the court's judicial activities. Appellant had come to the courthouse to schedule small claims cases, the judge was working on other legal matters, and the secretary was trying to organize the docket. Appellant's outburst interrupted these activities, called into question the integrity of the process, and manifested disrespect and disobedience towards the court, which properly subjected him to direct criminal contempt proceedings.

Id. at 1296-1297.

[18] Here, Lord does not dispute that he had been warned about his outbursts or that he used vulgarity, stated “fat f---ing bastard” or “that f---ing bastard,” and refused to apologize. Transcript Volume III at 170. The record supports the conclusion that the trial court had “firsthand and immediate knowledge of acts demonstrating a clear disregard for its authority which threaten[ed] to undermine the integrity of the judicial process and impede the performance of court work.” See Hopping, 637 N.E.2d at 1297. We do not find Lord's arguments persuasive or that reversal of the trial court's finding of contempt is warranted.

[19] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

[20] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The record includes Lord's first name spelled as Jordon and Jordan. The sentencing order and abstract of judgment spell his name as Jordon.

2.   Count I alleged: “On or about August 17, 2023, ․ Lord ․ did knowingly or intentionally deliver methamphetamine, pure or adulterated, and the amount of methamphetamine involved was at least five (5) grams but less than ten (10) grams[.]” Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 17.

3.   Count II alleged: “On or about August 17, 2023, but after the offense described in Count 1, ․ Lord ․ did possess, with intent to deliver or finance the delivery of methamphetamine, pure or adulterated, and the amount of the methamphetamine involved was at least ten (10) grams[.]” Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 18.

4.   We have observed:“The power of Indiana courts to summarily punish for direct criminal contempt, while specified by statute, rests upon the common law.” Hopping, 637 N.E.2d at 1296. Nevertheless, Indiana Code § 34-47-2-1(a) provides that any person who “disturbs the business and proceedings” of a court “by creating any noise or confusion ․ in a court of record ․ while the court is open for and engaged in the transaction of business” is guilty of direct contempt of court.Davidson, 836 N.E.2d at 1021 n.2.

Brown, Judge.

Judges Bailey and Weissmann concur. Bailey, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.