KIRKSEY v. SPENCE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] George Kirksey appeals the small claims court's judgment in favor of Bill Spence, Sr., and Debbie Spence (collectively, the “Spences”) on his claim for breach of contract. Kirksey purports to raise two issues for our review. However, due to his failure to comply with the Indiana Appellate Rules, he has waived our review of either claim. As such, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Kirksey has known the Spences for approximately twenty-eight years, and he has lived with them on and off for twenty-five years. In 2022, Kirksey sold his home and moved back in with the Spences. Sometime between April and July, Kirksey paid to have a roof installed over the Spences’ porch.¹ Kirksey paid $4,058.86 for materials and $1,500 for labor. Then, in August, the Spences informed Kirksey that they were going to sell their house and that he needed to find another place to live.

[3] At some point, Kirksey filed a notice of claim against the Spences in the small claims court and asserted that the Spences had breached a contract with him.² On September 9, 2024, the small claims court held a trial on Kirksey's claim. During the trial, Kirksey testified that he agreed to sell his house and move in with the Spences only because the Spences had stated that they would “give [Kirksey] their house when they passed away[.]” Tr. at 6. He testified that, after he moved in, Debbie was “in a hurry to get the roof built.” Id. He then testified that he hired the Spences’ son and one of his friends to do the work.

[4] Bill testified that Kirksey was the person who wanted to fix the roof and that the Spences “didn't have a problem with that.” Id. at 8. But Bill also testified that he had informed Kirksey that the Spences could not pay him. Similarly, Debbie testified that the Spences had informed Kirksey up front that he could do “what [he] want[s],” but that they “can't afford it.” Id. at 9.

[5] The court then asked Kirksey if he had any response, and Kirksey stated that he had “text messages back and forth between [him and the Spences] where [they] were talking about [the Spences] giving [Kirksey] the house.” Id. The court then asked if Kirksey had “any contract about the roof or anything like that,” and Kirksey responded: “I do not have a contract about the roof.” Id. At the conclusion of the trial, the court stated that Kirksey had “the burden of proving that there was some sort of ․ contract here” and that any such contract “doesn't exist.” Id. at 10. Accordingly, the court found in favor of the Spences. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[6] Kirksey appeals the small claims court's judgment in favor of the Spences. We first note that Kirksey is proceeding pro se. “It is well settled that pro se litigants are held to the same legal standards as licensed attorneys. This means that pro se litigants are bound to follow the established rules of procedure and must be prepared to accept the consequences of their failure to do so.” Basic v. Amouri, 58 N.E.3d 980, 983-84 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (internal citation omitted).

[7] The Indiana Appellate Rules require an appellant to include an argument section that “contain[s] the contentions of the appellant on the issues presented, supported by cogent reasoning. Each contention must be supported by citations to the authorities, statutes, and the Appendix or parts of the Record on appeal relied on[.]” Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a). And the rules require the appellant to include “a concise statement of the applicable standard of review” for each issue. App. R. 46(A)(8)(b).

[8] Cogent argument supported by adequate citation to authority “promotes impartiality in the appellate tribunal. A court which must search the record and make up its own arguments because a party has not adequately presented them runs the risk of becoming an advocate rather than an adjudicator.” Young v. Butts, 685 N.E.2d 147, 151 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997). We will not address arguments so poorly developed or expressed that they cannot be understood. Basic, 58 N.E.3d at 984 (quotation marks omitted).

[9] Here, Kirksey's three-page brief on appeal wholly fails to comply with Indiana Appellate Rule 46(A)(8). Kirksey fails to set out his contentions supported by cogent reasoning. He purports to raise two issues, including whether he entered into a contract with the Spences and whether the small claims court denied his right to due process by not allowing him to present evidence. However, each argument is between three and five sentences; fails to include a standard of review; and does not cite any authority, let alone relevant authority, or any parts of the Record on Appeal to support his arguments. For example, in his first issue, Kirksey argues: “Based on conversations with the defendant, Debbie Spence, on Facebook, the plaintiff agreed to sell his home with the understanding that Bill Spence Sr. wanted to leave the property to him. The plaintiff was told he could ‘fix the place up’ however he wanted.” Appellant's Br. at 3. However, Kirksey has not directed us to any evidence in the record to indicate that Kirksey and the Spences had a contract under which the Spences agreed to repay Kirksey for putting a roof on their porch.³

[10] In addition, in his second argument, Kirksey asserts that the small claims court violated his due process rights when it did not allow him to present certain evidence. But again, Kirksey has not directed us to any place in the record where he attempted to offer evidence that the court excluded, nor does he identify the evidence he sought to have admitted, describe its relevance, or explain how it was “the most important key supporting the case.” Id. And it is not our role to search the record to determine his arguments.

[11] As a result of his noncompliance with the appellate rules, Kirksey has failed to meet his burden on appeal to demonstrate that the small claims court erred.⁴ We therefore affirm the court's judgment.

[12] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Kirksey refers to the structure as a “patio,” Tr. at 5, and the Spences referred to it as a “screened-in porch.” Id. at 8-9.

2.   Kirksey has not provided a copy of that notice in his Record on Appeal.

3.   The only documentation Kirksey has provided in his appendix is a copy of a text message purportedly between him and Debbie in which Debbie stated: “We talked to a lawyer and we can leave the place and everything here to whoever we want upon our death and Billy wood [sic] like to leave it all to you, they don't want it, she wants us gone now[.] Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 4. However, there is nothing in that text message that shows that the Spences agreed to repay Kirksey for the roof installation.

4.   We note that the Spences have not filed an appellees’ brief. As such, we apply a less stringent standard and may reverse the trial court if Kirksey establishes prima facie error. See Deckard v. Deckard, 841 N.E.2d 194, 199 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). However, because of his noncompliance with the appellate rules, Kirksey has failed to meet even this low standard of review.

Bailey, Judge.

Brown, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.