Alexus L. Meriweather, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Alexus L. Meriweather (“Meriweather”) appeals her conviction, following a bench trial, for Class A misdemeanor criminal trespass.¹ Meriweather argues that there was insufficient evidence to support her conviction. Concluding that the evidence is sufficient, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

[2] We affirm.

Issue

Whether there is sufficient evidence to support Meriweather's conviction.

Facts

[3] The facts most favorable to the judgment reveal that, on March 3, 2024, around 2:45 a.m., around one hundred people, including Meriweather, were in a bar in Vanderburgh County (“the bar”). Meriweather had been in the bar since 9:00 p.m. and was a customer, not an employee. Two local police officers, Sergeant Blake Hollins (“Sergeant Hollins”) and Officer Culver (“Officer Culver”) were working at the bar as off-duty security officers. The owner of the bar had given the officers “the authority to act as an employee of the bar, ․ includ[ing] barring people, restricting access, [and] things of that nature.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 9).

[4] As closing time neared, some of the bar customers started to leave the bar and go into the parking lot. Thereafter, a distraught customer came back into the bar and told Sergeant Hollins that shots had been fired in the parking lot. Sergeant Hollins and Officer Culver went to the parking lot and encountered “at least 50 plus people within the general vicinity of shots being fired.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 10). Because there was “an active shooter situation[,]” Sergeant Hollins determined that they needed to clear the parking lot for safety and investigatory purposes. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 10). Sergeant Hollins called for police backup, and Officer Culver used the PA system in his vehicle to instruct the customers to “vacate the area[.]” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 11). Officer Culver gave the customers “numerous commands” that they needed to leave. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 14). At that time, Meriweather was in the parking lot, and she did not leave.

[5] Officer Michael Rose (“Officer Rose”), who was working as an off-duty security officer at a second bar owned by the bar's owner, went to the bar's parking lot and saw that it looked like “hell” and “was riddled with patrons from the bar.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 14). Officer Rose saw Meriweather and spoke directly to her. He told Meriweather that she needed “to leave the parking lot” and that it was “time to go.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 15). Meriweather had a “combative type” reaction and did not leave. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 16). Officer Rose told Meriweather to leave “[n]umerous times[,]” but she did not heed his “commands to vacate.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 16). Meriweather lingered in the parking lot and then eventually walked out to the roadway, but she then “came back into the parking lot again after numerous commands to leave.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 16). Once she returned to the parking lot, an officer arrested her for criminal trespass.

[6] Thereafter, the State charged Meriweather with Class A misdemeanor criminal trespass. In December 2024, the trial court held a bench trial. The State presented testimony from Sergeant Hollins and Officer Rose.

[7] Meriweather testified on her own behalf, and she also presented testimony from a bartender from the bar (“the bartender”). The bartender testified that Meriweather was a regular customer at the bar and was a friend of his wife. He stated that Meriweather had not paid her bar tab when she had left the bar and gone into the parking lot. The bartender also testified that Meriweather had told him that “she wanted to go get money out of her vehicle and come back and pay her tab.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 20). Additionally, the bartender testified that Meriweather had walked outside and that the doors to the bar locked upon exiting. The bartender also testified that “that night stuff happened in the parking lot so they were obviously kicking people out of the parking lot” and that Meriweather “was trying to come back and pay her tab.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 20).

[8] When Meriweather testified, she told the trial court that she was “not aware of [the officers] asking people to leave” because she was inside the bar and could not hear anything outside. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 25). Meriweather testified that she had walked outside in the parking lot because she was going to her car to get her money and a car seat for the bartender's pregnant wife. She acknowledged that there were “[a] lot” of police cars in the parking lot and that she had seen the lights and sirens. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 29). Meriweather testified that she had been told to leave “[p]robably once.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 29). She also testified that “the officers ․ were saying to leave but [that she] was trying to explain to them” that she was “trying to pay [her] tab.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 26). Meriweather stated that, after she had gone to her car and had gotten her money and the car seat, an officer would not let her back into the bar to pay her tab. Meriweather also testified that “[w]hen [she] finally was about to leave [she] was walking towards [her] car and ․ was dancing on the way to [her] car and that's when [an officer] came up behind [her] and arrested [her].” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 26).

[9] The State presented rebuttal testimony from Officer Rose. He testified that he did not recall Meriweather asking to pay her tab and did not recall her having a car seat. The officer also testified that if Meriweather had said that she wanted to pay her tab, he would have confirmed that information with the bartender.

[10] The trial court found Meriweather guilty of criminal trespass as charged. When entering its judgment, the trial court noted that “the officer outside [had] told [Meriweather] to leave and then [she] didn't leave[.]” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 37). The trial court acknowledged that Meriweather “felt that [she] had some justification in order to get back in” but noted that the surrounding circumstances included “the scene at that time when the bar [wa]s closing and [that] there ha[d] been a shots fired incident[.]” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 37). The trial court determined that Meriweather had committed criminal trespass, and it imposed a 180-day suspended sentence.

[11] Meriweather now appeals.

Decision

[12] Meriweather argues that the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction for Class A misdemeanor criminal trespass. We disagree.

[13] “Sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims trigger a deferential standard of review in which we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility, instead reserving those matters to the province of the jury.” Hancz-Barron v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1237, 1244 (Ind. 2024) (cleaned up). “A conviction is supported by sufficient evidence if there is substantial evidence of probative value supporting each element of the offense such that a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (cleaned up). “In conducting that review, we consider only the evidence that supports the jury's determination, not evidence that might undermine it.” Id.

[14] The criminal trespass statute in effect at the time of Meriweather's crime, Indiana Code § 35-43-2-2, provided, in relevant part, that a “person who ․ not having a contractual interest in the property, knowingly or intentionally refuses to leave the real property of another person after having been asked to leave by the other person or that person's agent ․ commits criminal trespass, a Class A misdemeanor.” I.C. § 35-43-2-2(b)(2).² “A person engages in conduct ‘knowingly’ if, when [s]he engages in the conduct, [s]he is aware of a high probability that [s]he is doing so. I.C. § 35-41-2-2(b). “A person engages in conduct ‘intentionally’ if, when [s]he engages in the conduct, it is h[er] conscious objective to do so. I.C. § 35-41-2-2(a). “Because intent is a mental state, the fact-finder often must resort to the reasonable inferences based upon an examination of the surrounding circumstances to determine whether—from the person's conduct and the natural consequences therefrom—there is a showing or inference of the requisite criminal intent.” Diallo v. State, 928 N.E.2d 250, 253 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (cleaned up). See also Heuring v. State, 140 N.E.3d 270, 275 (Ind. 2020) (explaining that intent is a mental function that can be inferred from a defendant's conduct and the natural and usual sequence to which such conduct logically and reasonably points).

[15] Meriweather does not dispute that the officers, as agents of the bar, told her to leave the parking lot and that she did not do so. Meriweather, however, argues that the State failed to prove that she had the requisite intent to refuse to leave. Specifically, Meriweather argues that the State did not prove that she knowingly refused to leave the parking lot because she had received “conflicting instructions from two different agents of the bar.” (Meriweather's Br. 9-10). She states that the officer in the parking lot had told her to leave but that the bartender had known that she was planning to come back inside the bar to pay her bar tab. Meriweather contends that her “justification to return” to pay her tab served as a “valid defense.” (Meriweather's Br. 10). She further asserts that the trial court “ignore[d] key testimony to [her] defense” when it gave more weight to the officer's testimony that Meriweather did not leave when told than the trial court gave to her testimony that she had told the security officer that she needed to pay her tab. (Meriweather's Br. 11).

[16] Our Court has explained that “[i]f a person has a fair and reasonable foundation for believing [s]he has a right to be present on the property, there is no criminal trespass.” Blair v. State, 62 N.E.3d 424, 428 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (citing Olsen v. State, 663 N.E.2d 1194, 1196 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996)). Here, however, there was no “fair and reasonable foundation” to support Meriweather's belief that her desire to pay her bar tab gave her a right to refuse to leave the parking lot after officers had told her to leave the parking lot where a shooting had occurred and was being investigated. See Olsen, 663 N.E.2d at 1196 (rejecting a defendant's claim that his refusal to leave a hotel property was justified by his “bona fide belief” that he had a right to be on the property after he had been asked to leave); see also Blair, 62 N.E.3d at 428 (rejecting the defendant's “good faith claim” that he had a right to enter the property).

[17] Here, the evidence revealed that at 2:45 a.m., after gun activity had occurred in the bar's parking lot, the bar's security officers used a PA system to instruct customers in the parking lot to leave. Meriweather, who had been inside the bar since 9:00 p.m., was in the parking lot at the time that the announcement was made. Officer Rose specifically told Meriweather multiple times to leave. Meriweather had a “combative type” reaction and did not leave. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 16). Meriweather lingered in the parking lot and then eventually walked out to the roadway, but she then “came back into the parking lot again after numerous commands to leave.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 16). Once she returned to the parking lot, the security officer arrested her. While Meriweather testified that she had told the officer that she needed to pay her bar tab, the officer testified that Meriweather had never mentioned paying her bar tab.

[18] Meriweather's argument challenging the sufficiency of the evidence is nothing more than a request to reweigh the evidence and the trial court's credibility determination, which we will not do. See Hancz-Barron, 235 N.E.3d at 1244. The evidence presented at the bench trial and the inferences drawn therefrom were sufficient for the trial court, as trier of fact, to conclude that Meriweather knowingly or intentionally refused to leave the bar parking lot after being told to leave. Accordingly, we affirm her criminal trespass conviction.³

[19] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-43-2-2. We note that the current version of the criminal trespass statute was enacted with an effective date of July 1, 2024. Because Meriweather committed her crime in March 2024, we will apply the statute in effect at that time.

2.   We note that, during the recent 2025 legislative session, our legislature amended Indiana Code § 35-43-2-2, and the amendment is effective July 1, 2025. See 2025 Ind. Legis. Serv. P.L. 23-2025 (S.E.A. 219).

3.   Meriweather mentions in passing that she had a “contractual obligation to pay her [bar] tab[,]” but she makes no argument that the State failed to prove that she lacked a contractual interest in the bar. (Meriweather's Br. 7). In her reply brief, she clarified that she did not intend to raise an argument that she had a contractual interest.

Pyle, Judge.

Chief Judge Altice and Judge DeBoer concur. Altice, C.J., and DeBoer, J., concur.