CODY v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Joe Cody appeals the trial court's dismissal of his pro se petition “to di[s]miss fines, fees, costs, and reinstate driving privileges,” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 8, pursuant to Indiana Code Section 34-58-1-2 (the “Screening Statute”). We find no error in the trial court's dismissal and, accordingly, affirm.

Issue

[2] Cody raises several issues; however, we find one issue to be dispositive, which is whether the trial court erred by dismissing Cody's petition.

Facts

[3] On November 13, 2024, Cody filed a pro se “verified petition to di[s]miss fines, fees, costs, and reinstate driving privileges.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 8. The motion alleged that Cody was an incarcerated individual; he “needs to be able to drive to maintain employment”; and he was seeking to modify his placement to work release. Id. at 10. The petition did not provide Cody's current driver's license status—for example, whether his license was suspended or terminated—nor the reasoning therefor.

[4] The following day, the trial court issued an order in the Chronological Case Summary that stated: “Waiver of filing fee granted. Petition for Specialized Driving Permit denied as it doesn't comply with Bartholomew County Local Rules or [Indiana] Rules of Court.” Id. at 14. Cody now appeals pro se.

Discussion and Decision

[5] Cody argues that the trial court erred by dismissing his petition. A trial court may dismiss an incarcerated person's petition pursuant to the Screening Statute, Indiana Code Section 34-58-1-2, and we review such dismissals de novo. Hill v. Chesterfield, 227 N.E.3d 949, 951 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024). “[W]e will affirm on any basis supported by the record.” Id.

[6] Indiana Code Section 34-58-1-1 provides that, “[u]pon receipt of a complaint or petition filed by an offender, the court shall docket the case and take no further action until the court has conducted the review required by section 2 of this chapter.” Indiana Code Section 34-58-1-2, the Screening Statute, provides, in relevant part:

(a) A court shall review a complaint or petition filed by an offender and shall determine if the claim may proceed. A claim may not proceed if the court determines that the claim:

(1) is frivolous;

(2) is not a claim upon which relief may be granted; or

(3) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from liability for such relief.

(b) A claim is frivolous under subsection (a)(1) if the claim:

(1) is made primarily to harass a person; or

(2) lacks an arguable basis either in:

(A) law; or

(B) fact.

(Emphasis added).

[7] Here, Cody filed a “verified petition to di[s]miss fines, fees, costs, and reinstate driving privileges.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 8. Cody's petition, however, provided no information regarding his driver's license status nor any legal basis to support a finding that this status should be modified. Cody claims in his Appellant's Brief that he was “pulled over for driving while suspended,” and his “intent was to file for a dis[ ]missal” of the ensuing charges, “but [he] was unable to because [of] work.” Id. Cody was then incarcerated on unrelated charges, and while he was incarcerated, his girlfriend paid the ticket for the driving while suspended offense. The Bureau of Motor Vehicles (“BMV”) then “put a hold on Cody's license for failure to take [a] drivers[’] safety course.” Id. Cody, however, included none of this information in his petition before the trial court.

[8] Moreover, the statutes cited in Cody's petition do not provide a basis to reinstate his driving privileges. Indiana Code Section 9-33-2-5 concerns judicial review of BMV action, but Cody mentioned no BMV action in his petition; Indiana Code Sections 9-33-4-1 et. seq. concern petitions to reduce unpaid driving-related fees; and Indiana Code Sections 9-33-5-1 et. seq. direct the BMV to create administrative “programs and activities concerning the reinstatement of driving privileges” for inmates, former inmates, and persons on parole or in a community corrections placement. Ind. Code § 9-33-5-3. These statutes are unrelated to Cody's request that his driving privileges be reinstated by the trial court. Cody's motion, thus, lacked “an arguable basis either in ․ law; or ․ fact.” Ind. Code § 34-58-1-2(b)(2).

[9] Cody argues that, as a pro se litigant, his petition should have been liberally construed. Cody cites federal jurisprudence in support of this argument, but the law in Indiana is that “a pro se litigant is held to the same standards as a trained attorney and is afforded no inherent leniency simply by virtue of being self-represented.”¹ Zavodnik v. Harper, 17 N.E.3d 259, 266 (Ind. 2014) (citing In re G.P., 4 N.E.3d 1158, 1164 (Ind. 2014)). We, thus, conclude that the trial court did not err by dismissing Cody's petition.² See Hill, 227 N.E.3d at 952 (affirming dismissal of inmate's complaint pursuant to the Screening Statute).³

Conclusion

[10] The trial court did not err by dismissing Cody's petition pursuant to the Screening Statute. Accordingly, we affirm.

[11] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   We note that, pursuant to Indiana Rule of Judicial Conduct 2.2, “[a] judge shall uphold and apply the law, and shall perform all duties of judicial office fairly and impartially. A judge may make reasonable efforts, consistent with the law and court rules, to facilitate the ability of all litigants, including self-represented litigants, to be fairly heard.” (Emphasis added). Further, comment 5 to this rule provides:A judge's responsibility to promote access to justice, especially in cases involving self-represented litigants, may warrant the exercise of discretion by using techniques that enhance the process of reaching a fair determination in the case. Although the appropriate scope of such discretion and how it is exercised will vary with the circumstances of each case, a judge's exercise of such discretion will not generally raise a reasonable question about the judge's impartiality. Reasonable steps that a judge may take, but in no way is required to take, include:(a) Construe pleadings to facilitate consideration of the issues raised.(b) Provide information or explanation about the proceedings.(c) Explain legal concepts in everyday language.(d) Ask neutral questions to elicit or clarify information.(e) Modify the traditional order of taking evidence.(f) Permit narrative testimony.(g) Refer litigants to any resources available to assist in the preparation of the case or enforcement and compliance with any order.(h) Inform litigants what will be happening next in the case and what is expected of them.

2.   Cody also argues that “he was not served due process by Ind. Constitution Art. 1 § 12. Where [sic] B.M.V. sent a notice of intent and a notice of suspen[s]ion to Cody's last known address, and it was unreasonable that either notice would have reached him in time as he was [i]ncarcerated and in transfer[.]” Appellant's Br. p. 10. This argument is waived because it was not presented to the trial court and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. See GKC Ind. Theatres, Inc. v. Elk Retail Invs., LLC, 764 N.E.2d 647, 651 (Ind. Ct App. 2002).

3.   We note that the trial court's order does not mention the Screening Statute nor the specific trial or local rules with which Cody's petition did not comply. This hampers our review. Although we affirm the trial court's dismissal here, the best practice is for trial courts to specifically state the reason for a dismissal, including the applicable rules and statutes on which the trial court has relied.

Tavitas, Judge.

Vaidik, J., and Felix, J., concur.