Ronald C. Zimmerman, by David Zimmerman, Guardian, Appellant-Petitioner v. Indiana Family and Social Services Administration, et. al., Appellee-Respondents. (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Ronald C. Zimmerman (“Zimmerman”), by David Zimmerman (“David”) as guardian, appeals the trial court's order that denied Zimmerman's petition for judicial review of the Indiana Family and Social Services Administration's (“FSSA”) determination relating to Zimmerman's Medicaid eligibility and that dismissed Zimmerman's claim alleging a violation of his federal civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by FSSA, the Secretary of the FSSA in his individual capacity (“the FSSA Secretary”), and the Dearborn County Division of Family Resources (“the County”). Zimmerman argues that the trial court erred by denying his petition for judicial review and dismissing his civil rights claim. Concluding that the trial court did not err, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

[2] We affirm.

Issue

Whether the trial court erred by denying Zimmerman's petition for judicial review and dismissing his civil rights claim.

Facts 1

[3] On January 13, 2014, then seventy-seven-year-old Zimmerman and his son, David, entered into a caregiver contract.² As part of the caregiver contract, David agreed to be Zimmerman's healthcare agent and to provide home health care services to Zimmerman, and Zimmerman agreed to pay for healthcare and other expenses rendered by David or any other caregiver. That same day, Zimmerman and David also executed a caregiver service addendum that set forth terms and conditions under which services would be provided.

[4] On May 9, 2019, the R. Zimmerman Family Heirs Trust (“the Family Trust”) was created as an irrevocable trust. David was the trustee and trust maker, and his siblings were beneficiaries. In 2019, Zimmerman transferred personal property, including his family farm Big Ole Oak Farms and other assets, into the Family Trust.

[5] Zimmerman also formed the Big Ole Oak Farms LLC (“the LLC”) in 2020.³ The Family Trust and David were the managing members of the LLC, with the Family Trust holding ninety-nine shares and David holding one share.

[6] On December 31, 2020, Zimmerman was admitted to a nursing home. Thereafter on August 31, 2021, David filed a Medicaid application on behalf of Zimmerman. The first month of requested eligibility was May 1, 2021.

[7] Initially, FSSA ⁴ twice denied Zimmerman's Medicaid application for benefits. FSSA's first denial of Zimmerman's Medicaid application was due to the value of Zimmerman's resources exceeding the Medicaid program eligibility standard. Zimmerman filed an administrative appeal of that denial. An ALJ held a hearing and remanded the case apparently for consideration of the validity of the Family Trust for Medicaid purposes.

[8] Thereafter, FSSA again denied Zimmerman's Medicaid application due to the value of Zimmerman's excess resources, FSSA's determination that the Family Trust was not valid, and issues regarding transfers to that trust. Zimmerman filed an administrative appeal of that denial. Following a hearing, an ALJ issued a decision “favorable” to Zimmerman and directed FSSA to take “further action[.]” (App. Vol. 4 at 219) (uppercase letters modified). The ALJ determined that the Family Trust was valid and directed FSSA to “re-determine [Zimmerman's] eligibility for Medicaid benefits.” (App. Vol. 4 at 233). The ALJ also directed FSSA to reassess Zimmerman's caregiver contract and caregiver service addendum to determine the impact on Zimmerman's overall eligibility. Additionally, the ALJ noted that Zimmerman had presented FSSA with a healthcare log of services that apparently had incorrect entries and directed FSSA to “[e]xamine the transfer dates of any and all of [Zimmerman's] resources ․ and [to] determine if the transfers to the trust [we]re v[i]olati[v]e and if a transfer penalty applie[d] to [Zimmerman].” (App. Vol. 4 at 232).⁵

[9] Thereafter, on September 1, 2022, FSSA sent Zimmerman an eligibility notice to inform him that his Medicaid application had been approved for “[f]ull coverage except long term care” and that his health coverage was effective May 1, 2021. (App. Vol. 4 at 245). FSSA also determined that Zimmerman's caregiver contract was “not valid[.]” (App. Vol. 4 at 246). Upon determining that Zimmerman's two healthcare logs ⁶ that he had submitted to document services provided to him were not valid, FSSA further determined that “the daily expenses claimed by the caregiver [we]re not supported by any documentation ․ [and] [we]re not allowable.” (App. Vol. 4 at 246). Additionally, the notice set forth a list of reported resources that had been transferred to the Trust in May 2019, which was during the applicable look-back period. The resources included Zimmerman's family farm, Big Ole Oak Farms, bank accounts, farm machinery, and other assets that were collectively valued at more than $1,000,000. FSSA noted that Zimmerman's conflicting healthcare logs had not provided supporting documentation to show that adequate consideration had existed for any relevant transfer and that, therefore, a transfer penalty should be imposed. Specifically, the notice informed Zimmerman that he had been “required to supply any necessary records, documentation, and information which verif[ied] the fair market value and consideration received” and that “[w]ithout information or documentation to verify the expenses listed on the log, all expenses should be considered a violative transfer and a penalty should be imposed.” (App. Vol. 4 at 246). Based on Zimmerman's transferred assets, FSSA imposed a transfer penalty, which was from May 1, 2021 to December 2, 2036 and totaled $1,285,061.63.⁷

[10] Zimmerman then appealed FSSA's decision regarding the transfer penalty. An administrative law judge (“ALJ”) held a hearing in January 2023. Zimmerman did not dispute that he had transferred assets in May 2019 or that these transfers had occurred within the applicable look-back period.

[11] On February 23, 2023, the ALJ issued a decision that was “favorable” to Zimmerman and that required both Zimmerman and FSSA “to take further action” on the transfer penalty issue. (App. Vol. 2 at 23) (quotations modified from uppercase to lowercase). Specifically, the ALJ determined that Zimmerman's caregiver contract and addendum were valid and that the caregiver contract could “serve as consideration for the transfer of assets.” (App. Vol. 2 at 36). The ALJ noted that unresolved issues with the two healthcare logs remained, determined that additional information was needed regarding the expenses that had been listed in Zimmerman's handwritten healthcare log,⁸ and ordered Zimmerman to submit a revised healthcare log to FSSA to show that the adequate consideration had been given and that the transfers had been non-violative. The ALJ provided Zimmerman with the following directives for submitting his revised log:

Within forty days[ ] from the date of this decision, [Zimmerman] shall submit a revised log, based upon the handwritten journal. The revised log shall be based upon a charge of $22.00 for all services, except adult day care services which shall be based upon a charge of $3.00 an hour. Entries for adult day care/on-call services may be included if there is contemporaneous evidence for the entry that [Zimmerman] notified the care giver that there was a need for the service. No interest shall be included. No expenses shall be included. No services that were provided when [Zimmerman] was in a hospital or nursing facility shall be included. No service such as Yard & Lawn Care, Maintenance and Repairs, and Farming services shall be included if the service was provided on or at real estate that [Zimmerman] did not own at the time the service was provided. No Care of Animals service shall be included for a service that was provided for a pet or livestock that [Zimmerman] did not own at the time the service was provided. The log shall run from January 14, 2014 until May 29, 2019, the date of the last potentially violative transfer. The revised log shall include a running total of the charges.

(App. Vol. 2 at 37) (footnote omitted). Additionally, the ALJ directed FSSA to review Zimmerman's revised log and to reassess whether a transfer penalty would be imposed. Specifically, the ALJ directed FSSA as follows:

Based on the revised log [that Zimmerman] submits, [FSSA] shall issue a new Notice of Action regarding whether or not a transfer penalty is still being imposed. If [FSSA] imposes a transfer penalty, [FSSA] shall inform [Zimmerman] what the amount of the transfer penalty is, the dates the transfer penalty is to run, and how the transfer penalty was calculated. If [FSSA] finds entries in the log invalid, the State Agency shall inform [Zimmerman] which entries were found invalid and why.

(App. Vol. 2 at 37).

[12] Zimmerman did not submit a revised log to FSSA. Zimmerman then appealed the ALJ's decision to the FSSA for a final agency determination. On March 30, 2023, FSSA sent Zimmerman a notice of final agency action, in which FSSA affirmed the ALJ's decision to remand the case for further action by Zimmerman and FSSA on the transfer penalty issue.

[13] Zimmerman still did not submit a revised log to FSSA. Instead, on April 21, 2023, Zimmerman then filed with the trial court a petition for judicial review that included a complaint seeking damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (collectively, “the complaint”), and he later filed an amended complaint. Under Count 1 of his amended complaint, Zimmerman sought judicial review of FSSA's decision that affirmed the ALJ's order for Zimmerman to resubmit a healthcare log and for FSSA to redetermine whether a transfer penalty would be imposed. Zimmerman challenged the ALJ's remand instructions for further action from Zimmerman and FSSA as being “wrongful directives” and arbitrary. (App. Vol. 5 at 160).

[14] Under Count 2, Zimmerman alleged that FSSA, the County, and the FSSA Secretary, in his individual capacity, had violated his federal civil rights by denying him “Medicaid nursing home assistance” by “wrongfully including” a trust “in the estate of [Zimmerman] so as to render the estate ineligible for such benefits.” (App. Vol. 5 at 164). Zimmerman sought to enjoin the FSSA Secretary from denying Zimmerman his right to Medicaid benefits “by including trust assets subject to 42 U.S.C. § 1369p(c)(2)([C])[⁹ ] as available resources of [Zimmerman].” (App. Vol. 5 at 164).¹⁰ Zimmerman requested the trial court to remand the case to the ALJ “directing [the ALJ] that the standards” to be used in the submission of Zimmerman's revised health care log was “invalid” and “arbitrary and capricious[.]” (App. Vol. 5 at 164).

[15] Thereafter, FSSA filed a partial motion to dismiss, seeking to dismiss Zimmerman's civil rights claim pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 12(B)(6) for failure to state a cognizable claim. Specifically, FSSA argued that the trial court should dismiss the civil rights claim against FSSA, the County, and the FSSA Secretary because none of them were a person subject to suit under Section 1983. FSSA also argued that no exception applied to allow the claim against the FSSA Secretary because Zimmerman's complaint did not allege that he was seeking prospective relief for an ongoing violation of federal law. Alternatively, FSSA argued that Zimmerman had not been denied any right conferred to him under the federal statute referenced in his complaint. FSSA pointed out that 42 U.S.C. § 1369p(c)(2)(C) provided Zimmerman with the right to an opportunity to make a satisfactory showing, “in accordance with State regulations” that his “asset transfers were not done for purposes of becoming eligible for Medicaid” and that he had received that opportunity and would again under the ALJ's remand order. (App. Vol. 4 at 185). FSSA asserted that Zimmerman's injunction request “actually s[ought] to enjoin how the agency exercises its discretion under 405 IAC 2-3-1.1(k)(7), in determining whether he ha[d] made ‘a satisfactory showing’ ” and that “injunctive relief [wa]is not available under Section 1983 to enforce state law.” (App. Vol. 5 at 185).¹¹

[16] The trial court held a hearing on Zimmerman's judicial review and civil rights claims in February 2024. Zimmerman challenged the ALJ directives on remand as being unlawful. FSSA argued that judicial review was not appropriate because Zimmerman had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies and because he did not have standing to seek review of a favorable determination.

[17] Thereafter, in April 2024, the trial court issued an order denying Zimmerman's petition for judicial review based on his failure to exhaust his administrative remedies and dismissing his civil rights claim under Trial Rule 12(B)(6). The trial court determined that Zimmerman “should submit a revised care log with additional evidence submitted to [FSSA] as outlined by the ALJ for further review and determination as to the transfer of asset penalty.” (App. Vol. 2 at 19).

[18] Zimmerman now appeals.

Decision

[19] Zimmerman argues that the trial court erred by denying his petition for judicial review and dismissing his civil rights claim. We first address Zimmerman's argument regarding the denial of his petition for judicial review.

[20] Judicial review of an agency decision is governed by the Administrative Orders and Procedures Act or AOPA, see Indiana Code § 4-21.5-5-1 et seq., which provides the “exclusive means for judicial review of an agency action.” I.C. § 4-21.5-5-1. Indiana Code § 4-21.5-5-2(b) provides that a petitioner is “entitled” to judicial review of a final agency action only if the petitioner has met the statutory requirements concerning standing, exhaustion of administrative remedies, timely filing of a judicial review petition, and timely filing of the agency record. I.C. § 4-21.5-5-2(b).

[21] Here, the trial court denied Zimmerman's petition for judicial review based on his failure to exhaust administrative remedies prior to seeking judicial review. Specifically, in the trial court's order, it noted that the ALJ had “remanded to [FSSA] to review a revised log to be submitted by [Zimmerman] within [f]orty (40) days which [Zimmerman] failed to do and thus a further review did not occur.” (App. Vol. 2 at 19).

[22] “It is well-established that, if an administrative remedy is available, it must be pursued before a claimant is allowed access to the courts.” Town Council of New Harmony v. Parker, 726 N.E.2d 1217, 1224 (Ind. 2000), amended on reh'g in part, 737 N.E.2d 719 (Ind. 2000). “Failure to exhaust administrative remedies deprives the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction.” Id. “The exhaustion doctrine is intended to defer judicial review until controversies have been channeled through the complete administrative process.” Johnson v. Celebration Fireworks, Inc., 829 N.E.2d 979, 982 (Ind. 2005) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

[23] Indiana Code § 4-21.5-5-4 provides that:

(a) A person may file a petition for judicial review under this chapter only after exhausting all administrative remedies available within the agency whose action is being challenged and within any other agency authorized to exercise administrative review.

(b) A person who:

(1) fails to timely object to an order or timely petition for review of an order within the period prescribed by this article; or

(2) is in default under this article;

has waived the person's right to judicial review under this chapter.

I.C. § 4-21.5-5-4 (emphasis added).

[24] Zimmerman acknowledges that the ALJ remanded his case for further action by both Zimmerman and FSSA on the transfer penalty issue. Furthermore, he does not dispute that he did not follow the ALJ's directive to submit a revised healthcare log so that FSSA could review it and redetermine whether or not a transfer penalty would be imposed.

[25] Instead, Zimmerman argues that the trial court erred by determining that he had failed to exhaust administrative remedies where he had timely filed his petition for judicial review. Zimmerman's argument is based on his incorrect interpretation of Indiana Code § 4-21.5-5-4. Zimmerman contends that Indiana Code § 4-21.5-5-4 provides that a person “only fails to exhaust his administrative remedies when he fails to timely file his petition for judicial review within the 30 days after [a] Final Agency Review Denial was issued.” (Zimmerman's Br. 20). Zimmerman is conflating subsection (a) with subsection (b) and is improperly reading them as being dependent subsections. To the contrary, subsection (a) relates to exhaustion of administrative remedies, and subsection (b) relates to a waiver of the right to judicial review.

[26] Zimmerman has failed to comply with the statutory requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies. As a result of Zimmerman's failure to exhaust administrative remedies, he was not entitled to consideration of his petition for judicial review, and we affirm the trial court's denial of Zimmerman's petition for judicial review.¹²

[27] Next, we address Zimmerman's argument that the trial court erred by dismissing his civil rights claim under Trial Rule 12(B)(6). Our Indiana Supreme Court has explained our standard of review when reviewing a trial court's decision on a motion to dismiss under Trial Rule 12(B)(6).

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint, not the facts supporting it. Thus, the motion tests whether the allegations in the complaint establish any set of circumstances under which a plaintiff would be entitled to relief. In ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the trial court is required to view the complaint in the light most favorable to the non-moving party with every inference in its favor. Our review of a trial court's grant or denial of a motion to dismiss based on Trial Rule 12(B)(6) is de novo. Viewing the complaint in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, we must determine whether the complaint states any facts on which the trial court could have granted relief.

Allen v. Clarian Health Partners, Inc., 980 N.E.2d 306, 308 (Ind. 2012) (internal citations omitted).

[28] “Section 1983 creates no substantive right of its own, but acts only as a vehicle to afford litigants a civil remedy for deprivation of their federal rights.” Crouch v. State, 147 N.E.3d 1026, 1030 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020). “To prevail on a Section 1983 claim, the plaintiff must show that[:] (1) the defendant deprived the plaintiff of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States[;] and (2) the defendant acted under the color of state law.” Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). “Whether a governmental entity is amenable to suit under Section 1983 depends on the meaning of the term ‘person.’ ” Id. For Section 1983 purposes, the term “person” does not include a state or its administrative agencies. See J.A.W. v. State, Marion Cnty. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 687 N.E.2d 1202, 1203 (Ind. 1997) (citing Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989)). See also Melton v. Indiana Athletic Trainers Bd., 156 N.E.3d 633, 649-50 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (explaining that “a state or state agency may not be sued under section 1983 regardless of the type of relief requested”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), reh'g denied, trans. denied. Additionally, a state official may be sued in his “official capacity for prospective relief such as an injunction based on an alleged ongoing constitutional violation.” Id. (emphasis added).

[29] Here, FSSA had approved Zimmerman's Medicaid application for full coverage except for long term care and had also imposed a transfer penalty. The ALJ did not sustain FSSA's transfer penalty decision and remanded this case for further action by both parties on the transfer penalty issue. Zimmerman then filed a Section 1983 claim against FSSA and related entities. Specifically in Count 2 of Zimmerman's amended complaint, he alleged that FSSA, the County, and the FSSA Secretary, in his individual capacity, had violated his federal civil rights by denying him “Medicaid nursing home assistance” by “wrongfully including” a trust “in the estate of [Zimmerman] so as to render the estate ineligible for such benefits.” (App. Vol. 5 at 164). Zimmerman sought to enjoin the FSSA Secretary from denying Zimmerman his right to Medicaid benefits “by including trust assets subject to 42 U.S.C. § 1369p(c)(2)([C]) as available resources of [Zimmerman].” (App. Vol. 5 at 164).¹³

[30] On appeal, Zimmerman concedes that he could not maintain a civil rights claim against FSSA and the County because they are state or administrative agencies and not included in the definition of a person for purposes of a Section 1983 claim. See J.A.W., 687 N.E.2d at 1203. Zimmerman, however, asserts that his civil rights claim against the FSSA Secretary was proper despite the fact that his complaint's caption indicated that he was suing the FSSA Secretary in his individual capacity. Zimmerman contends that his claim against the FSSA Secretary was intended to be in the secretary's official capacity and that he sought injunctive relief.

[31] FSSA acknowledges that Zimmerman sought injunctive relief from the FSSA Secretary but argues that what Zimmerman's “claim fails to account for, though, is that he prevailed before the ALJ[.]” (FSSA's Br. 40). FSSA asserts that “Zimmerman cannot plead a continuing violation of a federal right because the ALJ did not affirm [FSSA's] decision to impose a transfer penalty” and that “any potential transfer penalty is an issue that remains pending[.]” (FSSA's Br. 40). Additionally, FSSA asserts that dismissal of Zimmerman's complaint was proper because Zimmerman “received the rights afforded to him under the federal Medicaid statute” that he cited in his complaint. (FSSA's Br. 40). FSSA points out that 42 U.S.C. § 1369p(c)(2)(C) “does not guarantee Zimmerman access to public benefits” and, instead, guarantees him a right to “make a ‘satisfactory showing’ ” under the statue, that “he intended to transfer his assets ‘either at fair market value, or for other valuable consideration.’ ” (FSSA's Br. 40) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1369p(c)(2)(C)). FSSA asserts that Zimmerman has already received the opportunity to submit evidence and argument under that statute during initial proceedings and before the ALJ and that he will have an additional opportunity to do so on remand.

[32] The trial court agreed with FSSA's arguments. The trial court concluded that Zimmerman had “failed to show an ongoing violation of Federal Law ․ as noted in Melton[.]” (App. Vol. 2 at 19) (underline in original). The trial court stated that Zimmerman had not satisfied the ongoing violation component by merely citing to a federal statute in his amended petition and pointed out that the “statutory provision merely provide[d] [Zimmerman] an opportunity to satisfy his burden to a state agency to show Medicaid Benefits should not be reduced by a transfer penalty in the trust context.” (App. Vol. 2 at 19-20). The trial court also concluded that because Zimmerman's claim essentially sought to enjoin FSSA's “discretion under State laws and no Federal Law violation [had] occurred, [Zimmerman's] civil rights claim under [Section] 1983 [wa]s not justiciable and should be dismissed.” (App. Vol. 2 at 19).

[33] We agree with the trial court's conclusion that Zimmerman's civil rights claim should be dismissed under Indiana Trial Rule 12(B)(6), and we do not find it necessary to further expand on the trial court's analysis. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's dismissal of Zimmerman's claim. See Crouch, 147 N.E.3d at 1030 (affirming the trial court's dismissal of the petitioner's civil rights claim against a state official in her official capacity).

[34] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

2.   The parties titled the caregiver contract as “Care Giver Contract with Revolving Credit Account for Home Healthcare[.]” (App. Vol. 2 at 145) (all uppercase letters modified).

3.   It appears that the LLC was initially formed in 2016, was administratively dissolved in 2018, and then reinstated in 2020 or 2021.

4.   In this opinion, we will generically refer to “FSSA” when referring to the state agency or its underlying divisions.

5.   Our Court has explained a transfer penalty as follows:The Medicaid Act states that, with respect to coverage for nursing facility services, if an institutionalized person or that person's spouse disposes of assets for less than fair market value on or after a specific “look-back date,” ․ then the person is ineligible for nursing facility coverage for a certain period of time. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(1)(A). This period of non-coverage is known as a transfer penalty, and Congress's purpose in enacting the penalty was to maximize the available resources for Medicaid and limit them to those truly in need․ Indiana has implemented the transfer penalty provision of the Medicaid Act through a regulation, 405 Indiana Administrative Code 2-3-1.1(c), which largely mirrors the language of 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c).Austin v. Indiana Family & Soc. Servs. Admin., 947 N.E.2d 979, 982 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011).

6.   One of the healthcare logs was a handwritten log, and the other log had been created using an Excel spreadsheet.

7.   The record before us indicates that FSSA sent another eligibility notice of action to Zimmerman on November 14, 2022. Apparently, in that November notice, the transfer penalty date was modified slightly to May 1, 2021 until November 30, 2036. It does not appear that this November 2022 eligibility notice of action is included in Zimmerman's appendix. (See App. Vol. 5 at 126, 180).

8.   The ALJ noted that, based on representations presented in an affidavit from David, the handwritten healthcare log “appear[ed] to be a more contemporaneous document than the Excel” healthcare log. (App. Vol. 2 at 37).

9.   42 U.S.C. § 1369p(c) relates to “[t]aking into account certain transfers of assets[,]” and § 1369p(c)(2)(C) provides that:An individual shall not be ineligible for medical assistance by reason of paragraph (1) to the extent that ․ a satisfactory showing is made to the State (in accordance with regulations promulgated by the Secretary) that (i) the individual intended to dispose of the assets either at fair market value, or for other valuable consideration, (ii) the assets were transferred exclusively for a purpose other than to qualify for medical assistance, or (iii) all assets transferred for less than fair market value have been returned to the individual[.]42 U.S.C. § 1369p(c)(2)(C).

10.   Zimmerman also sought attorney fees as part of his civil rights claim.

11.   405 Indiana Administrative Code 2-3-1.1(k)(7) provides as follows:(k) An applicant or a member remains eligible for Medicaid under this section if any of the following apply:* * * * *(7) A satisfactory showing is made to the office, under the standards specified under 42 U.S.C. 1396p(c)(2)(C) by the Secretary of Health and Human Services, that:(A) the applicant or member intended to dispose of the assets at fair market value or for other valuable consideration;(B) the assets were transferred exclusively for a purpose other than to qualify for Medicaid; or(C) assets transferred for less than fair market value have been returned to the applicant or member. To establish that a transfer is made exclusively for purposes other than qualifying for Medicaid, the applicant or member shall submit sufficient evidence to show the transfer is made exclusively for reasons not related to Medicaid eligibility, estate recovery, or a lien.405 IAC 2-3-1.1(k)(7).

12.   In Zimmerman's appellate brief, he also raises arguments discussing the remand directives and the expenses to be included in his revised healthcare log. We note that he will be able to raise these arguments about the directives and the expenses on remand when FSSA reconsiders the expenses and redetermines whether a transfer penalty will be imposed.Additionally, we note that FSSA alternatively argued that the trial court properly denied Zimmerman's petition for judicial review because he did not have standing and because his claim was not ripe. Given our decision to affirm the trial court's judgment based on exhaustion of administrative remedies, we need not address these additional arguments.

13.   Zimmerman also sought attorney fees as part of his civil rights claim.

Pyle, Judge.

Judges Weissmann and Felix concur. Weissmann, J., and Felix, J., concur.