SANFORD v. HTIW PROPERTIES LLC (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Deborah Sanford appeals the trial court's grant of summary judgment for HTIW Properties, LLC and Horizon Transport, Inc. (collectively, “Horizon”) on her complaint alleging that Horizon's negligence caused her to sustain personal injuries. Sanford presents two issues for our review, which we consolidate and restate as whether the trial court erred when it entered summary judgment for Horizon.

[2] We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] In January 2021, Horizon hired Sanford, an independent contractor, to transport RVs across the country. Horizon stored the RVs ready for transport at a facility in Elkhart, and Horizon was responsible for the maintenance of that facility.

[4] On January 17 and January 19, Elkhart received one and one-half inches and two inches of snow, respectively. On January 21, Sanford drove a rental car to the Horizon facility to inspect an RV she had been assigned to drive to California. The RV was parked “in the back of the parking lot in a lot of snow.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 137. To complete her “walkaround” inspection, she “walked [in] deeper snow” because she knew that was “safer” than “flatter snow.” Id. Sanford then drove the RV to “the front part of the parking lot” so that, when she returned to get it, she would be “closer to the gate to get back in.” Id. at 137-38. Sanford then left the facility to return her rental car at a nearby Enterprise branch.

[5] Approximately one hour later, Sanford used a ride-share service to return to the Horizon facility. The driver dropped her off at the gate, and Sanford walked to the RV parked nearby. Sanford walked “on snow so that [she] wasn't walking on [a] slippery path where cars had traversed.” Id. at 145. She “tried to get onto the heaviest part of the snow” rather than a well-traveled part of the lot that was “very shiny” and looked like a fall risk. Id. She was “definitely concerned” about falling given the “condition of the parking lot[.]” Id. at 146. Sanford was “scared” and was trying to be “as safe as possible.” Id. at 147.

[6] Despite her caution, Sanford slipped and fell on her way to the RV. As a result, Sanford sustained a fracture to her right femur. She has since undergone three surgeries to repair her leg, and she might need a fourth surgery.

[7] In September 2022, Sanford filed her fourth amended complaint against Horizon alleging that Horizon's negligence proximately caused her injuries. In September 2024, Horizon filed a motion for summary judgment. Following a hearing, the trial court granted that motion. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[8] Sanford contends that the trial court erred when it entered summary judgment for Horizon. Our standard of review is well settled.

When this Court reviews a grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment, we “stand in the shoes of the trial court.” Burton v. Benner, 140 N.E.3d 848, 851 (Ind. 2020) (quoting Murray v. Indianapolis Public Schools, 128 N.E.3d 450, 452 (Ind. 2019)). Summary judgment is appropriate “if the designated evidentiary matter shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Campbell Hausfeld/Scott Fetzer Co. v. Johnson, 109 N.E.3d 953, 955-56 (Ind. 2018) (quoting Ind. Trial Rule 56(C)). We will draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Ryan v. TCI Architects/Engineers/Contractors. Inc., 72 N.E.3d 908, 912-13 (Ind. 2017). We review summary judgment de novo. Hughley v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1000, 1003 (Ind. 2014).

Arrendale v. Am. Imaging & MRI, LLC, 183 N.E.3d 1064, 1067-68 (Ind. 2022). And, as our Court has explained,

[n]egligence is a tort that requires proof of “(1) a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff; (2) a breach of that duty; and (3) injury to the plaintiff resulting from the defendant's breach.” Rhodes v. Wright, 805 N.E.2d 382, 385 (Ind. 2004). “Negligence will not be inferred; rather, all of the elements of a negligence action must be supported by specific facts designated to the trial court or reasonable inferences that might be drawn from those facts.” Kincade v. MAC Corp., 773 N.E.2d 909, 911 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002)․ “A negligence action is generally not appropriate for disposal by summary judgment.” Id. “However, a defendant may obtain summary judgment in a negligence action when the undisputed facts negate at least one element of the plaintiff's claim.” Id.

Evansville Auto., LLC v. Labno-Fritchley, 207 N.E.3d 447, 454 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), trans. denied.

[9] The parties agree that Horizon owed a duty of care to Sanford, and the sole issue for summary judgment was whether Horizon breached that duty. The parties also agree that the scope of the duty Horizon owed to Sanford is governed by the duty of care that a landowner owes to invitees upon the property. That duty is defined as follows:

A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm caused to his invitees by a condition on the land if, but only if, he

(a) knows or by the exercise of reasonable care would discover the condition, and should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to such invitees, and

(b) should expect that they will not discover or realize the danger, or will fail to protect themselves against it, and

(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to protect them against the danger.

Burrell v. Meads, 569 N.E.2d 637, 639-40 (Ind. 1991) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343 (1965)). In the context of premises liability, this court has held that constructive knowledge depends on a “condition [that] has existed for such a length of time and under such circumstances that it would have been discovered in time to have prevented injury if the [owner], his agents[,] or employees had used ordinary care.” See Schulz v. Kroger Co., 963 N.E.2d 1141, 1144 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (citation omitted, alteration original).

[10] In its summary judgment motion, Horizon argued that, because the “snow and/or ice” present at the Elkhart facility at the time of Sanford's fall was “known” and “obvious” to her, Horizon did not breach its duty of care to her. Appellant's App. Vol. 2, pp. 41-42. Horizon claimed that the “undisputed evidence” showed that it had “no reason to anticipate that [Sanford] would fail to protect herself” from the obvious danger of falling. Id. at 42. Horizon reasserts that argument on appeal.

[11] We agree with Sanford that Horizon's argument misses the mark. As our Supreme Court has explained,

[i]f a duty of care exists, the determination of whether a breach of duty occurred is a factual question requiring an evaluation of the landowner's conduct with respect to the requisite standard of care. It is in this factual assessment that the issue of the landowner's and the invitee's comparative knowledge becomes relevant.

Douglass v. Irvin, 549 N.E.2d 368, 370 (Ind. 1990) (emphases added). In essence, Horizon argues that Sanford's knowledge of the dangerous conditions established that it did not have to designate evidence regarding its conduct or knowledge vis-à-vis the ice and snow at the facility. But, as our Supreme Court stated in Douglass, “factual circumstances may exist in which a court may find that a landowner's failure to take precautions or to warn may constitute a breach of duty because it was reasonably foreseeable that the invitee could suffer harm despite knowledge or obviousness of the risk․” Id. (emphasis added).

[12] In support of its summary judgment motion, Horizon did not designate any evidence relevant to either its knowledge of the icy conditions at the facility or its conduct in assessing and/or mitigating those conditions. On appeal, Horizon merely states, without citation to the designated evidence, that “there were no facts about the snow and ice in the Yard of which Horizon could make Sanford more aware, particularly when Sanford—without informing Horizon—moved the RV to another part of the Yard and Sanford admitted that she knew she was more likely to slip and fall there.” Appellees’ Br. at 19. And Horizon points to designated evidence showing that Sanford was in communication with a Horizon dispatcher the day of her fall and could have reported the dangerous conditions but did not do so, and that Sanford could have refused the job or rescheduled given the dangerous conditions but chose to attempt the job. Horizon argues that “Sanford's injury can be attributed at least in part to her not complying with Horizon's rules” regarding the option to cancel or reschedule a job. Id. at 21 (emphasis in original).

[13] But, again, no part of that argument and none of the designated evidence establishes Horizon's knowledge of the conditions that day; whether Horizon had attempted to mitigate the dangerous conditions; or whether Horizon had warned invitees of the conditions. See, e.g., Henderson v. Reid Hosp. & Healthcare Servs., 17 N.E.3d 311, 320 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (reversing grant of summary judgment where no designated evidence to show whether hospital did or did not use reasonable care in addressing icy conditions), trans. denied. Instead, Horizon puts all of the responsibility for avoiding the dangerous conditions on Sanford. Horizon's arguments may be relevant to the ultimate fact-finder, but, on summary judgment, they are no substitute for designated evidence to show what Horizon's knowledge of the risk was relative to Sanford's knowledge. See Douglass, 549 N.E.2d at 370.

[14] When it granted summary judgment for Horizon, the trial court relied on case law that we find readily distinguishable. In Lowrey v. SCI Funeral Services, 163 N.E.3d 857, 861 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), we affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment for a landowner in a trip and fall case where the “undisputed material facts” showed that the landowner had “met” its duty of care “as evidenced by the designated photographic exhibits depicting flat, even, unobstructed, and wide sidewalks that appear to be in pristine condition.” (Emphasis added.) But here, again, there is no evidence that Horizon had met its duty of care to Sanford, and the conditions were anything but pristine. And, in the remaining three cases cited by the trial court here, summary judgments for landowners were affirmed where they and the plaintiffs had “identical knowledge” of each of the dangers posed. Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 20. Without any designated evidence showing what Horizon knew about the dangerous conditions, we cannot make those same assessments here.

[15] On the other hand, Sanford designated evidence showing that

[Horizon's] workers utilize the premises throughout each workday and report any weather conditions or other maintenance concerns. Further, if there is a snow fall of four or more inches, Horizon Transport's maintenance employee, Jason Boley, assesses the premises to determine snow removal needs. If snow removal is needed, Jason Boley typically performs this task.

Appellant's App. Vol. 2, pp. 168-69. That evidence supports genuine issues of material fact regarding whether Horizon had at least constructive knowledge of the conditions and whether Horizon's policy of ignoring snow accumulations of less than four inches was reasonable.

[16] In sum, Horizon has failed to negate the breach element of Sanford's negligence claim. The designated evidence shows that Sanford was aware of the danger of falling when she arrived at the facility but did not reschedule or cancel the job or contact Horizon to alert someone about the dangerous conditions. In addition, Sanford parked the RV near an icy part of the facility. But Horizon does not direct us to designated evidence showing what it knew about the conditions at the facility to enable an assessment of Horizon's and Sanford's “comparative knowledge” of the risk of falling. Douglass, 549 N.E.2d at 370; see also Smith v. Baxter, 796 N.E.2d 242, 246 (Ind. 2003) (affirming denial of motion for judgment on the evidence where plaintiff and defendants had comparable knowledge of danger posed by ladder; “close question” whether defendants should have anticipated harm despite obvious risk). Accordingly, genuine issues of material fact regarding whether Horizon's “failure to take precautions or to warn” of the danger was a breach of its duty to Sanford and whether it was reasonably foreseeable that Sanford could fall despite her knowledge or obviousness of the risk preclude the entry of summary judgment. See Douglass, 549 N.E.2d at 370.

[17] For all these reasons, we reverse the trial court's entry of summary judgment for Horizon and remand for further proceedings.

[18] Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

Mathias, Judge.

May, J., and Bradford, J., concur.