IN RE: the Involuntary Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of B.N. and K.N. (Minor Children) (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Ni.N. (“Mother”) and Na.N. (“Father”) (collectively, “Parents”) appeal the trial court's termination of their parental rights to two of their children (collectively, “Children”) on petition of the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”). Parents present the consolidated and restated issue of: Did DCS fail to present clear and convincing evidence to support the trial court's termination decision? We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Parents have a son, B.N. (born in February 2008), and daughter, K.N. (born in February 2009).¹ In April 2023, when B.N. was fifteen years old and K.N. was fourteen, DCS received a report that Parents engaged in domestic violence in the home while Children were present. During the incident, Father spit on Mother. As a result, he was charged with felony battery by bodily waste. During his arrest, the police found illegal drugs, and he was charged with felony possession of methamphetamine. The trial court ordered Father to have no contact with Mother and Children.

[3] DCS had a documented history of domestic violence allegations between Parents spanning several years, and Mother had twice filed for divorce but dismissed the cases. Based on the history and current events, DCS and Parents first agreed to a program of informal adjustment. Soon after, police located a missing juvenile in the family home. During the investigation, police found methamphetamine, marijuana, and paraphernalia in the house, including in B.N.’s room. Mother completed a drug screen, which was positive for methamphetamine. Mother was charged with possession of methamphetamine, marijuana, and paraphernalia.

[4] While out on bond on May 23, Father violated the no contact order by coming to the family home and staying overnight. According to Mother, Father had a gun and threatened to shoot himself and law enforcement if Mother called for help. For this incident, Father was charged with invasion of privacy. Father submitted to drug screens and tested positive for methamphetamine and THC.

[5] On May 24, DCS removed Children from the home and the next day filed a petition alleging they were Children in Need of Services (“CHINS”) due to “ongoing concerns of domestic violence, substance use by parents[,] parental unavailability because of the no contact order ․ [,] and [Mother's] possible risk for ․ incarceration.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 203–04. Parents left town and did not appear at the June 26 fact-finding hearing. The trial court adjudicated Children CHINS and entered a dispositional decree ordering Parents to, among other things: not use or consume any illegal controlled substances; complete parenting, substance use, domestic violence, and psychological assessments and follow all resulting recommendations; submit to random drug screens; refrain from acts of domestic violence; follow all probation terms; abide by the no contact order and immediately report any violations; and attend all scheduled visitations while complying with visitation rules. DCS placed Children with their older half-brother's mother (Father's ex-wife) and her husband.

[6] Parents initially failed to engage in services while they were living out of town and evading law enforcement. But in September 2023, Mother reported a new domestic violence incident with Father. Father was charged with invasion of privacy and incarcerated, and Mother returned to the family home. Around this time, Mother sneaked a marijuana vape pen to Children by hiding it in K.N.’s belongings. Foster parents discovered the pen after K.N. exhibited bizarre behavior and was hospitalized for using marijuana while taking over-the-counter medication.

[7] Once she was home, Mother began engaging with services, including case management, individual therapy, supervised visitation, and drug screens. Nine drug screens Mother took in late 2023 were positive for THC or methamphetamine. Initially the supervised visits went well, and Mother attended regularly. But then Mother and Children started arguing, requiring the supervisor to redirect Mother's behavior. Mother's visitation attendance declined, leading to visitations being suspended. But she continued to contact Children outside of supervised visitation by sending text messages, making phone calls, and showing up at B.N.’s work. At one point in early 2024, Children's individual therapist facilitated two or three family sessions between Mother and Children. He recommended supervised visitations not resume based on Children reporting to him their interactions with Mother outside therapy were “tense and heated and very discouraging.” Id. at 157.

[8] Father was released from jail for about two months in early 2024. He attended supervised visits, which went well. Father also completed a mental health and substance use assessment, but did not complete the therapist's recommended treatment plan because he failed to show up after the first therapeutic appointment. He attended four group therapy sessions but was terminated from the group in March due to non-attendance. Father tested positive for methamphetamine once in February.

[9] In April 2024, Mother's employer fired her because of poor attendance. Parents were then seen together, and again Father was charged with invasion of privacy and incarcerated. Mother was also arrested around this time for failure to appear at a hearing in the possession case and spent about a month in jail. In the summer, Mother and Children began family therapy with a new therapist in lieu of resuming supervised visitation.

[10] DCS petitioned to terminate Parents’ parental rights on April 17, 2024, and amended the petition on July 19. The trial court held a fact-finding hearing on August 20 and October 2, 2024. Both Children testified. According to K.N., “life at home was terrible for [her].” Id. at 63. Parents verbally fought often and sometimes physically fought. B.N. described constant arguments between Parents that “every so often” got physical. Id. at 83. He testified, “it's scary even thinking about being with my parents” and “I don't wanna live that” again. Id. at 95. K.N. stated she started using marijuana at age twelve and sometimes Parents would give it to her. B.N. testified Parents and Children used marijuana together. Both Children testified they loved Parents but did not want to live with them. They wanted their current placement to adopt them.

[11] Family Case Manager (“FCM”) Kendall Schuck testified it was in Children's best interest to stay in their current placement because it provided stability and safety, and they were doing well. Children's Court Appointed Special Advocate (“CASA”) testified Children made “extreme gains” in their placement, were “in a very stable place where they are thriving,” achieved “excellent grades [and] excellent attendance,” and were “aspiring for their futures.” Id. at 235. She recommended they continue in their current placement through adoption. Though only recently appointed to the case, Children's guardian ad litem (“GAL”) believed adoption was the best option for Children given their age and wishes.

[12] The family therapist who began working with Children and Mother in July 2024 testified things had been going well, but it was still early in the therapeutic process. As of the second hearing date, there were five or six more visits that also went well. Even so, the uncertainty in permanency was preventing the family from making progress, as the sessions often focused on the court proceedings.

[13] At the time of the fact-finding hearing, Father was incarcerated and had been for thirteen of the previous sixteen months. His earliest release date was October 2024. Mother was engaged in case management services and individual therapy. Mother's case manager testified that Mother kept her twice-weekly appointments and had made progress in managing her emotions and establishing boundaries. Mother's therapist stated Mother attended twelve therapy sessions and was making progress toward her goals. Mother was living with a friend in appropriate housing and was employed full time. Except for a few positive drug screens in January, Mother regularly tested negative for illegal drug use throughout 2024.

[14] As for Mother and Father's relationship, DCS referred Father to the Center for Nonviolence, but he did not complete the program. DCS had referred Mother to work with a domestic violence victim advocate through the YMCA. Mother attended two sessions, which FCM Schuck described as “the basic requirement for the no contact order to be dropped.” Id. at 219. Mother did not continue with the services thereafter.

[15] At the fact-finding hearing, Mother was equivocal about her relationship status with Father. Although living with another man and aware her relationship with Father “was very unhealthy for [her], for him, and for [their] children,” Mother also testified that she loved Father and did not “think [it is] okay to quit people, or ․ walk away from them, or turn their back because they make mistakes.” Tr. Vol. 3 at 65. Further, she believed that “if each one of us got what we needed with services” then “it is not out of this world” to imagine they could again be a “happy family.” Id. Mother filed for divorce in September 2024, after the first hearing date. During the second day of testimony, DCS introduced recorded text messages Father and Mother exchanged after the first hearing while Father was in jail. In those messages, Mother said she needed to file for divorce to have “better odds” of succeeding in court and told Father, “I wont [sic] give up [until] we have a home and are all together[,] I mean it.” Ex. Vol. 5 at 204, 220. When Mother's counsel asked K.N. whether she understood her parents were no longer together, K.N. responded, “I don't think they would stay away from each other.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 69.

[16] On December 17, the trial court terminated Parents’ parental rights, finding in pertinent part:

9. At the time of the fact-finding hearing, Father was incarcerated for, among other things, violation of a no-contact order issued because of a domestic battery he committed against Mother while the children were present.

10. Mother has not been able to remedy the need for supervised visitation ․ such that a trial home visit could not be implemented.

11. At the time of removal, there were a number of areas of concern, primarily, a history of domestic violence between Mother and Father; substance use by the parents; and substance use by the children with the substances being provided by the parents. Mother and Father demonstrated they will continue their relationship with each other, despite the belief of their own children that the relationship is harmful to each other and the family. Both parents have failed to submit to drug screens and have tested positive for illegal substances.

12. While the children were in placement, Mother provided a THC vape pen to one of the children by concealing it in their belongings. Since the removal of the children from the home, only the children have been able to demonstrate the ability to consistently abstain from illegal substances.

Appellants’ App. Vol. 2 at 62–63. Mother and Father each appealed the judgment, and this Court consolidated their appeals.

Standard of Review

[17] Parents have a constitutionally protected right to establish a home and raise their children. In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1230 (Ind. 2013). But “this right is not absolute.” In re Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d 41, 45 (Ind. 2019), cert. denied. “When parents are unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities, their parental rights may be terminated.” Id. at 45–46.

[18] To terminate a parent's rights to a child, DCS must allege that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the child, and that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c)(2), (3) (2024). DCS must also prove the existence of one or more of the following circumstances warranting termination:

(3) That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(4) That there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being, safety, physical health, or life of the child.

I.C. § 31-35-2-4(c)(1), (d).² If the trial court finds the allegations of a termination petition have been proven by clear and convincing evidence, the court “shall” terminate the parent-child relationship and “shall enter findings of fact” supporting that conclusion. I.C. § 31-35-2-8(a), (c); see also I.C. § 31-37-14-2 (burden of proof).

[19] We apply a two-tiered standard of review to a termination decision: first, we determine whether the evidence supports the findings and second, whether the findings support the trial court's judgment. In re R.S., 56 N.E.3d 625, 628 (Ind. 2016). We do not reweigh the evidence but consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences most favorable to the judgment. In re V.A., 51 N.E.3d 1140, 1143 (Ind. 2016). And we do not judge witness credibility for ourselves, instead giving due regard to the trial court's unique opportunity to judge the credibility of witnesses firsthand. Id. We will set aside the trial court's judgment only if it is clearly erroneous. Id.

Clear and convincing evidence supports the trial court's termination decision.

A. Factual Findings

[20] First, Parents challenge the following findings as unsupported by the evidence:

14. Mother has filed for divorce from Father and stated that she realized the relationship was unhealthy; however, Mother acknowledged that if Father completes therapy and remains sober, she would be willing to dismiss the divorce proceedings.

26. Mother and Father have demonstrated that they do not intend to follow any recommendations made to them regarding their violent relationship and wish to continue to be together.

28. Mother has continued to violate the supervised visitation order by sending obsessive and derogatory text messages to the children through their cell phones and devices. Mother has also visited one of the children at his place of employment, also in violation of the supervised visitation order.

Appellants’ App. Vol. 2 at 55, 58.³

[21] With respect to Mother and Father's relationship, the following evidence supports the trial court's findings 14 and 26: Parents’ long history of domestic violence; Mother's dismissals of prior dissolution actions; Father's violations of the no contact orders; Mother's equivocal testimony about her relationship with Father; Mother's limited engagement with domestic violence services; Father's failure to complete services at the Center for Nonviolence; Parents’ messages to each other during the pendency of the fact-finding hearing; and K.N.’s testimony that she believed Parents would not “stay away from each other.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 69. Despite this evidence, Parents ask us to give more credit to Mother's testimony that she “intended to permanently sever her marriage with Father.” Appellant's Br. at 20. This is a request to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. V.A., 51 N.E.3d at 1143. Evidence supports findings 14 and 26.

[22] As to finding 28, Parents dispute the trial court's characterization of the messages Mother sent to Children. There is no dispute Mother violated the supervised visitation rules by contacting Children via phone and text message and by showing up at B.N.’s work, which made B.N. feel “a little bit uncomfortable.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 99. Children's therapist testified there “seemed to be a lot of unhealthy communication” between K.N. and Mother, specifically “angry communication” from Mother to K.N. Id. at 161–62. Finding 28 was not clearly erroneous.

B. Conditions Unlikely to Be Remedied and Children's Best Interests

[23] Next, Parents argue the findings do not support the conclusions that there is a reasonable probability the conditions resulting in Children's removal will not be remedied, see I.C. § 31-35-2-4 (d)(3), and there is a reasonable probability the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to Children's well-being, see I.C. § 31-35-2-4 (d)(4). DCS alleged both circumstances but needed to prove only one. See I.C. § 31-35-2-4(c)(1), (d). Accordingly, we focus on the reasonable probability the conditions leading to removal will not be remedied.

[24] To make this determination, trial courts engage in a two-step analysis. In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1231 (Ind. 2013). First, the trial court ascertains what conditions led to Children's placement outside the home, then it determines whether there is a reasonable probability those conditions will not be remedied. Id. When making these decisions, the trial court must judge a parent's fitness to care for his or her child at the time of the termination hearing, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 643 (Ind. 2014). But the trial court must balance any recent improvements against a parent's habitual patterns of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation. Id. “We entrust that delicate balance to the trial court, which has discretion to weigh a parent's prior history more heavily than efforts made only shortly before termination.” Id. The evidence presented by DCS need not rule out all possibilities of change; DCS need only establish there is a reasonable probability the parent's behavior will not change. In re C.C., 153 N.E.3d 340, 348 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied.

[25] The trial court also found termination was in Children's best interests. See I.C. § 31-35-2-4(c)(3). When deciding whether termination is in a child's best interests, trial courts “must look at the totality of the evidence and, in doing so, subordinate the parents’ interests to those of the children.” Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 49. Children's need for permanency is a central concern. Id. “Indeed, ‘children cannot wait indefinitely for their parents to work toward preservation or reunification.’ ” Id. (quoting E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 648). And trial courts “need not wait until the child is irreversibly harmed such that the child's physical, mental and social development is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship.” E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 648 (quoting K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1235).

[26] Parents present the same argument for both statutory subsections (conditions unlikely to be remedied and best interests). They argue Mother made significant improvements and just needed more time “to demonstrate lasting and permanent change.” Appellants’ Br. at 21. Parents point to Mother's engagement in services and progress she made at the time of the termination hearing. Indeed, Mother was working full time, had appropriate housing, and was meeting therapeutic goals. She consistently tested negative for illegal drug use after January 2024, which we commend. But DCS removed Children in part because of their exposure to domestic violence between Parents. In that regard, Parents made little to no progress. As discussed above, Mother and Father failed to complete services designed to address domestic violence. And as the trial court found, Parents repeatedly demonstrated throughout the life of the case they would continue their relationship with each other. Although Mother filed a dissolution action between fact-finding hearings, the trial court had discretion to weigh Parents’ prior history—including the fact Mother had twice before filed for divorce but not followed through—more heavily than efforts Mother made only shortly before termination. See E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 643. The evidence supports a finding that there was a reasonable probability the domestic violence issues that led to Children's removal would not be remedied, even if DCS gave Parents more time. And through the family therapist, DCS presented evidence that the lack of permanency was negatively impacting Children.

[27] As to best interests, FCM Schuck, Children's CASA, and the GAL all testified it was in Children's best interests to terminate the parent-child relationship. “Recommendations of the case manager and court-appointed advocate, in addition to evidence that the conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied, are sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child's best interests.” In re A.S., 17 N.E.3d 994, 1005 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied. Moreover, Children themselves believed their best interests would be served by adoption by their current placement. Both testified to the chaotic, unstable, and harmful environment created in the family home. K.N. believed her Parents would never stay away from each other, and neither child wanted to return to their Parents’ care. The evidence supports the trial court's determination it was in Children's best interests to terminate Parents’ parental rights.

C. Satisfactory Plan

[28] Finally, Parents contend DCS failed to prove there is a satisfactory plan for Children's care and treatment. See I.C. § 31-35-2-4(c)(2). Parents “concede that case law on this particular point is not particularly in their favor.” Appellants’ Br. at 23. Still, they argue “maintaining the status quo,” that is, “Children remaining in current placement care while Mother continues services, and Father starts services upon his release from incarceration, is a very satisfactory plan[.]” Id. at 24.

[29] Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4(c)(2) does not require DCS to allege and prove the plan for a child's care and treatment is the best or most satisfactory plan; instead, subsection (c)(2) requires only that DCS present and prove a particular plan is “satisfactory.” I.C. § 31-35-2-4(c)(2); see also K.B.-P., No. 24A-JT-1917, at *5 (Ind. Ct. App. Jan. 24, 2025) (mem.). Indiana courts have traditionally held that for a plan to be satisfactory, it need not be detailed, so long as it offers a general sense of the direction in which the child will be going after the parent-child relationship is terminated. A.S., 17 N.E.3d at 1007 (quotation omitted). Here, the plan was for adoption with Children's current placement, where Children had been for fifteen months leading up to the fact-finding hearing. Foster father testified he and his wife want to adopt Children. This was a satisfactory plan for Children's care and treatment. See id. (noting a “DCS plan is satisfactory if the plan is to attempt to find suitable parents to adopt the children”).

Conclusion

[30] Clear and convincing evidence supports the trial court's termination decision.

[31] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Parents also have an older son who turned eighteen during DCS’ involvement and was not subject to termination proceedings. Father has another adult son, Children's half-brother, from a prior marriage.

2.   There are twelve total circumstances that may be alleged in a petition to terminate parental rights. See I.C. § 31-35-2-4(d)(1)–(12). We have quoted only the circumstances DCS alleged in its amended petition. See Appellants’ App. Vol. 2 at 142.

3.   Parents also state findings 38 and 39—in which the trial court found (a) DCS’ permanency plan of adoption was satisfactory, and (b) DCS, CASA, and the GAL believed termination was in Children's best interests—have no evidentiary support. But Parents but do not present any argument to support their claims. An appellant's contentions must be “supported by cogent reasoning” and “citations to the authorities, statutes, and the Appendix or parts of the Record on Appeal relied on.” Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a). Accordingly, Parents’ contentions that findings 38 and 39 lack evidentiary support are waived. City of Indianapolis v. Buschman, 988 N.E.2d 791, 795 (Ind. 2013).

Kenworthy, Judge.

Bradford, J., and Pyle, J., concur.