Christopher Scott Steinert, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] A jury found Christopher Steinert guilty of Level 4 felony child molesting for acts involving his daughter, C.S. At trial, C.S. had testified that, on a night that she had spent at Steinert's house, he had rubbed her genitals and touched her breasts while they were in Steinert's bed to sleep. Steinert challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his conviction and the admissibility of certain evidence. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In May of 2023, ten-year-old C.S. lived with her grandparents in Fulton County, across the street from her father, Steinert. C.S. spent the night at Steinert's house on the night of May 5th, 2023, while his wife was at work. That night, Steinert instructed C.S. to remove her “regular clothes” before getting into his bed. Tr. Vol. II p. 226. While C.S. wore a “bra and underwear” and Steinert wore only underwear, C.S. and Steinert engaged in “cuddle time” on Steinert's bed. Tr. Vol. II pp. 225–26. During cuddle time, Steinert touched C.S.’s breasts and vagina with his hands. Steinert had a “rough spot” on his hand that caused C.S. to experience pain when he rubbed her vagina. Tr. Vol. II p. 229. C.S. asked Steinert to stop, but he did not. As he was touching C.S., Steinert told her, “Get used to it.” Tr. Vol. II p. 229. Steinert also asked C.S. “to touch him[,]” but she refused. Tr. Vol. II p. 229.

[3] On May 12, 2023, C.S. told someone at school about what had happened to her. A school employee notified the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”), after which C.S. was interviewed by a DCS case manager and an Indiana State Police (“ISP”) detective. C.S. identified Steinert as the perpetrator and “made it very clear that she loved her father. She was also – made it clear that she felt that he'd be upset by her telling [the detective] these things.” Tr. Vol. II p. 199.

[4] ISP detectives interviewed Steinert on the same day as well. Steinert admitted that C.S. had spent the night at his house recently. According to Steinert, C.S. had asked if she could strip, but he had said no, stripped down to his boxers, and gone to sleep. When the detective used the term “cuddle time” during the interview, Steinert became visibly stressed, “was breathing heavier[,]” and he “seemed to be more agitated.” Tr. Vol. II p. 208. The interview with Steinert lasted approximately one hour. At some point during the interview, ISP Detective Josh Maller made a statement to Steinert that “C.S. knows this has happened other times or this has happened more than once[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 205. In response to the statement, Steinert indicated that the inappropriate touching had only occurred on the one time in question. Also, during the interview, Steinert suggested that C.S. had made the allegation because she was seeking attention.

[5] On May 16, 2023, the State charged Steinert with Level 4 felony child molesting. Steinert was held in the Fulton County Jail pending trial. Between November of 2023 and January of 2024, Perry Hurley, who was temporarily being held in the jail on federal charges, was in the same cell block as Steinert. Steinert told Hurley about his “situation,” explaining that “he had special cuddle time with his daughter at his house where he fondled and touched her, and that's what he did.” Tr. Vol. II p. 245. Steinert asked Hurley for his opinion on an alibi, which was “that there was a roommate, or a friend of either his or his wife or girlfriend's and that he was going to blame him for what he was charged with.” Tr. Vol. II p. 245. Steinert told Hurley that he “rubbed her on her pee-pee, and fondled her and played with the rest of it” and that that was “their daddy/daughter special time, was their cuddle time[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 250.

[6] In April of 2024, Steinert wrote a letter to C.S.’s grandparents in which he told them that he was “never alone with” C.S. Ex. Vol. I p. 20. He asked them to get C.S. to recant her allegations and warned that she could “do time” for “perjury.” Ex. Vol. I p. 21. Steinert also indicated that his former roommate “Josh” was the person who had been behaving inappropriately with C.S., claiming that he had caught them in compromising situations, he had kicked Josh out of the house, and C.S. was upset about that because she “thinks she is in love with” Josh. Ex. Vol. I p. 21.

[7] A jury trial commenced on October 29, 2024. Steinert admitted at trial that C.S. had slept in his bed on the night in question but testified that they had not removed their clothes. Steinert denied molesting his daughter and testified that C.S. had asked if she could “strip” and that he had “told her no, that was inappropriate.” Tr. Vol. III p. 65. Steinert also testified that prior to C.S. bringing the instant allegations, he had disciplined C.S. and she had expressed a desire to return to her mother in Virginia. After Hurley testified about his conversations with Steinert, Steinert claimed that he had never talked about his case to Hurley, but that he had left his legal paperwork on a lunch table in the jail. Gregory Chard and Joshua Caudill, two other Fulton County Jail inmates, also testified that they had seen Steinert leave his paperwork on a table and had seen Hurley looking at it. Chard also claimed that Hurley would “do anything for a time cut[.]” Tr. Vol. III p. 25. Hurley testified that he had not been given any “time cuts” from the State or Federal government in exchange for his testimony. Tr. Vol. II p. 242.

[8] The jury found Steinert guilty as charged. On November 20, 2024, the trial court sentenced Steinert to twelve years of incarceration, with two years suspended to probation.

Discussion and Decision

I. Sufficiency of Evidence

[9] Steinert challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for child molesting.¹

When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, appellate courts must consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict. It is the fact-finder's role, not that of appellate courts, to assess witness credibility and weigh the evidence to determine whether it is sufficient to support a conviction. To preserve this structure, when appellate courts are confronted with conflicting evidence, they must consider it most favorably to the trial court's ruling. Appellate courts affirm the conviction unless no reasonable factfinder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. It is therefore not necessary that the evidence overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. The evidence is sufficient if an inference may reasonably be drawn from it to support the verdict.

Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146–47 (Ind. 2007) (brackets, citations, and quotations omitted). Stated differently, in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, “we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences most favorable to the convictions, neither reweighing evidence nor reassessing witness credibility” and “affirm the judgment unless no reasonable factfinder could find the defendant guilty.” Griffith v. State, 59 N.E.3d 947, 958 (Ind. 2016). Furthermore, it is well-established that “a conviction may be based on the sole uncorroborated testimony of the victim, even if that victim is a minor.” Smith v. State, 432 N.E.2d 1363, 1372 (Ind. 1982).

[10] In order to prove that Steinert committed Level 4 felony child molesting, the State was required to prove that Steinert, with a child under fourteen years old, “perform[ed] or submit[ted] to any fondling or touching, of either the child or the older person, with intent to arouse or to satisfy the sexual desires of either the child or the older person.” Ind. Code § 35-42-4-3(b). Steinert specifically contends that the evidence “does not show a contemporaneous touching accompanied with the specific intent to arouse or satisfy sexual desires.” Appellant's Br. p. 10.

[11] Mere touching alone is not sufficient to constitute the crime of child molesting. The State must also prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the act of touching was accompanied by the specific intent to arouse or satisfy sexual desires. The intent element of child molesting may be established by circumstantial evidence and may be inferred from the actor's conduct and the natural and usual sequence to which such conduct usually points.

Nuerge v. State, 677 N.E.2d 1043, 1048 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (citations and quotations omitted), trans. denied. The intent to arouse or satisfy sexual desires may be inferred from evidence that the defendant intentionally touched a child's genitals. Holden v. State, 149 N.E.3d 612, 616 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied; see also Pedrick v. State, 593 N.E.2d 1213, 1220–21 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (finding sufficient evidence of sexual intent where the defendant, in part, touched and rubbed victims on their breasts).

[12] C.S. testified at trial that on the night that she had slept at Steinert's house, Steinert had touched her breasts and rubbed her vagina with his hands, had told her to “[g]et used to it[,]” and had asked her “to touch him.” Tr. Vol. II p. 229. This is sufficient to support a reasonable inference of specific intent to arouse or satisfy sexual desires. See Holden, 149 N.E.3d at 616.

[13] Moreover, Steinert's reliance on D.P. v. State, 80 N.E.3d 913 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), is misplaced, as this case is readily distinguished. In D.P., the individual accused of child molesting was ten-year-old D.P., who had allegedly touched four-year-old B.M. Id. at 916. There, we concluded that the evidence was insufficient to support the true finding for Level 4 felony child molesting where B.M. “did not feel the touching” and there was “no evidence of” exactly where, how, or how long B.M. had been touched. Id. There had also been no evidence of any kissing or D.P. asking B.M. to touch him. Id. Here, there was clear evidence regarding exactly where and how Steinert had touched C.S., as she testified unambiguously that Steinert had touched her breasts and rubbed her vagina with his hands.

[14] We conclude that the State produced sufficient evidence to sustain Steinert's conviction for Level 4 felony child molesting. Steinert's arguments to the contrary amount to nothing more than an invitation to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See Griffith, 59 N.E.3d at 958.

II. Admission of Evidence

[15] Steinert also contends that the admission of a statement by Detective Maller during Steinert's police interview contained hearsay, or hearsay within hearsay, the admission of which constituted reversible error. Appellant's Br. p. 15.

Generally, a trial court's ruling on the admission of evidence is accorded a great deal of deference on appeal. Because the trial court is best able to weigh the evidence and assess witness credibility, we review its rulings on admissibility for abuse of discretion and only reverse if a ruling is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances and the error affects a party's substantial rights.

Hall v. State, 36 N.E.3d 459, 466 (Ind. 2015) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Hearsay is “a statement that: (1) is not made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing; and (2) is offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Ind. Evidence Rule 801(c). Generally, hearsay statements are not admissible during trial. Evid. R. 802.

[16] At trial, the prosecutor asked Detective Maller whether, during Steinert's interview with him, Steinert had made “any admissions to having sexual conduct with C.S.” Tr. Vol. II p. 204. Detective Maller testified that he had, “[i]n a sense, yes.” Tr. Vol. II p. 204. Explaining, Detective Maller testified to the following:

So during the course of our interviews, we're always trying to obtain as much information as possible. And that includes information about the reason that we're there and also about any other reasons that we may not be completely familiar with or may not know about yet. So basically, what it boils down to is if somebody's done something once before, there's a possibility that it may have happened other times and we don't know all the details to those yet. So we make certain types of statements to the individual to try to see if anything like that comes out during the interview. During the -- the interview I made the statement that C.S. knows this has happened other times or this has happened more than once[.]

Tr. Vol. II p. 205. At this point, Steinert objected “on the basis of hearsay[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 205. The prosecutor responded “it's not hearsay. It's not being offered for the truth of the matter asserted, rather it's being offered to explain the question.” Tr. Vol. II p. 205. The trial court overruled the objection. Detective Maller testified that in response to his statement during the interview, Steinert had essentially said “it was the only time that it happened[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 205.

[17] The State asserts that Detective Maller's statement was not offered in evidence to prove that Steinert had molested C.S. more than once, but rather, it was offered to “provide the necessary context to understand the significance of [Steinert]’s response, which effectively constituted an admission that he had molested C.S. on this one occasion.” Appellee's Br. p. 18. However, given the other substantial independent evidence of Steinert's guilt, we need not address the admissibility of Detective Maller's statement because any error in the admission of Detective Maller's statement could, at most, only be considered harmless.

[18] “An error in admitting evidence does not require reversal unless it affects the substantial rights of a party.” Pelissier v. State, 122 N.E.3d 983, 988 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied. “The improper admission of evidence is harmless error when the conviction is supported by such substantial independent evidence of guilt as to satisfy the reviewing court that there is no substantial likelihood that the questioned evidence contributed to the conviction.” Id. (internal citation and quotation omitted). “[W]e consider the likely impact of the improperly admitted or excluded evidence on a reasonable, average jury in light of all the evidence in the case.” Hayko v. State, 211 N.E.3d 483, 492 (Ind. 2023). “Ultimately, the error's probable impact is sufficiently minor when—considering the entire record—our confidence in the outcome is not undermined.” Id.

[19] Admission of the challenged testimony was, at most, harmless given the substantial unrelated evidence of Steinert's guilt. C.S. gave clear and unambiguous testimony that during “cuddle time,” while C.S. and Steinert were both lying in bed dressed only in their underwear, Steinert had touched C.S.’s breasts and vagina with his hands. C.S. testified that Steinert had rubbed her vagina and that she had asked him to stop, but he had not. C.S. further testified that as Steinert was touching C.S., he had told her to “[g]et used to it” and had asked her “to touch him.” Tr. Vol. II p. 229. Furthermore, during Steinert's interview with police, Steinert became visibly stressed, “was breathing heavier[,]” and he “seemed to be more agitated” when the detective used the term “cuddle time[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 208.

[20] In addition, Hurley testified that Steinert had told him that “he had special cuddle time with his daughter at his house where he fondled and touched her, and that's what he did.” Tr. Vol. II p. 245. Hurley also testified that Steinert had asked for his opinion on an alibi “that there was a roommate, or a friend of either his or his wife or girlfriend's and that he was going to blame him for what he was charged with.” Tr. Vol. II p. 245. Steinert's actions after Hurley had left the Fulton County Jail further corroborated Hurley's testimony. Months after Hurley had left the jail, Steinert had sent a letter to C.S.’s grandparents in which he claimed that his former roommate “Josh” was the person who had been behaving inappropriately with C.S., claiming that he had caught them in compromising situations, that he had kicked Josh out of the house, and that C.S. was upset about that because she “thinks she is in love with” Josh. Ex. Vol. I p. 21. Notably, Steinert had not mentioned his theory about “Josh” to police during his police interview.

[21] Because Steinert's conviction is supported by substantial independent evidence of guilt, any error in the admission of Detective Maller's statement was harmless.² We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

FOOTNOTES

1.   To the extent that Steinert contends that Hurley's testimony was “incredibly dubious,” we reject this argument. Multiple witnesses testified at trial regarding Steinert's acts involving C.S. As such, the incredible-dubiosity rule does not apply. See Berry v. State, 703 N.E.2d 154, 160 (Ind. 1998) (providing that the incredible-dubiosity rule is applicable only to cases where a sole witness provides inherently contradictory testimony, and not to cases where there are conflicts between the testimony of numerous witnesses).

2.   Additionally, Detective Maller's testimony was cumulative of other evidence that was admitted and to which Steinert did not object. See Pelissier, 122 N.E.3d at 988 (providing that “[t]he erroneous admission of evidence may also be harmless if that evidence is cumulative of other evidence admitted.”) During cross-examination, Steinert acknowledged that when Detective Maller made the statement, Steinert had answered, “It is, as far as I know it is.” Tr. Vol. III p. 83. The State also admitted into evidence Exhibit 17, which contained Steinert's police interview and Detective Maller's statement. Steinert had “no objection” to the admission of the exhibit, which was played in open court. Tr. Vol. III p. 93.

Bradford, Judge.

Judges May and Mathias concur. May, J., and Mathias, J., concur.