MITCHELL v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Following a jury trial, Sterling Mitchell was convicted of domestic battery, a Level 6 felony, and invasion of privacy, a Class A misdemeanor. On appeal, Mitchell argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and that his sentence is inappropriate under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B). We conclude that the evidence is sufficient to sustain Mitchell's convictions and that the sentence imposed is not inappropriate. Accordingly, we affirm.

Issues

[2] Mitchell presents two issues, which we restate as:

 I. Whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain Mitchell's convictions.

II. Whether Mitchell's sentence is inappropriate under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) in light of the nature of the offense and his character.

Facts

[3] In June 2023, a no contact order was issued as a condition of Mitchell's pre-trial release in another cause, and the no contact order prohibited Mitchell from having contact with his girlfriend, Melissa Igay. On October 16, 2023, Igay returned to her residence from work. Igay's and Mitchell's thirteen-year-old daughter, N.I., was present in the residence at the time. While Igay was in the shower, Mitchell came to the residence and began arguing with Igay. Mitchell, who appeared intoxicated and angry, slapped Igay on the face and then choked her for five to ten seconds.

[4] After he released Igay, Mitchell went downstairs, and Igay followed. Mitchell then pushed Igay onto the couch and struck her on the face again. N.I. observed Mitchell's “hands around [Igay's] neck,” and N.I. attempted to pull Mitchell's hands off of Igay. Tr. Vol. II p. 203. N.I. then got between her parents and grabbed Mitchell's arms, and N.I. stated that Mitchell then pushed N.I. down. N.I. was crying and yelling, and in response, according to Igay, Mitchell “smacked” N.I. on the face. Id. at 223.

[5] Following the altercation, Mitchell paced around the residence, yelling, while Igay remained on the couch listening to him rant for hours. Once Mitchell fell asleep, Igay and N.I. exited the residence and called 911. During the call, Igay stated that the incident occurred “an hour and [a] half ago.” Suppl. Ex. Vol. I, Exhibit 4 at 1:30.

[6] Officers were dispatched to the residence around 1:17 a.m. on October 17 and observed a red mark on Igay's neck. After speaking with both Igay and N.I., the officers discovered the no contact order that prohibited Mitchell from having contact with Igay. The officers then placed Mitchell under arrest.

[7] The State charged Mitchell with: Count I, domestic battery, a Level 6 felony, for domestic battery against Igay in the presence of a child less than sixteen years of age; Count II, strangulation, a Level 6 felony; Count III, domestic battery, a Level 6 felony, for domestic battery against Igay while a no contact order protecting Igay was in effect; Count IV, domestic battery, a Level 6 felony, for domestic battery against N.I., who was less than fourteen years of age; and Count V, invasion of privacy, a Class A misdemeanor. The charging informations alleged that the offenses occurred “on or about October 17, 2023.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 23-32. Following a jury trial, Mitchell was found guilty of Count I and Count III, domestic battery, Level 6 felonies, and Count V, invasion of privacy, a Class A misdemeanor.¹

[8] At sentencing, the trial court vacated Count III on double jeopardy grounds. The trial court found Mitchell's prior criminal history and the fact that “efforts at rehabilitation have failed” to be aggravating circumstances. Tr. Vol. III p. 74. Mitchell's record included seven prior misdemeanor convictions and three felony convictions. The trial court also noted that Mitchell's parole was revoked once and that his suspended sentences had been revoked three times. While the trial court noted that Mitchell's mental and physical health were mitigating circumstances, it assigned them “little to no weight.” Id. Concluding that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances, the trial court imposed a sentence of two years and 183 days in the Department of Correction for the domestic battery conviction and a concurrent sentence of one year for the invasion of privacy conviction. Mitchell now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

[9] Mitchell first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his convictions. His sole argument is that there was insufficient evidence to prove he battered Igay in N.I.’s presence on October 17, 2023. Instead, he asserts that the alleged incident occurred on October 16.

[10] Sufficiency of the evidence claims warrant a deferential standard of review in which we “neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility, instead reserving those matters to the province of the jury.” Hancz-Barron v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1237, 1244 (Ind. 2024). A conviction is supported by sufficient evidence if “there is substantial evidence of probative value supporting each element of the offense such that a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. In conducting this review, we consider only the evidence that supports the jury's determination, not evidence that might undermine it. Id. We affirm the conviction “ ‘unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. It is therefore not necessary that the evidence overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. The evidence is sufficient if an inference may reasonably be drawn from it to support the verdict.’ ” Sutton v. State, 167 N.E.3d 800, 801 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (quoting Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146-47 (Ind. 2007)).

[11] Mitchell's domestic battery conviction is governed by Indiana Code Section 35-42-2-1.3, which provides: “[A] person who knowingly or intentionally: (1) touches a family or household member in a rude, insolent, or angry manner ․ commits domestic battery, a Class A misdemeanor.” The offense is a Level 6 felony if:

The person who committed the offense is at least eighteen (18) years of age and committed the offense against a family or household member in the physical presence of a child less than sixteen (16) years of age, knowing that the child was present and might be able to see or hear the offense.

Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1.3(b)(2).

[12] To convict Mitchell of invasion of privacy, a Class A misdemeanor, the State was required to prove that Mitchell “knowingly or intentionally violate[d] ․ a no-contact order issued as a condition of pretrial release, including release on bail or personal recognizance, or pretrial diversion, and including a no contact order issued under IC 35-33-8-3.6.” Ind. Code § 35-46-1-15.1(5).

[13] Here, Mitchell does not challenge any specific element of the offenses or argue that the State failed to prove the underlying conduct; he only argues that the underlying conduct did not occur on the date alleged in the charging information. N.I. testified she was not sure if the incident happened on the evening of October 16, 2023, or the morning of October 17, 2023. During the 911 call, Igay stated that the incident occurred “an hour and [a] half ago”, and officers were dispatched to the residence around 1:17 a.m. on October 17. Suppl. Ex. Vol. I, Exhibit 4 at 1:30. The charging informations alleged that Mitchell committed the acts “on or about October 17.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 23-32. The question, however, is not whether the offenses occurred on October 17, but whether sufficient evidence exists to support the convictions within the legally relevant time frame.

[14] Indiana law is clear that “[t]he indictment or information shall be in writing and allege the commission of an offense by ․ stating the date of the offense with sufficient particularity to show that the offense was committed within the period of limitations applicable to that offense.” Ind. Code § 35-34-1-2(a)(5). Our Supreme Court has held that, “[w]here ․ time is not an element of the offense, the State is not required to prove the offense occurred on the precise date alleged, and its presentation of evidence is not limited to events on that date.” Blount v. State, 22 N.E.3d 559, 569 (Ind. 2014) (citing Neff v. State, 915 N.E.2d 1026, 1032 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), adhered to on reh'g, 922 N.E.2d 44 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010)). In Blount, the State alleged that the offense was committed “on or about” a certain date. Our Supreme Court held that time was not of the essence and that the State was not required to prove the offense occurred on that date. Id. at 569-70.

[15] Mitchell makes no argument that time is of the essence here.² And although much of the evidence referenced October 16, the charging informations provided sufficient notice by alleging that the conduct occurred “on or about October 17, 2023.” Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 23. The State proved that the crimes occurred on October 16, and time was not an element of the offense. Thus, the evidence is sufficient to sustain Mitchell's convictions.

II. Appellate Rule 7(B) Analysis

[16] Next, Mitchell challenges his sentence as inappropriate under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B). The Indiana Constitution authorizes independent appellate review and revision of sentences imposed by a trial court. Lane v. State, 232 N.E.3d 119, 122 (Ind. 2024) (citing Ind. Const. art. 7, §§ 4, 6). This authority, as implemented through Appellate Rule 7(B), enables this Court to “revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court's decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Deference to the trial court's sentence should prevail unless “overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense and the defendant's character.” Oberhansley v. State, 208 N.E.3d 1261, 1267 (Ind. 2023) (internal quotations omitted). A defendant, however, need not show that both the nature of the offense and his or her character warrant revision; rather, “a strong showing on one prong” may “outweigh a weak showing” on the other prong. Lane, 232 N.E.3d at 127.

[17] Additionally, in determining whether a sentence is inappropriate, we are not limited to the aggravating and mitigating circumstances found by the trial court. Oberhansley, 208 N.E.3d at 1271. “Our role is primarily to leaven the outliers and identify guiding principles for sentencers, rather than to achieve the perceived correct result in each case.” Lane, 232 N.E.3d at 122 (internal quotations omitted). “Ultimately, we rely on our collective judgment as to the balance of all the relevant considerations involved, which include the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given case.” Id. (internal quotations omitted).

[18] When determining whether a sentence is inappropriate, the advisory sentence is the starting point the legislature has selected as an appropriate sentence for the crime committed. Fuller v. State, 9 N.E.3d 653, 657 (Ind. 2014). In the case at hand, Mitchell was convicted of domestic battery, a Level 6 felony, and invasion of privacy, a Class A misdemeanor. Under Indiana Code Section 35-50-2-7(b), “[a] person who commits a Level 6 felony ․ shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of between six (6) months and two and one-half (2 1/2) years, with the advisory sentence being one (1) year.” “[A] person who commits a Class A misdemeanor shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of not more than one (1) year.” Ind. Code § 35-50-3-2. There is no advisory sentence for misdemeanors. The trial court sentenced Mitchell to two years and 183 days for the domestic battery conviction and a concurrent one-year sentence for the invasion of privacy conviction.

A. Nature of the Offense

[19] Our analysis of the “nature of the offense” requires us to look at the extent, brutality, and heinousness of the offense. See Wilson v. State, 157 N.E.3d 1163, 1182 (Ind. 2020). Mitchell argues that his sentence is inappropriate because his actions were “not the worst of the worst.” Appellant's Br. p. 18. Mitchell choked and repeatedly slapped Igay in the presence of N.I. The incident occurred over several hours. Moreover, Mitchell was in violation of a no contact order that prohibited him from being near Igay. The purpose of the order was to prevent any type of contact, and Mitchell's disregard for the order demonstrates his disregard for the court's authority and his continued threat to Igay. Mitchell has failed to show that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of his offenses.

B. Character of the Offender

[20] Our analysis of the character of the offender involves a broad consideration of a defendant's qualities, including the defendant's age, criminal history, background, past rehabilitative efforts, and remorse. See Harris v. State, 165 N.E.3d 91, 100 (Ind. 2021); McCain v. State, 148 N.E.3d 977, 985 (Ind. 2020). The significance of a criminal history in assessing a defendant's character and an appropriate sentence vary based on the “gravity, nature and number of prior offenses as they relate to the current offense.” McElfresh v. State, 51 N.E.3d 103, 112 (Ind. 2016). “Even a minor criminal history is a poor reflection of a defendant's character.” Prince v. State, 148 N.E.3d 1171, 1174 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020).

[21] The trial court found several aggravating circumstances, including Mitchell's significant criminal history, his unsuccessful history of probation, and the fact that he was out on bond for other pending charges at the time of the offenses. Mitchell's criminal history dates back to 1997 and includes multiple convictions for drug- and alcohol-related crimes. Specifically, he has seven prior misdemeanors and three prior felony convictions, reflecting a pattern of disregard for the law. Mitchell's suspended sentences have been revoked three times. He violated his parole once, and his probation has been modified once. Mitchell has been given multiple opportunities for rehabilitation, but he has continued to engage in criminal activity.

[22] Mitchell's counsel argued that Mitchell has physical and mental health conditions, including diabetes, high cholesterol, high blood pressure, and a diagnosed anxiety disorder. Mitchell, however, presented no evidence regarding these issues and failed to explain how these conditions warrant a lesser sentence. Mitchell has failed to present any evidence of “substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character” to warrant a more lenient sentence under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B)’s character prong. See Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015).

[23] We cannot find any basis to conclude that the trial court's imposition of sentence was inappropriate considering the nature of the offenses and Mitchell's character. Accordingly, we affirm the sentence.

Conclusion

[24] Sufficient evidence sustains Mitchell's convictions, and his sentence is not inappropriate. Accordingly, we affirm.

[25] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The jury found Mitchell not guilty of battering N.I. in Count IV and not guilty of strangulation in Count II.

2.   Mitchell asserted no alibi defense and, to the extent N.I.’s age was an element of the offense, Mitchell makes no argument that N.I. was close to her sixteenth birthday.

Tavitas, Judge.

Altice, C.J., and Brown, J., concur.